The Divisional Organization and Armies under the Directory

The 1st Amalgame or Amalgamation ordered under Robespierre's dictatorship had been somewhat mishandled. There were approximately 209 line and 42 légère demi-brigades and the losses due to desertion, combat, sickness and lack of replacements had reduced many of them from their original 2400 men to 300 or even below that figure. Only the newly formed demi-brigades were close to full strength. Consequently, in early 1796, the Directoire ordered another amalgamation to consolidate their forces. The 2nd amalgamation was not fully completed until 1799. The infantry was reduced to 110 line and 30 légère demi-brigades and the strength of each battalion increased to 1,067 officers and men. The demi-brigade artillery company was reduced to 2 or 3 guns. 39

The composition of armies as well as that of Divisions varied greatly and continued in a constant state of fluctuation to face various threats and imperatives during the Wars of the Revolution. However, the basic Division remained the same. As seen previously, it consisted of two (or more) infantry brigades, each consisting of 2 demi-brigades, 40 one or two regiments of cavalry and artillery.

Division strength varied greatly. In 1796, Masséna's Division of the Army of Italy numbered 13,000 men while in 1800, Pully's Division in the Grisons numbered only 3,035. Perhaps, the greatest variation can be found in Jourdan's command during the Campaign of 1799. The Directoire became conscious that war with Austria once more had become inevitable. An ambitious strategic plan was developed by the Directory and Jourdan involving the "Army of Italy" 41. Jourdan was to be the spearhead operating in the north in Germany.

The Directory had promised Jourdan some 48,000 men and assured him that the offensive would have 100,000 men provided with a park of artillery, magazine of provisions and all his needs met. His left flank was to be protected with an army of observation under Bernadotte of some 38,000, while Masséna with some 24,000 men was to operate in Switzerland and protect his right. But at the opening of the campaign, Jourdan's command included only 36,994 men and the army of observation under Bernadotte supposed to protect his left flank was only 10,000 and much too weak to do anything more significant than demonstrations.42

Jourdan should have resigned but what concern us here is the composition of his army. A quick look at the Jourdan's Army of the Danube 43 composition on March 1st, 1799, i.e. at the beginning of the campaign, shows a total of 4 Divisions, 1 flanking brigade (under Vandamme) and a Cavalry Reserve of 3,265 (under d'Hautpoul).

DIVISIONS	BRIGADES	REGIMENTS	EFFECTIVE	TOTAL	INFANTRY	CAVALRY
VANGUARD (Lefebvre)	Soult	25th Légère	2,132	-	-	-
	Mortier	53rd Line	2,032	-	-	-
	Laval	67th Line	2,138	-	6,302	-
	Klein	4th Hussars	520	-	-	-
	-	5th Hussars	598	-	-	-
	-	1st Chasseurs	589	-	-	-
	-	17th Dragoons	395	-	-	2,102
	-	Artillery	559	8,953	-	-
1st DIVISION		Artillery	673	8,133	6,452	988
2nd DIVISION		Artillery	478	6,975	5,651	847
3rd DIVISION		Artillery	494	6,691	4,844	1,356
LEFT FLANKER		Artillery	109	2,997	2,897	-
CAVALRY RESERVE		Artillery	698	3,265	-	2,256

From the above, it's easy to see that Jourdan's Divisions were a shadow of what a Division should have been (compare the above strengths with that of the Army of the North in 1794). A Division was to include at least 2 infantry brigade each of 2 demi-brigades. This totals at least 4 demi-brigades per Division. His infantry numbered only 20,494! This is approximately the infantry strength of a large French Corps of 1805-1806. If the inept Directory had kept their promises to provide Jourdan with 48,000 troops, most of these Divisions should have had at least an additional infantry brigade or the infantry battalions brought up to strength. No wonder that Jourdan was overwhelmed.

Similar weak strengths are unfortunately found in other armies like the Army of Italy. The result was failure in critical areas like Italy and Germany in 1799. The inept Directory had simply failed to keep the army up to the task of defending France efficiently. 44

The Early Attempts to Organize Army Corps

The first attempt to organize army corps was made by Moreau in May 1796, when he took command of Rhin-et-Moselle replacing Pichegru. Prior to that date, an army consisted of a number of Divisions never grouped to operate together except for some special mission. Moreau began to reorganize his army into three Corps and a small reserve.

The right wing now included two Divisions under Férino (20,366 men), the center under Desaix, which was going to become the left wing, was 17,334 strong also in two Divisions (that of Desaix and Delmas), and the left wing, which was going to become the center, was under Saint-Cyr (Saint-Cyr's, Taponier's and Duhesme's Divisions) numbering 19,939 men. The reserve included a small infantry force and a "reserve cavalry" of Forest's heavy cavalry, 7,464 strong. 45 Rhin-et-Moselle had a field strength of 65,103, not including a force at Philippsburg, and the garrisons of Strasbourg and other fortresses, which numbered an additional 12,120.

For the Campaign of Germany in 1797, Hoche reorganized his army of Sambre-et-Meuse on the same basis after receiving reinforcements. 46 By April 1797, his army had an effective strength of 78,000 present under arms 47 and organized the 6 fighting Divisions into 3 formations (left, center and right) that we can call army Corps. 48 Lefèbvre commanded the right wing which included his own and Lemoine's Divisions with the Chasseurs à cheval Division of Richepanse, totaling 19,191 men. Grenier commanded the center consisting of his own and Olivier's Divisions, with Ney's Hussar Division in all 16,596 men. The left was under Championnet who had his own Division in addition to Bonnard's Division and Klein's Dragoons, all of which totaled 18,564 men. The cavalry reserve and the cavalry as a whole was under D'Hautpoul. Watrin commanded the infantry reserve and Colaud the 2 Divisions of Macdonald and Watrin, totaling 20,107 men. 49

In the above examples, we are not yet speaking of a true Napoleonic army Corps, since these early corps organizations were somewhat different: (1) each Division included a significant force of cavalry and (2) each Corps did not have its own commander with his own staff and hence was less flexible than the later Corps. The commanders of these early corps retained charge of their own Division, the senior general of brigade replacing them at the command of the Division when necessary. 50

Phipps (Vol. II, p.273 and also Jomini) points out that: "... not only the jibing Saint-Cyr, but Desaix and Férino also, were horrified at the idea of commanding anything except their divisions, and they remonstrated. Moreau held firm, and the advantages of the system were soon too manifest even for the scruples of Saint-Cyr to last."

Conclusion of Part II

We have seen how the permanent Division, which already incorporated the 3 arms (infantry, cavalry and artillery) under a single command, led to the embryonic sort of "army corps" of Moreau and Hoche and that the organization of armies like Rhin-et-Moselle and Sambre-et-Meuse already strongly suggested the organization of the Grande Armée into army corps 51 with its cavalry reserve.

The development and introduction of "army corps," including faster transmission of orders up through the chain of command and the ability to field much larger armies, continues next issue.

Evolution of French Army (section I): Armies of the Revolution
Evolution of French Army (section II): The War of 1792

Related:

A French Division's Staff: 1807