by Greg Novak and Frank Chadwick
Along the Israeli Syrian border, the division between the two sides was known as the "Purple Line" in honor of the color in which it was drawn on the UN map of the area. The Golani Brigade established 17 strong points along this border, as well as building an antitank ditch along most of it. Each of these strongpoints was designed to be held by a platoon of infantry and a platoon of tanks, and was backed up with series of tank ramps from which additional tanks could be brought up to support the position. The Israelis made the basic assumption that they would always have advance warning of any Syrian attack, and their troops would be in position when the Syrian attack came. These strongpoints were designed to be serve as a trip wire for the early detection of any Syrian attack, and were not seen as a permanent defense line. The lack of depth in the Golan position meant that the trip wire had to be placed right on the border. During the Yom Kippur War only four of the seventeen were overrun by the Syrians, while the other thirteen held out until relieved. In CD terms, each strongpoint would have a tank, a strongpoint stand, and a M-3 halftrack, and should be modeled by a bunker surrounded by wire and a minefield, and having a pair of tank ramps for the protection of the vehicles. The Israeli position on the Suez Front presented a different problem. There, the issue was whether to hold a front line position under the guns of the Egyptian Army, or fall back and take up a position back from the canal edge. Due to the fact that the spoil from the Canal's dredging operations had been placed on the east bank for the last hundred years, the Israelis found themselves unable to resist the lure of a prebuilt 180 meter anti-tank ditch, backed by a berm 20 meters high that ran most of the length of the canal, and which was unclimbable by any amphibious vehicle that could swim the canal. In the end the Israelis built a series of 33 strongpoints that covered the 110 kilometer length of the canal. The goal of these strongpoints, as in the Golan Heights, was to serve as the tripwire which would help prevent the Egyptians from crossing the canal. The Israeli fear was that a small Egyptian force would cross, seize a bridgehead, and call for a ceasefire. To prevent this, a series of roads was built to allow the Israeli troops to shuttle quickly from point to point, and tank ramps built along the length of the sand ramparts. If the Egyptians attempted to cross, the Israeli plan was to rush their armor forward and catch the Egyptians while attempting to cross the Canal. Again, the Israelis made the basic assumption that they would always have advance warning of any Egyptian attack and that the armor would be in position when the attack came. In honor of the Chief of Staff at the time, Lieutenant General Haim Bar Lev, the line was named after him. During the Fourth War, the "War of Attrition", the Israelis took more casualties holding the Bar Lev line then they did during the entire "Six Day War". After it ended the new commander of the Southern Front, Major General Ariel Sharon, ordered half of the strongpoints closed. Sharon's view was that Southern Command should let the Egyptians cross, and move inland out of the protection of their artillery and air defense weapons. Then, the Israeli counterattack would crush the Egyptians back against the Canal, and continue on to Cairo. The debate over the value of the strongpoints continued on to the start of the Yom Kippur War. The new commander of the Southern Front, Major General Shmuel Gonen, ordered the closed strongpoints reopened, but little was done prior to the start of the war. When the Egyptian attack broke out, only at a few points did the tanks make it up to the Canal to support the defenders. To make matters worse, in order to release the normal defenders of the canal from their positions for the Yom Kippur holiday, the strongpoints were manned at a low level by elements of a reserve infantry battalion from the 116th (Jerusalem) Infantry Brigade. In CD terms, each strongpoint would have a strongpoint stand, and a M-3 halftrack, and should be modeled by several bunkers surrounded by wire and a minefield, and having a tank ramp on either side, plus an additional one for the garrison's M-3 halftrack. The War of the Generals One last point on the performance of the ZAHAL in the 1973 War was the so called "War of the Generals". Due to the ZAHAL:s policy of recycling retired officers back into divisional command, the chain of command within Southern Command broke down soon after the start of the War. As mentioned, Major General Shmuel Gonen was the commander of Southern Command, having been appointed to that post in July of 1973, succeeding Major General Ariel Sharon, his former commander. With the outbreak of war on October 6th, both Major General Ariel Sharon and Major General Avraham Adan were sent to the Sinai with their reserve divisions to reinforce Southern command. As the former commander of the Armor Corps, Adan had also served as Gonen's commander and had been the commander of the Southern Front who had set up the Bar Lev line, after which he turned command over to Sharon. A war between the generals soon broke out as Gonen found himself unable to order his two new commanders to work together. Even when Lieutenant General Haim Bar Lev was returned to the active duty and sent to the Sinai to take command of the Suez Canal Front, the fighting between the generals continued. Sharon was determined to be the first Israeli commander to cross the Canal, and he was willing to do what he could to carry out that mission. There are some interesting possibilities here for wargamers to duplicate. The Israeli Defense Forces Yom Kippur War
Air Corps (Hel Avrir) Ground Corps Parachute and Infantry Corps Divisions Commands Bar Lev Line and the Purple Line Israeli Order of Battle Appendix 3: CD Israeli Data Charts for 1973 Back to Table of Contents -- Command Post Quarterly # 13 To Command Post Quarterly List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1997 by Greg Novak. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com |