I've been following Louis Rotundo's articles and the debate they've generated in EXchange, and I can't resist chiming in.

Inevitable Soviet Victory

Louis thinks Soviet victory is inevitable, and Charles Sharp agrees that he can't imagine any way the German military could have conquered the Soviet Union, unless Germany had embarked upon basic economic and political changes that the Nazis didn't want to do. Louis and Charles are prime Soviet researchers for Europa, and they do an excellent job.

But, the inevitability of Soviet victory is an opinion, albeit an informed one, which I don't completely share. I agree that the Germans had a formidable task in front of them, but it wasn't impossible or unimaginable for them to achieve it.

Let's keep the Nazis stupid and cruel as they were-no increased war production in 1940/41 for Barbarossa, no willingness to enlist the Soviet citizens against Stalin--and concentrate on the forces in the field. The Germans had no rational plan of campaign after the opening stages of Barbarossa (unless hoping the Red Army would completely collapse when the Wehrmacht reached Smolensk is a "rational plan").

This made them dither away part of the summer in pursuit of what turned out to be secondary goals and then launch their final drive too late, denying them Leningrad, Moscow, or the Don River valley and leaving their forces exhausted and exposed to counterattack. Better planning and execution, which they were indeed capable of, probably wouldn't have won the 1941 campaign but would likely have weakened the Red Army more.

In 1942, after being bled in the winter campaigns, the Germans repeated their high command follies. In the south, the German forces, after a good start, ended up being diverted back and forth between two objectives (the prime one, Baku and its oilfields, and the ever-growing secondary one, Stalingrad) and ended up achieving neither. In fact, the capture of Stalingrad, which had little importance, came to dominate German attention so much that they set themselves up for a Soviet knockout punch.

Meanwhile, Baku, with 50% of Soviet oil production, was forgotten. In the north, Leningrad was allowed to fester, with the Germans neither storming the city (and thus freeing up Army Group North) or falling back to less exposed positions. (Yes, the Germans were short of troops to go for both Baku and Leningrad-but only because they insisted on holding the useless, exposed salients at Demyansk and Rzhev in the center. Giving up these salients might have released enough troops to grab Leningrad.)

So, my thesis is that the Germans could conceivably have done better than they did in 1941 and 1942, possibly wearing down the Red Army and crippling the Soviet Union. This imaginably could have led to some form of German victory, or, if less successful, to a stalemate between the two sides. Everything here is speculative and debatable, but I think it's an imaginable case for why Soviet victory wasn't inevitable.

Soviet War Plans

Louis makes a case that, instead of the surprise attack turn system, Scorched Earth should have a German attack-Soviet counterattack- German smashing the counterattack sequence, based on Soviet war plans. There is nothing inherently wrong with this. In at least one minor way, it'd show what went on at Minsk better.

Historically, the Germans captured Minsk on the fly, partly because Soviet forces in the area had moved west looking for Germans to counterattack. In the game, the Soviets often sit tight in Minsk and make the Germans fight for it. In other ways, Louis's system would create problems, as it'd have to require mandatory Soviet attacks. This would open up a gamesmanship can of worms, as both sides would optimize their play to gain what advantage they could from the rule, rather than playing as best the situation demanded.

In a broader context, Louis perhaps is confusing the Soviet plan with what really happened. While Soviet forces in many places did attempt to move forward to contact and counterattack the enemy, they didn't do much more than attempt it. By about the second or third day of the campaign, the Soviet plan had already broken down, and most Soviet forces at the front were improvising their defenses. The counterattack often meant no more than a stiff meeting engagement as the Soviet forces contacted the Germansnot really any different than what goes on when you roll the die to resolve any ground combat.

A few days later, even the high command levels of the Red Army knew that the plan hadn't gotten off the ground, and they themselves abandoned it. (For example, substantial forces were transferred north out of the Ukraine to Belorussia, instead of counterattacking Army Group South. The famed counterattack from the Pripet Marshes against Army Group South occurred on 10 July 1941, well after the opening round, and was due to local circumstances and opportunity, not part of a master Soviet plan.)

Given the above, then Louis's scheme is acceptable, but by no means the only way (or even the best way) to cover the opening round. I think the current surprise attack is better than this. It incorporates the salient features of what went on, is fairly easy to use without excessive gamesmanship, and is consistent with surprise attack rules in other Europa games. The third point is minor, but nevertheless important for Grand Europa.

I've always looked ahead to Grand Europa when doing surprise attack rules, in order to have a consistent system when we're done. Whenever the Germans open a major campaign against a neutral power or against a belligerent power with forces not in contact with the Germans, the German player gets a surprise attack turn. Neutral powers don't get a reaction phase (per Fall of France), but belligerents do. Examples: Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union all are neutral and get hit by the double whammy.

In May 1940, Germany gets the surprise against Belgium, the Netherlands, and those Allied forces in northern France, which were out of contact with the Germans. Along the Rhine and the Maginot Line, Allied and German forces were in contact, hence no surprise attack here. There's still a lot of work needed to hammer this into a universal rule for Grand Europa, but this is the outline of where we're going.

Air Power

Louis gets caught in the "maximum effectiveness" trap when he looks at air power. An in-service rate of 50% doesn't mean that half your air units should be inoperative in the game. As with ground units (discussed in an earlier column), air units are rated on their average capabilities, not their maximum. No air unit ever had 100% serviceability for any sustained period of operations, and the game doesn't assume this for air units. Instead, an average serviceability rate is factored into the air units.

Louis's suggested two-phase air system (a strategic phase followed by a tactical phase) doesn't look like it'd work. I'm not sure how you can define what is strategic and what is tactical outside the catagorizing of the bombing missions in the rules, and even here a "strategic" bombing mission simply means you're using the strategic bombing strength, while the intent and effect of the mission may be tactical. More importantly, actual air operations weren't conducted on this twophase system. While there are some minor instances of air units alternating between "strategic" and "tactical" strikes at the same time, the vast bulk of the air forces concentrated solely on whatever was their current objective.

More Inside Europa

From the Beaches: Second Front
On the Soap Box: What is Europa?
Those Saucy Aussies: 2nd Australian Imperial Force
Meanwhile, Back in the East: Soviet Victory
Panzers East: Options for 1941