Musketeer and grenadier NCO's, 1806. (Kling)
Generally speaking, one can divide writings on the subject into
two broad groups-firstly those that see the period from Frederick's
death to 1806 as one of conservatism and reaction, with 1807
marking the beginning of the period of proper reforms; and secondly
those that see the entire period as one of continual reform. Most
Anglo-American historians tend towards the first view, perhaps
because they are unfamiliar with the German sources and lack depth
of knowledge on the subject and thus do not consider the "gray"
areas, but instead see things in terms of "black" and white". Ironically,
East German historians share this position, examining the social
forces at work in terms of "feudal reaction" and "bourgeois
revolution". However, the noted historian and journalist Sebastian
Haffner puts over the second outlook rather well in his recent work
Preussen ohne Legende (Hamburg 1980), pp. 168ff:
"We must get away from this legend. It is not only an
oversimplification, it is a falsification of actual history. The whole period is
in reality one unit. The same people and forces were at work the whole
time. The two most important reforming ministers, Stein and Hardenberg,
were Prussian ministers prior to 1806, the most significant military
reformer Scharnhorst was already deputy chief-of-staff ...
"The Prussia of the 18th Century was not only the newest but also
the most up-to-date state in Europe, strong not by tradition, but by being
modern. . . " The above should be borne in mind when considering the
catastrophe of 1806. I now wish to consider a number of points
raised in Major Lawson's contributions.
"FREDRICIAN"
My reasons for objecting to the use of this term to describe the
army of 1806 were outlined in THE COURIER 111/5, pp.18ff. If we are
to accept the point that the army of 1806 was "Frederician", then why
stop there? We could also apply the term to the army of 1813. After
all, the canton system modified in 1792 (2) was still in use until
1813/1814, there were still foreigners in the army (3), most of the drill contained in the 1812 Regulations had been in use in 1806 (4), soldiers were still flogged (5), the officer corps was of more or less the same composition (6), guns were still scattered amongst the infantry (7), and so on. As there were but few significant changes between the army of 1806 and that of 1813, then both are almost equally "Frederician" or "non-Frederician" , depending on your pointof
view. It is interesting that the noted military historian Siegfried Fiedler
describes the army of 1806 as "post-Frederician" (8). That would seem to be the best term to use.
Foreigners:
Anglo-American historians tend not to appreciate fully what the
word "foreigner" means in the context of the Brandenburg-Prussian
army at the time in question. The word "foreigner" here does not mean
non-German, it means non-Prussian. Prussians were largely of either
German or Polish extract, a small number were descendants of
Huguenot refugees.
The Polish-speaking inhabitants of the newly acquired Catholic
province of South Prussia were thus natives; the German-speaking
inhabitants of Lutheran Brandenburg were also natives, but the
German-speaking inhabitants of Lutheran Brunswick were
foreigners. Dedicated servants of the Prussian state and leading
German nationalists like Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Stein and Bluecher
were foreigners. What nationalistic 'espirit de corps' did the native
Prussian Polish recruits of the West Prussian militia have in 1813 when they deserted in droves? (9)
Did foreigners like Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Stein and Bluecher
"not share whatever nationalistic 'espirit cle corps' that one might
expect of the natives"? After the break-up of the army on the retreat
from Jena-Auerstadt more so-called "foreigners" managed to furtively
get back to the regrouping areas in East Prussia and Silesia than
"natives" . (10)
That doesn't seem to indicate a lack of nationalistic
'espirit de corps'. To continue on this point, Yorck wrote in 1820:
"The foreigners were not as bad as the learned gentlemen believe, and
I fear very much that the Rhineland or Posen militia would ever be
better. " (11)
That is a point to consider, especially when compared to the
"patriotism" and "nationalistic espirit de corps" of Napoleon's 'grande
Armee'. That consisted of French, Dutch, German, Italian and Swiss
recruits. The Prussian army with its Germans and Poles was more of
a national army than that of Napoleon. Finally on this point, Luetzow's
Free Corps of 1813 consisted mainly of "foreigners", yet it is often
regarded as the living symbol of German nationalism. Certainly there
were problems caused by the recruitment system of the Prussian
army and changes were made during the course of the Napoleonic
Wars, but to dismiss the "foreigners" as a "bad lot" is very one-sided.
"Die Kluft zwischen Mann und Offizier": Did "little or no empathy
exist between them"? It is hard to make such a sweeping statement
without having read a large number of memoirs and without having
done a good deal of research. All I have come across in the way of
memoirs of participants in the 1806 campaign are those of Friedrich
Wilhelm Beeger (12) and Wilhelm von Doering
(13). The former was a
private in 1806 and was promoted to lieutenant by 1813, so 'die Kluft' was not insurmountable in his case.
The latter joined the army as a 'Junker'and was taken prisoner at
Jena. Page 59 of his memoirs seem to indicate that a little more than
empathy existed between him and certain other soldiers. Perhaps the
above are isolated instances contrary to the general rule, but as I
have no other material to consider at present, it is difficult to see the
matter differently.
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT
Discipline in the Prussian Army could be harsh and punishment
severe, but that was little different from the armed forces of other
nations at the time. Was pressganging for the Navy in Britain more
civilized than press-ganging for Frederick's army? Clausewitz, when
a prisoner-of-war in France, made the following entry in his journal on
25th August 1807:
"it is true that in France all administrative processes are
characterized by extreme military tendancies; but there is no trace of
these in the character of the nation. Two or three gendarmes leading
thirty or forty conscripts, tied two by two, on a single rope to the
prefectures, proves both points at the same time. The first, because
this economical method saves gendarmes; the second, because the
shameful procedure suggests extreme compulsion. " (14)
I have yet to come across any account describing such extreme
measures being used in Prussia to get conscripts to report for duty.
Yet many writers and historians tell us of the extreme compulsion in
the Prussian army and the nationalistic 'espirit de corps' in the French
army.
The facts seem to be that throughout the period in question, the
Prussian Army was becoming increasingly liberal and punishment
was not so harsh as during the Seven Years War. In fact, a number
of Prussian regiments had a reputation for humane treatment of their
rankers. As General von Warnery (1720-1786) said: few troops [are]
beaten less than in certain regiments . . . (15)
I think it would be best to conclude that discipline and punishment
were probably no more severe in the Prussian Army than in others at
that time, and could have been less so.
MOTIVATION
Was it just harsh discipline that motivated the Prussian soldier? It
can be argued that there were a number of other reasons for
motivating the recruit, be he "foreigner" or "native". One of the
advantages of the Canton System was that recruits from the same
areas and villages were placed together in the same unit. Any
misdemeanor could become general knowledge in that village, likewise
acts of bravery. Personal and local pride was therefore motivation in
some cases. And as for the foreigners, a number of them were
soldiers by profession. If they performed poorly in Prussian service,
they were less likely to obtain employment elsewhere, so their
professional pride may have provided them with a degree of
motivation. Not to be forgotten is that old soldiers with a good record
were often rewarded with jobs in the civil service, post office, etc.
There was a good deal more motivating the Prussian soldier than the
threat of a beating.
THE OFFICER CORPS
Anglo-American historians often make the error of saying that
there were very few bourgeois in the officer corps and that it was an
exclusive aristocratic club. It is true that the officer corps and
especially particular branches of it were dominated by the nobility, but
access to it was not as restricted as some would have us believe.
What is often forgotten is that men of humbler origin were ennobled
for meritorious service or as part of their promotion to higher rank.
To go through a list of officers and comparing the number of those
with a 'von' in their name with those who do not can be misleading.
Take Scharnhorst as one example. He rose to the rank of Lieutenant-
Colonel in Hanoverian service. He joined the Prussian army with that
rank in 1801. In 1802 he received his patent of nobility and became
Lieutenant-Colonel von Scharnhorst instead of mere Lieutenant-
Colonel Scharnhorst. (16)
This is not to deny that the officer corps
was the preserve of the aristocracy, rather, it is an attempt to show
that access to it by men of humbler origin was not as restricted as
some say and that men of humbler origin were at times assimilated into
the nobility and that some of the statistics quoted often hide this fact.
Another point which should not be forgotten here is that the word
"aristocrat" does not have quite the same connotation when applied
to the Prussians as when applied to the French or English. The
Prussian nobility was as a whole a good deal poorer than their
western European counterparts and thus the gap between the
Prussian aristocracy and pesantry was not as great as in some other
countries and therefore probable that mutual understanding was greater.
AGE OF THE OFFICER CORPS
The age of the senior commanders in the Prussian army in 1806 is
often presented as a major problem * However, for the sake of
balance, it should be pointed out that the youngest senior commander
on both sides was a Prussian, Prince Louis Ferdinand. The third
oldest Prussian senior commander, L'Estocq, played such a
successful role at Eylau that his age is overlooked. The fourth oldest,
Tauentzien, commanded a corps in the Wars of Liberation, by which
time he had become older than the Duke of Brunswick was in 1806;
Bluecher had certainly not become any younger either and Grawert
went on to command the Auxiliary Corps in Russia in 1812.
The senior commanders of the German forces in the war of
1870/71 were of a similar age to those in 1806, but as the former
won, no one seems to complain about their age. We also have to bear
in mind that the youthful French marshalate was unique in Europe-no
other country had undergone such a revolution and removed the
upper echelons of power.
Finally, it shouldn't be forgotten that the junior officers of the
French army were no striplings. The average captain was older than
Napoleon, Mortier, Bessiers, Ney, Soult, Lannes, Davout and Murat.
The average lieutenant was the same age as Napoleon (17). These men had learned their trade in the days of the 'ancien regime' as had
the Prussian officer corps.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
As Mr. Lawson points out, in 1806 the Prussian supply train was
cumbersome yet unable to properly support the army. Attempts to
modernize and streamline it were made prior to 1813, yet time and
again, Prussian soldiers went hungry and unshod. In August 1813,
much of Bluecher's Silesian militia deserted and went home simply to
get something to eat (18). Yet such a poorly supplied and fed army
won several battles.
Furthermore, Bluecher's "Army of the Lower Rhine" similarly went
hungry but still managed to march through broken, muddy
countryside, fight a grueling battle and conduct a pursuit. Lack of an
adequate supply system in 1806 may well have contributed to defeat,
but the fact of the matter is that hungry, half-naked soldiers can still
win battles, as they did in 1813.
ARTILLERY
The artillery was, as a whole, mishandled in 1806. Certain reforms
were undertaken prior to 1813, including the abolition of battalion guns
and the formation of artillery reserves. However, that does not mean
that artillery used in 1813 was dramatically better. Battalion guns as
such may have been abolished, but each brigade now had a foot
battery which was used in a similar fashion (19).
Indeed, in the
"Instruction of 10th August 1813", Frederick William complained that
the guns were dispersed too much and used too early. (20)
Complaints similar to these were made about the artillery in 1806.
FREDERICK & LIGHT INFANTRY
As far as my limited knowledge goes, Frederick the Great's
writings did not influence French light infantry tactics. I have never
come across a statement to that effect and certainly have never
made one.
REFORMS PRIOR TO 1806
At this time there were no 'Schuetzen' battalions in the Prussian
Army, the first was formed in 1808. Prior to this, the 'Schuetzen' were
the rifle-armed sections of the line and light battalions. There were in
fact three battalions of 'Jaeger' which together formed the Field
Jaeger Regiment.
THE "WORST MUSKET IN EUROPE"
If the Prussian musket was
"abysmally poor", then why? Clausewitz's oft quoted but seldom
understood critique comes in his essay "Preussen in seiner grossen
Katastophe" written in 1823/1824 (21). From this essay it is not
entirely clear why Clausewitz held this view but the context in which
this comment was made would seem to indicate that the reason was
because the barrels were polished so often that they tended to
become so thin that they were prone to explode when fired.
Others than Clausewitz complain about the shape of the stock of
the 1780 model and this was modified before 1806. The shape of the
stock hindered aimed firing and thus the weapon was not suitable for
skirmishing line infantry. (The light infantry, however, had other, better
designed weapons.) But for the purpose for which it was designed,
namely for firing rapid volleys, the 1780 Model was an ideal weapon.
Furthermore, a French officer once commented:
"The Prussian soldier could not be better armed, the muskets and
locks are made with infinite care. The alterations made to it are
recognized as very advantageous. The soldier easily fires six times
per minute (we can only fire three times with our arms)." (22)
20,000-30,000 of these muskets were sold to Poland in 1789 and
1790; 30,000 to Spain in 1795; 57,000 to Swiss agents in 1798 and in
1804 100,000 were exported to America (23). Clearly, a number of people thought it was a fine weapon. It would therefore seem that the
fault with the Prussian musket was not the 1780 Model itself, but that
due to financial constraints, worn weapons were not replaced.
REGULATIONS FOR SKIRMISHERS
I don't agree that because a "...mere 4 paragraphs (of the 1788
light infantry regulations) are devoted to what might be called
'skirmish tactics' . . ." that ". . this meant that most Prussian officers
found 'the old method of forming a firing line three ranks deep and
advancing on the enemy' perfectly adequate." The amount of space
devoted to a subject in a set of regulations does not indicate the
frequency of its use.
If one compares this section of the 1788 regulations with the
same section in the 1812 regulations, then it is apparent that the latter
were also a "mere 4 paragraphs" and it should follow that the
Prussian officers in the Wars of Liberation were also reluctant to use
skirmishers. Yet historians and critics such as Paret (24) insist that
the Prussians used a large number of skirmishers at this time. The
whole point of skirmish tactics is that they are left to individual
initiative and not regulated.
THE BATTLE OF JENA
Very few recent accounts of this battle actually derive from
French or German language sources. Surely that is where the most
significant primary and secondary accounts would be found.
Perhaps it would help here to translate extracts on events in the
battle into English, to see if a different interpretation might be obtained.
We are often told the story of 20,000 Prussians standing
motionless before Vierzehnheiligen for two hours and being mowed
down by French 'tirailleurs', or that Hohenlohe's men were standing
aimlessly in front of Vierzehnheiligen unable either to deal with the
French skirmishers or to take the village because they were not
trained in street fighting. However, reference to the accounts of
eyewitnesses and secondary sources give quite a different
perspective.
Let us first establish how many men Hohenlohe had at
Vierzehnheiligen. The last returns made before the Battle of Jena
were on 6th October 1806 (25). These show Hohenlohe's entire force at a strength of about 42,584 men. Taking into account losses
suffered in the following week, it is estimated that he went into action
at Jena with about 36,800 men.
Taking into account the detachments and forces spread all over
the battle area, the defeated formations under Tauentzien and Dyherrn
reforming to the rear, is it reasonable to suggest that over half of the
troops remaining to Hohenlohe were deployed around a single village?
What the Prince in fact had deployed around Vierzehnheiligen was
eight battalions of infantry whose combined strength a week
previously was 5,751 men.
About 3,500 cavalry were deployed to their flank and rear and
three artillery formations were deployed in their support. The
combined total of these forces could not have been much more than
9,500 men, and as the cavalry were not engaged in the firefight, the
actual figure was nearer 6,000 men, not 20,000. The rest of the story,
when taken from sources who use this figure, is also much
exaggerated, as we shall see.
Now, to the official report of Major von der Marwitz, adjutant to
Prince Hohenlohe, for the inquiry into the defeat in 1806 (26).
"Our infantry attack, before which the enemy skirmishers fell back,
now came up to the village Vierzehn Heiligen where a line was
formed again and the left flank was taken slightly around the village . .
. The village was occupied by the enemy in strength, and behind it,
out of our line of sight, he had squeezed together strong columns or
was bringing them up. It seemed as if we wanted to take the village
by fire. We were standing only a few hundred paces from his
batteries and the hail of cannister wrought an incredible devastation
in our battalions which we could not replace with anything. Our
artillery almost flattened the village and the oldest soldiers, Prince
Hohenlohe himself, affirmed to having had no concept of such fire.
Along the entire line, one battalion volley followed another, without
effect in many places. The area at the entrance to the village was,
however, the scene of a fearful murder and loss of blood. . .
"One battery which had moved up close to the village bombarded
it as forcefully as possible for half an hour, but as the enemy
continued to stand behind the closely packed houses and sheds, it
could not be taken this way. The gunners requested permission to
fire incendiary shells into it. This was granted and the first set it
alight. Now the enemy began to withdraw and if only we had continued
this bombardment of incendiaries for a quarter of an hour then
nobody could have stayed in it or got through it and we would have at
least secured our retreat ... But after firing hardly more than a couple
of shells, it was stopped ...
"The enemy's fire ceased for a moment; perhaps this was the
moment when according to French reports the remainder of Ney's
Corps and the Reserve Cavalry arrived and when the enemy decided
to send in his infantry-held back for so long-as all the skirmishers
fell back on their corps and it was, as already mentioned, quiet for a
minute. We could see no other enemy than right in front of us in
Vierzehn Heiligen and behind this village. So the Prince decided, as
he thought this final effort necessary, to send a few battalions into it
and take it with the bayonet, but just then General Grawert rode up to
him and-~ongratulated him on winning the battle. The Prince did not
want to accept this congratulation and told General Grawert of his
decision to have the village attacked. But the latter requested that he
should delay it. He pointed to our half-ruined battalions which had
stood for two hours in uninterrupted fire, to the single line with no
reserve . . . and concluded with the remark: 'We can and must hold
this position until General Ruechel approaches with his corps and
then we can make the victory complete, taking the village, but if one or
a couple of attacks were beaten off, then we would have a hole in the
line which could not be filled and which the enemy would certainly
exploit and rob us of victory!'
"The Prince agreed with this judgment and we stayed there ...
"The enemy now had Augereau's Corps move through the
Isserstedt Forest and through isserstedt from where our few light
troops were soon driven off, and in doing so, found himself on
our right flank and in the rear of the Saxons in the 'Schnecke' . . .
Soult's Corps partly followed General Holtzendorf and partlyu
threw itself into our left flank, breaking out via Alten Goenne to
Hermstedt. At the same moment Bernadotte's Corps, coming
from Dornberg, appeared on the left flank of General
Holtzendorf and compelled him to retire ...
"it did not appear if it would be possible to hold the
position at Vierzehn Heiligen any longer with so few troops . . . As
the enemy now started to advance, Regiments ZastrowandGrawert
turned ...
"The great superiority of numbers of the enemy was now apparent . . .
There are a number of points of interest in this extract. Some
tell us that the Prussian artillery "fired aimlessly", yet
Marwitz mentions that not only was Vierzehnheiligen "almost
flattened", but also that the very first incendiary shell fired "set it
alight". A number of other extracts below mention the
effectiveness of the Prussian artillery despite the way in which
it was handled. We often hear the reason that the Prussians did
not storm Vierzehnheiligen was that they were "untrained for
village fighting".
Someone appears to have forgotten to remind Hohenlohe,
Grawert and Marwitz of this. Hohenlohe almost had the place
taken with the bayonet and Grawert objected on the grounds
that the battalions were half-ruined by enemy fire, not that they
were untrained for such an exercise. Marwitz, Hohenlohe's adjutant,
did not advise against the Prince's proposal on those grounds.
One wonders where this story of the Prussians being
unable to fight in the villages comes from. The next point is
that for a time the Prussians thought that they had victory in
their grasp. Some historians and writers tell us that the result
of Jena was a foregone conclusion, yet it seems in fact if, even
for a short time the matter was in the balance. The difference in
tactical doctrines ~o not seem to have been decisive. Marwitz
mentions that Grawert argues against going into the village
partly on the basis that the battalions designated for the attack
had been under fire "for two hours". We will later see that
others dispute this length of time and it does not seem beyond
the bounds of possibility that Grawert was exaggerating to
underline his argument.
Finally on this account, it is interesting to note that a major
factor in forcing the Prussians back was the turning of both
flanks of their position at Vierzehnheiligen and the subsequent
threat to their rear.
The report of Colonel von Kalckreuth, commander of infantry
Regiment Prince of Hohenlohe (No. 32) at Jena (printed in Jany's
"Gefechtausbildung", pp. 123ff.):
"The skirmishers of the regiment spurred on by those officers
commanding them stopped the enemy light troops from advancing for
a very long time although they were better protected everywhere by
terrain which was most advantageous to them. It could not be
otherwise, for in this standing battle which we had to endure for
several hours, we had heavy losses of men due not only to the far
more numerous enemy artillery but also due to the skirmish fire.
Despite that, the courage of the men was unshaken and if
circumstances had allowed us to attack the enemy instead of waiting
for his attack, then this courage would never have dissipated. In the
meantime, the former did not occur, there merely came the order not
to advance any further. This lack of movement gave everybody the
opportunity to see the unfavorable turn of events and the disorder
tearing the beaten left flank apart everywhere. Also, the movement of
the enemy cavalry which was beginning to go around our unprotected
right flank and thus into our rear was drawing on the men's attention
and causing despondency. . .
There are several points worth noting here. Firstly, the
skirmishers of this regiment were used but would seem to have been
beaten by the French who were better protected. Yet some writers
claim that "absolutely no skirmishers" were deployed. Other
accounts below will confirm the use of skirmishers by the Prussians
in the fight around Vierzehnheiligen. Secondly, the French artillery
certainly seems to have been responsible for a substantial amount
of the casualties suffered and thus losses were not due just to their
skirmishers. Finally, we get confirmation of the effect of the French
flanking moves which seem to have decided the issue at
Vierzehnheiligen.
Thirdly, for the sake of balance, I now refer to extracts from
Pascal Bressonet's "Etudes tactiques", pp. 179ff:
"During this time the infantry of Grawert's division continued its
offensive march on Vierzehnheiligen ...
"The French, posted in the hedges and enclosures, put up a
lively fire. Their action, like that of the skirmishers spread out over
the plain, along with the cannon of the grand battery and the artillery
of V Corps inflicted significant losses on the Prussian line for which
there was no proper reserve to replace them.
"Grawert's infantry replied to this terrible fire by first throwing out
to the fore their isolated skirmishers, then by employing battalion
volleys and platoon fire, mostly without result despite the skirmish
fire of the French being so effective that Regiment Sanitz fell back
for a moment. it was however reformed in line by Prince Hohenlohe.
"Meanwhile, the Prussian 12pdr. batteries were causing serious
damage in our artillery but without obliging them to cease firing,
although several pieces were dismounted and several caissons
blown up. . .
"Meanwhile, around Vierzehnheiligen, the combat grew in
intensity.
"Wolframsdorf's battery of 12pdrs. had not stopped firing on the
village. But the French were not evacuating it, holding the outskirts
with screens of skirmishers and sheltering their reserves behind the
walls and sheds ...
"Hohenlohe's line however moved closer and closer to
Vierzehnheiligen in spite of the enormous losses it was suffering. Its
fire became terrifying and it was a critical moment, 'the most critical
of the day'says the report of V Corps.
"Marshal Lannes resolved to attack the enemy's left wing ...
"Hohenlohe, seeing the start of this movement, immediately
understood the danger and consequently had his left flank position
altered and formed a hook which was prolonged by the cavalry on the
plateau.
"in spite of the intensity of the fire of Battalions Kollin and
Grawert, of 12pdr. Battery Wolframsdorf and of Gause's half-battery
which was placed in front of Dragoon Regiment Krafft, the two French
regiments succeeded in their attack ...
"But Hohenlohe had sent the Saxon cavalry placed to the north of
Isserstedt and brought back the Kochtizki Cuirassiers with several
squadrons of the Albrecht and Polenz Light Horse. The 100th. and
103rd., still in disorder, were charged by them all . . . The 100th. and
103rd. were obliged to fall back to their starting point ...
"The Prussian Regiment Grawert recommenced its slow march
on Vierzehnheiligen.
"However, this local success by the cavalry decided nothing and
the need to put an end to this long wait was becoming urgent. The
intervention of a fresh reserve thrown on Vierzehnheiligen was all
that would bring about a solution ...
"Judging that time to be the favorable moment for the last effort
he sense necessary, the Prince resolved to have Vierzehnheiligen
attacked with the bayonet by several battalions ...
"Grawert requested him to take a different course ...
"Then, looking at Vierzehnheiligen, judging that a simple
bombardment would not cause the village to be evacuated, it was
decided to follow the advice of the gunners, that is, to set it alight.
The first shell was effective. The French evacuated the first houses
but remained behind shelter in the gardens, along the fences and
hedges. The reserves merely fell back.
"Seeing that the fire was not causing an evacuation, the firing of
incendiary shells was stopped.
"Only the bayonet would have led to a decisive result.
"But at this moment, Napoleon, until then on the defensive,
awaiting the result of the battle fought by Saint-Hilaire and the arrival
of his reinforcements, came to learn that Holtzendorf's Corps was
defeated. At the same time, he saw VI Corps and the Cavalry
Reserve debouching.
"The Emperor passed over to the offensive.
This version coming from an historian on the French General Staff
provides much food for thought. it confirms that Grawert first used
his skirmishers against Vierzehnheiligen, but it would seem that they
were soon driven back. It also confirms that the Prussian artillery
was used to great effect. Of great interest is that it would seem
that at one point the battalion and platoon volleys by Hohenlohe's line
tipped the balance against the French in Vierzehnheiligen although
these volleys appear to have had little effect for most of the time.
However, this moment would seem so crucial that Lanness risked
two of his regiments in a diversionary action to relieve the pressure.
Bressonet confirms Hohenlohe's intention to take Vierzehnheiligen by
the bayonet. it is also apparent that as the artillery bombardment had
not caused the desired evacuation of the village by the French, that
Hohenlohe was again on the point of storming it when Napoleon
passed over to the offensive.
Finally, to a short quote from Houssaye's "Iena":
"It seems that German history exaggerates the length of the stand
by Grawert's division in that position by an hour. . . "
This is a possibility which I think can be considered as all the
German accounts seem to be based on Grawert's estimate.
From all the above, I think it is now possible to glean a reasonably
accurate outline of the events in and around Vierzehnheiligen.
Firstly, the Prussians, about 6,000 men, advanced to within a few
hundred paces of the village. The thin skirmish screen was thrown
out and driven back. The Prussians then engaged in volleys by
battalion and platoon. The artillery of both sides came into play, the
Prussians seem to have inflicted appreciable damage to both the
village and the French batteries, and the French caused severe
losses to the Prussian infantry with cannister fire. The French
infantry remained largely hidden, behind cover, with skirmishers
sniping at the Prussian line and inflicted significant losses with no
great losses of their own. The Prussians did not press the attack
home and storm the village. Although accounts state that they
remained stationary, there seems to have been a slow forward
movement. Marwitz seems to think that about this time, the village was
set alight. Bressonet puts it later and that seems more probable as the
moment was now so critical for the French that Lannes launched
a sortie from the village with two regiments of infantry.
This attack was repelled with great loss and the Prussian
advance continued. Hohenlohe decided to press home the attack and
take the village with the bayonet. Grawert stops him and they wait for
Ruechel to arrive.
Meanwhile, the Prussians would now seem to have set fire to the
village, causing the French to recoil slightly. Hohenlohe is again on the
point of having his infantry move in and capture the village. Finally,
just as Hohenlohe is making this decision, the French turn both his
flanks and threaten his rear. The Prussians waver and the French
take the initiative, attacking and routing the Prussians. It is apparent
that there was a lot more to this battle than a line of Prussian
automata blazing away at an invisible enemy for a couple of hours as
their leadership had no idea what to do.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would advise people wanting to gain a clear and
objective look at the Prussian Army of 1806 and its role in that
campaign to steer away from Anglo-American writings on the subject
and instead to concentrate on the primary and better secondary
sources on the subject produced by the participants and later by the
General Staffs of the respective armies. A comparison of several
such accounts gives a good overview of the events.
Jany, Curt: Ceschichte der Preussischen Armee (Reprinted
Osnabrueck 1967), esp. Vols. III & IV. Referred to as "Jany".
(1) See THE COURIER, III/5,
III/6, IV/2.
More 1806
My thanks to Major Lawson for presenting his counterargument to the
views I expressed in the series of articles I wrote on the development
of Prussian tactics from the death of Frederick the Great to the end of
the Napoleonic Wars (1).
"For this legend, which even today is stuck fast in many heads, the
twenty years of Prussian history from 1795 to 1815 fall into two
sharply contrasting periods as black and white as the Prussian flag. The
years of the Peace of Basle with Revolutionary France were, according to
this view, a period of stagnation and decadence for which the collapse of
1806 was payment, the period from 1807 to 1812 is a time of
courageous reform, regeneration and preparation for the uprising which one
could say occured according to programme and was rewarded with
the victorious Wars of Liberation.
Prussian infantry officers, field dress, 1806. (Kling)
Prussian musketeers in campaign dress, 1806. (from Kling)
Prussian Musket, 1740/89 Model. One of the several used by the Prussian infantry at Jena. Note the shape of the butt. (With the kind permission of Biblio-Verlag).
Prussian Musket, 1809 Pattern. The butt is largely similar to
that of the above. (With the kind permission of Biblio-Verlag).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
German General Staff: Das Preussische Heer der
BefreiungsKriege Q vols., reprinted Bad Honnef 1982). Referred to
as "GGS".
Exerzir-Reglement fuer die Infanterie der Koeniglich
Preussischen Armee. (Berlin 1912). Referred to as "1812 Regs".
Fiedler, Siegfried: Grundriss der Militaer und Kriegsgeschichte
3.Band-Napoleon gegen Preussen (Munich 1978) Referred to as
"Fiedler".
Braeuner, R.: Geschichte der preussischen Landwehr (Berlin,
1863). Referred to as "Braeuner".
Lehmann, Max: Scharnhorst (2 vols., Leipzig 1886-1887).
Referred to as "Lehmann".
German General Staff: 1806. Das Preussische Offizierkorps und
die Untersuchung der Kriegsereignisse. (Berlin 1906). Referred to as "1806".
Bressonnet, Pascal: Etudes Tactiques sur la Campagne de 1806. (Paris 1909)
Jany, Curt: Die Gefechtsausbil dung der Preussischen Infanterie von 1806. (Reprinted Wiesbaden 1982).
FOOTNOTES
(2) See Jany III, pp.185ff.
for details and methods and how they changed since the time of
Frederick. See also Jany IV, pp.22: 'The old Canton Regulation of
1792 did however remain in force until spring 1813.'
(3) The former system of
recruiting foreigners was abolished on 20th November 1807 (Fielder
3, pp.276). That does not mean that the foreigners already in service
were dismissed.
(4) Jany III, pp. 489f f.
(5) GGS 1, pp.351ff.
(6) CGS 1, pp.37.
(7) 1812 Regs., pp.121ff.
(8) See Fiedler 3.
(9) Braeuner I, pp.136ff.
(10) Fiedler 3, pp.149.
(11) Quoted in Jany IV, pp.2 fn.
(12) "Seltsame Schicksale eines alten Soldaten" (Ueckermuende 1850).
(13) "Erinnerungen aus meinern Leben 1791-1810 (osnabrueck 1975).
(14) Quoted in Paret, Peter: Clausewitz & The State, pp. 130.
(15) Quoted in Fiedler 3, pp.41.
(16) Lehmann I, pp.307.
(17) Jany III, pp.432ff.
(18) Braeuner I, pp.256ff.
(19) 1812 Regs., pp.121ff.
(20) GGS I, pp.257.
(21) This essay appears in "Verstreute Kleine Schriften" (Osnabrueck 1979).
(22) Finot: Une mission
militaire en Prusse en 1786 (Paris 1881) pp. 192, 280.
(23) Jany III, pp.468 f n. 114.
(24) See Paret, Peter:
Yorck & The Era of Prussian Reform (Princeton 1966).
(25) 1806, pp.182-183.
(26) Printed in 1806.
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