Part 1: Early Activities Part 2: Invasion of Canada Part 3: The Battle of Valcour Island Part 4: Prelude to Saratoga Mike finishes up his five part series on the role of the vilified Benedict Arnold in saving the American Revolution from utter defeat and disaster. Here he discusses the decisive battle of Saratoga. -- DWT An assessment of the campaign season of 1776 for both the British and American army reveals that the British failed to achieve their 1776 strategic plan of separating the New England colonies from the rest of the republic. As for the Americans, they succeeded -- though in their case victory meant merely surviving to fight another year. Britain had planned to end the Revolution in 1776 by isolating New England from the rest of the colonies by recapturing New York City, then attacking north up the Hudson with a simultaneous invasion south from Canada. It was basically a good plan. Unfortunately the execution of the plan left much to be desired. In the southern action, British forces under the command of Lieutenant General William Howe, Commander-in-Chief in America, succeeded in recapturing New York City. Howe's army continued on to defeat the rebel army commanded by General George Washington. In a series of engagements Howe defeated his opponents and seized rebel forts, soldiers, and enemy stores. The British northern invasion on the other hand enjoyed little success. This invasion force under the command of Sir Guy Carlton, Governor-General of Canada, by the late fall had advanced only to Fort Ticonderoga, at most a minimal achievement. At which point Carlton, due to the imminent winter ordered his forces to return to Canada and winter quarters. General John Burgoyne, second in command to Carlton, disagreed. He argued that they could take Ticonderoga and use it as the launch point for the next spring's campaign. The northern setback was totally due to Carlton's delay in the launch of his invasion fleet until late in the season. The delay in turn was a result of the absolutely unexpected and unplanned American reaction to the threat from the north. Learning of the invasion, Benedict Arnold had constructed an opposing fleet. This forced Carlton to build a larger fleet. A good British plan, which should have succeeded but did not, due to an intelligent well thought out and executed defense. Carlton's late start brought General Winter in as an American ally. Back to the Drawing Board England's plans to crush the American colonial revolution in 1777 began as the northern invasion failed. Howe was first to propose a plan. On October 9th, then again on November 30th, Howe wrote to George Sackville, Lord Germain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in London that: My principal object (for the campaign of 1777) is to open communications with Canada. My forces will hold New York City and secure Albany, this will require a total of fifteen thousand men. We will simultaneously capture and occupy Rhode Island with a further twelve thousand men. Then, if prior objectives are obtained with an additional ten thousand men my forces will secure New Jersey and advance and capture Philadelphia in the autumn. Germain had a major problem with Howe's plan. The British Army did not have the manpower to support it. Russia had refused to supply troops with a derisive slap in the face and Holland followed suit. German princes were supplying all they could recruit and when that failed they forcefully impressed the rest. Germain, if nothing else was creative, by including Howe's troops who were sick, deserters, or prisoners, he responded to Howe that his present force was sufficient for the job at hand. Howe, when he received Germain's letter, knew he would not receive the troops requested and therefore changed his plans to focus on a southern strategy. He advised Germain that under these new plans he would take Philadelphia and capture the Congress. More letters went back and forth. Burgoyne had his own plan, which he would deliver in person. In December of 1776 Burgoyne took a leave of absence to ostensibly attend his seat in Parliament. The true purpose of his trip was to sell his plan to Germain and the King. Burgoyne had by this time formulated a "Grand Strategy" to end the war in one campaign. According to Burgoyne's plan, in the spring of 1777 British forces under his command would invade New York from Canada. Howe would attack North from New York City with Colonel Guy St. Ledger leading a diversionary pincer movement east from Lake Eire down the Mohawk River Valley. All armies would assemble on the objective, the heart of the northern rebellion, Albany, New York. This would separate the rabid Northeast from the remaining colonies and from there His Majesty's forces would simply divide and conquer. George III reviewed Burgoyne's plan personally, early in February 1777. The King's notations are recorded in his own hand on the proposal. King George ordered the plan to be executed. Interestingly the same plan was recorded as being reported to the rebel New York State Committee of Conspiracy on February 15, 1777 -- 13 days before the King himself read it. "Confusion to the enemy" All these plans and all these letters and meetings in London led to a situation that only a decisively strong Secretary of State for the Colonies would be able to resolve. Germain was not the man to do it. Originally named George Sackville, Germain had commanded a British cavalry unit at Minden during the Seven Years War. The allied armies at the time were under the command of Frederick of Brunswick. Frederick felt that Germain's refusal to bring his cavalry into action when commanded to result in less than a full victory. Frederick demanded Germain be court-martialed. Found guilty of disobedience, he was dismissed from the British Army. Later Sackville adopted the surname of Germain as the result of a bequest. It was this same disgraced officer, now George Sackville, Lord Germain that North appointed to manage the war against the American colonies. The command issue was further complicated by the intense personal animosity that General Howe and Lord Germain held for one another. Germain never told Burgoyne that Howe had no intention of attacking north nor did he order Howe to do so. Total confusion reigned by March 20th, 1777, when Burgoyne sailed to return to Canada. The only uncontested order issued by Germain during this entire time appointed Burgoyne commander of the Northern British army with instructions to invade the colonies and link up with General Howe. As for Howe in New York, he felt his plan to capture Philadelphia, which Germain had previously approved, was still valid. King George III believed otherwise, as HE had personally endorsed the "Grand Strategy" submitted by Burgoyne with Howe attacking up the Hudson River, St. Ledger threatening Albany from the east, and Burgoyne coming south from Canada. At the juncture of the three forces at Albany Howe would assume overall command then crush the rebellion. There were in fact no orders ever sent to Howe in this matter. An aide to Germain, the Under Secretary of the Colonies, William Knox, testified to this fact in 1782. Knox recalled that as Germain was leaving the office one evening, he stopped to sign the letter which ordered Howe to move north to support Burgoyne and the Grand Strategy but Germain found the letter not yet written. Germain then proceeded to chastise his aides for making his "poor" horses wait in the street and himself late for his appointments. Another aide, the Deputy Secretary, D'Oyley promised Howe he would himself write the instructions to Howe and copy Burgoyne. Whereupon Germain was satisfied and departed for his evening appointments. There is no evidence any communication ever went out to either commander -- so no one really knew what the plan was supposed to be.. Burgoyne's Invasion Of New York By June 3rd, General John Burgoyne had received apparently the utmost cooperation in every way but one by the British Canadian Commander, General Carlton. Carlton flatly refused Burgoyne's critical request to supply the troops needed to protect and outpost Burgoyne's army's link to Canada as he advanced south. Quoting orders from Germain, Carlton informed Burgoyne his hands were tied. His instructions from London demanded he maintain sufficient forces to protect Canada during the execution of Burgoyne's "Grand Strategy." It was Burgoyne's, not Carlton's, responsibility to secure his own line of advance. A cynic might observe that this was Carlton's revenge that he had been undermined in London by his second in command. The cynic would have been right. This decision would cost Burgoyne dearly. On July 1st, Burgoyne's Advance Corps under Brigadier Fraser reached Fort Ticonderoga. Four days later General Schuyler, the American Northern Commander, responded and headed north from Albany. The British, through the simple expedient of mounting cannons on a eight hundred foot high hill overlooking the fort, caused its immediate abandonment by the rebels on the night of July 5th. American Major General Arthur St. Clair, the commander of the fort ordered his garrison to retreat in two directions, one echelon to go by water to Skenesboro, the other overland to Hubbardton. To cover the withdrawal, St. Clair asked for four volunteers. They were ordered to maintain a furious cannonade that night. On July 6th, the British attack found four exhausted drunken gunners sleeping next to an open cask of Madeira wine. The fort was otherwise deserted. The loss of Fort Ticonderoga was a catastrophe to the American cause. Its capture shocked the colonies. Each individual's reaction was in direct proportion to his distance to the fort. In addition to the loss of the northern invasion barrier, the fort's 126 cannons were lost and rumors of treason were rife. Six weeks George III upon learning of Ticonderoga's capture rushed into his wife's chambers unannounced, shocking her and her chamber maids shouting, "I have beaten them" "I have beaten all the Americans". Reaction in France to the loss was immediate. Overnight American delegates in Paris, engaged in delicate negotiations with the government for recognition of American sovereignty, arms and an alliance against Britain found themselves unwelcome and doors closed in their faces. When Washington learned of the loss of Ticonderoga he appraised Congress of the imminent danger. Congress for once understood. With a British army under Howe in New York and Burgoyne's army on the move south Congress was shocked and immediately approved Washington's only request -- that Major General Benedict Arnold be transferred to the Northern Army to assist in the defense. Arnold was ordered north and his letter of resignation from the Continental Army, which he had coincidentally submitted that day to Congress, ignored. Arnold, despite the past insults heaped on him by Congress, obeyed his orders and headed north. Arnold Returns In the north calamity followed calamity. On July 7th, at Hubbardton, south of Ticonderoga, British Brigadier l Simon Fraser force's supported by German Major General Baron von Riedesel's Hessians and Indian allies surprised, defeated and scattered one of the two American units retreating from Ticonderoga. American casualties were over fifty percent. Three hundred and twenty four out of six hundred Americans were lost. The second American unit had no better success. Pursued, then forced to burn and destroy their supplies, the five hundred colonial soldiers were driven out of Fort Anne by an advancing force under British Lieutenant Colonel Hill. By the 13th of July St. Clair arrived, with the remnants of his Ticonderoga command, at Fort Edward after a march of one hundred and ten miles. Now the distance of their march on a map might be one hundred and ten miles as a crow flies, but overland in that area of northern New York a hundred and fifty miles would be closer to the mark. This works out to marching approximately 14 to 18 miles a day. Following these engagements Burgoyne assembled his army a mere twenty-three miles north of the Americans at the town of Skenesboro (now renamed Whitehall) on July 9th. Burgoyne's army, approximately 7,000 regulars not counting Loyalist or Indians, was nothing short of awesome against the handful of American troops. Facing them were the combined armies General Philip Schuyler's and St. Clair's -- the ragtag American force did not exceed a total of 4,000 men composed of untrained militia and shaken Continental soldiers. At Skenesboro Burgoyne was faced with making the decision of his career. How he should advance his to Albany? The Grand Strategy called for his army to sail down the entire length of Lake George after the capture of Fort Ticonderoga. Then a relatively simple portage of ten miles would have placed his army on the Hudson River with a clear passage to Albany. Burgoyne, however, had let events over take this plan by encouraging his forces to pursue the retreating defenders of Ticonderoga off the beaten path into what was then a wilderness. Burgoyne now chose to modify the plan. He would have his troops build a road while they advanced south the route to follow Wood Creek through the twenty-two miles of virgin forest to Fort Anne. The camp followers, personal baggage and sufficient supplies would also accompany this force. His artillery, with the remaining supplies, would return to Lake George and sail that route south. Burgoyne was now within sixty miles of Albany, where he planned to join up with St. Ledger and Howe. The combined army, under Howe's command, would now subjugate the New England rebels. The Battle of the Axes The American military's little known response to the invasion at this point was to become called "The Battle of the Axes". Who ordered it, when it began even at this is time is not clear. There are hazy references yet no firm documentation. Yet the campaign occurred for even the British recorded the impact of the operation. Someone, perhaps Schuyler, perhaps Arnold, issued the order which sent about one thousand men, their wagons, oxen and axes into the twenty three miles of wilderness separating the American forces and Burgoyne's invading army. The mission, slow Burgoyne's advance and buy time. The operation was incredibly effective. Whether it was five hundred or a thousand men or when it began or ended is not important. Burgoyne's troops could hear chopping, trees falling, found streams bursting above their banks, swamps where fields had been, and bridges gone. The unusual amount of rain that month of July only added to Burgoyne's woes. Burgoyne remained at Skenesboro enjoying himself while his road was complete blissfully unaware of the snag in his plans. He arrived at Fort Edwards which the Americans had previously abandoned, on July 29th. It had taken his troops approximately twenty grueling, irreplaceable days to advance twenty-two miles and it would cost Burgoyne the campaign. Only two days before July 27th, an atrocity occurred which rallied all Americans against the British. The Murder of Jane McCrea Young, beautiful Jane McCrea was on her way to meet her fiancée, a Loyalist Lieutenant, planning to marry him that evening. Near Fort Edwards, Burgoyne's Indians murdered and scalped her. Rather than be outraged, Burgoyne ordered the Indians rewarded for the scalp with the standard British payment, a keg of rum! The news was electric. In a short time the word had spread to even the smallest settlements in New York, Maine, Vermont and western Massachusetts. One recent author said it best: "The slaying of Jane McCrea was, to the people of New York, what the battle of Lexington was to the New England Colonies." Within days the American ranks swelled. They would continue to join over the next few months as the harvest was brought in, all vowing to protect their women. More bad news reached Burgoyne, He received word from Governor Clinton of New York that General Howe had sailed with his army from New York City on the 23rd of July to attack Philadelphia. Clinton was left with only a token occupation force in the city. Burgoyne neglected to share this unwelcome information with his staff. On Howe's sailing, Washington released sent General Schuyler two Regiments of Continentals and Colonel Daniel Morgan's five