Note: This lengthy and detailed article has been divided into three sections for ease of reading.--RL

The Armies of the Revolution and the Divisional system

The armies of the Revolution kept the Divisional organization and consequently the brigade subdivision. On January 1st, 1791, a new regulation reorganized the French army 1. The regiments of all arms, infantry, cavalry, artillery, etc., gave up their old names and took a number, which reflected their seniority. The difference was that the Divisions were permanent - by the attribution of the different units on a permanent basis - and not ad hoc formations like they were in other armies.

The elimination of the traditional Provinces, which were replaced by 89 departments, forced a reorganization of the military government's scheme of Permanent Divisions. The old military governments based on the Provincial organization were disbanded on February 25, 1791 and replaced by 23 Divisions Militaires, each including entire departments. The changes were territorial rather than organizational. Each new Division Militaire was still under the command of a lieutenant-general assisted by 2 or 4 maréchaux de camps. 2

The headquarters of these Divisions were located at: 1st, Lille; 2nd, Châlons; 3rd. Metz; 4th, Nancy; 5th, Strasbourg; 6th, Besançon; 7th Grenoble; 8th Marseille; 9th, Montpellier; 10th, Toulouse; 11th, Bordeaux; 12th, Nantes; 13th, Rennes; 14th, Caen; 15th Rouen; 16th, Arras; 17th, Paris; 18th, Dijon; 19th, Lyon, 20th, Angoulème; 20th, 21st, Bourges, 22nd, Tours; and 23rd, Ajaccio (in Corsica). The new organization recognized that the borders with Spain and Sardinia were as secure as they had been in the past. So was Britanny and the southwest coast. The defensive priorities remained the same. Any major threat would come from the northeast border. Consequently on that frontier, two large military commands were organized in addition to one in Normandy, commanded by a Marshal of France as in the previous organization of 1787. The 14th (Caen) and 15th (Rouen) Military Divisions were under the command of Marshal de Mailly; the 1st (Lille) and 16th (Arras): Marshal de Rochambeau; 2nd, (Châlons) 3rd (Metz) and 4th (Nancy): Marshal de Bouillé.

On March 3, 1791, the Assembly disbanded all the Provincial troops 3 with the exception of the Provincial Corsican Regiment. 4 In spite of the menace of war, the measure had been adopted by the Assembly purely on a political basis but effectively reduced by 132 battalions the effective force of the country!

In the mind of the Assembly, the Provincial troops were replaced by the National Guard (Garde Nationale) which had formed everywhere in France spontaneously after the events of July 14, 1789. 5 The Decrees of June 13 and 21, and July 3, 1791 are the origin of the National Guard volunteer battalions. Already before June 13, some patriots had begun to organize a few units to reinforce the frontier. One was organized on May 27 at Dijon and another one on June 3 at St.Amand. 6 In agreement with the decree, the first battalions of volunteers were composed of 10 companies of 50 men each. On October 1st, 1791, a total of 84 battalions joined the army. They were only to serve until December 1, 1792.

Revolutionary France prepared for war after Austria and Prussia declared that they were ready to join other Powers in restoring the authority of the French monarchy. Consequently, a decree of December 14, 1791, organized three armies for the defense of the northern and eastern frontiers. They were: Army of the North (Armée du Nord), Army of the Centre (Armée du Centre) and Army of the Rhine (Armée du Rhin). These armies were composed of regiments of the old regular army transferred from different parts of France in order to face the potential foreign threats. Consequently, the permanent Divisions were short of effective manpower and their brigades had to be reorganized. On February 4, 1791, the Assembly had taken measures already to forward to the Divisions on the northern and eastern frontiers some 30 infantry regiments on war footing completed to an effective strength of 750 men per battalion. In addition, the arsenals were ordered to furnish some 97,913 muskets to arm the National Guard of those borders.

The morale and organization of the regular army regiments were strongly undermined by the political clubs advocating open rebellion against any kind of previously established authority. This brought virtual anarchy in many regiments. The desertion rate increased. In June, 1791, that disorganization combined with the development of political events occasioned by the flight of Louis the XVIth (the King was arrested at Varennes) was the cause of the emigration of many aristocratic officers. For instance, all the officers of the 1st of the Line in garrison at Dunkerque emigrated taking with them the regimental flags. However, many nobles more or less accepted the Revolution and remained in the army 7 but the net result was a shortage of cadres 8 which was to affect the army for years to come. In addition, since some 33% of the recruits had traditionally come from Paris and its suburbs and higher pay was offered in the volunteer units, recruiting for the regular army fell to insignificant levels. The army's ranks were short by some 67,000 men. Consequently, many regiments were understrength.

The Assembly was now forced by events to raise a total of 169 National Guard battalions. The irony of the situation is that many ex-Provincial-militiamen became part of these new National Guard battalions. 9 These new National Guard battalions fell short of the ex-Provincial militia standards. As these new battalions elected their cadres, they were initially undisciplined. They could keep order in France but were far from being trained and organized as a regular army.

The Assembly on July 22, 1791 decreed that the effective strength of the National Guard of the frontier departments would be increased to 97,000 in addition to the 26,000 that had been previously mobilized. 10 These National Guards were to garrison all the fortresses on the frontiers in order to relieve the regular army from that duty.

To add to the turmoil 11 caused by these events, the Assembly on July 21, 1791, decreed that the foreign regiments (German, Irish, and Walloon) were not an integral part of the French army. Only the Swiss regiments were now considered as legitimate foreign troops.

The Preparation of the Army for War in 1792

The Wars of the Revolution started on April 20, 1792 after the French Assembly declared war on Austria. However, the French army, which had been disorganized by the revolution and above all lacked homogeneity and cadres, was a shadow of what it had been only 3 years back. The effective manpower and the officer cadres 12 of the regular armies were well below normal strength. Nevertheless, in spite of emigration, lack of trust, and constant harassment from the Convention, it is the loyal officers of the ex-Royal army that held the army more or less together during the first battles against the Austrians and Prussians. 13

The War Minister returning from an inspection trip along the North-East border reported the situation to the Assembly on January 11, 1792. 240 battalions were concentrated between Dunkerque and Besançon; but as it was necessary to keep 88 of them to garrison the fortresses, only 172 battalions remained to organize the armies with a strength of only 75,000 men because most of these battalions had an average of only 500 men each.

As early as January 16, 1792, the minister presented his recommendations to the Assembly. The volunteer battalions were a constant source of lack of discipline primarily due the fact that they elected their commanders. As the effective strength of the regular army decreased every day, the minister recommended that in order to obtain a solid and effective army, the only possible solution was to incorporate the battalions of volunteers into the regular army. The proposition raised an intense and passionate discussion which showed that the majority of the Assembly was hostile to the army and was thinking more about disbanding it rather than increasing it! 14 Carnot declared in the name of the military Committee, that it was mandatory to accelerate the time when the Line troops would be intermixed with the volunteers. Aubert-Dubayet suggested that the line battalions be brigaded with those of the volunteers, that is placing them side by side without incorporating them. The compromise was rejected by the Assembly which closed the debate on January 22 by voting that the Line troops could never be recruited from among the volunteers.

Nevertheless, the War Minister fully realizing the needs of the army, disregarded the Assembly vote prohibiting the integration of the volunteers into the regular army. He adopted Aubert-Dubayet's idea when the volunteers were brigaded with the Line battalions and placed under the command of the colonels. These colonels were given the power to remove from command the incompetent officers of the volunteer battalions. It was a step in the right direction. 15

Already on July, 3, 1791, a decree had put all the regiments on war footing by increasing the effective strength of each battalion to 750 men. Unfortunately the effective manpower of the French army was some 67,000 men short 16 . The Line regiments were unable to send 2 battalions on war footing to the armies because of severe shortages of manpower. The minister on March 15, 1792 decided that each regiment would send its 1st battalion and the grenadier company of the 2nd battalion increased to full war footing. The men of the second battalion were to remain in garrison as a depot company and train new recruits.

In an attempt to correct the manpower shortage situation, the Assembly voted to raise more Volunteers. 17 A new decree of May 5, 1792 provided that 31 new battalions of volunteers would be raised and that the 74 existing battalions would be increased by 124 men to 698 men. But a new decree dated May 14 increased the size of these battalions to 800 men. The departments were responsible for furnishing the necessary manpower to increase the effective strength of these battalions. But the war had been on since April.

On June 27, the Minister reported to the Assembly that the Line infantry only were 19,315 men short from full strength. However, the volunteer battalions were short by some 79,274 men and none of the volunteer battalions had yet reached the 800-man size called for by the decree. In addition, 30 battalions had not yet been formed.

In 1792, in the different new armies, the brigades were organized as much as possible with 2 line battalions and 2 battalions of volunteers. 18 Each line battalion of volunteers was brigaded with a battalion of the line and the colonel of the regiment commanded both battalions. The battalion of grenadiers in the brigade had 6 companies, 4 of line and 2 of volunteers. 19

Evolution of French Army (section II): The War of 1792
Evolution of French Army (section III): Armies Under the Directory

Related:

A French Division's Staff: 1807