by David Nilsen and Greg Novak
IRAQI TABLES OF ORGANIZATIONThe Iraqi Army that invaded Kuwait had extensive experience fighting one of the most appallingly futile wars in history: one which accomplished none of its aims, moved no more than 40 miles the entire time, and took eight years to do so. It is remarkable that Saddam would believe that a war so monumentally unsuccessful could provide any useful lessons on the proper conduct of warfare, but believe it he did. Saddam apparently believed that the dubious reputation he had earned in that war would allow him to bluff the weenie Coalition into accepting his fait accompli, or failing that, his mastery of attrition-based meatgrinder warfare would enable him to bleed the Coalition forces to the point where he could cut a deal to end the war. That he would have to fight a war of maneuver, coupled with the effects of a well-directed air war, seems never to have occurred to him. The mind boggles. When looking at a country which had more tanks per capita than any other nation in the world, it is easy to miss the important fact that the Iraqi Army was first and foremost a leg infantry army. Of the estimated 71 army (not counting the Republican Guard) divisions, 63 were infantry. These infantry divisions were designed to hold ground, and lacked the transportation to maneuver once in place. This positional character held sway throughout the Iraqi Army, as even its nominally mobile motorized and mechanized units typically adopted a cantonment approach, rather than being organized to maintain steady movement. In an effort to give this infantry army a force that could be used to move and counterattack, the Iraqi Army created the "Commando" units. These were similar in concept to the German Stosstruppen ("shock troops") of WWI. These units drew the best trained and equipped infantry, and varied in size based on the echelon of the unit to which it was assigned: companies for brigades (or an entire division for low-grade infantry units), battalions for brigades or divisions, sometimes up to a full brigade for a mobile or Republican Guard division. These units were carried in trucks or APCs, giving them the ability to maneuver as needed. These units were used as spearhead units in the attack, as mobile reserves or counter-attack forces, rear-area security, and, when necessary, as "stiffeners" to ensure the loyalty of the troops around them (giving rise to the stories of the Iraqi execution units). I have adopted the US Army's practice of distinguishing between Iraqi "commando" and "special forces" units, although these terms are used interchangeably in most Gulf War accounts. While commando is used here to refer to the elite light infantry units organic to division formations and below, special forces is used to describe the independent brigades (as many as 10) that were credited with being trained for special operations in the enemy rear such as helicopter assaults, paradrops, amphibious operations, etc. It is this training that makes them distinct from the commandos, and requires them to be allocated at corps level or higher. Depending upon the source, there is considerable overlap between units which are assessed generally as special forces, specifically described as naval infantry/marines or airmobile, or are lumped together with the elite infantry commandos. In view of reports that new commando units were being raised (the source of the "six special forces divisions" mentioned above) to ensure loyalty in army units and the civilian populace, it is likely that an Iraqi corps might have commando as well as special forces brigades assigned to it. Because of their similarity, these brigades are treated as having the same organizations. The Republican Guard was the Iraqi elite striking force, and explicitly owed its allegiance to Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party. Its eight divisions were named as well as numbered, and comprised two armored divisions, two mechanized divisions, three motorized divisions, and a Special Forces Division (which was likely an administrative holding unit for special forces brigades under Guard control). An additional five Republican Guard divisions were announced as being raised during the war, including the Al-Abed, Al-Mustafa, and AnNidala Divisions, but none of these ever had any effect on anything. The