For further examination, it is necessary to discuss each branch of the
Mexican Army separately, beginning with the infantry. The appearance of the
Mexican infantry was impressive. There are many accounts of how the
American soldiers were awed by the handsome array of Santa Anna's Army at
Buena Vista; even if some jested that the brilliantly uniformed Mexicans were
"too pretty to shoot." [30]
The uniforms represented a gaudy rainbow of colors. The uniform regulations
were those issued July 10, 1839, which had been revoked in 1840, but declared
in force again on December 22, 1841. [31]
Most of the infantry were dressed in "turkish blue" tailcoats and pants, with various colors of facings, and brass buttons. [32]
No two regiments had the same color combinations. Each man wore a pair of
white cross belts to support his cartridge box and infantry sword (light infantry
and Guard Grenadiers wore black belts). The headgear consisted of stovepipe
shakos with brass bands, chinscales and insignia. All shakos were topped with a
red pompom except for riflemen, who were identified by green pom-poms, and
grenadiers had white. An additional distinction forthese elite companies was a
yellow "flash" on each cuff. The elite companies in units composed entirely of
riflemen or grenadiers had double flashes on each sleeve.
[33]
Since all troops wore epaulettes, rank distinctions were somewhat
complicated: a corporal had a yellow diagonal stripe on each lower sleeve, a
second sergeant had silk fringe on the right epaulette and first sergeants had
fringe on both epaulettes. Sub-lieutenants wore a gold or silver epaulette on the
left shoulder and lieutenants one on the right. Captains had two such epaulettes.
Lieutenant colonels and colonels were distinguished by red waist sashes and
gold bullion epaulettes, the colonels having a star on theirs. Generals also had
similar epaulettes, with brigade generals wearing dark green sashes, and division
generals sky blue sashes. Only generals and detached officers were allowed to
wear black bicorne hats with red, white and green plumes.
[34]
The major difference between the uniforms of the regulars and the active
militia infantry, was that the latter wore sky blue pants with red piping. Except
for the First Active Regiment of Mexico, which wore the facings of the First
Regular Regiment, the facings of the other active militia were all red with yellow
piping. [35]
The National Guard generally served in gray frock coats with red trim, yellow
epaulettes, and sky blue pants with a yellow stripe. Cross belts were either black
or white. Many National Guards wore French style barracks caps instead of
shakos. These were two-sided blue caps, worn fore-and-aft, with a red tassel and
a red band around the bottom. [36]
A uniform that seemed to be popular among National Guard and militia
officers was a dark blue frock coat, single- or double-breasted, with the collar
and cuffs all red, orjust red on the trim.
[37]
A couple of paintings by James
Walker, a British artist in Mexico during the war, depict a Mexican National Guard
unit wearing a dark blue double-breasted coat with red cuffs, collar, and
epaulettes; a blue barracks cap with red trim; white cross belts; and red pants.
[38]
White jackets and trousers were available for wear in hot climates, and these
were sometimes worn in other areas, because that was all that could be
obtained. [39]
As to the weapons, almost all the infantry carded short infantry swords,
although these were of doubtful practical value in combat. Several types of
muskets were used by the Mexican Army, but the most widely used appears to
have been the British India-pattern Brown Bess musket. This was a.753 caliber
smooth-bore flintlock musket, weighing about twelve
pounds, with a thirty-nine inch long barrel, and a walnut stock with brass fittings.
There was no rear sight. It fired a ball of 1-3/16 ounces, for an effective range
of about one hundred yards. The bayonet was a seventeen-inch, three-sided,
socket bayonet. [40]
At this range, one battalion firing a volley with smooth-bore muskets at
another might hit five men. However, at a short range of thirty to forty yards,
massed fire could inflict 50 percent casualties. Well-drilled troops could fire four
or five rounds per minute, but when the barrel became fouled, firing was
reduced to about one round per minute. [41]
The rifle companies were armed with British Baker flintlock rifles. The thirty-
inch, .625 caliber barrel had seven groove rifling with one turn in 120 inches.
Weighing nine and one-half pounds, the rifle had a pistol grip, brass fittings and
patch box, and sight accurate to two hundred yards. The 350 grain soft lead ball
required a greased patch and had a muzzle velocity of twelve hundred feet per
second. The bayonet was a twentythree inch long broad blade sword bayonet
with a brass handle. The ramrod was heavy, because it required the use of both
hands to force the patched ball down the barrel. Thus, loading was somewhat
slower than the smooth-bore musket. [42]
The Mexican infantry regiments theoretically were composed of two
battalions. Each battalion had six fusilier companies, one rifle company and one
grenadier company. The paper strength of a company was one captain, one
lieutenant, two sub-lieutenants, one first sergeant, four second sergeants, nine
corporals, eighty privates. A fusilier or grenadier company had a drummer,
bugler and fifer, while a rifle company had four buglers instead. The regimental
headquarters staff consisted of a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, a commandant,
two second adjutants, two lieutenants, two ensign-sub-lieutenants, two surgeons,
two chaplains, a drum major, a bugle corporal, two pioneer (sapper) corporals,
with sixteen pioneers and two armorers. [43]
Each battalion carried the Mexican national flag with the unit name lettered in
gold. [44]
There is no mention of second battalions in the orders of battle for the
Mexican Army. There are only a few instances of the strength of a regiment
exceeding the paper strength for a battalion; for example, the Sixth Regular
Infantry Regiment at Cerro Gordo had about nine hundred men. [45]
The Eleventh Line had nine hundred to one thousand men in the Valley of
Mexico. [46]
Whether these were one over-strength battalion or two half-strength
battalions is unknown. Probably the second battalions were skeleton units
serving as replacement depots.
