The War of 1792

The Wars of the Revolution started on April 20, 1792 after the French assembly declared war on Austria. The campaign was to be opened by the invasion of Belgium (then the Austrian Netherlands). The operation was badly organized with forces much too weak, with too many volunteer battalions still poorly trained and with too few trained cadres. On April 29, 1792, two columns starting from Lille and Valenciennes panicked at the view of the enemy and routed 20.

In his very reliable and well researched The Armies of the French Revolution 21 , Phipps relates the routing of the columns:

"...Stopping short of Mons, Biron decided to retire.... Then a panic occurred amongst Biron's cavalry and on the 30th April at Qiévrian, his troops broke and fled for Valenciennes. In neither his case nor that of Dillion, had the enemy been in presence of the affrighted troops."

Note that the rout was initiated by a panic that developed in the cavalry part of the regular army! After that event, Degrave, the War Minister, resigned and was replaced on May 9 by Colonel Servan.

It is interesting to note that old Marshal Rochambeau, the well known commander of the French expeditionary force during the War of the American Revolution, had disagreed with an offensive on the grounds that his troops (mostly regulars) were too green and unsteady for such operations. He recommended that he remain on the defensive until the troops were more battle ready.

The Divisions and Brigades in the Early Armies of the Revolution.

The new armies of the early Revolution, i.e. 1792-3, were far from the well organized armies of the old regime. In addition to lack of discipline, these armies suffered from chronic disorganization from top to bottom because of the shortage of cadres (the losses of officers due to the emigration had not yet been compensated for) and chronic lack of supply. The emigration and removal of numerous senior officers among which were no less than 593 generals, had ruined the old staff system. Their replacement (some 700 officers) lacked the necessary training and were unable to cope with the emergency. So, when the war came in April 1792, the three armies completely lacked the necessary coordination and leadership to be successful. Since there was no generalissimo 22, these 3 armies operated independently by "remote control" from the Committee of Salut Public in Paris. Thus, the army commanders did not cooperate during the first months of the war with the exception of Dumouriez, commanding the Army of the North, assisting Kellermann, commanding the Army of the Center, in stopping Brunswick's advance at Valmy. 23

It would be hard to recognize the old permanent Division organization with well trained staff and manpower in these three armies. However, this does not mean that the organization by Divisions and brigades was given up. On the contrary, we witness clear determination to stick to the Divisional system. Carnot had formally endorced it by a Decree in 1794. The only difference is that the strength and composition of these brigades/Divisions were in constant fluctuation and included a great many volunteers.

It would take a book to cover accurately the pertinent changes that took place in French army organization since 1789. Surprisingly, in spite of what has been written in many English language sources 24 , the volunteers of the 1st ban were not untrained at the beginning of the Campaign of 1792. They had from eight months to a year of training according to the Règlement of 1791, and, when properly commanded and supported by regular troops and artillery 25 , they were fairly good troops. They were even capable of deploying under fire from column to line, which they did at the Battle of Jemmapes 26 , and holding their own. It is true that on many occasions the volunteers, as well as some battalions (or cavalry regiments) of the regular army 27 , would bolt at the first volley. Nafziger, p. 139 summarizes the situation very well:

..."It is not the military instructions or knowledge of the theory of maneuvers, but the unit's cohesion or collective courage that permits a unit to face enemy fire. The year of 1793 was a year of training for the new French army and by 1794 they were capable of engaging in sustained fire fights."

The tragedy was that the volunteers of the 1st ban were required to serve only for a single campaign. Consequently, these volunteers considered themselves in December 1792 free and whole companies and battalions simply went home. In October, 1792 there had been 100,000 French in Belgium and by December only 45,000 remained.

