The combination of unopposed movement and non-motorized exploitation produces a simple, robust movement system that solves the problems I have listed. This combination simplifies the integration of march rates with their doctrinal and historical values since it does not rely on large multipliers which would align one part of the game while warping another. It allows motorized and non-motorized units to be treated in a consistent manner in unopposed movement, which decreases the complexity of introducing this innovation. It produces a more sophisticated combat model without a corresponding increase in the complexity of the game or the rules.
| TABLE 4 - Summary of march abilities by movement type for 6 MP unit | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Type | Movement | ||
| Opposed | Unopposed | Administrative | |
| Base Mvt multiplier | 1 | 1.5 | 2 |
| Exploitation | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Enemy territory | Yes | Yes | No |
| Move adjacent? | Yes | No* | No |
| Engaged in combat | Yes | No | No |
| Max possible march | 9 | 12 | 15 |
| *Overrun strength and partisans only | |||
Aligning the mobility of units with doctrine and history may have important tactical consequences, depending on how the additional mobility is implemented. By implementing part of the additional mobility as exploitation, tactical abilities not offered by the current system become possible. One of the most important of these abilities is the ability to implement a mobile defense. By adopting a move - fight - exploit system for all arms, players can mass combat power, attack, and then give ground. This gives a measure of tactical flexibility in accordance with that which armies historically had. This properly models the mobile defense on the operational level.
[23]
This ability isn't inordinately powerful, however, since the ability is limited to half movement. In practice, German infantry can only just leave a hex adjacent to the Soviet artillery
divisions, thereby buying themselves some time, but it is at best a limited respite. A natural, self-imposed constraint exists when either natural defensive terrain or fortifications
come into play. After all, who would give away the Dnieper, Valdai Hills, or a fort line by simply retreating? Fighting an opponent in positions such as these is the natural function
of massed artillery and artillery divisions. Proper positioning of offensive forces can also reduce the effectiveness of the mobile defense.
Some limits may need to be established on non-motorized exploitation. Such limitations can
easily be implemented by several techniques. Some examples of factors in the game that can be
utilized in establishing limitations are: time period, weather, unit type, unit strength, nationality, or doctrine. Depending on how the rule or restriction is written, it can reflect
changes in ability, doctrine, political constraints, equipment, operating conditions, or other factors.
Retrofitting these new rules into Europa games is generally straightforward. For most games, a simple insertion of these rules to supplement the current system should be sufficient. Some games may require a minor adjustment to the rules. A possible example for use in FitE/SE: Soviet non-motorized units may not exploit on II Jun 41. During Soviet unpreparedness, Soviet units may not exploit if they attacked during the combat phase, or are in a ZOC
during the exploitation phase.
When playtesting these rules you will have to consider the effect on whatever other "house" or
experimental rules you use.
Although these modifications are not overpowering by themselves, in combination with some "house" or experimental rules they do have that potential. I would suggest that you first try these concepts out with a limited scenario, instead of starting from scratch with a full setup. With a little play, the necessary mental and tactical adjustments to these rules usually come quickly. I expect that your playtest results will coincide with those of everyone who has tried
these ideas: they work very well.
The advantages of these modifications to the movement system outweigh the disadvantages.
Exploitation by non-motorized units and unopposed movement leads to tactical play which is more sound, interesting, and decisive. Movement rates are boosted to a figure closer to their historical norms and possibilities. Pockets will become much more common. A mobile defense now
becomes possible, giving the Germans a better chance of surviving on the Eastern Front from'43 to'45.
As a final and important advantage, these results are gained while leaving the counters, 013s, and most basic game mechanics unchanged.
In closing I would like to give my special thanks to Tom Johnson and Charlie Meyer for their ideas, valuable advice, and playlesting. Their contributions were instrumental in the evolution and refinement of the ideas presented in this article, and the article itself. I would also like to thank Jason Long, Joe Hayes, Mike Schomisch, and the Eau Claire group.
[1] Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 21-18 Foot Marches, 1971, p. 11 - War Department, FM 7-20 Rifle Battalion, 1942, p. 58
[2] Herman Foertsch (Colonel of the German General Staff), The Art of Modern Warfare (Originally Kriegskunst Heute und Morgen), (New York: Veritas Press,
1940), p. 198, 142
More Forward...March! A Re-evaluation of March Rates
Astell's Rebuttal to Forward March
Playability and Playtesting
Final Notes
Footnotes
[3] War Department, TM-E 30-451 Handbook on German Military Forces, 1
Mar 1945, p. IV-1
[4] Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-2-2 The Soviet Army - Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support (16 July 1984), p. 9-2
[5] FM 21-18 Foot Marches, p. 16
[6] Lieutenant Colonel Paul W. Thompson, Lieutenant Colonel Harold Doud, Lt. John Schofield, Col Milton A. Hill, How the Jap Army Fights (New York, Washington
D.C.: The Infantry Journal, 1942), p. 54
[7] John G. Burr (LTC, U.S.A. Ret.), The Framework of Battle (Philadelphia, New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1943), p. 85-6,92
[8] Infantry in Battle (Washington D.C.: The Infantry Journal, 1939), p. 94-95
[9] Burr, p. 90; Charles E. Kirkpatrick, "Blitzkrieg Proving Ground", World War II, September 1989, p. 33
[10] John A. English, A Perspective on Infantry (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), p. 139
[11] Albert Seaton, The German Army 1933-1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 179
[12] English, p. 123
[13] Harrison Salisbury, The 900 Days (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1969), p. 193
[14] Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front 1941-45 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1986), p. 21
[15] FM21-18 Foot Marches, p. 3
[16] R. Ernest Dupuy and George Fielding Eliot, If War Comes (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), p. 113
[17]. TM-E 30-451 Handbook on German Military Forces
[18]. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 105-5 Maneuver Control (December 1973), p. H-2, H-3; Stephen B. Patrick, "Combined Arms Combat Operations in the 20th Century", Strategy and Tactics, #46, p. 12
[19] A. A. Sidorenko, The Offense, (Moscow, 1970), p. 73
[20] Field Marshal Eric von Manstein, Lost Victories (Novato: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 448; Colonel T.N. Dupuy & Paul Martell, Great Battles on the Eastern Front (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc, 1982), p. 89
[21] "The Concept of Defense", Infantry Journal, March 1942
[22] Dupuy and Martell, p. 87
[23] Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations
Introduction
Doctrinal March Rates
How Much Time Does Combat Take?
The Solution to Understated Movement
Final Results and Footnotes
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