A unique unit was the Grenadier Guards of the Supreme Powers, created in
1841 to serve as an executive guard. The strength of the battalion was 1,200
men in eight companies. Eight departments contributed 150 men each, all of
whom had to be five and one half feet tall. Each company had a captain, four
lieutenants, five sergeants, twelve corporals, two drummers, one bugler, and the
rest privates. The regimental headquarters staff had a colonel, a lieutenant
colonel, three adjutants, an armorer, surgeon, chaplain, drum major, and bugle
corporal. [47]
Just before the war broke out the Fourth Light Infantry Regiment was
created from the Third Regular Infantry. The San Blas Coast Guard battalion
was renamed and uniformed as the Third Regulars. [48]
The active militia, coast guard and National Guard battalion had the same
organization as the regulars, although their strength was somewhat smaller.
[49]
The two elite companies of the coast guard battalions were generally
veterans. [50]
Originally there were nine active militia regiments and eleven coast guard
battalions, but the raising of new units during revolutions had increased this
number to five regiments and sixteen battalions of active militia, and fourteen
coast guard battalions by 1845. [51]
Since the active militia had been in continuous service in pay of the central
government, there was little difference between them and the regular troops.
[52]
The only difference was that the militia had generally remained in garrison
for local defense, instead of serving in the field.
[53]
Thus, they were probably less efficient and less inured to the rigors of
campaigning.
This tendency of the Mexicans to garrison the regular and militia units in
cities seems to have had a debilitating effect on the Mexican Army.
[54]
Although the decades of revolution provided the Mexican Army with combat
experience and built up the endurance of the troops, much of the experience
was the wrong kind. The battles have been described as "mob fights", where the
day was won either with a cavalry charge or bribery.
[55]
More commonly, they seem to have been mostly displays of noise and
power, fought to satisfy honor. The artillery dueled as such long ranges, that
few men were hit. Otis Singletary stated that the Mexican Army "preferred to
fight at long range... and... had little enthusiasm for close work with the
bayonet. [56]
If the revolutions provided a poor sort of combat experience, the training of
the Mexican Army did not adequately prepare it, either. The tactics of the
Mexican Army were somewhat outdated. The regulations and system of tactics
were copied from the tactical manuals of the Spanish Army prior to 1821, but in
practice the regulations were not always applied. [57]
The light infantry were trained in 1814 tactics until 1841, when a new light
infantry manual was issued so that the tactics would be "more adaptable to the
brave Mexican Army [58]
In 1843, the army officially adopted a manual of
simplified line infantry tactics, written by Captain Juan Ordonez, a
Headquarters Staff attache. Possibly the tactics were simplified too much; the
troops never drilled in units larger than brigades, and rarely practiced battle
maneuvers. [59]
If the training was somewhat limited, at least the regular troops were well
drilled. The soldiers of General Gabriel Valencia's Army of the North were
described in Ramon Alcaraz's book:
Their martial bearing, their discipline, their skill in the manual of arms, and
their sunburnt countenances revealed at once that they were the oldest
veterans... and cheerfulness and enthusiasm were seen depicted on every
face in the army. [60]
The regulars performed well under fire, too. Alcaraz described the
deployment of a regular regiment at the battle of Palo Alto: "The 4th regiment of
the line moved forward in good order, in close column. The Americans observed
this, and received it with a very spirited discharge of cannon. The 4th, not
disconcerted, calm amidst the dangerso great, as if on parade, continued its
movement till coming up to the line, where it deployed to the front on the left of
the 10th." [61]
The best Mexican infantry units were the four light infantry regiments.
These seem to have been the veteran troops. The light infantry were trained to
fight in both line and skirmish tactics. [62]
They were probably the best trained and disciplined soldiers in the Mexican
Army. Their comparatively plain and simple uniform reflected the sober
efficiency of veteran troops.
Of course, not all of the army were veterans of this caliber. There were
many auxiliaries, National Guards, militia, and recruits who joined the army. For
example, in the Buena Vista campaign three of Santa Anna's eight brigades were
described as "raw" or "undisciplined". [63]
These troops were given as much training as time allowed, but it was not
enough to make them really effective troops. Although they often were capable
of fighting well in defensive positions, as at Churubusco, Molino Del Rey and
Capultepec, they were ineffective in the attack.