Their replacements, the highly patriotic volunteers of the 2nd ban, were not as good material as those of the 1st ban. 28

Anarchy can last for only so long and the need to go back to the old disciplined ways became apparent even to the Committee of Salut Public. The French army had become a melange of regulars, volunteers, federals, legionary and free corps units differing in everything from uniform to organization. In response, the first amalgame in late 1793/early 1794 combined the remaining veterans of the old army with the recruits and volunteers into new regiments now called demi-brigades. It had been ordered by a Decree of January 28, 1794 but it had already begun in 1793. At first, one regular battalion was "amalgamated" with two volunteer battalions to form a three-battalion demi-brigade. These demi-brigades were classified as line (ligne) or légère (light) depending on the origin of its regular battalion. 29

Starting approximately in July 1794, it can be said that the army of the Revolution instead of being composed of a number of incongruous units, now possessed regiments and resembled in organization the armies of other nations 30 That is well illustrated by Jomini's reference to the Battle of the Roër where "..the Republicans offered the spectacle of an army of 100,000 men, maneuvering with as much order and precision, and ready to charge the enemy." 31

At the same time, the Divisional system was formally reinforced. As before, one or more brigades with artillery and cavalry formed a Division 32 on a much more permanent basis. Several Divisions formed a field army 33 . In 1794, there were 11 such armies. The Convention had to put down revolts in several parts of France 34 so it needed troops everywhere in the interior of France. The Directory that followed the Convention did not feel any more secure and always retained a considerable amount of men for its safety back in France.

Some Examples of Divisional Organization and Armies in 1794

The Year 1794 saw a rebuilding of the French army by the amalgame or consolidation of the army which had become a jumble of regular, volunteers, legions and free corps units. 35

There were 11 field armies as well as an army of the interior. The three largest armies were concentrated in the north and northeast. The largest was the Army of the North, which in theory numbered 245,822, a figure far from that on September 1st, 1794 (after it was broken down to form the famous Armée de Sambre-et-Meuse, with additional elements from the Armies of the Ardennes and Moselle). The Army of the Moselle numbered 102,323 and that of the Rhin (Rhine) 98,930. The remaining armies, Alpes, Ardennes, Italy, Pyrénées, and Côtes (of the Coast) had a paper strength varying between 22,000 and 60,000 men.

Let us take a look at the organization of the Army of the North as of September 1st, 1794. 36

DIVISIONS	INFANTRY	CAVALRY	ARTILLERY	GUNS	HOWITZERS	MORTARS
1st Souham	14,813	3,436	1,311	60	9	-
2nd Moreau	11,053	1,026	577	39	2	-
3rd Lemaire	11,255	1,118	595	35	3	-
4th Despeaux	5,432	647	283	16	2	-
5th Bonnaud	9,103	1,558	658	34	5	-
6th Delmas	4,481	380	241	16	2	-
Artillery Park	-	-	901	51	22	10
TOTAL	56,137	8,165	4,566	251	45	10

Hence, the Army of the North had:

Infantry	56,137
Cavalry	8,165
Artillery	4,566
TOTAL	68,868

As we'll see later, the above organization of an army is typical. An army was formed in several Divisions, with the Divisional strengths varying significantly. However, all the Divisions were a mixture of infantry, cavalry and artillery. The strength of 68,868 is that of two to three average corps in Napoleon's army. In 1794, we find several armies operating on or between the Dunkerque and Switzerland, Nord, Ardennes, Moselle and Sambre-et-Meuse. New armies could be formed as a function of strategic or political considerations. In addition, armies could change names. For instance, Sambre-et-Meuse was formed of detachments from Nord, Ardennes and Moselle. This new army under Jordan forced the Austrians over the Rhine, after it had defeated the Austrians at Fleurus 37 on June 24, 1795.

In taking a look at the French order of battle at Fleurus 38 , one may be surprised to discover that some of the brigades included some cavalry, which was not operating solely in cavalry brigades as might be expected. In addition, some brigades still included some volunteer battalions.

In 1795, two French armies were in the Rhine area. Sambre-et-Meuse, still under Jourdan, was operating around Coblenz and Rhin-et-Moselle, under Pichegru, was in Alsace.

Evolution of French Army (section I): Armies of the Revolution
Evolution of French Army (section III): Armies Under the Directory

Related:

A French Division's Staff: 1807