The Mexican Army 1846

Introduction

By Ron Vaughn

At first glance, the Mexican Army appeared to be excellent. The artillery, engineers, and showy cavalry were highly regarded by the Mexicans and foreign observers [1] .

Mexican Lancers advancing. General is a Hinchliffe figure. Others are by Frontier.

Twenty years of intermittent revolutions had provided plenty of combat experience. Mexico had expected to win a war with the United States, and the European press concurred. The London Times in 1845, reported that the Mexican soldiers "are superior to those of the United States." [2]

Beneath this exterior appearance there were many serious defects. One of the most serious flaws was the use of conscription to fill the ranks. According to the law of January 26,1839, a quota of men was set for each department. On the last Sunday of every October, lots were drawn and their names posted in public for eight days.

The draftees entered the army on December 15, for a term of six years. All single men, childless widowers, married men separated from their wives, and childless married men, who were eighteen to forty years old and at least sixty Mexican inches tall were subject to conscription, but there was a long list of exemptions. Drafted citizens could hire substitutes, but if the substitutes deserted, the draftees had to serve. [3]

Men not included in the draft could volunteer, but these were few. When the war began, on the first day of the call for the enlistment of volunteers, only eleven men came forward in Mexico City. [4]

Obviously, anyone with a little money could avoid the draft. Few educated or upper-class men served in the ranks, except for the privileged Active Commerce Regiment of Mexico, a militia unit of merchants and professional men, nicknamed the polkos or "polka dancers", by the people. [5]

Therefore, the burden of service fell upon the lower classes, the peons. Most of the rank and file were ignorant Indians and mestizos. [6]

Apparently, the formalities of drawing lots and exemptions did not provide enough recruits, so the army resorted to the use of press gangs. These would impress vagrants, criminals and poor passers-by on the streets. [7]

Reportedly, Indians often were hunted down and caught with lariats. [8]

Naturally, by recruiting only the poorest and most wretched people, the ranks were filled with those who had the least interest in defending the country. [9]

Many were poor physical specimens. The average soldierwas of less than medium stature. Enlistment records list heights of five feet-two inches, five feet-one and one half inches, etc. Some had rickets. [10]

The recruit's introduction to drill was with the aid of the rod. John Scott observed, "... the sergeant taking in his hand a long and supple hickory, would lead them forth and drill them; and if they failed to execute his orders with precision and promptitude he would lash them with unmitigated severity while no sign of resistance would be manifested on the part of the soldier." [11]

The switch was officially carried by all corporals (except in the Military Academy and Invalid Corps) as their "badge" of rank. [12]

The compensation paid to the conscripts was poor. The rate of pay established in 1839 for a thirty-day month was 15 to 26 pesos depending on rank or unit type for enlisted men. In comparison, a Division General was paid 500 pesos a month in the field or about 330 in garrison. [13]

Paydays were irregular, some troops reportedly had not received their complete pay for many years and had to work on the side so they could buy enough food. [14]

Under these circumstances, desertion was heavy. Mexican armies often melted away through desertion, especially during retreats, such as the long march from Matamoros or Buena Vista. At Chapultepec eight hundred of the two thousand defenders deserted in one night. [15]

The military jails and courts were full of defendants and cases. General Pedro Maria Anay wrote: "We never had an army, but a mass of pernicious men... After the battle of Angostura, in which our army lost 9,000 men through desertion, it improvised a defense of Cerro-Gordo, and the results were what one would expect of the kind of troops with which we fought all the combats. Those defeats... recommended that the congress dictate new laws to replace the corps of the army with useful men, and not with imbeciles and vicious men who don't know their duties nor those that society imposes, and do not understand the Spanish language." [16]

Later in the war, a broader base of manpower was attained, when the National Guard was called out and a decree was issued for all males, sixteen to fifty years old, to enlist or forfeit all political rights. [17]

Although these "volunteers" were poorly trained, they put up a spirited defense of Mexico City, for example the Bravos and Independencia Battalions at Churubusco, the National Guard at Molino del Rey, and the San Blas Battalion at Churubusco. [18]

Although the conscripted troops were somewhat unreliable, the problem was not an insoluble handicap, as many excellent armies relied upon conscription before and since. The quality of the Mexican draftees was not necessarily bad material for an army. Justin Smith wrote: "The Indians in particular could be described as naturally among the best soldiers in the world, for they were almost incredibly frugal, docile and enduring, able to make astonishing marches.." [19]

Many times Mexican armies demonstrated their capacity for long marches. General Pedro Ambudia reported that one day his brigade marched about forty- eight miles [2] . In the march to La Angostura, Santa Anna's army traveled almost fifty miles in twenty-four hours, and then began a battle. Thirty-six of those miles were passed without food or water. [21]

The Mexican soldiers were not lacking in bravery either. Although not warlike by nature, they had enough courage to face danger without fear. [22]

Justin Smith wrote that they were "quite ready - from animal courage, racial apathy or indifference about their miserable lives - to die on the field. [23]

The Mexican Indian was a fatalist. Justo Sierra declared, "The Mexican soldier.. when hungry and weary, still fights on with courage and ardor. But, subject to sudden fits of despondency, like all the undernourished, and the panic, like all high-strung. when he loses confidence in his officer or his leader he deserts; remembering that he was carried off by the levy and educated by the rod.. " [24]

Many eye witnesses have testified to the bravery of the Mexican soldiers in battle. Ulysses S. Grant said, "I have seen a brave stands made by some of these men as I have seen made by soldiers." [25]

Pierre T. Beauregard wrote: "The Mexican stood artillery and infantry fire fully as well as our own troops." [26]

At Palo Alto, the American artillery decimated the Mexican battalions, but the gaps were always closed up. All of the original color bearers were shot down, and the Fourth Infantry lost three in a row. [27]

Some thought that this courage was of limited duration. However, this is not necessarily true. A study of the battle reveals that the Mexicans retreated from Resaca de la Palma, only after their pickets were driven in, their center penetrated by a cavalry and infantry charge, and their flank turned. This would be enough to cause almost any army to break and run.

Though the morale of the Mexican Army generally was good -- after the disastrous retreat from Buena Vista, when thousands deserted, the veterans still had spirit -- after the route at Cerro Gordo, a certain defeatism appeared. Jose Remirez wrote: "The troops have come back very much depressed. The leaders and officers declare that the Yankees are invincible, and the soldiers are telling terrible tales that bring to mind the conquest Some say that the enemy soldiers are such huge, strong men that they can cut an opponent in two with a single sweep of their swords. It is also said that their horses are gigantic and very fast and that their muskets discharge shots which once they leave the gun, divide into fifty pieces, each one fatal and well-aimed. Let us say nothing about their artillery, which has inspired fear and terror in all our troops and is undeniable proof of our backwardness in military art." [28]

Even with such stories going around the activity of the preparation for the defense of Mexico City renewed the hope of the army. [29]

It continued to fight stubbornly and with spirit in spite of poor rations, brutal discipline, low pay, defeats and lack of national feeling; the army was able to make repeated attacks at Buena Vista, and fight tenaciously at Churubusco, Molino del Rey, Casa Mata, and Chapultepec.

The main problem with the morale of the Mexican soldiers was that itwas somewhat brittle, prone to fits of panic. He seemed to lack motivation. As discussed earlier in the paper, the average Mexican of the lower class did not have education, nationalism or social mobility. He had little loyalty beyond the extended family, regarding the Mexican government as something alien. He had little respect for his officers.

TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE MEXICAN ARMY IN 1845*

REGULARS (Total: 17,717)

Infantry 11,501

    1 Guard Grenadier Battalion
    11 Line Regiments (+1 in 1846)
    3 Light Regiments (+1 in 1946)
    1 Standing Battalion in Mexico & 1 in California
    1 Invalid Battalion

Cavalry 3,934

    2 Squadrons Guard Hussars
    2 Squadrons Cuirassiers
    2 Squadrons Jalisco Lancers & Mounted Rifles
    10 Regiments Cavalry
    1 Company in Tobasco

Artillery 1,840

    3 Brigades & 5 Companies Foot Arty. (116 guns)
    1 Brigade Horse Arty. (24 guns)

Engineer Corps 442

PRESIDIAL CAVALRY (Total: 1,209)

    35 Companies in interior & California 1.209

ACTIVE MILITIA (Total: 14,615)

Infantry 6,470

    5 Regiments
    16 Battalions

Coast Guard Infantry 3,624

    14 Battalions as Coast Guards
    8 Veteran Companies of Coast Guards

Cavalry 3,990

    5 Regiments
    8 Detached Squadrons
    1 Detached Regiment in Aguascalientes
    11 Detached Squadrons of Auxiliaries in interior

Coast Guard Cavalry 531

    5 Squadrons 8 Detached Companies

TOTAL ARMY 33,541

* Raphael Semmes, Service Alloat and Ashore during the Mexican War (Cincinnati: William H. Moore, 1851), pp. 38-39; Manuel Balbontin, Estacto Militar de la Republica Mexicana en 1846 (Mexico: Ignacio Pombo, 1891), p. 13.


The Mexican Army 1846


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