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When combat is sought and joined, it obviously requires time which could be spent marching. The question is, how much time? The U.S. Army has conducted broad historical research, in which the battles and campaigns of many armies were analyzed. Based upon this research, they have determined that the rates of opposed advance shown in Table 2 can be expected.
[18] .
| TABLE 2 - RATES OF ADVANCE IN COMBAT |
|---|
Combat
Ratio | Terrain |
|---|
| Open | Median | Closed |
|---|
| 2:1 | 600(450) | 400(300) | 250(200) |
| 3:1 | 1100(550) | 750(400) | 300(250) |
| 4:1 | 2200(700) | 1325(500) | 350(300) |
| 5:1 | 3300(1100) | 1500(800) | 500(450) |
Figures for Infantry are in parentheses.
Rates are in meter/hour. |
The results of Soviet Army research on the depth of attack for its divisions in WWII is shown in Table 3. [19] Notice that as the war advances, and Soviet army attacks have increasingly favorable force ratios, the depth of attack for a division increases. This agrees in principle with the findings of the U.S. Army.
| TABLE 3 - Soviet Divisional Daily Objectives |
|---|
| Period | Depth of Mission in Km |
|---|
| Immediate | Subsequent | Mission the day |
|---|
| Open | Median | Closed |
|---|
| WWI | - | - | 2-4 |
| 1941 | 1.5-2.5 | 3-4 | - |
| 1942 | 2-3 | 4-6 | - |
| 1943 | 2-4 | 5-7 | - |
| 1944 | 3-5 | 5-7 | 10-12 |
| 1945 | 3-5 | 6-8 | 8-20 |
With a 3:1 attack, the U.S. Army states that you should be able to gain 4.8 km per day. The Soviets expected their divisions to gain from 4.5-6.5 km per day even in attacks during 1941. The
Germans considered an attack to be going poorly if it produced an average rate of advance of only 4 km per day. [20]
The deepest attack possible under the Europa combat system is 16 miles (25.6 Km). Using the U.S. Army's findings, assuming only 12 hours per day in the attack and a combat ratio of 3:1 in median terrain produces a rate of advance of 4800 meters, or 3 miles, per day. Over the course of a 6 day attack in a 15 day turn this results in an advance of 18 miles. Using the Soviet divisional objective figures shows that this same depth should be reached in at most 6.4 days. At this depth the attacker has exceeded the maximum depth of an attack currently allowed in only 6
days.
Actually, the time required to seize the objective would be less than six days. The previous example assumes a defensive depth of 16 miles whereas the actual depth of the defense would be only on the order of 12,000 meters for the large US divisions with two regiments forward and one back. [21]
Divisions of other nations were generally smaller, and could be expected to have shallower defensive zones. To fight a battle through to this depth would require only 2.5 days, which implies there are potentially 12.5 days for movement.
Planning the battle, and reconstitution following it, would consume 1-2 days. The time required
for combat would be 3-5 days. The attacker should still have nine days available for movement. At the standard march rate this would produce a movement rating 50% greater than the average base
movement factor. There is currently no mechanism to redress this understatement of movement.
Advance in Continuous Combat
Examining the rates of advance when in contact with the enemy also points to the current understatement of movement. Using the US or Soviet figures in Charts 2 and 3 to analyze advance in continuous combat reveals that the rate of advance should be higher. Using US figures and assuming no breakthrough and continuous combat over the length of a turn produces a rate of advance of 3
hexes per turn for a 3:1 attack in median terrain. This is 3 miles per day.
In the fighting at Kursk, during Operation Citadel, the Germans maintained a rate of advance of 2.5 miles per day while they were operationally effective. They achieved this rate of advance
although they were fighting against the most potent Soviet defense ever assembled. Their combat
ratio was no better than 2:1, and usually considerably lower, except for the ratio of tanks and
assault guns in the Voronezh Army Group sector where it was 6.31. [22]
Under the current rules the greatest advance possible for a unit in contact moving from a
ZOC to a ZOC, attacking, and then advancing after combat is 2 hexes. Two hexes over the course of a turn averages out to only 2.1 miles per day. This rate is too low and results from the understatement of movement in combat by at least one hex per turn.
Over the course of a six year war, including almost four years of continuous combat on the Eastern Front, this is a significant value. That one hex represents the ability of units in combat to maneuver and gain critical ground. Since the difference between the expected advance in combat and the actual is one hex, it is easy to correct. This one hex represents from 1 to 4 movement
points, depending on terrain. These two figures average to 2.5 movement points, or approximately 50% of the base movement rating of the average infantry division. Once again there is a demonstrated need to add 50% to the base movement value of units.
Tactical Problems Resulting from Understated Movement
The current movement system makes several tactics impossible, or at best, far less common than they should be. These tactics are the mobile defense and envelopment, both of which characterized much of the fighting on the Eastern Front. Their lack indicates that the ability of Europa to model maneuver warfare at the operational level can be improved.
A mobile defense is one in which space is traded for time, with counterattacks launched as
opportunities avail themselves. This was basic German tactical doctrine, and the lack of provision for it in the game has serious consequences. With the current movement system, the German has only one sound option when a strong Soviet offensive supported by artillery divisions is in the making: retreat. By simply retreating, the German is imposing no casualties by counterattacking the Soviets, which is something they were able to do when executing a mobile defense.
Although envelopment battles now occur, they tend to be limited to maneuver by mechanized units only, the role of the infantry in the scheme of maneuver is either limited or nonexistent. Historically they were the primary agents in low level encirclements. In a large encirclement they formed the maneuver base, while the more mobile mechanized divisions enveloped the enemy.
More Forward...March! A Re-evaluation of March Rates
Astell's Rebuttal to Forward March
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© Copyright 1989 by GR/D
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