Shortcoming
The most serious shortcoming in the training of the Mexican Army was the
lack of instruction and practice in firing. The people were not familiar with
firearms, because the Mexican government prohibited the citizens from bearing
arms, [64]
and most of the conscripts would have been too poor to have owned firearms
prior to entering the army.
Although the recruits were drilled in the manual of arms for loading and
firing, there was no target practice, or firing of blanks. Thus many recruits went
into battle without ever having fired their muskets before. [65]
Naturally, such soldiers were poor marksmen. the lack of instruction in firing
not only decreased the marksmanship, but reduced the coordination and rapidity
of their volleys.
The Mexicans lacked the fire discipline to hold their fire in order to deliver a
shattering point-blank volley. The Mexican drill manual stated that after the first
volley, the soldiers were to fire at will. [66]
Upon examination of the battles, it appears that the Mexican infantry
usually wasted their fire by commencing fire at too long a range for the initial
volley to have much of an effect on the morale of the attackers.
There is much testimony by American soldiers on the inaccuracy of the
Mexican fire. [67]
One combatant noted, "Though they loaded and fired very fast, they did not
take good aim, or they would have killed every man of us." [68]
At Churubusco, the fire of the Independencia Battalion stationed on the roof
of the convent killed and wounded soldiers in the Bravos Battalion manning the
parapet outside the convent. General Rincon was forced to order them down.
[69]
Although the smooth-bore musket was an inaccurate weapon to shoot with,
the problem was made worse by the Mexican practice of overloading their
muskets. Attempting to compensate for the poor quality of the Mexican powder,
they put too much powder in their cartridges. This increased the recoil, marring
the aim, and causing bullets to go too high. To avoid the heavy kick, many
soldiers fired from the hip. [70]
Considering their small stature and emaciated condition, it is not surprising
that they might do this.
In spite of all of these handicaps, there were several instances during the
war when American attacks were repulsed by defensive fire. At the Tete du pont
and Fort Diablo in Monterrey, and at the Churubusco Convent, the fire of
Mexican infantry and artillery repelled the assaults. [71]
At Portales (in the rear of the Churubusco Convent) and at Casa Mata, the
fire of Mexican infantry alone stopped the attacks. [72]
Notably, in the last two examples, the defenders were the Mexican Light
Infantry regiments and the Eleventh Line - the elite regiments of the Mexican
Army. [73]
In comparison with the American Army, the Mexicans were at a great
disadvantage in firepower. Taking the number of infantry engaged in a battle
and dividing by the number of casualties their opponents suffered, the result is
an approximation of how many soldiers it took to kill or wound an enemy soldier.
Using this method, at Resaca de la Palma it took sixteen Mexicans to kill or
wound one American. On the other hand, there were four Americans for every
Mexican hit. At BuenaVista the ratio for the Mexican was the same rating, 1:16.
the American was about 1:3, however, the American artillery contributed a major
portion of the casualties so this is not a very valid figure. At Monterrey the
defenses and artillery doubled the Mexican effectiveness to 1:7 and the
attacking Americans were reduced to 1:16. At Portales and Casa Mata the
Mexican effectiveness was about 1:4. As there are no Mexican casualty records
for these battles, the American effectiveness cannot be determined, although in
the attack against the Churubusco Convent itself the ratio is roughly 1:17.
The great differences in Mexican fire effectiveness, ranging from 1:16 to
1:4, can be explained by examining the circumstances of the battles. The battle
of Resacade la Palma was basically a skirmish type battle fought in open order.
The random firing of the Mexicans would have been particularly ineffective
against dispersed targets. At Buena Vista many Mexican infantry had little
opportunity to fire because they were advancing in deep column formations. On
the other hand, at Casa Mata the defenders were veterans, firing with weapons
rested on the parapet; and the attackers were in close order on open ground.
These were optimum circumstances for effective fire. Taking the mean between
these two extremes, it seems reasonable to estimate the effectiveness of the
average Mexican soldier was about 1:10.
Thus, in an even fire fight, the American infantry had about a 2:1 fire
superiority over the Mexican infantry. Naturally, no army could win against such
odds, unless it had a numerical advantage.
Only in defensive positions could the Mexican infantry fight on equal terms
with the Americans. However, entrenchments can usually be outflanked. The
Mexicans lost many battles because their static positions were flanked by an
American turning movement, e.g., Resaca de la Palma, Monterrey, Cerro
Gordo, Padierna, and Churubusco.
This explains the paradox of the testimony on the bravery of the Mexicans,
versus the fact that they often ran away. Many brave and disciplined armies
have been routed by flank attacks, and what soldiers could stand against an
enemy with an intrinsic fire superiority of 2:1 ?
The Mexican Army 1846
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