by Stephen Darley, North Haven, Connecticut
The Danbury raid and the Battle of Ridgefield were concluded with the British army being loaded on their ships and heading back to New York. Arnold sent a letter to McDougald the evening of the 28th advising him that Tryon and his army had left for New York on the British ships. He favorably commented on “many of the officers and men” who he said had “behaved well”. He also had harsh words for the militia, “I wish never to see another of them in action”. The Continental Congress approved the belated promotion of Benedict Arnold to Major General on May 2nd even before he could make it to Philadelphia to meet with them. Given the proximity in time to the Battle of Ridgefield, it is obvious that the promotion was a reward for those services. The approval, unfortunately, did not include restoring his seniority. That promotion for Benedict Arnold was too little and too late as it turned out. The Continental Congress, in a further effort to reward Arnold and to try to undo their initial slight, passed a formal Resolution on May 20th directing: “That the Quartermaster-general be directed to procure a horse and present the same...to Major-general Arnold... as a token of their approbation of his gallant conduct in the action against the enemy in their late enterprise to Danbury...” The approval of Arnold’s promotion by the Continental Congress proved to be enough incentive to keep Arnold in the army and engaged in the fight to restore his seniority. If Arnold had resigned in early May, after Ridgefield, instead of July 10th, there would have been no actual Burgoyne threat to cause Washington to have immediate need of his services and Congress to ignore his resignation. During the first half of 1777, Congress showed little concern for threats by officers to resign. In all likelihood, Arnold’s resignation, if offered in May, would have been accepted. Both sides in the battle had some casualties but it was certainly not a major battle. Howard Peckham, the acknowledged expert on battle casualties, concludes that the British had 25 killed in action, 117 wounded and 29 missing in action. He states that the American losses were 20 killed and 75 wounded. If Peckham is correct, the British got the worst of the encounter and the higher British casualties, without question, were an important factor in the British reticence in attacking American supply depots that were not on the coast. No one can really say how that decision affected the course of the war. The Danbury raid did not achieve the British objective of limiting the Continental Army’s ability to wage war by destroying their supplies. It is true that the British destroyed a large storage of supplies at Danbury. However, as McDevitt says, the loss of the Danbury supplies did not impact the American army’s campaign of 1777 at all. The fact of life in the American army was a severe shortage of supplies, and this was true in all zones of combat and at all times. “The loss of these stores (speaking of the Danbury supplies) appears to have been but one more headache for the overburdened procurement service of the American Army.” The shortage of supplies for the Continental Army was so acute that the loss of the Danbury supplies barely rippled the water. It is a sad commentary on the state of the Continental Army in 1777 and the inability of the Continental Congress to supply its fighting army in the field. Finally, the real hero of the Battle of Ridgefield was Benedict Arnold. His commanding presence in the heat of battle, in this as in other battles, did much to advance his immediate military objective of stopping the British. Arnold, once again, proved himself to be fearless in battle and willing to lead his men by example. He constantly exposed himself to enemy fire and by the force of his presence turned raw untested recruits into a minimal fighting force that could achieve unexpected results. He also won an overdue promotion. ReferencesRobert McDevitt, Connecticut Attacked: A British Viewpoint, Tryon's Raid on Danbury (Chester, Connecticut: Pequot Press, 1974).
More Battle of Ridgefield Back to Cry Havoc #35 Table of Contents Back to Cry Havoc List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2001 by David W. Tschanz. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |