In order to understand the tactical operations of cavalry during the period between 1792 and 1815 it is necessary to begin with their organization. Tactics may determine organization, but more often organization determines tactics. It is difficult to understand the tactics without understanding the elements that are used to execute those tactics. Therefore we begin with the organization. There are a number of characteristics that should be examined. The first to be reviewed is the ratio of men to officers and non-commissioned officers. This is the "leadership ratio". TABLE I Type Officers NCO's Troopers Leadership Ratio Number of Squadrons Hesse-Kassel (1796-1806) Dragoon 5 11 122 7.625 3 Cuirassier 5 11 122 7.625 3 Hussar 5 13 132 7.333 4 Saxon (1810-1815) All 11 12 164 7.130 4 Prussia (1787-1808) Cuirassier 7 15 144 6.545 4 Dragoon 7 15 144 6.545 4 Hussar 5 15 144 6.545 4 Prussia (1812-1815) Cuirassier 6 12 101 5.600 4 Dragoon 6 12 101 5.600 4 Hussar 6 12 101 5.600 4 France (1799-1803) Heavy 8 16 114 4.750 3 Dragoon 8 28 192 5.333 4 Hussar 8 28 192 5.333 4 Chasseur 8 28 192 5.333 4 France (1803-1815) Cuirasser (03-06) 8 16 150 6.250 4 Curassier (06-12) 8 16 166 4.611 4 Cuirassier (12- 15) 8 16 204 5.777 4 Dragoon (03-11) 8 28 184 5.111 4 Dragoon (11-15) 8 28 242 6.722 4 Lancers 8 28 220 6.111 4 Hussar 8 28 174 4.833 4 Chasseur 8 28 174 4.833 4 Grand Duchy of Warsaw (1807-1813) All 8 28 162 4.500 4 British Dragoon Guards 8 20 172 6.143 4 Light Dragoons 8 20 172 6.143 4 Russia (1802-1812) Cuirassier 3 14 132 7.765 5 Dragoon 3 14 150 8.824 5 Hussar 3 12 132 8.800 10 Russia (1812-1815) Cuirassier 3 14 132 7.765 5 Dragoon 4 14 140 7.778 5 Hussar 7 13 132 6.600 10 Uhlan 7 12 132 6.974 10 Bavaria (1803-1815) All 4 9 134 10.310 4 Baden (1812) Hussars 8 26 164 4.824 6 Hesse-Darmstadt (1812) All 3 11 77 5.500 4 Kingdom of Northern Italy (1812) All 8 16 150 6.250 4 Naples (1812) ll 6 28 154 4.529 4 Westphalian (1807-1814) Cuirassier 8 16 136 5.667 4 Chevauxleger 8 28 122 3.389 4 Hussar 8 28 122 3.389 4 Wurttemberg (1812) Chevauxleger 3 11 113 8.070 4 Note: The dates show the period in which the organization shown was effective. In contrast, the nationalities shown with the date of "(1812)" indicate solely that the cavalry of the country involved had that organization during that year. One can make a number of reasonably accurate assumptions about the quality of any given cavalry unit by an examination of the leadership ratios shown in Table I. It is reasonable to assume that if there are more officers and non-commissioned officers per trooper they should be able to provide superior control over the unit. However, it should not be assumed that the leadership ratio alone is sufficient to indicate which regiment is the best. It is purely an indicator which should be the case. Some nations are noted for their horsemanship while others are noted for indiscipline. Either national characteristic could offset any leadership ratio indications. Another variable that will invariably be brought up is that this analysis looks solely at theoretical strengths. In the field men would be lost and these numbers would change. However, historical evidence shows that officers and non-commissioned officers remain at the colors longer and tend to have a higher survival rate than the troopers. This suggests that campaign casualties would improve the leadership ratio rather than reduce it. Let us rearrange and distill Table I into a more manageable listing: TABLE II Country Average Leadership Ratio Baden 4.824 Bavaria 10.310 Britain 6.143 Darmstadt 5.500 France 5.416 Kassel 7.528 Naples 4.529 N. Italy 6.250 Poland 4.500 Prussia 6.473 Russia 7.787 Saxony 7.130 Westphalia 4.148 Wurttemberg 8.070 Best Ratio Using an analysis of leadership ratios, the Westphalian light cavalry should have been the best in Napoleonic Europe. However, as we mentioned earlier, national character can intervene. The one historical fact that would support a high rating is that Westphalia was one of the horse breeding areas of Germany and there would be a tradition of horsemanship in that territory. Unfortunately, its military activities are not well enough recorded for their high. rating to be so supported. The second best rating belongs to the Poles. This is not surprising. The Poles lived on the edge of the steppes and had a tradition of horsemanship. Their army had 16 cavalry regiments and 12 infantry regiments. That shows a decided predisposition towards cavalry. One would then logically presume that Russians, living in the steppes, would have a similar tradition and have a higher leadership ratio. This, as we know, was not true. The average Russian peasant did not see a riding horse until he was drafted into a cavalry regiment. This could well justify a low ranking on the list. Worst Ratio The worst leadership ratio belongs to Bavaria. This is surprising, but that the Bavarians might not be horsemen is not. Bavaria is mountainous and not where one would expect to find horsemen. Wurttemberg, which brings up the rear with Bavaria, is also quite mountainous. Its rating in Table II could also be supported by this. The other interesting position is that of France. It would appear to be quite near the head of the list and certainly ahead of its principal rivals. More interesting is he relationship it holds in this listing against the British. The British were known as horsemen and famed for the quality of their horses. They were well trained and highly professional, which initially makes this relationship unusual. There is, however, a famous quotation which supports this relationship. The quotation by Wellington is, " ... I considered one of our squadrons a match for two French, yet I did not care to see four British opposed to four French, and still more so as the numbers increased..." Wellington goes on to say, "They (the British) could gallop, but could not preserve their order." The Prussians are in the middle of the leadership ratio chart. It is interesting to note that they improved their leadership ratio after the Jena-Auerstadt fiasco. However, despite this improvement, there are no indications that they were anything unusual when it came to being horsemen. Looking at a few select nations and the number of maneuvering units in each nation's squadron we find the following: TABLE III Country Average Leadership Ratio Average Squadron Size No. of Maneuvering Units Poland 4.500 162 4 France 5.416 184 4 Britain 6.143 172 8 Prussia 6.473 130 12 Saxony 7.130 164 4 Kassel 7.528 125 8 Russia 7.787 135 8 This list does not show a relationship between the leadership ratio and the squadron size but there is a slight relationship between the number of maneuvering units and the leadership ratio. This may be coincidental. However, it is important that we watch the number of maneuvering units as we go further into this analysis. In the French system there is a fully developed forward leadership. Each of the four maneuvering elements has an officer in front of it, leading it and controlling its front. The presence of officers in front of each maneuvering element insures that it will go in the precise direction desired. It also insures that the troopers cannot advance too far forward, thus losing vertical alignment in that direction. In the body of the squadron each of the four maneuvering elements has a non-commissioned officer on both of its flanks. This provides lateral control on how loose the files become as well as provides guides for the maneuvering elements to align themselves on in the "lateral" direction. The file closer rank behind the body of the squadron closes the rear of the squadron. It does to the rear of the squadron what the forward leadership does to the front of the squadron, except provide it direction. The real function of the file closer's rank was to push the men forward and insure that they "closed" their ranks up. It was to prevent men from stopping and deserting their ranks to the rear when faced by the enemy. The French system provides a large degree of control on every flank and face of the squadron, thereby insuring that it should behave as desired in battle and that once it has completed a charge, it should rally more quickly. The Russian system is very similar to the French system. The forward leadership is quite similar to that of the French and should, therefore, provide an equal degree of forward control. The distribution of non-commissioned officers in the body of the squadron is similar in general arrangement to that of the French, but there are not as many non-commissioned officers there. The few that are there are on the ends of the maneuvering elements, but there are several ranks of maneuvering elements whose flanks do not have one. It is reasonable to assume then, that the Russians could not control the "lateral" alignment of their squadron as well as the French could. The file closer's rank has solely non-commissioned officers, and not as many as were in the French file closer's rank. The rear control cannot, therefore, be as good as that of the French. The Prussian system is yet another variation of the French theme. However, the officers, except for the squadron commander, are integrated directly into the front rank of the squadron. This means that the forward leadership is limited to only the squadron commander. He has too many things to do in this situation to do any of them well. He has to evaluate the enemy and move the entire squadron in an appropriate direction when evaluating that threat. He also has to provide directional guidance to the maneuvering elements of the squadron as well as insure that none of the troopers draw forward from the front rank of the squadron. He's going to have problems doing all the tasks. The officers and non-commissioned officers in the body of the squadron are rather thinly spread. In addition, there are none on the left flanks of the maneuvering units, which will let those elements flop about in the air. The French posted a non-commissioned officer there to keep that from happening. This suggests that the lateral control is going to be poor and the files are likely to open up. The filer closer's rank is well manned and should be able toperform their function more than satisfactorily. However, this arrangment shows a philisophical predisposition towards pushing the squadron rather than leading it. The British system is quite similar to the Prussian system, but has evolved in the direction of the French system, providing a link between the two. The British have only the squadron commander in front. This, as in the Prussian's, provides little forward control over the front rank of the squadron and has the squadron commander attempting to do too much by himself. The French system of placing officers in front of the leading squadron rank allows them to keep the troopers from losing their heads and charging off in the heat of battle. The British have, however, integrated 60% of the squadron officers into the front rank of the squadron. This indicates that they should have an excellent lateral control. The maneuvering elements should be rigidly controlled and wheels, etc., should be well executed. Like the French system, the British system boxes the troopers in laterally and keeps the files tight. The file closer's rank is quite dense and should provide more than adequate rear control. Because of the open nature of the front of the squadron in both the British and Prussian systems it is highly probable that not only would stopping a charge be difficult for both nations, but rallying a squadron after a charge would also be comparatively more difficult than any country employing the French or modified French system. These verbal discussions of the differences are not the easiest to follow, so Table IV provides a numeric summarization of several of these countries. The figures shown for Forward, Rear and Lateral Control are based on the specific unit's formations for the years indicated. The Forward Control Ratio is generated by taking the number of officers, etc., in front of the squadron and dividing it into the number of troopers in the squadron. The Rear Control Ratio is generated in the same manner and the Lateral Control Ratio is simply the number of officers, etc., positioned within or on the flanks of the body of the squadron divided into the number of men in the squadron. TABLE IV Country Year Unit Type Leadership Ratio Forward Control Ratio Rear Control Ratio Lateral Control Ratio Westph. '07-'14 Chevauxleger 3.389 24.40 17.43 12.20 Westph. '07-'14 Hussar 3.389 24.40 17.43 12.20 Poland '07-'13 All 4.500 32.40 23.14 6.75 France '06-'12 Cuirassier 4.611 33.20 23.71 16.60 France '99-'03 Heavy 4.750 22.80 16.29 11.40 France '03-'15 Hussar 4.833 34.80 24.86 7.25 France '03-'15 Chasseur 4.833 34.80 24.86 7.25 France '03-'11 Dragoon 5.111 36.80 26.29 7.67 France '99-'03 Dragoon 5.333 38.40 17.45 8.00 France '99-'03 Hussar 5.333 38.40 17.45 8.00 France '99-'03 Chasseur 5.333 38.40 17.45 8.00 Prussia '12-'15 Cuirassier 5.600 101.00 9.18 20.20 Prussia '12-'15 Dragoon 5.600 101.00 9.18 20.20 Prussia '12-'15 Hussar 5.600 101.00 9.18 20.20 Prussia '12-'15 Uhlan 5.600 101.00 9.18 20.20 Westph. '07-'14 Cuirassier 5.667 27.20 27.20 11.33 France '12-'15 Cuirassier 5.777 40.80 29.14 20.40 France '11-'15 Lancer 6.111 44.00 31.43 9.17 Britain '00-'15 Drag. Gds. 6.143 172.00 15.64 12.29 Britain '00-'15 Lt. Drag. 6.143 172.00 15.64 12.29 France '03-'03 Cuirassier 6.250 30.00 21.43 15.00 Prussia '87-'08 Hussar 6.545 144.00 28.80 14.50 Prussia '87-'08 Cuirassier 6.545 144.00 28.80 12.00 Prussia '87-'08 Dragoon 6.545 144.00 28.80 12.00 Russia '12-'15 Hussar 6.600 18.86 16.65 26.40 France '11-'15 Dragoon 6.722 48.40 34.57 10.08 Saxony '10-'15 All 7.130 27.33 27.33 12.62 Kassel '96-'08 Hussar 7.333 26.40 -- 10.15 Kassel '96-'08 Cuirassier 7.625 24.40 -- 11.09 Kassel '96-'08 Dragoon 7.625 24.40 -- 11.09 Russia '12-'15 Cuirassier 7.765 44.00 16.50 22.00 Russia '02-'12 Cuirassier 7.765 44.00 16.50 22.00 Russia '12-'15 Dragoon 7.778 35.00 17.50 23.33 Russia '02-'12 Dragoon 8.824 50.00 18.75 25.00 Russia '02-'12 Hussar 8.800 44.00 16.50 33.00 Unfortunately no conclusions can be drawn solely from this numerical representation of the quality, quantity and positioning of the controls; it does permit an easy method for comparison. THEORETICAL TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT There are two principal types of cavalry during this period, heavy and light. The function of the heavy cavalry, sometimes more appropriately called "battle cavalry", was to smash enemy formations with a concentrated charge. After dispersing the enemy cavalry, the heavy cavalry was to turn and attack the flank of the enemy infantry. Its formation, organization and tactics were developed with this goal in mind. The light cavalry was quite often employed as "battle cavalry" and it could stand in line of battle, but its principal task was reconaissance. It was intended to be broken into smaller units for use as pickets and vedettes in conjunction with its reconaissance role. This accounts for the higher number of sergeants and corporals in the French light cavalry than are found in their heavy cavalry. In other nations this numerical variance may not always be apparent, but the function of the light cavalry was the same. Current parlance has often distorted where the dragoons fit into this scheme. One often hears the term "medium" cavalry used with regards to dragoons, but no period literature reviewed to date has ever used that term. It is surprising to learn that the French did transfer the dragoons to the light cavalry category during the Revolution to make up for a shortage of light cavalry. This designation appears to have faded and the dragoons appear to have become rather hermaphroditic in nature, as well as taking on a flavor entirely their own. After 1800, when the French cavalry was brigaded invariably the cuirassiers and dragoons were put into homogeneous brigades. Occasionally a light regiment might be added to one brigade of a "heavy" cavalry division to provide it with some reconaissance capability, but this was an administrative assignment more than one for battlefield operations. Prior to 1800 the French did not organize homogeneous brigades, but put together formations with a little bit of everything. The cavalry was not concentrated by type. It would appear that around 1800 someone realized the value of a concentrated heavy cavalry formation and it was adopted by the French. The French light cavalry appears to have been mixed almost with impunity. The hussars and chasseurs seem to have been considered functionally identical. After 1807 Russians appear to have followed the same system as the French and formed homogeneous heavy cavalry brigades, divisions and corps. Before that they organized in mixed brigades with a heterogeneous mixture of cavalry types. The Austrians followed the French lead and changed from the mixing of heavy and light cavalry to pure heavy and light brigades some time before 1805. The Prussian Army after 1808 was too small to form the massive cavalry corps of the French, Russians, and Austrians. They did form their four cuirassier regiments into two brigades which were assigned to the Allied Guard Corps in 1813/14, but prior to Jena-Auerstadt, the practice was to form the integrated brigade/division with a heterogeneous mixture of cavalry types. The British did not organize major forces of cavalry where brigading became a question until late in the Spanish campaign. At that time they appear to have always brigaded light dragoons into light dragoon brigades and their heavier brothers into heavy brigades. ATTACK FORMATION Once the target was selected the regimental or squadron commander would decide what formation was appropriate for the target, the terrain, and any other threatening enemy units that might be in the area. As soon as possible the squadron would be reformed to the appropriate formation for the desired attack. THE LINE OF BATTLE The principal battle formation used by cavalry was the line. This allowed the regiment to extend to its full length and make he most efficient use of every saber. It also allowed the regiment the potential of outf Ian king by sheer width of the line over that of a smaller regiment. Its principal characteristic was that the entire regiment impacted at, for all intents and purposes, the same time. The shock of this massive impact would, theoretically, shatter the enemy line. The line was universally used by every nation's cavalry. The British and others used a system of two lines. It is best described by a passage from the British 1812 regulation. "There may be situations where a small body of cavalry, such as two or three squadrons, is to attack another nearby similar body, and can depend on its superiority of movement and agility. -- For this purpose it may divide into small bodies of fourteen or sixteen files each, with intervals equal to their front, and the second line, or reserves, must cover those intervals at one hundred and fifty paces to the rear. -- This enables to turn the enemy's flank rapidly, by having a more extended front, and several light and moveable bodies. -- If there are three squadrons, the first line maybe formed of six small troops, and the second of three, each of which latter will be subdivided into two; five of these will cover the intervals, and the sixth outflanks to right or left as may be ordered. -- If there are only two squadrons, the first line is of four small troops, the second of two, which are again subdivided, three of them covering the intervals and one out flanking. "The second line is not only used as support, but it may also be sometimes brought up in part, on the flank of the first line, while advancing to the attack, or order suddenly to turn the enemy's flank. -- If there are six troops in a first line covered by six smaller ones, two of these latter may be taken from one flank to turn that of the enemy: this leaves one interval uncovered, because, if these two small troops are taken from the flank on which the second line does not out-flank, then this second line covers to that hand one interval more, which changes the troop that before out flanked into a covering troop. -- Sometimes the advantage to be gained by out-flanking an enemy appears so great, that half the second line will be taken away for that purpose, being enabled to leave some intervals uncovered, in consequence of the disorder the enemy is thrown into by this maneuver." Before 1806 the Prussians used a linear attack known as the "Attacke mit drei Glidern" or an attack with three ranks. This was established by the Regulation of 1796. Tactically it was a two rank line with a third rank formed behind them which acted as a flanking corps. This rear rank was formed by drawing the four files from the left wing of each Zug. The third rank was then divided into two groups which were posted behind each wing of the regimental line. It would then swing out and attack the enemy flank and rears as opportunities permitted. The Prussian 1812 Regulation laid down strict instructions that a small reserve is to be formed behind either flank to protect the squadron from a flank attack as well as to swing out in an attack on the enemy's exposed flanks. The 1st Zug of the 1st squadron formed the reserve on the right and the 3rd and 4th Zugs of the 4th squadron formed that on the left. Before 1806 the Prussians used a form of line attack known as "en murial" or a wall attack. This attack was a massive linear attack which began at a range of up to 1,500 paces from the enemy. The last 700 to 1,000 paces of this attack were executed at the gallop. This attack had both advantages and disadvantages. The massive line had a tendency to form clumps and to break up as it advanced over the 1,500 paces it was intended to cover. It also totally exhausted the horses by the time the charge was complete. Any enemy cavalry reserve would damage it tremendously once the charge was completed. However, whatever it contacted during the charge was often swept away. On a larger scale light and heavy cavalry would often operate together. The light then acted either as a screening force or as a second line. When the light cavalry led the heavy cavalry it screened it against hostile fire and was used to conceal its advance from the intended target. If the light cavalry advanced behind a line of heavy cavalry, it formed on the heavy cavalry's flanks, behind the cavalry; When the heavy cavalry had locked the enemy in melee the light cavalry would swing out and strike the enemy in the flank. This invariably resulted in the enemy breaking and retiring in disorder. Instances of this can be found in battle accounts of many nations, most notably the Russians. ECHELON ATTACK AND ECHEQUER ATTACK The Echelon Attack and the Echequer Attack are variations on the linear theme. In both systems the leading element(s) of the attacking formation struck the enemy before the other elements. This initial impact would begin the process of breaking up the linear integrity of the defending unit. As the enemy line began to destabilize a second, fresh force would strike it, accelerating its disintegration. In the case of an echelon attack there would e several successive shocks that "theoretically" would ensure its destruction. Though the British 1812 Regulation speaks of echelon attacks formed with several regiments, the theory and fact applies to single regiments. The Regulation states: The echellon movements of a great corps, place it in an advantageous situation; to disconcert an enemy; to make a partial attack, or a gradual retreat. Different previous maneuvers ought always to have diverted the attention of an enemy, and prevented him from being certain where the attack is to be made. It may be formed from the center, or from either of the wings reinforced: If successful the divisions move up into line to improve the advantage: If repulsed, they are in a good situation to protect the retreat. In advancing several bodies move independent, act freely, and remain ready to assist. In retiring, they fall gradually back on each other, and thereby give mutual aid and support. "The echellons of a line are, according to its strength, of three, four or five squadrons each. Though their flanks seem multiplied, they are not exposed, as they cover each other. "Echellons seen at a distance appear as if at full line: being short and independent lines, they can easier march obliquely to outwing an enemy, or to preserve the points of appui to a wing; and such movement may not be perceptible to an enemy." The Hesse-Kassel 1796 Regulation contains both the echelon and echequer attack. It states that one of the principal advantages of these two forms of attack was that the units were independent and could take advantage of flanks when they were encountered. It also states that the echelons that were not in the front line drew less fire and were more likely to be fresh when they contacted the enemy. The Prussians before 1806 made extensive use of echelon attacks. The process was delineated in the Regulation of 1796. The echelons were placed 30 paces apart, They found the echelon attack more naturally easier to handle and maneuver than the long, undivided linear attack. It is unusual, but the Prussian 1812 Regulation does not sDeak of the echelon attack. The Saxons, as the Prussians, British and Hessians, used echelons in advancing and retiring. The French Regulation of 1799 speaks of echelon formations, but not the echequer. No discussion of the utilization or philosophy of the echelon formation is provided in The Manual de Sous-officier. However, in the Die Westphalische Armee one finds the comment, Sehr ableibt war die Staffelattacke, die vorwiegend gegen Infanterie in Linie und gegen Karres angewendet wurden. Basically it says the echelon attack was used for attacks against infantry in line or square. As the Westphalians were a French client state whose army was closely modeled on the French, it is reasonable to assume that this philosophy was taken from French cavalry philosophy. SCHWARM ATTACK The Prussian Schwarm Attack was used before 1806 and was formed in two ways. Upon the signal to form the schwarm attack every fourth Zug drew forward and formed a skirmish screen which covered the advance. These skirmishers would, with their fire, draw the enemy fire onto themselves and screen the main body behind them. It was used as a system for attacking infantry in square. It could also be formed by combining light and heavy cavalry. A heavy cavalry regiment would advance on the infantry and tease it into firing. Light cavalry, concealed behind it, would then swing out and strike the enemy before it had a chance to reload. The intent was to be able to cross the dangerous fire zone when the infantry could not fire, come into contact with them and engage them in melee without suffering the effects of their musketry. The Saxons also used this attack. It was designated solely as for use against infantry. A line of flankers preceeded the main cavalry line by 50 to 60 paces. The flankers would advance far enough to fire their weapons on the enemy infantry. Then the cavalry line would advance and attack the infantry. COLUMN ATTACK The Column Attack was an older form of attack used principally against infantry. In Die Westphalische Armee one finds the quotation, which translated, says, The column attack, which in the wars of the French Revolution were frequently used by the French cavalry, after 1804 was used only against infantry and was employed against heavy cavalry. In 1813 the column attack was reinstituted because of the badly trained troopers, who could be better controlled in column than in line. This attack was executed at a trot. The Prussians.before 1806 employed the column attack. They used it principally against infantry and formed it in a Zug column. The principles for this attack were established in the Instruction for the Generalmajors of Cavalry of 16 March 1759. The Prussian 1812 Regulation formed this attack by squadrons. It was still principally used against squares. When one examines cavalry attacking an infantry square some of the reason for using a column becomes quickly apparent. A typical Russian battalion, formed in square, had a frontage of 50 men, or approximately 86 feet. A cavalry squadron of 100 troopers, formed into two ranks, had a frontage of 50 men. If 3.5 feet is allowed for the width of a horse and rider, we find that the cavalry squadron would have a frontage of 175 feet. The overlap is tremendous. If the cavalry regiment were formed in line it would miss the target square with all but approximately half of one squadron. The column placed one squadron in front. The squadron's frontage provided a not too excessive overlapping of the square. The remaining squadrons (even more so than in the echelon and echequer attacks) were sheltered from hostile musketry and would arrive at the target square fresh and still in good order. ATTACK À LA DÉBANDADE The Saxons had an unusual attack known as "à la débandade". This attack was executed in the widest open interval and was principally used by light cavalry. The regulation does state that the cuirassiers would rarelyuse this. It was to be used against unformed infantry or uhlans. When used against uhlans it allowed the Saxon cavalry to get behind the uhlans as well as lessened the effectiveness of the lance. The effectivness of the lance, it was felt, would be lessened because the target was not concentrated and the uhlan would have to constantly aim his lance at the specific, moving target, rather than just lock it forward and hit a massed target. LAVA ATTACK Research has revealed one other sort of attack. This was the cossack "lava" attack. Unfortunately, no documentation has surfaced which provides a good explanation of what this attack looked like. Speculation would suggest that it was an unformed, rather wild attack, after the manner of most Hollywood cavalry charges. This speculation is supported by historical accounts of cossacks in battle. Principally, when faced by formed enemy cavalry the cossacks were rarely a match for them and seldom let themselves be engaged by them. It is a commonly accepted fact that a formed unit would always defeat an unformed unit. This implies that the cossacks were not tightly formed when they attacked. Such an unformed cavalry attack would only be successful against unformed, demoralized infantry and that is something at which the cossacks were noted as being very good. THE PROCESS OF THE ATTACK Whichever formation the regimental officers would adopt in a charge there was a definite sequence of steps through which they passed their troops. The cavalry would begin to advance, it would move to the trot, then the gallop and finally it would come to the charge and impact the enemy. After impact there were two things that would happen. The victor would chase the defeated unit, if possible, and both units would attempt to rally. This general sequence was followed by every nation, however, there were vatiations in each. Those variations are as follows: RANGE FROM TARGET AT WHICH THE CAVALRY BEGINS TO: Nation Walk Trot Gallop Charge French unspecified unspecified 230 80 Prussian (pre-1806) 1000 950-750 650-450 300-200 Prussian 6-800 unspecified 220 100-80 Hessian 6-800 6-400 200 80-70 British unspecified unspecified 250 80 yards In the British 1812 Regulation we find the following discussion of the charge: "In a charge of either infantry; or cavalry, though a momentary disorder may take place; yet the instance the enemy gives way, the line must be again formed, and the pursuit continued by light troops, or by detached troops or companies only. -- These follow the enemy with the utmost vigour, and as soon as the line is in order, it advances again and completes defeat. "When cavalry attack cavalry, the squadrons must be firm and compact; but when they attack infantry the files may be opened, and the men may bend down on their horses necks, "It may be expected that under a severe fire both the cavalry and infantry lose to a degree their regular order before they arrive on the enemy, but cavalry acting against cavalry can profit by its maneuver and order till the very last moment; for till the horses heads come up against each other, there is nothing that ought to prevent a cavalry soldier from being as steady in the ranks, as if he was at a common exercise, In another chapter the British Regulation goes on to say, "Whatever distance the squadron has to go over, it may move at a brisk trot till within two hundred and fifty yards of the enemy, and then gallop. -- the word CHARGE! is given when within eighty yards, and the gallop increased as much as the body can bear in good order. -- Any attempt to close the files at the instant of the charge, would only increase the intervals in a line, and tend to impede the free movement of each horse, who at no time requires to be more independent than when galloping at his utmost exertion, and every rub to right or left diminishes that effort in a degree. "At the instant of the shock, the body must be well back; the horse not restrained by the bitt, but determined forward by the spur; rising in the stirrups, and pointing the sword, will always occasion a shake in the squadron; it will naturally be done when necessary. "It is in the uniform velocity of the squadron, that its effect consists; the spur as much as the sword tends to overset an opposite enemy; when the one has nearly accomplished this end, the other may complete it. "In every part of the charge and in quick movement, the standard must be very exact in following the leader; and the man particularly attentive in keeping up to, and dressing to their standard. They will have their horses in hand, and perfectly square to the front, their heads well up, which will keep them under command. -- Men must remain firm in their saddles; an unsteady man will always make a horse so; one such will interfere with the movement and effect of a whole squadron. "When the shock of the squadron has broken the order of the opposite enemy, part maybe ordered to pursue and keep up the advantage; but its great object is instantly to rally and to renew its efforts in a body, either to the front, or by wheeling to take other squadrons in the flank. "If the squadron fails in its attack, and is itself put in disorder or confusion, it must retire as well as it can, to make way for those that support it, and must rally as soon as possible under the protection of others. "A squadron should never be so much hurried as to bring up the horses blown to the charge, and this will much depend on circumstances and the order they are in. "When after the charge, part of the squadron disperse to pursue, they should open out and cover the front and intervals. When they return and form, each man should observe his point, come around by his proper flank, and by the rear of his respective rank and on no account cross near the front of the squadron. "Every soldier who is attacked, and whose order is broken, looks upon himself as beaten, and is not easily brought to rally, if the first advantage is pursued; and the operation is in itself difficult, after he has once turned to the rear. -- But the body that attacks, though put in confusion, will easily unite while its motion is progressive and forward, and acts with a confidence and exertion which will never be found in those that stand still." Though not laid out for condensation in an article there are odd comments that are of extreme interest to be found in this regulation. One such comment is "... though circumstances of situation may prevent a line [of cavalry] from advancing much, it should never absolutely stand still to receive the shock, otherwise its defeat is inevitable." Rallies after charges appear to have been totally controlled by bugle charges and the position of the standard. The appropriate bugle call would be made and, hopefully, the troopers would return to their squadron or regimental colors. SOURCE DOCUMENTATION DRILL REGULATIONS Britain -- Instructions and Regulations for the Formations and Movements of the Cavalry: Whitehall, 1813. France -- Instruction concernant les manoeuvres de la cavalerie légère; Paris, Year VII ["Year VII" of the Revolutionary calendar was Sept. 22, 1798 - Sept. 21, 1799 -- ED.] -- Manual des sous-officiers de cavalerie Extrait -- des Règlements Militaires; Hamburg. 1812 Hesse-Kassel -- Exerzir-Reglement für Curassiers, Dragoners und Husaren; Cassel, 1796 Prussia -- Exerzir-Reglement für die Kavallerie der Königlich Preußischen Armee; Berlin, 1812 Saxony -- Exercir Reglement für die Königlich Sachsische Cavalerie; Dresden, 1810 OTHER DOCUMENTS Lunsmann, F.O., Die westfalische Armee, Hanover, 1934 Nafziger & Gilbert, The Bavarian and Westphalian Armies, 1799-1815: Cambridge, Ontario, 1981 Nafziger, The Russian Army, 1800-1815; Cambridge, Ontario. 1983 Nafziger & Park, The British Military: Its System and Organization, 1803-1815; Cambridge, Ontario, 1983 Nafziger, G.F., "Napoleon's 1812 Invasion of Russia"; unpublished MS. Nafziger, G.F., "The French Army, 1788-1815": unpublished MS. Oman, C.W.C., Wellington's Army 1809-1814; New York, 1913 Preußischer Großen Generalstab, (Jany) Urkundliche Bieträge und Forsuchungen zur Geschichte des Preußischen Heres, vol. 6 Der Preußische Kavalleriedienst vor 1806, Reprinted Weisbaden, 1982 Related Cavalry Charge! A New Thought on an Old Theme Cavalry Tactics and Quality (Napoleonic Wars) Largest Cavalry Combat Since Eylau Quick Thoughts on Cavalry Melees Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. VI No. 6 Back to Courier List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 1986 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com