Adwalton

And what happened at Adwalton? At the end of June 1643 the Fairfax's found themselves opposed by the Earl of Newcastle with a force of 11,000 foot and 7,000 horse. In the face of such overwhelming odds they decided to go on to the offensive and to make a surprise attack in the early morning. They mustered about 3,000 foot and 700 horse. It was a bold plan, but it didn't work. Instead of marching out from Bradford at 4 o'clock it was nearer eight before the army moved. Instead of surprising Newcastle they collided with his advance guard and he had plenty of time to draw up to meet them.

Remarkably, at first, the Fairfax's army did extremely well, driving back Newcastle's infantry. The infantry were apparently all musketeers and they were fighting in the enclosures on the edge of the moor. Newcastle's pikemen, drawn up on the moor itself, could serve no purpose but to stand and watch the fire fight and protect the artillery from parliamentarian horse. Sir Thomas was on the right wing with about 1,200 foot and 5 troops of horse. He got them into an enclosure and drove off a series of three attacks by between 10 and 14 troops of horse, pursuing with his own horse right up to the enemy cannon.

Unfortunately things did not go so well on the left flank. Here Gifford was in command and was doing as well as Sir 'Thomas. But then the Royalists launched an attack by a large body of pikemen. This desperate attack managed to break the Parliamentarian line and open the way for Newcastle's horse to get into the enclosures and close with the infantry who had no pikes to defend them against either the Royalist pike or horse. The left wing collapsed leaving Sir Thomas isolated on the right.

Despite this turn of events Sir Thomas managed to get his command off the battlefield and into Bradford largely intact, no mean feat in itself. But again, one can easily imagine him wondering what on earth had happened to the left wing under Gifford when his wing was doing so well in similar circumstances.

What follows does not concern this paper too much. The Hothams were prevented from betraying Hull and in their darkest moment the Fairfax's were able to make their way there to relative safety. Sir Thomas's ride to Hull is heroic stuff, a hot rearguard action at Selby, shot in the wrist, numerous desperate charges, his wife captured, his daughter abandoned, over 40 hours in the saddle. Inspiring and courageous but militarily insignificant, except for one thing, Sir Thomas escaped to fight again. [37]

Believing the Fairfax's to be a spent force Newcastle left them alone and marched into Lincolnshire. During July and August the Fairfax's rebuilt their army in Hull. And while they regroup it is a good moment to review Sir Thomas's actions so far. Superficially it is not a bad record. Bradford, Wetherby and Tadcaster all successfully defended. Sherburn beaten-up, Leeds and Wakefield stormed. There were tactical errors at Seacroft although the strategy worked, and one total disaster at Adwalton followed by a great escape of Boys Own proportions. And there can be no doubting Sir Thomas's personal courage, although it could get him into trouble, as at Wakefield.

And yet this record reveals more than a few imperfections when closely examined. Wetherby was almost a disaster averted only by the personal courage of Sir Thomas and a handful of men. Tadcaster was not his victory, in any case lack of ammunition forced them to withdraw at night. The raid on Sherburn was another narrowly averted disaster. At the storming of Leeds and Wakefield the laurels went to the infantry, nominally under his command, but led by others.

As for Adwalton, twenty years later Sir Thomas would blame Gifford for the defeat, describing him as disaffected and his actions being "not witbout much suspicion of treacbery in it." [38].

There is however nothing to substantiate this claim. Indeed, although Gifford was arrested in October 1643, accused of treachery, three years later Lord Fairfax supported Gifford's claim for arrears of pay. [39] Not the action of a general towards someone responsible for his total defeat. Sir Thomas also blamed Col. Rogers for the failure of the infantry to break out of Bradford in the aftermath of Adwalton, accusing him of "a cowardly fear". [40]

Of course the simple facts are that on Adwalton Moor the Fairfax's were outnumbered by 4,000 to 18,000 and that Bradford was surrounded by all of Newcastle's army and defended by only 60 horse and 800 foot. Any other out come than defeat would have been miraculous. But clearly Sir Thomas was not a man overly concerned with odds. Witness the assault on Wakefield. Also during his breakout from Bradford he charged 300 horse with 12, and broke through. [41] He clearly expected similar from others and would accept no excuses for defeat. Indeed in victory he praised and thanked God whilst in defeat he blamed others. Gifford for Adwalton and the anonymous infantry for Seacroft.

And to a certain extent he had a point. At Adwalton on his wing of the army had been undefeated and had very nearly succeeded in carrying out that most difficult of manoeuvres, a fighting retreat in the face of greater numbers. If the infantry had kept their discipline and cohesion he might just have done it. He certainly believed in his own invincibility "esteeming nothing unfeasible for God and for man to do in God's strength." [42] It also has to be said that he was very lucky. But there is nothing wrong with that. Even Napoleon asked how lucky his officers were when assessing their abilitles. [43] Fortune favours the brave!

And so by July/August 1643 we have a brave, lucky and, all said and done, successful commander of cavalry in a secondary theatre of the war. But one who was already being hailed by the London press. Indeed one London pamphlet giving an account of the defence of Bradford and the capture of Leeds and Wakefield christened Sir Thomas "The Rider of the White Horse." [44]

Hull