EDITOR'S NOTE: I asked Philip to contribute to our examination of cavalry melees. He responded by uncovering some nifty information and producing this superb article.
Regarding the effect of giving a horse its head for the first time during a charge; my 'horsey' friends who gallop the Virginia countryside during the hunt season concur that a horse would panic and plunge out of control under these circumstances. -- JIM ARNOLD
"I considered our cavalry so inferior to the French from want of order, that although I considered one squadron a match for two French, I did not like to see four British opposed to four French: and as the numbers increased and order, of course, became more necessary, I was the more unwilling to risk our men without having a superiority in numbers. They could gallop, but could not preserve their order."[1]
These comments by the Duke of Wellington must be among the best-known quotations arising from the Napoleonic Wars, a generally-accepted fact that the British cavalry was in general incapable of executing a charge without running wild, careering on piecemeal without attempt to rally, and thus often wresting defeat from the jaws of victory. The purpose of this article is not to re-tread this old ground, but has arisen from a statement which has never before been published, and which (unlikely though it sounds) deserves some consideration.
Initially we should comment upon the accuracy of Wellington's statement; whilst there is much truth in it, it is perhaps a little too critical. Had Wellington reposed a little more confidence in his cavalry, he might have allowed them more opportunities, though it must be said that most of the successful actions all occurred when he was not present to witness them, and (significantly) when comparatively small numbers of troops were involved.
Given that it is true that British cavalry charges had a tendency to degenerate into madcap pursuits which careered on unchecked to destruction, the question which remains (when all experience and common sense demanded as rapid a rally as possible after the initial shock), is why did charges degenerate in such a way? The obvious reason -- indiscipline -- seems too simplistic for units which were not, in other services such as outpost duty, overtly undisciplined. A range of other reasons has been advanced, which whilst contributory factors do not appear to tell the complete story; for example, an anonymous Peninsular cavalryman stated that "The superior breeding of the English horses renders them more unsteady than the half cart-horse of the Frenchman."[2]
Leaving aside the fact that the French cavalry were not all mounted on "half cart-horses", some of the British remounts in the Peninsular War were wretched. Even something as laudable as regimental pride could have an effect; as Capt. Clark-Kennedy of the Royal Dragoons desperately tried to rally scattered elements at Waterloo, he called out to one party, "Royals, form on me!" Disinclined to obey any but their own officers, the troopers shouted back, "We are King's Dragoon Guards!" and charged on!
All these reasons have a degree of validity; but there is one more which, to the best of the present writer's knowledge, has never been advanced in print before, and comes from a 19th Century manuscript which I was recently able to examine. To accord it any credibility whatever, perhaps readers will forgive the brief digression which precedes the theory.
The author of this manuscript -- a memoir of the beginning of his military career and informed thoughts on possible improvements in cavalry training -- was Colonel John R. Harvey, who though an officer in his uncle's regiment, was so determined upon a cavalry career that he resigned his commission and enlisted as a private soldier in the British 16th Lancers, working his way through the ranks until again commissioned, a most unusual course of action to be adopted by a "gentleman", when all his fellows in the ranks were thus his social inferiors. Harvey appears to have lived and breathed the cavalry ethos, and consulted with every ex-cavalryman he could in an effort to steep himself in cavalry history and lore. Later a historian of distinction, presumably his ambitions were fulfilled when in due course he led his own cavalry command on campaign. The opinions of a man with such almost unique experience of cavalry life, in every rank from trooper to command, must merit consideration.
Theory
Harvey's theory is quite basic, and is simply that even cavalry troopers with years of service might never, ever, have ridden a horse at full gallop, nor might any of their mounts been ridden at full gallop, until actually committed to their first charge in action. In other words, when a charge occurred, the men might not be in control of their mounts -- if they had never galloped before, how could they be? -- and the horses equally at a loss to understand why they had been fully given their heads for the first time.
This is a startling assertion and one which sounds most improbable, despite the fact that Harvey believed it true in at least some regiments, from his own experience and from conversation with old officers (always bearing in mind that Harvey's career occurred in an era when the role of the cavalry was seen as charging, even though the last old-style regimental charge -- Omdurman -- was years in the future). It resulted, said Harvey, from training which (despite what regulations or common sense demanded) depended largely upon regimental practice; and in some regiments, said Harvey, it was a punishable offense for a man to ride his horse at anything more than a canter; a full gallop or charge à l'outrance was unknown. Certainly, early "inspection returns" suggest that many regiments over the years had introduced their own idiosyncracies, including such amazing features as in one notable case a mock "Red Indian war-whoop." Given this, it is not impossible in isolated examples for Harvey's theory actually to have been the case.
The reliance on regimental practice is obvious from the text of successive training manuals, though few were as dismissive of the basic skills of horsemanship as Lt. Gen. Humphrey Bland's Treatise of Military Discipline (London, 1759): "'Tis presumed that the men are taught to ride, and the horses dress, in order to perform the following Exercise"!
The 1801 cavalry manual noted that the attack was the cavalry's principal object, yet devoted only four pages out of 374 to the techniques of the charge. Its basic tenets are sound: "It is in the uniform velocity of the squadron that its effect consists; the spur as much as the sword tends to overset an opposite enemy... When the shock of the squadron has broken the order of the opposite enemy, part may be ordered to pursue and keep up the advantage; but its great object is instantly to rally and renew its efforts in a body..."
But when coming to the actual techniques, the regulations are much less precise: "It depends upon the commanding officer to lead at such a pace as that the flanks and rear rank may always keep up... the squadron... may move at a brisk trot till within two hundred and fifty yards of the enemy, and then gallop -- the word CHARGE! is given when within eighty yards, and the gallop increased as much as the body can bear in good order..." (present author's italics). Whilst the maintenance of order was of great importance, so as to maximize the impetus or "shock effect" of the charge, it is obvious from the above that some commanding officers could have obeyed the regulations without ever exercising at full pace.
Some contemporary accounts of "field days" suggest that very rapid movement was unusual. For example, it was observed that at Swinley Camp, near Windsor, in 1798, fast riding was so uncommon a sight that "The rapidity with which the men were led over the ground... occasioned several officers to predict the breaking of some of their necks. No fatal accident, however, happened till the 27th of August, when a private of the 7th Light Dragoons fell, with his horse, and died the next day.
On the other days five or six falls generally occurred, but the mischief was confined to the destruction of horses, broken bones and bruises... nobody showed a greater alacrity in falling than General David Dundas... the complete revolutions he made in his way from the saddle to the ground entitle him to the praise of an excellent tumbler.... "[3] Though the regiments involved were "confessedly the elite of the British Cavalry... every one of whom had served three campaigns... men who had seen the substantial face of war, and stood the brunt of battle", further evidence of their lack of equine management is noted in their inability to control their horses even in the noise of pistol-fire: "... a great number of horses were so scared by the report of the pistols, as to run out of the ranks, in spite of all the efforts of their riders".
One suspects that comments like that by the Peninsular veteran in the United Service Journal in 1831, "Much more depends on the horse than on his rider.., when once thoroughly confused and terrified, the animal becomes quite unmanageable..." are founded upon bitter experience.
Less Than Complete Training
Given that training for the charge would appear to have been less than complete, it might be expected that after one charge a regiment would realize its failings and remedy them before another general action. Analysis is difficult, however, due to the comparatively small number of occasions in which British charges were made during the Napoleonic Wars, much of the Peninsular terrain being unsuitable for full-scale cavalry actions. Regiments which did make serious errors could be cut up so badly as a result that they never again had the opportunity to charge; witness the 23rd Light Dragoons, sent home after their horrendous losses at Talavera.
Wellington placed much of the blame for these "galloping" tactics upon the higher command: "Our officers of cavalry have acquired a trick of galloping at everything. They never consider the situation, never think of manoeuvring before an enemy, and never keep back or provide for a reserve.., at least one-third should be ordered beforehand to pull up and reform, as soon as the charge has been delivered...."[4]
In this there is, of course, a degree of truth; with the exception of Paget (employed only in the early stages of the Peninsular War, not under Wellington until Waterloo) and Le Marchant (killed in his first major engagement), Wellington was ill-served by his cavalry generals, some of whom were completely incompetent. But it must be said that the cavalry behaved better than most of its critics stated, and that there were notable successes; though interestingly, these occurred either when commanded by capable leaders (an obvious point), or when the enemy was in retreat or disordered, or (most importantly) when no French reserve was available to deliver a "counter-punch", thus not taking advantage of any lack of order or failure to rally by the British ranks. This latter point seems to have been overlooked in some analyses of "successful" actions.
It is possible briefly to recount certain of the most notable or notorious incidents, in an attempt to arrive at conclusions. Examples drawn from the Peninsular War include the following noted successes:
Benevente: 10th Hussars and detachment of vedettes overthrew French Guard chasseurs; no French reserves; presence of Lord Paget.
Usagre: French broken; no French reserve.
Morales: 10th Hussars; French broken and pursued for two miles. No French supports immediately available.
We should also list disasters, most of which began with complete overthrow of the enemy, but were ruined by inability or unwillingness to rally, falling victim to counter-attacks:
Talavera: 23rd Light Dragoons; in their first action, and disordered by falling into a ravine, then in a broken and scattered state charging on instead of pausing to rally, apparently unable to stop.
Campo Mayor: 13th Light Dragoons; had arrived in Peninsula the previous year, but this apparently their first charge. Total success turned into failure by inability to rally, riding on piecemeal for miles.
Maguilla: Regiments not inexperienced (3rd Dragoon Guards and 1st Dragoons, both in Peninsula since 1809), but very badly led (Slade).
It is worth remarking that the disasters seem all to have occurred with regiments which had not had experience of charge before, or when the formations had outstandingly mediocre leadership (Slade at Maguilla, Long at Campo Mayor). The two factors together probably guaranteed disaster.
Conclusions
What can be summarized, then, regarding the old tradition of "galloping at everything"? It would appear that the following would be reasonable conclusions:
1. Cause of disasters would appear not to have been indiscipline, or even faults of command at regimental level (though doubtless some unit commanders contributed to the failings of the aftermath of charges). Inexperience rather than indiscipline seems to have been the culprit, which if that were the case, even units which might normally be regarded as "elite" would be equally liable to court disaster. This inexperience seems to have encompassed both the technique of the charge itself, a failure in horsemanship, and the willingness to pull up and re-form, though the latter would have been virtually impossible to achieve if Harvey's contention is at all accurate. (As an example of how regimental officers apparently failed to realize what was required of them, the following eye-witness account by a participant describes the action at Campo Mayor; one can hardy realize that what is described was a major failure, a captured siege-train being lost due to failure to rally:
"The French manoeuvred most beautifully... the 13th behaved most nobly. I saw so many instances of individual bravery, as raised my opinion of mankind in general many degrees. The French certainly are fine and brave soldiers, but the superiority of our English horses, and more particularly the superiority of swordsmanship our fellows showed, decided every contest in our favour; it was absolutely like a game at prison bars, which you must have seen at school... The whole way across the plain was a succession of individual contests, here and there, as the cavalry all dispersed... it was certainly most beautiful...."[5]
2. Given that inexperience, not indiscipline, was the major factor, it would be reasonable to expect a rapid improvement in a regiment's capacity for executing a charge following their first bad experience. There seem to be no examples of a unit making a second wild charge, but as cavalry combat was so limited the assertion is arguable.
3. Successful operations were those in which no enemy force was available for an immediate counter-charge, so that even if the victors were unduly disordered, their failings would not be revealed.
4. Allied to inexperience, the main ingredient for disaster would appear to have been the inefficiency of higher, rather than regimental, command, for the allocation of reserves would normally be expected to rest with the brigade-commander, in actions in which more than one unit were involved. Though regimental commanders might detach a squadron to act as a reserve in combats in which only their own unit was involved, for larger encounters the brigadier should have taken the responsibility.
As a footnote, it may be of use to quote Wellington's own instructions on how a cavalry commander should execute a charge, for which the summary is as follows:
1. A reserve should always be kept, to improve a success or cover an unsuccessful charge. This reserve should not be less than half the total force, and occasionally up to two-thirds of it.
2. Normally a cavalry force should be formed in three bodies, the first two in lines and the reserve in column, but so formed as to be changed easily into line.
3. When acting against cavalry, the two lines and reserve should be separated by between 400 and 500 yards; this is not too great a distance to prevent the second line and reserve from supporting the first, nor too little to prevent a defeated front line from passing between the gaps in the supports without disordering them.
4. When acting against infantry, the second line should be only 200 yards behind the first, so that it can deliver its charge before the infantry have had time to re-load after repelling the first line.
5. When the first line charges, the supports must follow at a walk, and preserve their order at all times; they are useless unless their formation is kept rigidly.
[6]
1. Wellington to Lord William Russell, 31 July 1826; see also Sir Charles Oman's Peninsular War, Vol. I p. 119. return to note 1
Picture Note
* This print of a celebrated "single combat", in which Corporal Logan of the British 13th Light Dragoons killed ihe French Colonel Chamorin at Campo Mayor, illustrates how contemporary pictures may be misleading whilst not inaccurate in detail. The uniform shown worn by Logan is accurate, according to the uniform regulations of 1812; but at Campo Mayor, the year before, he would have been wearing the previous uniform of braided dolman and fur-crested "Tarleton" helmet. Chamorin's uniform includes red trousers, an apparent "inaccuracy"; but they are doubtless intended to represent the dark red or red-brown overalls adopted by many French officers in the Peninsular war. return to picture
Related
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
At right, "A Corporal of the 13th Dragoons Killing a French Colonel" aquatint by M. Dubourg after Denis Dighton published 1 December 1818. See note.
Sahagun: 15th Hussars; caught French before they were ready; no French reserves to counter-attack. Led by Paget, best British cavalry commander.
Vimiero: 20th Light Dragoons; in the first action and probably carried away by initial success.
Wellington's Instructions
FOOTNOTES
2. United Service Journal, 1831. Several articles on this subject by different officers. return to note 2
3. Morning Chronicle, 5 September 1798. return to note 3
4. Wellington's Dispatches, Vol. VIII p. 112. return to note 4
5. The Courier, 20 April 1811. return to note 5
6. Wellington's General Orders, pp. 481 -82.
Cavalry Charge! A New Thought on an Old Theme
Cavalry Tactics and Quality (Napoleonic Wars)
Largest Cavalry Combat Since Eylau
Quick Thoughts on Cavalry Melees
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