On November 1, 1943, the German forces hanging on to the perimeter below the Dnepr Loop at Bukrin were treated to a heavy barrage, followed by aircraft strafing and rocketing their front lines. "Here they come, again," thought the soldiers.

General Nehring, commanding the XXIV Panzer Corps was cautiously optimistic. True, some of his six divisions were a bit understrength, but the addition of the SS "Das Reich" Division, with its hefty rocket and artillery support, made him confident that this Soviet attack, like all the others since that day in late September when the skies had rained paratroopers across the route of his retreating panzers, would come to grief.

The terrain in the Bukrin bridgehead was so cut with ravines, and so difficult to traverse that his well-sited guns should have no trouble turning back this attack, too. The Soviet troops facing him were worn down from their efforts in September and October, and it appeared that the Luftwaffe had been fairly successful in restricting the amount of artillery ammunition reaching the bridgehead. Of course, the last weeks' dirty weather had seriously limited any flying, but still the artillery fire falling on his forward positions didn't seem quite as severe as previously.

General Nehring was partly correct; the attacks launched the first three days of November out of the Bukrin bridgehead did fail to crack the lines of XXIV Panzer Corps. Not until the 3rd of November did the Germans realize that they had been suckered. The initial Soviet fixation with Bukrin, which had cost them so many soldiers and tankers, had been turned to the Soviets' advantage, as the real breakout attempt burst like a storm over the heads of General Hell's over-matched VII Corps north of Kiev.

His best division, the 75th Infantry Division, was holding Kiev, while the 68th and 88th Infantry and 20th Panzer Grenadier held the line north of Kiev, facing the Soviet 38th Army in the Lyutezh bridgehead. Between them these latter three divisions deployed 4500 infantrymen, 77 artillery pieces, 35 antitank guns, 6 Marder tank destroyers, and 6 Sturmgeschutz assault guns.

Behind the corps was its ace in the hole, the proud 7th Panzer Division. This division, once called the "Ghost Division," that Rommel had pushed into France with such elan, was now almost literally a ghost, fielding only 25 armored vehicles, 850 motorized infantrymen, 16 antitank guns, and 18 artillery pieces. Nonetheless, these were feisty ghosts, and the division commander, von Manteuffel, rated the unit as "qualified attack capable."

They believed that they were facing two or three Soviet rifle corps, supported by a tank corps. Imagine their surprise when a barrage from 2000 guns and 500 rocket launchers (including two Soviet artillery divisions and a Guards rocket division) smashed into their front lines followed by an assault from four rifle corps and a tank corps.

For a day and a half the Germans grudgingly gave ground, suffering serious casualties in the process. At that point 1st Ukrainian Front's commander, Marshal Vatutin, ordered the 3rd Guards Tank Army of Colonel General Rybalko into action. Rybalko's orders were essentially "pedal to the metal, boys!"

With headlights on and sirens blaring, Rybalko's VI and VII Guards Tank Corps hit the thinning lines of VII Corps and crashed through. Kiev was cut off and stormed, and Rybalko's T-34s set off in an energetic pursuit to the southwest.

What had happened?

How is it the Germans found themselves in the midst of such a crisis?

After the battles of the Kursk bulge, the German offensive strength had been spent, their finest divisions shattered and hurled back to their starting positions. The initiative for the rest of the war would rest with the Soviet Union and its allies. In surprisingly short time, the Soviets had assumed the offensive, and although stung again and again by German counterattacks and ambushes, they had pushed the Gen-nans steadily back to the mighty Dnepr River.

Here the Germans had assumed that they would be able to rest and rebuild in a strong position, for the wide river had a generally high bank on the western shore and some parts of it had been fortified. However, the Soviets rushed the river and crossed it on the run. While the bridging equipment slowly came up, submachine gunners had floated across on logs and in rowboats, rafts had brought over machine guns and antitank guns, and underwater bridges had been built with whatever the engineers could find. Along its length, the Dnepr had seen the Soviets win bridgehead after bridgehead.

However, the most important crossing, at Bukrin, had not served its planned purpose. The Soviet staff, concentrating on the Bukrin bend, had not been able to break out here. Their troops had, in fact, crossed the river ahead of General Nehring's panzers, but insufficient preparation time combined with bad weather delayed and disrupted the supporting paratroop drop. The paratroops were thus scattered all over the surrounding countryside, and their main forces were never able to assemble as Nehring's troops rolled over their drop zones. The Soviet offensive from the bridgehead was then strangled by a massive German concentration on excellent defensive ground.

The Soviet commanders in this sector, Vatutin, Moskalenko, Rybalko, and Zhukov were unable to convince Stalin that it was no go from Bukrin, and fruitless attacks followed each other throughout most of October. Finally, toward the end of October, Stalin issued an order chastising the commanders on the spot for uselessly wasting troops trying to break out of Bukrin and directing them to shift their effort to the Lyutezh bridgehead north of Kiev.

Here, in late September, the 38th and 60th Armies had gained small bridgeheads which they had expanded. Unfortunately, the brilliant General Chernyakovsky had outreached himself, and, lured by the glory of Kiev, had attacked south, directly toward the city, rather than west to enlarge the bridgehead and to envelop the city. Given a narrow front, the Germans had managed to contain the bridgehead. At least, that is, until the November onslaught.

The Battle for Kiev November 1 - December 24, 1943

Prelude to the Onslaught
Breakthrough and Counterstroke
The Second Round
The Meleni Pocket? and Conclusions