The Fall of the Rock
Corregidor: May 5/6th 1942

Referee's Notes

by Greg Novak

1. The game starts at 11 PM on the 5th, and continues until at 0900 AM on the 6th. From 1100 to 0700, turns are one half hour instead of the normal 15 minutes, as per the night rules. From 0700 to 0900, the turns revert to the normal 15-minute turns. The normal night rules on reducing morale and troop quality are not in effect, they have already been factored into the troop ratings. Do not readjust the troop ratings at dawn, as the troops have been awake all night.

2. The Japanese choose to land during a full moon. Visibility on land is set at 4", visibility at sea is 16". Stands within 2" of the coast may attempt to spot out to seaward the full 16". Landing boats are considered to be moving in the open, but all spotting attempts are with a -6 modifier.

For the 0600 and 0630 turn, increase visibility to 30", at 0700, visibility becomes 60".

3. The American bombardment of the North Channel was extremely effective in spite of the fact that it was carried outby blind fire. For each landing craft that moves between Bataan and Corregidor, or Corregidor and Bataan, roll 1D6. A 1-4 has no effect, a 5 is one hit on the landing craft and as well as one of the stands being carried. A 6 causes two hits on the landing craft, and two hits on the stands being carried. These rolls are made before the landing craft enter the board. Note that a landing craft that sails from Bataan to Corregidor, back to Bataan, and then back to Corregidor, will be attacked three different times. Two hits damage a landing craft, which means it may not be used again during the game, though it will complete the voyage that it is on. Four hits sink a landing craft. Craft which are in contact with land and which are sunk, still land the personnel stands, but lose any weapons or vehicles that they are transporting. Craft that are sunk in the channel are lost with all stands/vehicles that they are carrying. If any Japanese landing craft move south of Hookers Point, a second die roll is made for damage to reflect the fact that additional fire was present there from the southern forts.

4. For each Japanese landing boat, the referee needs to roll 1D6 twice. The first roll determines the actual entrance of that boat. On a roll of a 1 or 2, shift the boat one foot to the left. On a roll of a 3 or 4, it arrives at its chosen entry point. On a roll of a 5 or 6, it arrives on board one foot to the right of its entrance point. The second die roll indicates the arrival time of the board. On a 1 to 4, it arrives at the chosen time. On a 5 or 6, it arrives thirty minutes later than planned.

5. Victory is determined by the following conditions:

    Decisive American Victory: Japanese driven back into the sea
    Tactical American Victory: Japanese ashore, but their advance held to the area about Kindley Field.
    Draw: Japanese ashore, and in control of the island from the east end of Kindley Field, to a line due north across the island at Battery Maxwell Keyes.
    Tactical Japanese Victory: Japanese ashore, and in control of the island from the east end of Kindley Field, to the top and west slope of Water Tank Hill.
    Decisive Japanese Victory: Japanese ashore, and in control of the entire tail of the island.

Additional Notes

One of the most interesting things about this action is the total amount of artillery in the area, and the fact that neither side was able to make any effective use of it. The Japanese were unable to communicate with their batteries back on Bataan, while the American defenders had never thought about setting up a fire control plan to allow for fire on the invaders once they were ashore. Historically, this was a rather bitter infantry fight, which ended in a Japanese Tactical Victory, and the surrender of Corregidor on the 6th as a result. The fact that the Japanese had gotten a platoon of tanks ashore at the end of the battle helped convince General Wainwright to surrender, as there were no antitank weapons present on the island.

The absence of any staff stands is deliberate. The American communications network was badly damaged by the pre-invasion bombardment, while the Japanese plan of invasion fell apart fron the start, with landing craft arriving on the wrong beach and in the wrong order. What command control existed was very local, hence no staff stands to help straighten things out.

To help balance the scenario, there are several what ifs that can be added to the American Order of Battle to help things out:

1. There were two battalions of American light tanks present on Bataan. There had been some discussion on bringing a platoon of M-3 tanks to Corregidor to aid in the defense, but action was never taken. Allow the Regimental Reserve to arrive with a self ordering M-3 Light tank.

2. In the same manner, there existed on Bataan the Self Propelled Artillery Group, which was armed with the M-3 GMC 75. Again, some discussion had been made on transferring one or more batteries of these weapons to Bataan to use for beach defense, but no action was taken. Options would be to allow the regimental reserve to arrive with two self-ordering M-3 GMC (75)s in place of the M-3 tank, or allow one self ordering M-3 GMC (75) to start the game at Monkey Point. What is referred to as the twin pillboxes there was in reality the Naval Radio Intercept Tunnel, a rather large concrete lined tunnel complex. This was the prewar facility for US Navy's Asiatic Fleet's codebreakers and as they and their equipment had been evacuated off Corregidor by submarine, it was open for use by the defenders. If used by the M-GMC for shelter, do not allow any other stands to use this facility as pillbox. The M-3 may not fire from within the tunnel.

Bibliography

Hold High the Torch, A History of the 4th Marines, Kenneth W. Condit and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Headquarters, USMC, Washington, 1960.
Corregidor, The Saga of a Fortress, James H and William M. Belote, Harper & Row, New York, 1967.
The US Army in WWII, The Fall of the Philippines, Louis Morton, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington DC 1953.

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© Copyright 1993 by Greg Novak.
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