Winceby and Nantwich and Marston Moor
by David Blackmore
WincebyOf course cavalry are little use in a siege, particularly so at Hull where the surrounding land was flooded. Sir Thomas therefore shipped his horse and dragoons across into Lincolnshire where, for the first time, he joined forces with that other formidable cavalry commander, Oliver Cromwell. On the 11 October, after several days of manoeuvring and skirmishing between cavalry, the cavalry of the Earl of Manchester, commanded by Cromwell, and the cavalry commanded by Sir Thomas, met a larger force of Royalist horse at Winceby. But, as Sir Thomas is reputed to have said before the battle "Come, let us fall on, I never prospered better than when I fought the enemy three or four to one." It was a brief if bloody affair fought entirely between horse and dragoons. Cromwell led the first charge and had his horse killed under him. Fairfax managed to bring his force, forming a second line, around to a flank where his charge broke the Royalists already engaged by Cromwell. It was what cavalry is all about, weight delivered at speed it
is the shock, the impact, of a cavalry charge that determines it's
success as much, if not more, than the fighting skills of the
individuals in it. And Sir Thomas's delivery was perfect. Not only
did he manage to move his 20 troops, some 1200 men, round to a
flank, but so time his charge that he caught the Royalists in the flank.
And not only was his delivery perfect, it was also his first delivery
of a cavalry charge proper. True, he had seen a lot of fighting, but
until Winceby always small scale raids, assaults on towns, fighting
retreats and defensive battles. The Earl of Manchester wrote "Sir
Tho. Fairfax (who is a person that exceeds any expression oj a
commendation of his resolution and valour) performed what he was
commanded with readiness and.success."
[46]
On the same day Newcastle raised the siege of Hull and
retired to York. In the middle of the following winter came Sir
Thomas's greatest test when he was ordered to raise the siege of
Nantwich. I shall pass over the difficulties Fairfax experienced in
assembling his relief force and in campaigning in the depths of
winter. Instead I shall start on the morning of the battle with the
situation as it presented itself to him.
Nantwich sits astride the river Weaver and as a result of this
the Royalist commander, Lord Byron, had been forced to divide his
forces on either side of the river. His position was not helped by the
fact that the two river crossings available to him were both some
distance from the town. One, a temporary plank bridge replacing one
destroyed by the defenders of Nantwich was two miles to the north
and the other, a stone bridge, was two miles to the south. Byron was
aware of Fairfax's approach from the North West and had begun to
assemble his forces on the west bank of the Weaver via the northern
bridge. His plan was to meet Fairfax at Acton church which had been
fortified. Unfortunately for him a thaw set in and during the night
the temporary northern bridge was washed away and the water
meadows around Nantwich flooded. This left his forces still on the
East bank with a long march to the southern crossing and another
long march back up to Acton, a total of about eight miles.
What Fairfax could see was that the Royalist forces were
split in two and that he had some time before they could unite.
Following a council of war it was decided to attack the Royalists at
Acton church before Byron could assemble all his force there. It
should be remembered that Fairfax's force was far from superior to
Byrons, both had about 3,000 foot while Fairfax had about 1800
horse to Byron's 900. Unfortunately Fairfax's baggage and rearguard
were slow and by the time he was ready to attack the rest of
Byron's forces were beginning to arrive at Acton. Fairfax now
decided to march across Byron's front to Nantwich where he could
obtain reinforcements to take on Byron the next day. Led by
pioneers cutting passages through hedges Fairfax's force started their
march.
Taking advantage of this the Royalists first attacked Fairfax's
rear and then his front. A confused battle developed with Fairfax
fighting on two fronts about a quarter of a mile apart. After about
two hours and the intervention of 700 or 800 musketeers from the
garrison of Nantwich, who attacked from the rear the Royalists
fighting Fairfax's front, much of the Royalist foot gave up the fight
and broke, the remainder being driven into Acton church where they
surrendered the following day, The Royalist horse took very little
part in the battle, mainly covering the retreat of the foot that
managed to extricate themselves.
Fairfax could, once again, be said to have been lucky. One
military writer has described his decision to cross Byron's front as
"attempted military suicide." But was the battle of
Nantwich simply a lucky deliverance from the consequences of
rashness? His initial plan, to attack the forces at Acton church and
destroy the enemy piecemeal, was sound.
When the arrival of the rest of Byron's forces rendered this
plan unfeasible, even for him, what were the options open to him?
He could have retreated and failed to relieve Nantwich, but this is not
even worthy of consideration given Fairfax's character and contempt
for odds. He could have tried to reach Nantwich by a different route
but that did not guarantee being able to avoid battle. As it was, he
was only a mile and a half from the town and Byron's forces were
probably still deploying. A quick sprint across Byron's front before
he could react was a gamble but represented his best chance of
achieving his objective of relieving Nantwich. And how much of a
gamble was it? He needed help from the garrison to be sure of
defeating Byron and the closer to the town he got, if not actually into
it, the more likely help was and the easier for it to come to him, He
was probably also aware that, due to Royalist mistakes, the
approach between him and Nantwich was lightly defended, making
help from the garrison easier still. And that help did come, the attack
of the 7 or 800 musketeers on the Royalist forces attacking Fairfax's
front was almost certainly decisive, causing the collapse of those
Royalists and allowing the rear to be helped in turn.
And then there was the terrain. Fairfax wrote of fighting
from hedge to hedge. Lord Byron wrote "The place of battle was
in an enclosed field, where horse could do little service," his
brother Robert wrote "our army was drawn in several enclosures,
there our horse could do no good, nor we help one another."
Indeed it is clear that the Royalist horse were effectively
neutralised by the terrain. Lord Byron again "The ground was so
enclosed the horse could do no service, and some of them, who were
struck with a same fear, so disordered the rest, that though they did
not run away, yet it was impossible to make them charge."
On the other hand Fairfax's horse had only fought one battle in
open country, Winceby. They were used to fighting in enclosures and
lanes, as at Seacroft, Adwalton, the retreat from Beverly and
numerous raids, assaults and skirmishes. Indeed Fairfax makes much
of the effectiveness of his horse. "..our foot, at the beginning,
gave a little ground: but our horse recovered that by beating the
enemy horse out of the lanes that flanked our foot, " and
"..the horse, commanded by Sir Wm Fairfax, did expose
themselves to great danger to encourage the foot, though capable of
little service in these narrow lanes."
Little service perhaps, but more than the Royalist horse and possibly decisively so.
Was Fairfax's decision to march across Byron's front a gamble? Certainly it was, but it was one that increased the odds in his favour and in the end decisively so. [47]
April 1644 found Sir Thomas back in Yorkshire and taking part in the storming of Selby. This attack followed what might be called the classic pattern of attacks on towns by the Fairfax's. That is a vigorous assault by infantry to open up a way into the town for
the horse to finish the job. Once again we find Sir Thomas leading from the front, too far in front, where, as he put it, "my horse was overthrown, being single a little before my men who presently relieved me." [48]
Finally we come to the Battle of Marston Moor. Sir Thomas
found himself in command of the cavalry of the Allied Army's right
wing. Drawn up in three lines this command consisted of 3,000
horse from the Fairfax's own army in the first two lines and 1,000
Scottish horse in the third line. In addition the extreme right flank
was protected by dragoons and there were blocks of musketeers
interspersed amongst the horse.
When the Allied Army attacked Sir Thomas charged at the head of his own regiment. Despite having to cross some very difficult ground and being under fire from Royalist musketeers supporting the Royalist horse, Sir Thomas and his own regiment broke through, pursuing some Royalists towards York. But it was a small victory obtained at great cost, as he wrote ""scarcely any officer which was in this charge, which did not receive a hurt."
The rest of his command was swept away and his brother
Charles was killed. Returning from the pursuit to
see what had happened to his command Sir Thomas once
again found himself alone and surrounded by the enemy. This
time he resorted to subterfuge, removing the Allies field sign
and riding unrecognised to join Cromwell who was rolling up
the enemy from the left flank. As a general it was not his day,
that honour belonged to Cromwell. Yet there is much that can
be said about his personnel conduct. He himself wrote of the
wound he received to his cheek, visible in some later portraits,
his horse was shot and according to one account later died
under him at which point he was helped from the field.
Despite his personal defeat there is no criticism of him in the
accounts of the battle, only praise. That which perhaps best
sums up his role was written by the Scots Major-General, Sir
James Lumsden who said of Sir Thomas that he was "one
brave commander, but his horse answered not our
expectatioun." [49]
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