units had the best equipment and manpower that the Iraqi Army had, and were the backbone of Saddam Hussein's regime. Following the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq began the recall and mobilization of its reserve units: usually counted as one reserve armored division and 14 reserve infantry divisions. Some sources go as high as 34 infantry divisions, but much of this variation can be attributed to the brigade/division equivalents confusion discussed earlier. I am convinced that there is little utility in attempting to distinguish between regular and reserve infantry divisions, at least in the Kuwait theater. First of all, the variation in configuration between any two infantry divisions is sufficiently great to blur any meaningful distinctions between regular and reserve divisions (for example, note the putative 47th "reserve" infantry division, augmented with attached brigades to 200 pieces of artillery and almost as many tanks). Second, units that were originally assessed as being reserve or conscript divisions were later assessed by in-theater intelligence as being units with long service as effective counter-insurgency troops (for example, the 45th Infantry Division). Third, there is every reason to speculate that a recalled reserve formation is more effective than a regular unit augmented up to strength by last-minute conscripts (drafted under protest, with at least two of them being American citizens). Finally, it appears that much of this mobilized force was not deployed by division, but rather as separate brigades which were parcelled out one each to the front-line infantry units in southern Kuwait (these are the high-numbered brigades in the III Corps breakdowns on page 42). For these reasons, Iraqi divisions in the Kuwait theater are not differentiated as reserve or regular divisions, although these distinctions are retained for the nominal rosters outside of the theater. For CD/CA players and referees, assembling an Iraqi force will be something of an exercise in creativity, even with the OBs below. No two Iraqi divisions were alike, and the exact details will never be known. The organizations below are a jumping-off point, and should be used as such. For example, Iraqi doctrine called for regular army mech and armored divisions to have an SA-6 battalion, although in reality none of them did. So give them one if you feel like it. The same applies to engineers and attached commando units. This process can also be applied in reverse to create a unit badly mauled by air war bombardment: reduce the number of tanks and infantry stands, but not the amount of artillery-most of this was destroyed by Coalition artillery, not airpower. Players who wish to conduct "what if"experiments with more competent Iraqi forces should add a TOC to each battalion headquarters and/or command stands at the company level. The experience rating and morale ratings of the Iraqi Forces before the start of the air war are as follows:
8th Republican Guard Special Forces Division Regular, Morale: 10
Regular, Morale: 8
Trained, Morale: 7 to Green, Morale: 5 Iraqi Pilots are Regular, Morale: 8 Iraqi Regular Infantry DivisionDivisional Headquarters, with:
Recon Battalion, with:
1 TOC van 1 jeep 2 Recon Companies, each with: 3 recon BRDM-2 or other reconnaissance vehicle 0-1 Field Engineer Battalion, with:
1 jeep 1 earthmover 1 medium supply truck 3 Engineer Companies, each with: 2-3 engineer stands Divisional Air Defense Artillery, with:
1 jeep 1 medium supply truck 3 Batteries, each with:
1 gun crew stand 1 medium truck Antitank Battalion, with:
1 jeep 1 medium supply truck 2-3 Batteries, each with:
1 gun crew stand 1 medium truck or MT-LB 0-1 Company, with: 1 BRDM-2 AT or 1 jeep or VAB with Milan or HOT Tank Battalion, with:
1 maintenance van 1 medium supply truck 1 recon armored car 3 Tank Companies, each with: 2 T-55, T-55+, T-59, or T-62 Commando Battalion, with:
1 APC or jeep 3 Infantry Companies, each with:
2 infantry stands 3 APC or 2 medium trucks Weapons Company, with:
1 weapons stand 1 recoilless rifle (82 to 107mm) 1 gun crew stand (ds) 3 medium trucks 3 Infantry Brigades, each with:
1 TOC van 1 jeep 1 medium supply truck Brigade Mortar Company, with: 1 82mm mortar stand (ds) 3 Infantry Battalions, each with:
3 Infantry Companies, each with: 3 infantry stands and 1 weapons stand Artillery Brigade, with:
3-4 Towed Howitzer Battalions, each with:
1 FO stand 1 jeep, BTR-60PU, or BRDM-2U 1 TOC van 3 Firing Batteries, each with:
1 gun crew stand (ds) 1 medium truck 0-1 Rocket Battery, with:
1 BM-21 MRL 1 medium ammo truck with trailer Notes 1. Organization above represents the "paper" organization of such a division. In actuality, most of these units were missing their field engineer battalion, and the composition of their artillery support varies wildly. 2. Iraqi doctrine called for 14.5mm AAA (ZPU-2 or -4) and 37mrr AAA to be allocated at the battalion level, defending the battalion headquarters. These systems were available to the front-line infantry units (with the divisional ADA), and were used doctrinally. 3. Iraqi doctrine called for SA-9 or -13 SAMs to be allocated at the brigade level, along with ZSU-23-4s. However, these systems were not available in infantry divisions, requiring S-60 57mm guns to be used in their place at the brigade level. 4. Iraqi doctrine called for SA-6 SAMs to be used at the division level. As these were not available to infantry units, they were required to use S-60s at the division level as well. 5. If division is given four tube battalions, do not give it the rocket battery. 6. For the Divisional Recon Battalion, vehicles may also be jeeps/ white Toyota pickup trucks with HMGs. Iraqi Reserve Infantry DivisionDivisional Headquarters, with:
Recon Company, with:
Divisional Air Defense Artillery, with:
1 jeep 1 medium supply truck 3 Batteries, each with:
1 gun crew stand 1 medium truck Antitank Battalion, with:
1 jeep 1 medium supply truck 3 Batteries, each with:
1 gun crew stand 1 medium truck Tank Battalion, with:
1 maintenance van 1 medium supply truck 1 recon armored car 3 Tank Companies, each with: 2 T-55, T-55+, T-59, or T-62 Commando Company, with:
2 infantry stands 1 weapons stand 2 medium trucks 3 Infantry Brigades, each with:
1 TOC van 1 jeep Brigade Mortar Company, with: 1 82mm mortar stand (ds) 3 Infantry Battalions, each with:
3 Infantry Companies, each with:
0-1 weapons stand Artillery Brigade, with:
1 TOC van 2 medium supply trucks 1-3 Towed Howitzer Battalions, each with:
1 FO stand 1 jeep 1 TOC van 1-3 Firing Batteries, each with:
1 gun crew stand (ds) 1 medium truck Notes 1. The organization above is intended to portray an infantry division rather lower in the pecking order. Where ranges are given for the number of various units, this portrays the natural variation in these units in the Iraqi Army. To simulate losses due to desertion during the air war, furtherreduce the number of stands, particularly in the artillery batteries and infantry companies. 2. Iraqi doctrine called for 14.5mm AAA (ZPU-2 or -4) and 37mm AAA to be allocated at the battalion level, defending the battalion headquarters. These systems were available to the front-line infantry units (with the divisional ADA), and were used doctrinally. 3. Iraqi doctrine called for SA-9 or -13 SAMs to be allocated at the brigade level, along with ZSU-23-4s. However, these systems were not available in infantry divisions, requiring S-60 57mm guns to be used in their place at the brigade level. 4. Iraqi doctrine called for SA-6 SAMs to be used at the division level. As these were not available to infantry units, they were required to use S-60s at the division level as well. 5. For the Divisional Recon Battalion, vehicles may also be jeeps/ white Toyota pickup trucks with HMGs. Iraqi Mechanized Infantry DivisionDivisional Headquarters, with:
1 TOC van 1 jeep Recon Battalion, with:
1 TOC van 1 BTR-50 2 Recon Companies, each with: 3 recon BRDM-2 or other reconnaissance vehicle Field Engineer Battalion,, with:
1 earthmover 2 medium supply trucks 3 Engineer Companies, each with:
2 medium trucks or 2-3 engineer vehicles Bridging Platoon, with: 1 MM AVLB Divisional Air Defense Artillery,, with:
1 BTR-60PU 1 TOC van 3 Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions, each with:
1 jeep 1 medium supply truck 3 Batteries, each with:
1 gun crew stand 1 medium truck SP AA Battalion, with:
1 jeep 1 medium supply truck 2 Batteries, each with: 1 ZSU-23 1-3 SA-9 Battalions, each with:
1 jeep 1 medium supply truck 2 Batteries, each with:
1 SA-9 Antitank Battalion, with:
1 jeep 1 medium supply truck 3 Companies, each with: 2 BRDM-2 AT or 2 jeeps or VAB with Milan or HOT Commando Battalion, with:
