Dean West is a trained military historian and "historical consultant" to the JOHNNY REB developers. He is a member of the Indiana Historical Society, the Indianapolis Civil War Round Table, the Porter-Lake County (Indiana) Civil War Round Table and a life-long wargamer. Dean is also a member of the Game Designers Guild. Lawrence P. Duffield's chastisement of JOHNNY REB is an example of the intemperate and superficial reviewing style this hobby could well do without. Many of us involved in the development of this game are "Old Guard" historical miniatures wargamers and, in many cases, bonafide historians. Personally, I cannot determine whether I am an Historically oriented wargamer, or a wargame playing historian. John Hill, however, is one of the finest game designers working in the field today and has been recognized as such. Nevertheless, John Hill and ADVENTURE GAMES' effort to create a workable Grand-Tactical American Civil War game need not be revered, applauded, or even noticed; but neither should it be subject to the ridicule of reviewers like Mr. Duffield. Larry's stated expectation that; "the (play) testers believed we would be able to get into a game of JOHNNY REB in a few minutes after we opened the box", seems unreasonably optimistic (and demanding) for a reviewer of even the simplest game system, and gives important insight into our critic's desire to really look into this game system and give it a fair shake. John Hill is a good game designer, but he cannot perform miracles. JOHNNY REB is realistic and playable, but it does take some time to learn. John has tried to incorporate into the rules many inter-relating, but often intangible, factors that affected Civil War combat. The events he is attempting to model were by nature complex and even savants like Mr. Duffield will have to expend some time to learn the mechanics of the rules. Fortunately, Larry's review provides rich ground for rebuttal, and the record needs to be set straight. "TRUST TO THE IRON DICE OF BATTLE" Albert Sidney Johnston Mr. Duffield concludes that there is "much too much" die rolling in JOHNNY REB. We disagree. John has chosen the die-roll to simulate the indefinable uncertainty of the battlefield -- where fear, confusion, terror, death and chaos hold high carnival. How much control is possible over men in this "battlefield environment" is impossible to quantify. General impressions of "average" behavior in combat can be gained through historical study. These basic impression scan be modified based upon the elan, discipline and condition of the troops; by the weapons with which they are armed; by who commands them. But no thinking person can hope to predict exactly how human beings will perform when they "see the elephant". In his epic Civil War poem, "JOHN BROWN'S BODY", Stephen Vincent Benet expresses the true nature of war better than I could ever hope to do: "if you take a map and move wooden blocks upon it strategically, the thing looks well, the blocks behave as they should. The science of war is moving live men like blocks. And getting the blocks into place at a fixed moment. But it takes time to mold your men into blocks and flat maps turn into country where creeks and gullies hamper your wooden squares. They stick in the brush, they are tired and rest, they straggle after ripe blackberries, and you cannot lift them up in your hand and move them. -A string of blocks curling smoothly around the left Of another string of blocks and crunching it upIt is all so clear in the maps, so clear in the mind, but the orders are slow, the men in the blocks are slow To move, when they start they take too long on the wayThe General loses his stars and the block-men die in unstrategic defiance of martial law Because still used to just being men, not block-parts. We wargamers "lift them up in (our) hand and move them". Given this advantage, and if realism is at all a consideration, it is not necessary to simulate with our leaden warriors the capricious nature of men in battle? JOHNNY REB is a game of chance because we believe war is ultimately a game of chance. There is for this reason quite a bit of die-rolling involved in the play of the game. However, if familiar with the game system, the die-rolling goes fast, and the uncertainty created adds great excitement to the game, because one can never be sure of exactly what will happen. In the words of Napoleon: "No plan of battle survives contact with the enemy Mr. Duffield bases his conclusions on one playtest in which the opponents decided to form skirmish lines in cover, rejected any thought of maneuver, and simply blazed away at each other for five and a half scale hours. Since each regiment gets to fire once per turn, with dice thrown to determine fire effect, and since four units were engaged, the firing alone generates 88 die rolls during Larry's 22 turn playtest. Units that are behind or in cover, or are in less vulnerable formations are allowed "saving rolls" for each casualty. If a unit sustains seven casualties, it is allowed to roll 7 dice for saves. Larry has counted this as 7 separate rolls. We feel it makes more sense to throw seven dice once rather than one die seven times, as did Mr. Duffield. This is how he came up with so many die rolls. Unless advanced upon, skirmish lines were supposed to be able to hold opposing skirmishers in check (more on this later), and it seems that the outcome obtained in the scenario was historically accurate, if boring, and vindicates the game system. It is not the developer's fault that the playtesters decided upon such uninspired tactics. JOHNNY REB players with average experience could resolve this fire fight, using Duffieldian tactics, in about 20 minutes of real time. Our group has played innumerable scenarios, involving 10 times the maneuver elements employed in Pitzer's Run, and have had a decisive result in ten or eleven turns. ON AVERAGING REGIMENTAL STRENGTHS, THE QUESTION OF HISTORICAL FRONTAGES, AND THE DEMISE OF BOOKKEEPING. Mr. Duffield complains that averaging of regimental strengths to the nearest 100 men "is too crude an average to accurately depict the Civil War regiments". Given the Grand-Tactical scope of the game, our critic has missed the point. Many Grand Tactical games, for simplicity's sake, represent entire brigades with one massive maneuver element. John Hill has taken a different tack. By representing the regiments within the brigade, JOHNNY REB allows a tactical flexibility that, in my view, increases the realistic tactical operation of the brigade on the miniature battlefield. Although John has designed the regimental maneuver element, the "unit of force", to behave individualistically, it is the employment of brigades on the battlefield that is of primary importance to the players. The first thing a tabletop commander in this game must learn, once he has mastered the basic mechanics, is how to properly deploy his brigade to accomplish its mission: how to maneuver the brigade as a coherent whole from point A to point B in the manner most efficient to the purpose of his movement, or how to deploy his internal maneuver elements to best defend a position assailed by the enemy. Once given orders by the gamer-brigadier, the innate regimental colonels will attempt to have their units perform as the brigadier desires. The brigadier must concern himself with the coordination of the whole. The sub-division of the brigade into individual maneuver elements of variable strength allows almost exact simulation of historical brigades. Mr. Duffield lists the strengths of regiments comprising two Union Vth Corps brigades present at Gettysburg. In spite of my personal belief that not every soldier that showed up at morning muster was present when the shooting started (Thomas Livermore in "NUMBERS AND LOSSES IN THE CIVIL WAR" always figures "effectiveness" as 93% of gross strength), I am willing to accept Larry's figures; so, the 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, numbered 1010 men. If designing a scenario in which this brigade was historially engaged, it would be depicted as containing one 400 and two 300 man regiments. Thus, all three internal elements of the brigade have been represented, and the historical brigade strength is off by less than 1%. Is that really too crude a representation to be tolerated? This seems close enough for a purely skirmish game. Would a fair minded reviewer of THE SWORD AND THE FLAME fault the designer if a unit consisted of 100 men instead of 101 men? Mr. Duffield takes John to task for suggesting that only two stand sizes be used regardless of the number of figures on each stand. This does not fit Larry's notion of correct regimental frontages as determined by the time honored wargame eq Width of File (28") * (# of Men In Line/ # of ranks [2]) = Correct Regimental Frontage I hope John will forgive me for revealing that I have always advised him against the two stand generalization; not because he's wrong, but because most historical miniatures gamers, myself included, are extremely frontage conscious and love the above equation. However, there is no dogma inherent to the rules that disallows mounting troops in accordance with theoretical mathematically equated frontage. This is the gamer's decision, and if anything, is an illustration of the adaptability of JOHNNY REB to the player's personal fancy. My own 200 regiment army is mounted in exact accordance with Duffield's thinking on frontages, although John Hill, and D.H. Mahan, have done much to convince me that the practice has little practical application nor historicity. Mahan was the Professor of Engineering and the Science of War at West Point during the tutelage of many, maybe most, professionally trained officers that served in the war, and his teachings were regarded as "the regulations" with respect to Grand Tactics; just as Hardee's "TACTICS" were the "regulations" for discipline and drill. His ponderously titled, "AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON ADVANCE-GUARD, OUT-POST AND DETACHMENT SERVICE OF TROOPS AND THE MANNER OF HANDLING THEM IN THE PRESENCE OF THE ENEMY", states doctrines which give the frontage conscious food for thought. Mahan states: 77. The habitual order of battle of infantry is in two or THREE RANKS. With us, that of two ranks is generally preferred. 123. The battalions, whether deployed in column or in line, preserve the proper intervals (between units) for evolution; these intervals may be increased in obstructed ground without weakening the defense. 126. The battalions composing the main-body may be drawn up in one or two lines (note Larry; four ranks). The latter usually obtained only when a large force is present. 164. In estimating the frontage of a position, an allowance of about 180 yards may be made for each battalion from 600 to 700 men strong. This last is particularly destructive to our strict frontage equation. Further, John Hill and I tramped arguing all over Gettysburg, where regimental frontages are clearly marked in many places, such as on Culp's Hill, By measuring these frontages and estimating regimental strengths as closely as possible, we found that actual frontages did not correspond to the equation in most cases. I was discomfitted but enlightened. John was vindicated, though I intend to continue mounting per equation. Now, one final bit of wisdom from Professor Mahan: "To this it may be added, that no soldier who has made himself conversant with the resources of his art, will allow himself to be trammelled by any exclusive system. What the case requires he will do, if confident of his troops." Therefore, John's two stand generalization is, in my revised view, historically tenable; and it has no effect on game play, simplifies the mounting task, but has nothing whatsoever to do with marketing a product, as is intimated by our ungracious reviewer. However, it does pain me to agree with Mr. Duffield that the 600 and 700 man unit mounted on five stands warps the fire and morale rules. These strong units generate high fire factors due to the number of figures in the unit while they take less casualty morale checks due to the large number of figures on each stand (casualty morale checks are triggered automatically by the loss of a stand). I have no five stand 600 man regiments in my army. I do have 600 and 800 man regiments. Hardee's "TACTICS" defines a battalion as any sub-unit of a regiment consisting of two or more companies. if I wish to mass these battalions into one regimental maneuver element, my "house rule" recreates Duffield's theoretical frontage of the 600+ regiment, and the massed unit takes morale checks when two stands are lost, instead of when just one is lost. Problem solved. Another example of the personal touch tinkering that can be accommodated by this most innovative game system. Lawrence thinks our regimental maneuver element "has little more flexibility within the system than a single counter in T.S.R.'s "GLEAM OF BAYONETS". That hurt. To simplify the playing of the game -- to improve playability -- one of John's primary design goals was to eliminate tedious bookkeeping. The paperwork innate to many wargames is what makes them tedious, and eventually boring. JOHNNY REB regiments, used in conjunction with the color-coded casualty markers and order markers, essentially eliminate all bookkeeping and is a major innovation of this rules system. Players can merely look at a JOHNNY REB regiment and determine it's modified morale point and morale condition (good order, shaken, routed), present strength, casualties sustained, basic fire factor, formation (including disorder), facing and orders for the turn. He may also gaze upon the beauty of the figures. What more can be asked of the silent metal heros composing these regiments? Campaigns, conscription, and the myth of the big rebel regiment. "These campaign rules are offered as a starting point... the rules are but guidelines and should be interpreted as such". With these words John begins and ends his campaign rules section. The campaign rules appear in Appendix F, and were really thrown in as a bonus for the gamer. The JOHNNY REB rules were designed to simulate the collision of troops on the battlefield - large numbers of troops fighting over relatively small areas of ground. It is, again, a Grand-Tactical simulation. What is important on the JOHNNY REB table-top is how many troops are available on the battlefield and how they are deployed; What "off table" troops are within supporting distance, and where and how fast can these troops reach the field. The game gives the player the means to operate within the "battlefield environment". The SCENARIO provides the background "Campaign" element. John provides APPENDIX F: CAMPAIGN RULES as too(] for thought, and as guidelines for how JOHNNY REB can fit into the campaign environment. However, Larry's section criticizing the campaign rules does raise interesting historical questions which warrant discussion. LARRY: "The Union policy was NOT to reinforce older regiments, but make entire new ones instead." In 1862, 50,000 Union recruits were raised for the specific purpose of reinforcing existing regiments. In 1863 over-all governmental policy changed and recruits were drafted into older regiments from then on. Too, Union colonels had an informal habit of sending recruiters home to gather replacements for the regiments. This phenomenon usually began as soon as the regiments reached the theatre of war, and it was done in 1861, LARRY: "The Confederate draft system (after 1862) could not keep up with losses entirely, and by 1864 they, too, were consolidating and disbanding regiments." There is a commonly held notion that Confederate regiments were generally stronger and more stable due to the workings of the Rebel Conscription Act, which enlisted regiments for the "duration of the war", and called for the drafting of replacements into existing regiments. The problem with this theory is the presumption that the rebel conscription laws really worked. Most historians seem to be under the impression that these laws did not work well at any time during the war, and that replacements were never available in the numbers required. Conscription did not enjoy great popularity in the South, and the government was only haphazard in its enforcement. Professor James McDonough in "STONES RIVER: BLOODY WINTER IN TENNESSEE", postulates that Southern women probably enjoyed greater success rallying troops to the colors than the Conscription Act did. The ladies simply snubbed and villified healthy men who would not fight for "the cause". If that grim feminine ploy won't make a man fight, nothing will! In fact, Union and Confederate regimental strength levels closely coincided in every pre-1864 battle that I researched, and when the did deviate to any degree, it was the Union regiments that were stronger. The following table of battles from both eastern and western theatres illustrates the point. My figures may be off up to 7% either way due to the failure of the various sources to entirely agree with respect to numbers engaged. BATTLE DATE FOUGHT AVG. UNION RGT. AVG. CONF. RGT. 1st Bull Run July 21,1861 690 690 Shiloh Apri 16-7,1863 650 500 Perryville Oct. 8,1862 330 290 Antietam Sept. 17,1862 350 175 Stones River Dec. 31,1862 and Jan. 2, 1863 390 290 (330 if combined unit figured as one maneuver element) Champion's Hill May 17,1863 400 400 Gettysburg July 1,2,3,1863 300 300 AVERAGE STRENGTH 440 380 As for Confederate ability to maintain more stable regimental strengths prior to 1864 due to infusion of replacements into existing units, let's consider a specific, but typical, regiment and brigade. The infantry of Hampton's Legion, a prestigious and well financed unit, exceeded 600 rank and file at 1st Bull Run. Slightly over one year later, 77 very veteran soldiers remained to fight at Antietam. Hood's brigade, to which the Legion was attached from The Seven Days through Antietam, numbered 2000 men in five regiments at Gaine's Hill, June 27,1862 (note - 400 man average unit strength). At Antietam, 864 men remained. At Gettysburg the brigade, minus the Legion and 18th Georgia, but reinforced by the 3rd Arkansas, had "ballooned" way back up to 1100 effectiveness (average regimental strength, 275). Mr. Duffield is further confused with respect to the consolidation and disbandment of Southern regiments. He thinks there was none of this until 1864. Wrong, Larry. The Confederacy consolidated and disbanded regiments as early as 1862. Walker's 2nd Tennessee and the 21st Tennessee were disbanded and consolidated to form the 5th Confederate infantry. The 40th Tennessee, captured at island Number 10, April 7, 1862, was disbanded upon its parole and never reconstituted. At Stones River, 18 rebel regiments were consolidated to form 9 field units. Most of these remained combined for the duration of the war, primarily because replacements were never able to bring the units up to a strength warranting separation. Many more examples can be cited. Pitzer's Run: Skirmishers and Small Arms Fire We have already alluded to Mr. Duffield's first of three playtests of the Pitzer's Run scenario. The other two involved formed units charging the skirmishers in the woods, and all charges were repulsed. it should be pointed out that the attacking Unionists were outnumbered by the Rebel voltiguers 800 to 500, and this could have had some bearing on the outcome. As a result of these playtests Larry concludes that "Against an enemy deployed in skirmish order 2 inches from the woods, there is no viable charge option and no real alternative to simply lining up and shooting." Apparently Larry feels skirmishers in the game are unrealistically invulnerable and powerful. But then he complains it is unrealistic to halve the firepower of skirmishing troops? We wish our critic would be more consistant in his reasoning on these matters. Our reviewer seems to feel there is little difference between the effectiveness of close order and skirmish fire. I respectfully disagree. it is widely accepted that troops standing shoulder to shoulder in close order, under close supervision of officers and performing rote loading and firing drill, are capable of developing a greater volume of fire than are those operating in dispersed order. Commenting upon the proper use of skirmishers, Professor Mahan states in his regulations: "As each individual (skirmisher), although immediately supported by his file closers, and those on his right and left, is still often thrown upon his own resources, being obliged to take cover where he can most conveniently find it, he must be a good marksman, COO/, deliberate, and circumspect: as it may become necessary to keep an enemy occupied hours, and even days together." Mahan continues: "The accuracy of aim, upon which the good effects to be obtained by skirmishers depends, requires that the men should keep coo/ and in good order. All hurried and violent movements by which men may lose breath, should be avoided; and they should be frequently cautioned against rapid firing, which soon impairs the aim, and be directed never to raise the piece until they feel sure of their shot." We firmly hold that the halving of skirmish fire is entirely justified and is supported by actual battlefield practice, and by the "regulations". Mr. Duffield discusses the practice of holding works with thin "skirmish" lines of troops, and implies that JOHNNY REB does not cover this eventuality. Please be advised the rules cover this situation in painstaking detail beginning on page 65. John gives progressive benefits to skirmishers (and other troops) defending behind four different types of works -- light, hasty, medium and heavy. The gamer does not have to use all these rules unless he wants to, but they are there. Larry makes the true statement that; "No one actually knows the firepower and hit ratio of Civil War troops." Having said that, he then comes up with a theory that 1000 men firing at normal range should inflict 140 casualties "every 5 to 7 minutes". This theory does not stand the test of historical comparison. Groveton, or Brawner's Farm, was fought August 28,1862. It was a standup open field firefight fought at normal to close rifle-musket range. It was the baptism of fire for the soon to be famous "Iron Brigade", which numbered 2100 effectives at the time. These troops were attacked by Ewell's and Taliaferro's Rebel divisions, numbering in excess of 6000 men. Since all these Graycoats were not simultaneously engaged, let us say that on the average the Yankees were under the fire of 2000 enemy rifles. According to Larry's thinking, the Iron Brigade should have been wiped out in 45 minutes. Historically the battle lasted something over two hours, and the brigade lost 751 casualties, some of these to artillery fire. This works out to about 24 men every five to seven minutes per 1000 troops firing. The Confederates lost about 2000 men at Brawner's Farm. After estimating casualties caused by other Union troops engaged (including six Napoleons), and averaging the number of muskets the Iron Brigade had continuously in action, it appears they may have brought down 50 enemies every five to seven minutes. So what does this prove? I hope it shows that events on the battlefield defy definitive analysis, that Larry's theory is without merit, and that the JOHNNY REB timeframe is closer to reality. Two 500 man (25 figures) JOHNNY REB regiments, firing in similar circumstances and in good order, have the possibility of inflicting from40 to 360 casualties every fifteen minutes or so. Most results fall realistically between these two extremes. Mr. Duffield calls John's weapon ranges specious, and the fire modifiers "crude". Crude by what standard he does not say. John represents eight basic types of Civil War small arms. Most of these can be modified for special differences (breach loading, flintlock, poor quality, etc.). Each weapon has four range categories - close, normal, long and extreme. As an example, rifle-musket close range is inside 80 yards. John feels at this range the weapon was awesome, and fire factors are doubled. From 80 out to 200 yards is normal range, the effective battlefield range, and fire is normal. Long range (out to 400 yards halves fire factors) because we feel at this range the efficiency of weapon and firer begin to decline. Bench-rest tests of the rifle-musket show it to have an extreme range of 600 yards, and so in the game the weapon has the potential to fire at this range. Fire, however, is quartered, and one must be very lucky to inflict any damage. JOHNNY REB gives the player all the potential inherent to the weapon; it is up to the gamer to apply tactics and decide how best to apply this potential. Larry might like to know that bench-rest tests of the Spencer carbine showed it to have a longer range than either the Springfield or Enfield rifles. John could not quite buy this, and so gives the weapon a range slightly less than the rifle-musket, but greater than the range of muzzle and breachloading carbines. Shotguns in the game are devastating inside 20 yards (fire factors tripled), and are effective out to 40 yards. Outside these ranges, their fire is rather ineffectual, but I do agree that 160 yard extreme range is too long. I feel the extremely low velocity of the shotgun blast ends its total range rather abruptly. In a second edition of the rules, I would lobby to do away with long and extreme ranges for shotguns. This would be similar to how John handles canister ranges in the game, and would be a reasonable expedient. In addition to the preceding factors, John also takes into account the proficiency of the firing unit (militia, green, average or elite... Oh yes, and sharpshooter), the morale state of the firing unit, the formation of target and firing unit, target cover, type of works unit is firing from, officer benefit, and terrain. This is "crude"? Every type of small arm range has been carefully researched, and with the possible exception of the shotgun range as it now appears in the rules, can be supported by strong evidence, and the inter-relation of the various weapons gives a very realistic feel to JOHNNY REB. Why Larry is confused about visibility is beyond me. Since Pitzer's Run is fought entirely within woods, woods visibility, as carefully described on page 7 of the rules would apply. Larry either did not read them, or could not understand them, although they are very clearly stated. PARTIAL LIST OF REFERENCES Battles and Leaders: Thomas Yoseloff, New York, Vols. 1. 2 & 3, London 1956 Edition; Benet, Stephen Vincent: John Brown's Body, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1927; Catton, Bruce: A Stillness it Appomattox: Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Co., 1965; Coddington, Edwin B.: The Gettysburg Campaign, New York, Chas. Scribner & Sons, 1968; Connelly, Thomas: Autumn of Glory - The Army of Tennessee. 1862-65, L.S.U. Press, Baton Rouge, 1971; Davis, Burke To Appomattox, New York, Rinehart & Co., 1959: Freeman, D.S.: Lee's LTs, A study in Command, New York, Chas. Scribner & Sons, Volume III, 1944, Hardee's Tactics; Livermore, Thomas L.: Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1957; Hill, John: Johnny Reb, St. Paul, MN, Adventure Games, 1983; Mahan, D.H.: An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard, Outpost and Detachment Service of Troops and the Manner of Posting and Handling Them in the Presence of the Enemy; New York, Joan Wiley, 1861: McDonough, James: Stone, River: Bloody Winter in Tennessee: Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1980; Murfin, James: The Gleam of Bayonets, New York, Bonanza books, 1965; Nolan, Alan: The Iron Brigade; Ann Arbor, Hardscrabble Books, 1983; Polley, J.B.: Hood's Texas Brigade; Dayton, OH, Morningside Bookshop Edition, 1976; Tremain, Henry E.: Last Hours of Sheridan's Cavalry: Bonnell Silver & Bowers, 1904, pp 1,37-65; Zimmerman, Richard Unit Organization of the Civil War: Ontario, RAFM Co., Inc., 1982. Johnny Reb: Two Points of View Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye In Defense of Johnny Reb Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. VI No. 1 Back to Courier List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 1985 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com