hundred riflemen to support the northern defense. Washington also endorsed Schuyler's plans to harass Burgoyne's rear. Two events occurred on August 11th., Burgoyne still at Fort Edward, acted on intelligence received that rebel supplies and a large number of horses were inadequately guarded at Bennington, Vermont, to his southeast. He ordered a force comprised of eight hundred Hessians, Indians and Loyalists under the command of the German Lieutenant Colonel Blaum to proceed to Bennington and seize everything. On that same day Schuyler learned Burgoyne's subordinate commander, St. Ledger, had laid siege to Fort Stanwick at the western end of the Mohawk River Valley. Schuyler ordered an expedition to raise the siege of Fort Stanwick. Arnold, the only officer to volunteer for the assignment, immediately led eight hundred volunteers to challenge St. Ledger's forces. Then on August 14th, Schuyler was relieved of command of the Northern Army by the direct order of Congress for the loss of Fort Ticonderoga. The man, who replaced him as Commander, Gates, had in fact manipulated Schuyler's downfall. Washington had refused to issue this order. The Bennington Force Is Crushed In two engagements on August 16th, the Americans virtually destroyed the Hessians, their supporting allies, and another column of Burgoyne's Hessian troops sent to their aid. Unfortunately for the Hessians, the Americans were prepared for them and were commanded by an outstanding leader, John Stark. A former Ranger under Roger during the French and Indian War, Stark had seen action at Breeds Hill in Boston. He had resigned his commission on March 22, 1777, another casualty of Congress, after they continued to pass him over for promotion. Stark was ably supported in these actions by nearby militias led by men of great ability. Stark took command of the defenders only when assured it was independent from Congress. He organized and executed the action, which destroyed Burgoyne's thrust to the east. By the evening of August 16th, Lieutenant Colonel Blaum was mortally wounded, his force destroyed along with a substantial number of the five hundred and fifty reinforcements rushed to his aid. The final figures on Burgoyne's losses at the two battles of Bennington were devastating. The Hessians lost two hundred-seven dead with seven hundred taken prisoner. The number is believed accurate as compensation for all Hessian soldiers lost had to be paid to their respective Prince. There has never been an accounting for Indians or Loyalists lost in the two engagements. American casualties amounted to thirty dead, forty wounded. After darkness the surviving Hessians assembled in a field. Their drummers began to beat their drums while the survivors stood beside them. This signal, well known in Europe, indicated they surrendered. Blind to the signal though ignorance the Americans ignored it. The Hessians finally gave up their effort and straggled back to the British lines. There is no reference on the American side that these Hessian soldiers performed with anything but absolute bravery. On the contrary, one unit, out of ammunition, charged the American line with sabers and succeeding in breaking out. The Hessian mistake was to confuse Rebels posing as Loyalists while their positions were surrounded. Both German commanders had questioned the logic of General Burgoyne's orders and only set out on their mission after being reassured of total support and accuracy of the intelligence. Burgoyne had not recovered from the losses of one seventh of his army at Bennington when within a week he learned St. Ledger had abandoned the field to General Arnold on August 23d at Fort Stanwick. Five days later General Burgoyne received the news his army was cut off from Canada and was out on a limb. Burgoyne then decided to await news of promised support from Clinton in New York City. General Arnold rejoined the Northern Army the first week of September after driving St. Ledger back to Canada. On his arrival he found General Gates in command and the army in an extremely vulnerable location. Finding an ally in Gates' talented engineering staff officer, Colonel Kosciuszko, both convinced Gates the army's present position was untenable. Authorized by Gates they located an excellent blocking defensive position some miles north at Saratoga on Bemis Heights. Properly fortified and garrisoned it would block any British advance. Gates bought the idea and ordered it be done. Arnold and Kosciuszko worked together. While Kosciuszko designed the defenses and supervised their construction, Arnold planned for the deployment of the forces available. Not to sound Biblical but for seven days and seven nights seven thousand Americans toiled to complete an awesome defense work. When finished it was anchored on the east by the bluffs of the Hudson River, went west one mile then north one mile. Battle of Saratoga Simon Fraser We Have Met The Enemy and He Is Us Why Build a Road Through the Wilderness? Three British Generals Ticonderoga's Fatal Flaw Battle of Saratoga Jumbo Map (very slow: 349K) More Benedict Arnold Part 1: Early Activities Part 2: Invasion of Canada Part 3: The Battle of Valcour Island Part 4: Prelude to Saratoga Part 5: Battle of Saratoga Back to Cry Havoc #28 Table of Contents Back to Cry Havoc List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1999 by David W. Tschanz. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com