1 TOC van 1 APC 1 recon armored car
2 infantry stands 1 weapons stand 4 APC
1 BRDM-2 AT 1 gun crew stand (ds) 1 107mm RR 2 medium trucks 2 Mechanized Infantry Brigades, each with:
1 TOC van 1 jeep 1 MTP-LB ARV 1 medium supply truck Brigade Recon Platoon, with: 1 recon BRDM-2 or other reconnaissance vehicle Brigade Mortar Company, with:
1 gun crew stand (ds) 1 medium truck or MT-LB Tank Battalion, with:
1 maintenance van 1 medium supply truck 1 recon armored car 3 Tank Companies, each with: 2 T-55, T-55+, T-59, T-62 or T-69 3 Mechanized Infantry Battalions, each with:
1 TOC van 1 APC 1 recon armored car 3 Infantry Companies, each with:
2 infantry stands 1 weapons stand 3 APC 1 medium truck Weapons Company, with:
1 BRDM-2 AT or VAB/HOT 1 gun crew stand (ds) 1 107mm RR 2 medium trucks Tank Brigade, with:
1 TOC van 1 jeep 1 T-54T ARV 1 medium supply truck Brigade Recon Platoon, with: 1 recon BRDM-2 or other reconnaissance vehicle Brigade Mortar Company, with: 1 MT-LB SP 120mm mortar 3 Tank Battalions, each with:
1 maintenance van 1 medium supply truck 1 recon armored car 3 Tank Companies, each with: 2 T-55, T-55+, T-59, T-62 or T-69 Mechanized Infantry Battalion, with:
1 TOC van 1 APC 1 recon armored car 3 Infantry Companies, each with:
2 infantry stands 1 weapons stand 3 APC 1 medium truck Weapons Company, with:
1 BRDM-2 AT or VAB/HOT 1 gun crew stand (ds) 1 107mm RR 2 medium trucks Artillery Brigade, with:
1 TOC van 3 heavy supply trucks SP Howitzer Battalion, with:
1 FO stand 1 ACRV-2/2 1 ACRV-2/1 TOC 3 Firing Batteries, each with: 1 2S3 SP 152mm or 2S1 SP 122mmhowitzer 3 Towed Howitzer Battalions, each with:
1 FO stand 1 BTR-60PU or BRDM-2U 1 TOC van 3 Firing Batteries, each with:
1 gun crew stand (ds) 1 medium truck or MT-LB Towed Howitzer Battalion, with:
1 FO stand 1 BTR-60PU or BRDM-2U 1 TOC van 3 Firing Batteries, each with:
1 gun crew stand (ds) 1 medium truck or MT-LB Rocket Battalion, with:
1 FO stand 1 BTR-60PU or BRDM-2U 1 TOC van 2 medium ammo trucks with trailers 3 Firing Batteries, each with:
1 medium ammo truck with trailer Notes 1. Iraqi Regular Army armored divisions are treated as having identical organizations to that shown above, except that the number of mech and tank brigades are reversed. 2. Iraqi doctrine called for 14.5mm AAA (ZPU-2 or -4) and 37mm AAA to be allocated at the battalion level, defending the battalion headquarters. These systems were available to all units (with the divisional ADA), and were used doctrinally. 3. Iraqi doctrine called for SA-9 or -13 SAMs to be allocated at the brigade level, along with ZSU-23s. These systems were available to mechanized and armored divisions, and were used according to doctrine at the brigade level. 4. Iraqi doctrine called for SA-6 SAMs to be used at the division level. These were available only in Republican Guard units, requiring the use of S-60 57mm guns, SA-9/13 SAMs, and/or ZSU-23s at the division level in the non-RG mechanized and armored divisions. Iraqi Armored DivisionAs the Mechanized Infantry Division above except it has two tank brigades and one mechanized infantry brigade. Marine BrigadeBrigade Headquarters, with:
1 TOC van 1 jeep 1 medium supply truck Brigade Mortar Company, with:
1 gun crew stand (ds) 1 medium truck Assault Engineer Company, with:
1 engineer stand 1 engineer stand with flamethrowers 3 EE-11 APC 3 Special Forces Battalions, each with:
1 TOC van 1 EE-11 APC 1 recon armored car 3 Infantry Companies, each with:
2 infantry stands 3 EE-11 APC Weapons Company, with:
1 BRDM-2 AT or VAB/HOT 1 gun crew stand (ds) 1 107mm RR 2 medium trucks Towed Howitzer Battalion, with:
1 FO stand 1 jeep or BRDM-2U 1 TOC van 3 Firing Batteries, each with:
1 gun crew stand (ds) 1 medium truck Notes 1. The Iraqi Army is variously reported to have had from three to seven or eight Marine or Naval Infantry brigades, plus one Marine brigade under RGFC control. This presumably includes special forces brigades which are trained for amphibious operations as discussed earlier. The organization above is a guess; all that is known for sure is that the Marines use the Brazilian EE- 11 Urutu amphibious APC. 2. The RGFC's Marine brigade is said to be almost the size of a division. Treat it as three Marine brigades as above, plus the same supporting units as an Infantry Division. CORPS TROOPSEach corps in the Kuwait area had one to two corps artillery brigades, consisting of a mixture of 122mm howitzers, 130mm guns, 152mm howitzers, and 155 mm guns. Additional corps assets consisted of one or two special forces and/or commando brigades, two to three combat engineer battalions, a corps air defense brigade, recon battalion, and an army aviation wing. Corps Artillery Brigadewith: Brigade Headquarters, with: Target Acquisition Battalion, with:
1 FO stand 1 BTR-60PU or BRDM-2U 1 TOC van 2 Sound Locating Batteries, each with: 1 sound locating stand 1 medium truck 2 Radar Locating Batteries, each with: 1 radar locating van 3-5 Towed Gun/Howitzer Battalions, each with:
1 FO stand 1 BTR-60PU or BRDM-2U 1 TOC van 3 Firing Batteries, each with:
1 gun crew stand (ds) 1 medium truck or MT-LB Rocket Battalion, with:
1 FO stand 1 BTR-60PU or BRDM-2U 1 TOC van 2 medium ammo trucks with trailers 3 Firing Batteries, each with:
1 medium ammo truck with trailer Notes Corps Recon Battalionwith:
1 TOC van 1 BTR-50 2 Recon Companies, each with: 3 recon BRDM-2 or other reconnaissance vehicles Special Forces/Commando BrigadeBrigade Headquarters, with:
Brigade Mortar Company, with:
Assault Engineer Company, with:
3 Special Forces/Commando Battalions, each with:
1 TOC van 1 APC 1 recon armored car or BMD 3 Infantry Companies, each with:
2 infantry stands 3 APC, 2 medium trucks, or 6 BMD Weapons Company, with:
1 BRDM-2 AT or VAB/HOT 1 gun crew stand (ds) 1 107mm RR 2 medium trucks Towed Howitzer Battalion, with:
1 FO stand 1 jeep or BRDM-2U 1 TOC van 3 Firing Batteries, each with:
1 gun crew stand (ds) 1 medium truck Notes 1. The above organization is used to represent commando (elite light infantry) brigades attached to divisions or corps as well as special forces brigades, trained for special operations such as paradrops, helicopter assaults, amphibious operations, etc. 2. If the above organization is to represent a helicopter airmobile brigade, the recon armored cars and APCs should use the BMD option listed with them. Corps Air Defense Brigade
1 command stand 1 BTR-60PU 1 TOC van 3 heavy supply trucks 3 Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions, each with:
1 jeep 1 medium supply truck 3 Batteries, each with:
1 gun crew stand 1 medium truck SAM Battalion, with:
1 jeep 1 medium supply truck 3 Batteries, each with:
Notes
Corps Army Aviation Wing
1 TOC van 1 BTR-60PU 2 medium supply trucks 2-4 Attack Helicopter Squadrons, each with:
3-4 Mi-24, SA 316, SA-342, or BO 105 1-2 Transport Helicopter Squadrons, each with:
1 Mi-6 3 Mi-8/17 Notes 1. Iraqi doctrine called for the use of mixed three-helicopter hunterkiller teams: one Mi-24 "battle captain," one missile-armed Gazelle, and one rocket-armed BO 105, which would imply that each squadron was a mix of these three types. However, Iraq also used pure NE-24 teams (four or more aircraft each) for barrage rocket attacks. Therefore the composition of the squadrons above is open to interpretation, especially since the Hinds are used in both mixed and pure roles. In the final analysis, however, Iraqi Army Aviation had no impact on the course of the war, making these questions somewhat academic. 2. Transport squadron(s) is used for corps logistics, or to allow airmobile assaults with the corps' special forces brigade(s). Combat Engineer BattalionsBattalion Headquarters, with:
3 Engineer Companies, each with:
Bridging Company, with:
Notes 1. Iraqi division-level engineer units were conspicuous by their absence in the Gulf War, leaving the bulk of the work to be done by corps-level assets. Even these units were not equipped up to their proper standards, and this lack was evident in the quality of the Iraqi defensive positions which were too shallow, not sited to provide interlocking fire or mutual support, and with insufficient overhead cover. Although it has been observed that the Iraqis were experts at fighting World War I all over again, the sad fact is that they were not even good at that.
1991 Persian Gulf War Supplement Part 2
Iraqi Forces CA TO&E Iraqi Air Force and Navy CA TO&E Iraqi Army CA TO&E Iraqi Republican Guard CA TO&E Sources Back to Table of Contents -- Command Post Quarterly # 5 To Command Post Quarterly List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1994 by Greg Novak. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |