The British Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Howe, who was at winter quarters in New York City, sent a small force on a surprise raid on the American supply depot at Peekskill, N.Y. in February of 1777. The supplies stored there were destroyed with minimal loss of British soldiers.
Howe liked that success and two months later he planned another raid on an American military supply depot. This time it was to be Danbury, Connecticut. Howe thought that the two raids would help deflect criticism that he was too easy on the colonials. Howe’s spies had correctly informed the British that the Americans had “considerable amounts of clothing, provisions, pork, flour, munitions, medicines, Army tents and other items” in depositories at Danbury and the surrounding area. He wanted to follow up his recent raid on American supplies with another that involved even bigger stakes. It was believed by many on the British side that it would not take much to get the Americans to end the war and that destroying their supplies would completely demoralize the poorly supplied American Army. Moreover, Howe was having his own supply problems and could use the rebels' supplies for his own men.
Howe selected Major General William Tryon, the former British Governor of North Carolina and New York, to head the Danbury raid. The size of the force is subject to varying estimates but Howe himself stated that the force consisted of “a detached Corps of troops consisting of 1800 Rank and File”. Other estimates place the force at 2000 men. Howe tried to confuse the Americans by sending a diversionary force up the Hudson River toward the Peekskill area.
The diversion worked to a large extent by keeping the only sizable American force in the area holding in their positions and unable to render any real assistance during the Danbury raid and the subsequent battles. Brigadier General Alexander McDougald, who was in the Peekskill area, commanded this division of the Continental Army. Washington learned of the British troop movements up the Hudson River and alerted McDougald to watch for British activity in his area.
Connecticut seemed like a good choice for Howe. Not only was it relatively close to Howe’s base of operations in New York, it also targeted a fairly isolated spot which was not heavily guarded and it could be reached primarily by sea. The Continental Army command seemed to believe that if it avoided a troop concentration in the Danbury area, the enemy would not realize the substantial build up of supplies they had stored there for future use. Howe felt he could destroy some valuable supplies without serious risk to his own forces and that at the same time he could help advance the British war effort by capturing enemy supplies for use by the British.
Howe also had intelligence reports, which turned out not to be accurate, that suggested he could influence the choice of sides by a sizable number of people in the countryside of Connecticut.
General Tryon and his troops left New York by ship on April 22nd and arrived at Compo Beach on the afternoon of April 25th. Compo Beach is at the mouth of the Saugatuck River in Norwalk, Connecticut. The troops were unloaded from the ships and on the morning of the 26th they began the march to Danbury, which was 22 miles away. Connecticut, as with other coastal colonies, had men assigned to watch the shoreline for British activity, so knowledge of the movement of Tryon’s troops was soon conveyed to various towns throughout Connecticut.
The British, however, made good time on their march and arrived at Danbury on the afternoon of April 26th. This was much too soon for any major opposition to get organized and the British were able to march to Danbury uncontested and without any problems. The small American militia force guarding the supplies offered no resistance to Tryon’s army but did hide some supplies before they left.
The British immediately began to gather up the supplies that were stored in various locations around Danbury. As the supplies were located, they were taken to a central location to be destroyed. Tryon had his troops continue to use this method until the morning of the 27th when he realized that it would take too long. The British then began to burn the individual buildings that housed the supplies in order to save time. Most of the supplies accumulated by the Americans were destroyed and the British burned a number of homes and public buildings. Each side promulgated different estimates of the amount of goods and supplies that were ultimately destroyed.
Meanwhile, the local American forces in Connecticut were converging on Danbury, determined to try to stop the British and avenge the losses in Danbury. One of those people who answered the call to arms sent out when the British first landed was the intrepid Benedict Arnold, who was still with his family in New Haven.
Even though he was troubled by his failure to get promoted to Major General and wanted to get to Philadelphia, he immediately answered the call to arms understanding better than most how valuable his services would be. Recruiting a few locals from New Haven, including some of his old comrades from the Connecticut Footguards like Eleazor Oswald and John Lamb, he rushed towards Danbury to help stop the British. Another local Connecticut militia leader who answered the call was Major General David Wooster, who had served in the French and Indian War and in the early months of the Revolution. The early arrivals from around the area, including Brigadier General Gold Silliman, who was a local militia commander from Fairfield, ended up in Bethel, which was a neighboring town, and others soon followed.
The gathering of potential adversaries in Bethel was conveyed to General Tryon at one o’clock on Sunday morning. “This news upset the plans previously made by him for a stay in Danbury over the Sabbath.”
Tryon’s troops had found some liquor among the stores and had consumed a large amount of it making many of his men too drunk to perform their duties. Tryon was aware that the arrival of American forces in a nearby town left him exposed. Moreover, he was a long way from the protection of his ships and he wanted, as he subsequently stated, “to avoid Mr. Arnold”, whose imminent arrival had also been reported to Tryon.
The General made the decision to conclude the destruction of the American goods and form up his troops for the return march. Tryon made another very important decision that on the return march he would not return the same way he had come but rather he would make a wide sweep through Ridgefield and Wilton to avoid contact with the gathering American forces at Bethel. The British began their return march early Sunday morning, April 27th , and they left a burning town and, according to local Danbury accounts, some local residents dead and wounded. Tryon had achieved his basic objective of destroying rebel supplies “at the cost of a few wounded” but that was about to change.
More Battle of Ridgefield
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© Copyright 2001 by David W. Tschanz.
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