A Review of Adventure Games' JOHNNY REB Miniatures Rules Mr. Duffield is proprietor of GAMETABLE, in Campbell, CA. He is a long time gamer and historian, with one published set of Miniatures Rules: BRIGADIER!, set in the Horse & Musket period. He reviewed The Complete Brigadier in THE COURIER, Vol. IV, No. 4. JOHNNY REB, Rules for Re-creating Civil War Battles with Miniature Soldiers. Published by Adventure Games, Inc., 1278 Selby Ave., St. Paul, Minn, 55014. John Hill, designer; Dana Lombardy, developer. FORMAT: A boxed rules set, containing a 92 page rules booklet, an 11 page scenario booklet (with 6 Scenarios), two four-page rules summary sheets ("Combat Tables Card"), a template for determining firing and turning angles, and a sheet of uncut counters for using in giving orders, and assorted marking functions. Price: $19.95/ SUBJECT: Tactical level (brigade and division) land combat in the American Civil War. One miniature figure equals 20 historical soldiers, one cannon model equals 2 cannon. A game turn equals approximately 15 minutes. Rules give scales for 9/10mm, 15mm and 20mm figures and conversion instructions for 25mm figures. INTRODUCTION Time was when every miniatures gamer was his (more rarely, her) own rules designer. As new blood joined the hobby and figures became more available, people who weren't anxious to spend 400 hours researching to play a 4 hour game began to complain. Published rules became the rule. With the growth of a board game industry, game designers of proven skills reached public notice. And one of those, one of the very best, was John Hill, designer of SQUAD LEADER, and some half dozen or so other cardboard shootouts. John Hill, moreover, had a very individualistic design philosophy he wasn't shy about explaining. If it wasn't fun, it wasn't worth playing. So when Adventure Gaming brought out a real, live John Hill game, with his name on the cover and all, we miniatures players settled down for a real treat. Alas for us gamers, JOHNNY REB just doesn't deliver on this promise. "... MUSTER, AND COUNT OFF BY FIVES." Initially the testers believed we would be able to get into a game of JOHNNY REB a few minutes after we opened the box. After all, we already had an army of one entire Union Corps (V Corps, 15,000 men+) and a reinforced Confederate Division (Hood's), plus about a Cavalry Brigade(+) for each side. The strengths had been carefully researched at 1 figure to 20 soldiers, and the frontages were proportional to actual troop frontages. All we had to do was convert to John Hill's ground scale and play, we thought. It didn't work out that way. Unit sizes must be averaged to the nearest 100 historical soldiers. This is too crude an average to accurately depict the Civil War regiments. John opts to depict each regiment of infantry or cavalry in exactly five stands of equal size. The stands may contain from 2 to 6 figures. This allows representation of regiments at strengths of 200, 300, 400, 500 or 600 men each. For units smaller than 200 men or larger than 600, new base sizes must be constructed. Historically, Civil War Union regiments, and to a lesser extent Confederate regiments, varied widely in strengths at different times during the war. The brigades listed below are in the Union V Corps at Gettysburg, with regimental strengths as specified: 2nd Bde, 1st Division 32nd Mass. 242 4th Mich. 342 62nd Penna. 426 3rd Bde,1st Division 20 Me. 380 16th Mich. 150 44th N.Y. 313 83rd Penna. 308 (Source: Zimmermann, p. 49) Other examples are easy to find. Civil War Regiments range in strength from approximately 150 men or so through 1060 for a full strength regiment (1200 for a Heavy Artillery Regiment like the ones Grant deployed as Infantry in 1864-65). Rounding to the nearest 100 men and ranging from 200 to 600 men is too crude a representation of regimental strengths for Civil War battles. The rules do not allow for campaign game attrition within regiments. Each regiment is fixed in strength once and for all by the mounting system. In our campaigns, we often start out with units at full mustering strength (900 or so) and reduce them by combat and disease during the campaign (and perhaps reinforce them with drafts). When a battle comes up, the strength could be anywhere from 150 or so to the full 1060 men of a brand new regiment. JOHNNY REB, however, forces the gamer to assign the figures for a particular regiment permanently to stands. This forever fixes the size of each regiment at one point, and obscures a major historical fact of the Civil War. One true command problem was allocation of regimental missions according to individual sizes and capabilities. JOHNNY REB homogenizes the regiments into a preconceived shape and size. The "quick fix" of permanently mounting the regiment on stands, then deducting stands as losses occur will not work in JOHNNY REB, because a lost stand has a catastrophic tactical effect on the battle. (See Morale discussion, below.) JOHNNY REB has a Campaign Rules section (pp75-79). And, after a battle, it describes the following effects of casualties: (Defeated Side) "Stands which lost all their figures return to their units after four campaign turns, if a roll of 1 or 2 is made for each stand." (Turns are 12 hours each.) The Victorious side gets its casualties back in 12 hours on a roll of 1-5. Now if your unit goes into a fight missing 2 stands, with a -4 morale difference, I guarantee you won't like it. Historically regiments were reduced severely by casualties, yet performed with as much elan as before. In fact, a Union regiment, blooded in its first fight and losing perhaps as much as 25% of its original strength of 600 or so, might be more useful than before, having attained Veteran status. Next, the historical question becomes, where did these regiments come from? The Union policy was not to reinforce older regiments, but make entire new ones instead. The Confederate draft system (after 1862) could not keep up with losses entirely, and by 1864 they, too, were consolidating and disbanding regiments. So these men who rejoin their regiments are coming from thin air. (Some, of course, are "skulkers" and stragglers and lightly wounded men. But up to half the wounded in the Civil War died, or were otherwise taken out of the war. So that argument breaks down.) The inescapable conclusion is JOHNNY REB simply doesn't model campaign attrition or attrition within a regimental well. The stand sizes chosen do not closely approximate actual unit frontages, and the designer's explanation that those frontages vary widely is insufficient to cover the discrepancies. All infantry in JOHNNY REB are mounted on only two size stands, regardless of the number of figures on them. Regiments of 200 or 300 men are mounted on 5 stands of 7/8" square (15mm size), while regiments of 400, 500 or 600 are mounted on stands of 1"x7/8". This is convenient for the manufacturer of JOHNNY REB miniatures, who also make lead stands. But realistic? Civil War formations did have a certain elasticity. Commanders would often "stretch" a weak formation to cover more ground. And green troops especially would "cluster" in clumps much tighter than regulations demanded of skirmish and battle lines. Still, I cannot believe that adding 300 men to a battle line would increase its frontage a mere 25 yards (from 175 to 200 yards). The regulation frontage in Civil War units is 28" per man. A regiment of 400 men, the "average" size Mr. Hill says he is basing his regimental strengths on, has approximately 20 men in the regimental HQ group (Colonel, Color Party, Stretcher Bearers, Sergeant Major, etc.), plus approximately 3 men per Company (at full strength, 5 men) who deploy behind the battle line. The remaining 350 men deploy in 2 ranks, with intervals of approximately 3 yards between companies. Thus, the "theoretical" of such a formation is 175 files, taking up 140 yards, plus 27 yards for company intervals, or 167 yards. At "Open order", each file maintains a 4 foot frontage, for a total of 250 yards front for the same size regiment. Such a regiment in JOHNNY REB deploys on 200 yards, a reasonable compromise between Close Order and Open Order frontages. However, a 600 man regiment, ranging in historical "regulation" frontages from 450 yards to 735 yards, also takes up only 200 yards frontage as if it had deployed in 4 ranks per file instead of 2. But, it retains its 600 man firepower on the narrow frontage, in effect making it behave, not like a 600 man regiment, clumsy and somewhat unwieldy, but like a 400 man regiment with repeaters and bullet proof vests (because it takes more "hits" to eliminate a stand which meanwhile fires more powerfully!). "YOU TAKE A DIE ROLL, AND I'LL TAKE A DIE ROLL..." Scenario One, our first test battle was the skirmish at Pitzer's Run, 2 July, 1863. A tiny brigade under Col. Berdan engages the win of Wilcox's Alabama Brigade. The battle is the first Scenario in the scenario book, with the fewest pieces per side, and ought to be an ideal means to get to know the system. The Scenario Booklet has a short description of the battle situation and result, Victory Conditions, Deployment information, Terrain Description and Order of Battle, plus a 1" to 1' scale map. The Pitzer's Run map was 2' square (presumably for a 15mm scale game). The game is a simple firefight. Losing a regiment off the field costs the game. There is no time limit. The terrain is very close (the entire map is covered by light woods, with a tiny stream running from north to south across the center, and a trail running NW to SE across the stream and map). Players initially deploy both of their units on board, plus eight hidden unit counters. one hidden unit counter can conceal both units, or represent one, or nothing at all. in order to play the scenario, the players must understand pp 1-31, 38-55, 59-64, and 68-69. No cavalry or artillery rules need be studied. An immediate problem was the hidden unit rule. On pages 68 and 69, concealment rules are discussed. Since we needed to understand them to deploy, we went there first. Concealed units are "removed from the playing area unless they would be visible to the enemy as determined by the scenario or line-of-sight visibility rules". Hidden units are revealed when they become "...visible, under any visibility rule, to an actual on-board unit or counter that represents a real unit Folks, there is no visibility rule that says anything about when we should take off the hidden movement counters. The rules of visibility referred to above are on page 7, it turns out, and state: "at the start of the scenario, the visibility will be defined in terms of feet". (Nowhere is the visibility for Pitzer's Run defined. in fact, in no scenario is the visibility defined.) Ah, but there's more. Pitzer's Run takes place in woods, and rule 0.3.5 Obscured Visibility defines how to see in woods. It is actually quite clever. Essentially you can see 2D6 inches and fire at full effect, and over that is half effect. interesting, but when do we pick up the dummy counters? HouseRule #1: Visibility is 4 feet. If a dummy counter is seen in normal fire range, it is removed and whatever it represents is put down. When do we check visibility? House Rule #2: Check visibility at the end of normal movement. This is the only time each turn that it is checked. (This allows for checks against units moving into range during movement.) It is also checked before the start of each game, so that units writing orders will know what they can see to fire at. House Rule #3: You can fire, using Area Fire, at a hidden unit counter, and the target losses are assessed, including saving throws, without telling the firer what, if anything, he hit. (We trust each other: if you think that's asking too much of your opponent, either don't use hidden movement or house rule #3.) The scenario calls for one general officer per side. Unfortunately the rules do not tell the stand size (or even whether the general gets a stand of his own). We assumed Brigadier Wilcox was a single mounted figure, and Col. Berdan a single dismounted figure. Deployment: We deployed the 1 US Sharpshooters in skirmish order at the NE edge of Pitzer's Run and the 3rd Maine in skirmish order at the SE edge. The Confederates deployed 10 and 11 Alabama in skirmish order at the NW and SW edges respectively. Initial Turn. Visibility - 8", all units are in sight of one another. Both players put out orders. All 4 regiments opened fire. Ranges are 6" for all units, because the creek is2" wide and each regiment is 2" back, so as to prevent a moving unit from crossing and meleeing immediately without taking a close range shot. (The Run is rough terrain, maximum speed for any formation is3"/turn, leaving it open to a 1" range volley.) The deployment dictated the character of the battle. With no chance to charge, both sides deployed into skirmish order and had at it. Each regiment rolls 2 dice to determine basic random effects. Their range is determined from Table 8. The 1 USS is in normal range, everyone else is at long range. As an example of play, let us take the 1 USS. It has 10 figures, firing at Normal range. So, Table 9: Factor Modifiers for Fire & Melee, modifies this number of figures firing as follows: Infantry in Skirmish order fire at half effect (eg. 5 figures). Unit is equipped with breechloaders, has First Fire orders, is firing its opening volley of the battle and has a +1 officer (Colonel Berdan) assisting the shooting. The unit is Elite. Total effect "up 5". The 1 USS fires as if it had 15 figures eligible to fire. Die roll: 12 (Best Possible!) = 7 hits. We are not, however, done. The target, 10 Ala. is also in Skirmish Order. It gets a Saving Roll for each hit, for that reason. Result: 7 more die rolls to determine how many actual hits. Rolls of 1, 5,3,3, 3,6, and 6. Final Results = 3 hits. The unit saves on rolls of 1 through 4 and is hit on only 5 or 6. Once again, the 1 USS has been lucky. 10 Ala., firing back, is at long range, in skirmish order firing at a skirmishing target, with 20 base figures, and General Wilcox helping. It is of average morale. Results: 1 hit (5 die rolls). 11 Ala. and 3 Me. also exchange volleys with results of: 0 hits on 11 Ala. (2 die rolls) and 1 hit on 3 Me. (3 die rolls). First Turn Morale Checks: 1 USS must roll a 2 on 2 dice or higher to pass,10 Ala. must roll a 3 or better, and 3 Me. must roll a 4 or better. Obviously, all pass (we needed 15 minutes and three charts and two pages of rules to figure that out!). Officers may be killed if they are too close to enemy units (whether or not they are fired on or the unit they support is fired on -- I guess they die from a heart attack). But no one died this turn (chances are 1 in 36). Second Turn, visibility is 8", no need to do anything but fire. Results: 10 Ala. 1 kill, loses a stand, must check morale with a roll of 5+. Rolls a 7 on 2 dice. Officer not killed. 11 Ala. and 3 Me. don't lose anyone (5 die rolls), but 1 USS loses another and a stand. Checks with a 2+ to pass. (3 die rolls.) Third through Sixth Turns: Both US formations lose a figure and each CSA regiment loses 2 hits (42 die rolls). No Officer hits. Seventh Turn: 10 Ala. and 3 Me. each lose 1 hit, Colonel Berdan is lightly wounded (no further effects rest of game). 10 die rolls. This generates a Morale Check for officer loss on the Union side, but both pass. Eighth Turn: 10 Ala. loses another hit (and second stand) 1 USS loses another figure and another stand. 11 Ala. and 3 Me. each lose a figure. Bloody Turn. 14 die rolls. Morale Checks for 10 Ala., 11 Ala. and 1 USS. 10 Ala. rolls 9, with a Base 3, -1 for cover, +4 for stands lost, +2 for relative isolation, and -1 for General Wilcox, it passed. 11 Ala. has a roll of 7, also passing. 1 USS rolls 12, automatic good morale, 3 Me. rolls 8, good enough. Ninth through Fifteenth Turns: 10 Ala. loses 2 figures, 11 Ala. loses 3 figures and 1 USS loses 1 figure. 66 die rolls. 16th Turn: 2 hits on 10 AIa. (Die roll of 12 byl USS!). A third stand. Morale check is Base 3, +6 for stands, -2 for Officer and result means 10 Ala. could have an "unexpected devastation" Morale Check, but she already has a check for stand loss. 17th Turn: No losses. 7 die rolls. 10 Ala. rallies. 18th Turn: 3 hits on 10 Ala. (Die roll of 10, all three hits missed their saving rolls!!!) A fourth stand. Morale Check is Base 3, +10 -2, roll of 8, result of Shaken, in place. No other losses. 3 Me. redeploys to line. 19th Turn: 10 Ala. fails to rally. 3 Me. moves across to edge of Run, firing on the move. 3 Me. loses 1 figure, but passes Morale Check. 20th Turn: 10 AIa. rallies. 3 Me. loses I figure. 3 Me. crosses Run, fires into 10 Ala. as partial flanking fire, accepting a similar position for itself vs. 11 Ala. No effects. 21st Turn: All return to FF Orders. 10 Ala. loses 2 figures. 13 die rolls. 22nd Turn: 10 Ala. receives 2 more hits (actually, a volley from 3 Me. would have inflicted 5 hits had there been that many to take). The unit is eliminated. A Union win. We fought this battle again, with different results, but it still lasted 8 Turns. The Union formed to charge before the enemy had been shot to pieces. They lost 7 hits in one turn and the game. So we tried again. The CSA deployed as above, and the Union massed its men, I USS in skirmish order as above, the 3rd Me. behind in line. Plan was to move up after a couple of fire exchanges and overrun 10 Ala. On Turn 1 we started shooting, and on Turn 4 made the charge. 3 Me. lost 8 figures coming in, to 7 figures for the 10 Ala., which routed, but rallied. 3 Me. couldn't continue the charge as 11 Ala. had formed up and was threatening to roll the Union up. In the ensuing firefight, 3 Me. died under the combined guns of the two CSA regiments while both 10 and 11 Ala. took many casualties. So much for charging. Against an enemy deployed in skirmish order 2" from the woods, there is no viable charge option and no real alternative to simply lining up and shooting. Either side can maneuver, but it is taking a serious risk which is not repaid by a significant advantage. However, shooting takes forever. Don't rely on your skirmishers to win anything quickly. The games we played lasted from 2 to 5 1/2 hours game time, against a historical result, using slightly different formations, of 40 minutes (3 Turns). In all three games, die rolling was more effective than average. The game took unhistorically long, the scenario bogged down in boredom, and there was much too much die rolling. In board game terms each regiment has little more flexibility within the system than a single counter in, say TSR's GLEAM OF BAYONETS game (about Antietam). 2 "pieces" set up next to one another in a patch of woods, and shot each other to bits in 20 Turns. Maneuver was minimal, decisions were minimal, and the whole thing could have been handled with at most two or three die rolls. Yet we made over 200 die rolls. Pitzer's Run demonstrates nothing else than the complexity of the Fire rules. The requirement for over 200 die rolls to resolve a four regiment fire fight is absurd. If the rolls produced exceptional accuracy, perhaps they might be excused. But the actual modifiers are relatively crude: halving or quartering the number of figures firing, or modifying the row of results used. The dice do give a very wide range of results: a single 30 man skirmishing regiment firing on a skirmishing target in woods can kill from no one (29% chance), 20 men (45% chance) through a maximum of 80 men (0.2% chance). This wide swing of possibilities is characteristic of a John Hill game, and if you like that sort of on predictability, this is a plus for JOHNNY REB. JOHNNY REB makes the historical assessment that skirmish lines sacrifice firepower for safety. In the Pitzer's Run Scenario, the key figure is that a skirmish line, safe in covering terrain, is unapproachable byan enemy battle line. The attacker must risk his regiment in an attack that will guarantee that it takes heavy casualties for one turn, and may, if the additional charge bonus die roll is poor, take two turns of casualties. The difference between being hit with and without a saving rolI, in the woods, is that the one with the saving roll takes 1/3 the losses of the other. In deploying for maximum protection, the gamer must choose to lose firepower. Being in skirmish order costs a 50% reduction in figures firing. Since Civil War regiments fired at will, even in volley line, it is difficult to see why the same man separated from his fellows by an additional two yards or so, can hit only half as often. (However, remember, this is only my objection. No one really knows how effective Civil War rifle fire was, and under what conditions.) in the case of unprotected formations, there are arguments for this judgement (eg. once separated from supervision, taking cover properly has a much higher priority than shooting, etc.). Civil War generals used the Skirmish order to deploy their men in a very broad front, such as when they were defending trenches. in that case, with the men, conceptually speaking, in small groups within widely separated rifle pits or trenches, the skirmisher effectiveness penalty seems excessive. "DESIGN FOR EFFECT", John Hill. "HISTORY IS BUNK", Henry Ford A careful read of the remainder of the rules and a few experiments with troops brought out the following additional comments. Weapons Ranges, as given in the various charts, are suspect. Because of the close distances inherent in JOHNNY REB's scale, weapons' effective and maximum ranges are distorted to produce specific effects. Rifle close range is 2". In order to keep riflemen from slaughtering cavalry who cannot even shoot back, pistols are given a maximum range of 2" (80 yards!). Shotguns, in order to be significantly better than pistols for cavalry, are given a range of 160 yards (!!). Artillery canister ranges have been severely truncated (from 350 historical yards to 160 yards to allow rifles a better chance to decimate crews before they are destroyed by short range canister fire. Repeating Carbines are allowed to fire with similar ranges to rifles so that enterprising rules lawyers won't stand a half inch out of range and destroy enemy carbine armed cavalry. (Pickett's Division was almost wiped out, in 1865, charging Sheridan's cavalry. Pity they didn't know that their weapons were effective at 400 yards and the carbines weren't useful till 300.) It is hard to argue with this sort of design technique, but it isn't exactly history either. Artillery Procedures are even more complex than small arms. To score a hit with artillery, you must roll to see if you hit at all (on Table 14, Number to Hit, as modified by Table 15, Modifiers to Hit Number), then to see what you did (on Table 13, you get the Artillery equivalent row to be used on Table 10 as the Base Number. After determining the base number, modify it according to Table 9: Factor Modifiers for Fire and Melee, Table 11: Modifiers to Small Arms Kills or Artillery Factors, and apply the result to Table 10.). Then you take Saving Rolls, if applicable. A single battery firing on an enemy under cover (this is the Civil War, remember) can use 7 charts and a maximum of 21 die rolls, if a friendly officer is directing fire. (Assumptions: 3 sections of Napoleons, all hit, and target is entitled to Saving Rolls.) There is no command role for Division and Higher Staffs. Although the preface to JOHNNY REB claims to "transport you to a field command in the midst of a desperate Civil War battle", it does no such thing. Brigade leaders can only affect combat by leading regiments in battle, the Colonel's job. Division commanders can also take over a regiment, but exercise no effect on orders, Brigade leaders, etc. except by, again, leading a regiment. All elements of a player's command receive new orders to take account of a changing situation by telepathy, as no command distances are involved, and if all the generals are killed off, the only effect is a series of morale checks and modifiers. There are anomalies in the Game Sequence/Time Sequence. As in most games, there is a problem with what to do about the movement rates and game turn scale. We have seen George Jeffries and others attempt to deal with this by adopting radical methods of Turn Sequencing. JOHNNY REB simply announces that a Turn equals 15 minutes. Movement scales would indicate that it is more like 6 to 7 minutes of movement, gauged from road march speeds of 120 paces per minute forced march. The average result of an infantry duel at normal range is 140 casualties per thousand men engaged. No one actually knows the firepower and hit rates of Civil War troops, but a scale of 5 to 7 minutes of fire at 2 rounds per minute should produce that amount of casualties. The other 8 to 10 minutes per Turn are the traditional "delay" time, averaged over the field. Nothing new here. Although Pitzer's Run was played several times, and individual situations were set up to test specific rules, we did not try to test another scenario. Our feeling was that if we could not make the system play smoothly with only four regiments and two officers, adding extra complications would only increase the frustration level without adding new understanding of the game rules. AN OVERVIEW As has been made, I hope, absolutely clear, I was less than impressed. JOHNNY REB is a game I would be hard put to find a use for. it is complex enough that I would never want to teach a beginner the thing, and not historical enough to interest the researcher-gamer. It has its good points. Morale Checks and Fire effects make Melee rare, as it should be. The technology is all there, but doesn't dominate the play of the game. There are a lot of special rules to be remembered, but some people really enjoy knowing the difference between "advance by rushes" and "wave assaults", and who could resist "charging with unloaded weapons"? Shades of Emery Upton! If the special rules area bit simplistic, so what? At least they're there: John Hill knows his Civil War. It may be just that I expected more. Not done the way I would have done it... I have my own set of Civil War Rules I published in 1977, and I like them. But from John Hill, I definitely expect rules that are either a new advance over the state of the art, or a smooth, playable and fun game. JOHNNY REB is neither. No, I believe a betters et of Civil War rules can be obtained by picking up John Grossman's COMPLETE BRIGADIER, and modifying the fire combat a little to give it some chance effects. JOHNNY REB is for the completist John Hill collector or the completist Civil War rules collector. Ach, Johnny, we hardly knew ye! REFERENCES Duffield, L.P. BRIGADIER!. San Jose, Ca.: GameTable, 1977. $9.00. Tactical Combat 1700 to 1914. Emphasizes command restrictions, changing weapons technology, organization. Grossman, LF. COMPLETE BRIGADIER, St. Paul, Minn.: Adventure Games, 1982. $19.95. Tactical combat 1680 to 1880. A good coverage of Horse & Musket warfare. Zimmerman, Richard J. UNIT ORGANIZATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR. Cambridge, Ont., Canada: RAFM Co. Inc., 1982. An excellent, readily available introduction to Civil War organization and strengths. Johnny Reb: Two Points of View Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye In Defense of Johnny Reb Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. VI No. 1 Back to Courier List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 1985 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com