Braddock's Defeat
July 9, 1755

Wargame Scenario and Battle

by Capt. Dave Parker

The scenario I have laid out is designed to see if Braddock could have beaten Beaujeu had his van commander behaved differently. His men had failed to follow the practices of the past month which had foiled the enemy so well. Braddock had ordered all important terrain features be seized prior to marching past them. There was a wooded hill to the right of the column which Gage left unguarded. The two guns were left behind with the carpenters to ease hauling. Gage had no strong reason to worry about attack at this point. He had already passed two great points for ambush - the fords of the Monongahela and was only a half day's march to the fort. He was confident no attack would come. Had Beaujeu not convinced Contrecoeur to move there would have been no battle and had the Indians reponded quicker it would have at least been where expected - at the ford!

As it was, the two opponents bumped into one another and the final stroke which broke the invading army was the panic which raced through it as it collapsed on itself. Rearward elements pressed forward while forward ones scrambled to the rear. It is quite possible that if Gage's men had pressed forward in a series of rushes, or at least held steady longer, the main force could have been brought up in good order and gained victory through weight of numbers.

This scenario opens at the lull in battle noted at the end of the introduction. The forces should be deployed as noted in Map 3. The French objective is to overwhelm Gage's men and drive them back in confusion. The British must maintain their battle line to allow reinforcements to arrive. In this scenario General Braddock has stayed with the main body to organize its advance, leaving Gage in command. Our theme editor, Bill Protz, has played the scenario using his rules, "Drumsof War Along the Mohawk", published recently and presents the following battle report. The Battle: Battle Report by Bill Protz

These extra guidelines are needed for the scenario:

1. The British should not be rated above average. This will reflect the inexperience of the regiments.

2. Reflect the high proportion of officer casualties and ensuing morale deterioration in British and French regulars.

3. Indians should be afraid of artillery.

4. The card system of "The Sword and The Flame" colonial rules might be appropriate for this scenario to encourage disjointed command. I'd give the British fewer cards in the deck.

5. Because of the terrain, movement by formed troops causes disorder.

6. Flanking parties should be allowed to operate in open or close order. Further research (Nichols) leads me to believe the flankers of Gage's men were Provincial "Rangers".

7. The pioneers and wagons can be excluded.

8. Have the game begin with contact between the French column and leading British elements 200 yards in advance of Gage's position. Lay out the British as shown on Map 3.

9. Braddock must come forward to take command shortly after the game begins. Victory goes to the British if they can organize, form line of battle, and hold on for about an hour. This gives the main body time to form up and advance in good order.

10. The entire wargame table should be considered lightly wooded with heavy spots and will restrict fire and movement.

Prior to playing the Monongahela Advance Guard Scenario, it was necessary to augment the tabletop rules, "Drums of War Along the Mohawk", to consider two special characteristics of the battle. These are explained in context with the rules. Otherwise the rules already reflect Dave's ideas with the exception of (5) which is taken into consideration in morale and firepower effectiveness by time spent moving:

    a. Reduce British close order morale from +2 to +1 due to the inexperience of the red coats. However, plusses of this kind are negated when close order soldiers are in the woods. Morale will therefore break down sooner than when in the open. The trees on this battlefield were spaced apart enough to allow soldiers opportunities to remain in close order but this cover cannot afford a morale bonus unless it is used as cover.

    b. Selection of units for movement and fire is by card draw (playing card deck); red for the British and Americans and black for the French, Canadians and Indians. jokers are used to move or fire out of sequence and to temporarily delay an enemy from doing so. This happily removes total control from the wargamers and produces "fog of war". Fire is not simultaneous. Thus, casualties taken by a unit in a turn will not fire when that unit is later able to fire by card draw.

In view of the high mobility and firepower of the French (the Indians actually!) at this battle, 1/4 of the red cards were removed from the deck. This insured that the French would be highly maneuverable and that their fire would precede British fire more times than not.

The order of battle was based on a ratio of 1 miniature to 5 historical men though any ratio up to about 1:10 will work.

French ForceMiniaturesActual
Men
Compagnies Franches de la Marine Officers636
Compagnies Franches de la Marine Cadets1?
Compagnies Franches de la Marine Soldats1472
Canadian Militia29146
Indian Allies127637
TOTAL177891
British/American Force * MiniaturesActual
Men
Flankers on the left1364
Flankers on the right1364
Pickets in the very front**211
Immediate reserve for the pickets421
Main body under Gage1681
6 pounder artillery pieces***22
Rear body of advance guard841
TOTAL56282

*This is only the advance guard of Braddock's little army, He was to the rear marching with the main body which had just passed over the Monongahela River. The entire command (advance guard and main body) consisted of approximately 1,300 personnel of which about 2/5 were Americans. Another part ofthe force was a number ofdays behind with slow moving wagons,etc., under Dunbar.

**The light horse is ignored given their small numbers.

***6 additional miniatures were detailed to fire the cannons.

A glance at the numbers of combatants arrayed for each side reveals that the British have an additional problem. Not only are they green, but the advance guard is outnumbered 3:1. The main body is needed to offset this disparity particularly since the French force will fight from cover and most of the British must stand inclose order though the Americans can sensibly take cover. However, these Americans were not the Americans we think of from history lessons. Kopperman asks, "Who were these Americans? Were they the backwoodsmen of legend, who blazed trails through the forest, could shoot the eye out of a squirrel at fifty paces, and knew as they did their own the mind of the Indian? A few of them were. But for the most r)art, they were the dregs of colonial society - seaboard society, at that. With few exceptions, they were Virginians, Pennsylvanians, and Marylanders, none of the three provinces owning a majority. Not only those who joined the two [British] regiments, but the men of the independent companies as well, were generally recent recruits who had never known discipline or been under fire." [20]

Turn 1

The leading scouts of each side caught sight of each other at a distance of 36". For this battle I chose a ground scale ratio of 1" = 5 yards. Neither side started deployed for battle. The French Marines and Canadian Militia were in a marching formation three miniatures wide; the Compagnies Franches de la Marine in the lead. Indians were deployed evenly on the flanks. The British were deployed as on Map 3.

One interesting occurrence which meshed with history was that the French commander Beaujeu was killed in the early contact at the head of the marines. This happened through a remarkable set of die rolls in the simulation. Ensuing morale checks failed (but almost succeeded) in routing the Canadians.

MAP 5: Turns 6-8. British are totally formed and about to be surrounded.

Turns 2-5

During this period the leading British groups fell back on their supports because they were outnumbered. Flankers came in and by turn 4 a two deep line had been established facing forward toward the area where the French first appeared while two single deep lines were established en potence (swept backwards like the wings of a jet aircraft) to cover the flanks and rear.

The French force had quite a distance to travel to get closer and this was made more difficult by a slow British retrograde movement. This inhibited greater fire effect by the French since everyone was constantly moving. This also prevented greater numbers from firing because there was a lot of blocked fire. Fire is allowed for moving miniatures but a decrement of -1 applies for a shooter who has moved 5" and also if a target has moved 5". The marines faced the front of the British formation while the Indians ran parallel with the British flanks. The Canadians engaged the British right center. See Map 4.

Movement rates: Close Order 10", Open Order British flankers 10" + a six-sided die, Open order Marines/Canadians 12" + a six-sided die, Indians 15" + a six-sided die. Movement in sparse woods requires a six-sided die toss; the result is deducted from movement. Open order personnel can run twice (others once), adding an extra die to movement; two for close order movement.

Casualties in miniatures (bearing in mind that there were 177 on the French side and 56 for the British) amounted to:

StatusFrenchBritish
Wounded35
Dead2 6
Total5 (3%)11 (20%)

MAP 4: British fall back to form up. French & Canadians come forward while Indians flank their foe.

Turns 6-8

During this period all of the miniatures of the advance guard plus the 2 x 6 pounder cannons established themselves into a three-sided square which was still failing back but at less than 5" per turn to enhance fire effectiveness. The wings were now at 90 degrees to the front of the line. Cannon fire was split between the Canadians and various groups of Indians since casualties in these groups by artillery causes a morale check. Straggling to the rear were the wounded at a required 6" per turn. The hill which Dave mentions as so important to the British was now directly to their right.

Though I knew this height was historically important and that Dave felt I should try to occupy same, it was too difficult to do. This was because it took time to form the dispersed British groups into a formed body of decent size and while this was happening the Indians rushed past the flanks and large numbers of them reached the hill before the British could have done so in strength. I also felt the head of the main body still way to the rear had to be protected and so I reasoned I could not leave my position to its front. In addition there was the problem of the artillery. It would have had to have been abandoned.

The French force (everyone in open order and in cover) closed in on the British. Facing the left and right of the British center were the Marines and Canadians. Each British flank was being fired upon by Indians. Other bands of native Americans were now beyond the rear of the British position. Their motives were to fall on the retreating wounded, to bring fire to bear on the unprotected rear and to stall the main body once it appeared. Cannon fire was largely ineffective though one group of Indians fled and the Canadians came close to losing morale. See Map 5.

Casualties in miniatures by the end of turn 8 including those shown previously now amounted to:

StatusFrenchBritish
Wounded79
Dead3 7
Total10 (6%)16 (29%)

Prognosiss

After turn 8, further action was unnecessary. The leading elements of the British main body were still 8 turns away and it would require time to properly deploy which meant 3-4 more turns. Since the advance guard had lost 29% of its men in a turns and because enemy fire was now in greatly superior numbers, mathematics seemed to dictate that over 60% of the advance guard would be rendered hors de combat by turn 16. Before this, morale checks due to casualties probably would have caused the survivors to rout to the rear crashing into the main body thereby recreating history.

On the other hand, the British artillery might have eventually caused the large group of Canadians to rout in addition to another Indian band or two. Had this been combined with a faster retrograde movement or had the British just simply retreated at a faster pace on the main body, the result probably would have been different since British numbers would have eventually exceeded those of the French. However, I felt it was necessary to try to role play the British side as it was historically commanded so I tried to hold the advanced position until the main body arrived. This could have been possible had the British been allowed to seek cover. However, Braddock would now allow this and so I did not either.

One final thought occurs. Some readers may be able to formulate a different plan for the British to help them succeed. Dave suggests advancing on the Indians and militia with close order regulars. This will cause morale checks and can eventually produce beneficial results. However, those advancing in this fashion are subject to getting stuck out on a limb and destroyed piecemeal. What would you do?

Recreating history on the tabletop according to what actually happened can be a rewarding and a learning experience. Perhaps it is even suitable to do in school history classes to stimulate students in our past and in recruitment of new generations of wargamers. Teachers might welcome such an assist.

Now please return to Dave's concluding remarks.

CONCLUSION

The year 1755 provides a wide range of possibilities for the French and Indian War armchair general. Conflicting national strategies of the two colonial powers provide plentiful material on a diplomatic level which wargamers could use. On an operational level the British four-pronged invasion of New France provides both naval and military actions. Each of the four prongs leads to plenty of exciting possibilities for the tabletop. Braddock's campaign against Duquesne is the most well-known prong but is also the least well understood. I hope this article had adequately shown that Braddock's failure can't be understood without looking at the entire year's efforts. Every move he made was an intelligent one, given the urgency of his objective.

Intercolonial jealousies, three innocent blunders by Gage, and a body of green troops added up to disaster and the general's death. Fortune played a very poor mistress. Had she smiled more readily upon him in any of a number of instances, the campaign would have been a success. What better circumstances could exist for a wargamer?

NOTES

[1] The quotations are purely fictitious and used only for color. The course of events is accurate and based on Kopperman's account.
[2] The initial reactions of the French and British columns are clouded in controversy. Kopperman's account is followed closely. I've found no source which positively identified the French regulars as troops of the marine. This is an assumption. As the reinforcement was still trying to elude Admiral Boscawen 8 June, it is unlikely any of them arrived for the battle of 9 July.
[3] Leach provides the most useful account of British plans.
[4] Franklin's autobiography contains an account of his dealings with Braddock.
[5] Leach provides an excellent account of past intercolonial jealousies.
[6] Paragellis, p. 83; Nichols, pp. 141-2.
[7] Kopperman, pp. 24-5.
[8] Kopperman, pp. 25, 282-3.
[9] Costain gives an account of Franco-Indian relations in the Mohawk Valley.
[10] Katcher, p. 2.
[11] Kopperman, pp. 52-3.
[12] Kopperman, p. 282, n. 9.
[13] Nichols, p. 127.
[14] Paragellis, pp. 86-7.
[15] Paragellis, pp. 91, 7; Nichols, p. 136.
[16] Paragellis, pp. 88-9; Nichols, p. 127n.
[17] Nichols, p. 133. Paragellis hasa table of Braddock's strength returns at Fort Cumberland8lune 1755. The notation I use for strengths is: all ranks/rank & file/sick present/sick in hospitals. Stewart's Light Horse: 38/33/5/0; Mercer's Artificiers: 49/42/0/15; Poison's Artificiers: 57/50/0/1; Steven's Rangers: 60/53/0/2; Hogg's Rangers: 49/42/4/2; Waggoner's Rangers: 60/53/9/2; Cocke's Rangers: 54/47/1/0; Perronee's Rangers: 58/52/0/5; Dagworthy's Maryland Rangers: 61/53/2/0; Dobb's North Carolina Rangers: $1/72/0/0. The last two are listed with the provincials.
[18] O'Meara contains conjectural plans for the fort.
[19] Kopperman, pp. 26-30.
[20] Kopperman, p. 15.

SELECT ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following works were consulted for this article and will assist the reader in learning more about the defeat of Braddock imd the French and Indian War.

Anderson, Fred. A People's Army (University of North Carolina Press,1984). This work attempts to answer such basic questions as who fought the French and Indian War? In answering this and similar questions Anderson also gives wargamers a lot of help. A must book for any library.

Costain, Thomas B. The White and The Gold: the French Regime in Canada (Doubleday, 1970). This book does not have a bibliography or citations which would allow the reader to check the original sources. It is still useful for a view of the French doings in North America. This is written from their point of view and gives good insight into the reasons French colonization was divergent from British. We can also get a clear picture of why a rivalry developed between the French and the Iroquois Confederacy.

Franklin, Benjamin. Autobiography, Labaree, Ketchum, Boatfield, and Fineman eds. (Yale University Press, 1964). Required reading for history students with even a passing interest in non-military colonial history. His brainy solution to Braddock's supply problem might give ideas for your campaigns.

Katcher, Philip. Armies of the American Wars (Hastings House Publishers, New York, 1975). This is a useful book on uniforms but I have two objections with it. First, there are no footnote$ for the reader to consult for further reference, and second, the plates are so wonderful that I just wish there were more. I'd give up a lot to see Mr. Katcher's research notes!

Kopperman, Paul E. Braddock at the Monongahela (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977). This is the most well-researched and scholarly book on the subject. I have used it extensively for this article. Very highly recommended.

Leach, Douglas, Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America 16071763 (MacMillan, 1973). Part of the excellent MacMillan Wars of the United States eries,this is a full treatment of the military history of British Colonial America.

Molto, John. Uniforms of the Seven Years War 7756-63 (Blandford Prets, 1977). A good uniform source to start with.

Nichols, Franklin Thayer. "The Organization of Braddock's Army", The William and Mary Quarterly Third Series,Volume IV, pp. 125-47. This article appeared in 1947 and was an extract from the author's Doctoral Dissertation at Harvard University. The research is outstanding and notes provide a wealth of new leads for further detail.

O'Meara, Walter. Guns at the Forks (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979). The book is useful as it focuses on "the story of two frontier forts", not just the Braddock campaign. Some good maps and charts.

Paragellis, Stanley, editor. Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1765. These are documents selected from the Cumberland collection in Windsor Castle. The volume provides important manuscript information in superb detail.

Parkman, FranCIL Montcalm andWolfe. The great classic on the French and Indian War. Although superceded in places by more recent scholarship, this remains a useful introduction to the French and Indian War.

Peckham, Howard H. The Colonial Wars 1689-1762 (University of Chicago Press, 1964). Although flawed In its portrayal of the events at the Battle at the Monongahela, the broad-brush approach to the Colonial Wars provides a good overview. If you have the time for 566 pages instead of 239, read Leach's book instead.

More French and Indian Wars: 1744-1766


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