Discussed in the last article were the inherent
weaknesses of the Prussian Army of 1806. Many of these
can be attributed to the stubborn refusal of the military
hierarchy in Prussia to bend with the winds of reform;
other weaknesses were the result of over two decades of
partial neglect of the military by the Prussian civilian
bureaucracy. British General Henry Lloyd succinctly
describes, and then prophetically characterizes what was
to happen to Frederick's great army when he wrote in
1781, "The Prussian army, being composed chiefly of
strangers of different countries, manners, and religion, are
united only by the strong chain of military discipline; this
and a most rigid attention to keep up all the forms and
discipline established, constitutes a vast and regular
machine, which being animated by the vigorous and
powerful genius of their leader, may be justly accounted
one of the most respectable armies in Europe; but should
this spring, however, languish but for an instant only, the
machine itself, being composed of such heterogeneous
matter, would probably fall to pieces, and leave nothing
but the traces of its ancient glory behind."
[1]
Such was to be the fate of the Prussians on 14
October 1806. Neither Frederick WiIIiam III, nor any of the
old campaigners who composed the Ober Kriegs
Collegium (a council of old soldiers supervising the
Prussian Army) would prove capable of utilizing, much
less animating, the Prussian soldier as Frederick had
done.
The Prussian King had preferred to rely on neutrality
against the threat of French domination in Europe, but
when he was informed of Napoleon's intention to offer
England the Prussian's holdings in Hanover behind his
back, this final insult to the already muchtrampled
Hohenzollern honor was too much for even the dilatory
Frederick William III.
Thus on 9 August 1806, the cabinet ordered the army
from its garrisons. Prussia had finally emerged from her
neutrality; notably she could not have picked a much less
advantageous time to do so. Prussia could not depend on
England for support; it was highly unlikely that Austria
would face Napoleon again, and although the Tsar had
promised support, Russian forces were far removed from
the area of operations. Prussia would face Napoleon's
victorious Frenchmen essentially alone.
On 25 September, Frederick was to send an
ultimatum to Napoleon: all French troops must withdraw
behind the Rhine leaving Prussia free to organize a North
German Confederation. it was hardly an ultimatum that
the French Emperor would accept, yet, for some
unexplained reason, Frederick still believed there was a
good chance for compromise with the French. Worse still,
the Prussian King allowed his senior officers to believe
that the chance for accomodation with Napoleon was
likely. Thus, at a time when super-human efforts were
required of Prussia, both the army and the nation
responded feebly at best.
Preparations for war were poorly coordinated in the
Prussian camp. The mobilization had been inefficient, for
out of a possible strength of over 200,000 troops, nearly
half were to remain in their garrisons, depots, and
fortresses. Worse still, over 30,000 troops were left in
East Prussia as if there were a threat from their Russian
allies. Frederick William III also put little pressure on the
smaller German states for support; other than a small
Saxon contingent, there was to be no other support for the
Prussians from this quarter. Thus the possibility for a
further 30,000+ men to fight on the Prussian side was
unrealized.
If the political leadership of the state was inept, the
Prussian army was even worse off. This was because it
was burdened with three almost independent
commanders. Three separate armies were deployed into
Saxony. Frederick had entrusted overall command to the
over-aged Duke of Brunswick, who also commanded the
largest of the three separate elements. However, Prince
Hohenlohe, who had had considerable
command experience in 1794 and now commanded his
own army, decided not to subordinate himself to the
Duke, and proceeded on his own semi-independent
course of action. General Ruchel, commanding a
corpssized army, was essentially caught in the middle
between the devisiveness of his two royal counterparts.
Hence, the Prussian field force was divided into two
uncoordinated main armies, a weaker third element, and a
distant reserve at Magdeburg commanded by
Wurttemberg. As Napoleon began his advance through
the Thuringian Forest in the direction of Dresden on 6
October, the Prussian forces were deployed as depicted
on Map 1.
Each of the Prussian armies was sub-divided into
divisions, which as stated in our first article, had
undergone reorganization into the combined arms pattern
of the French corps. However, none of the Prussian
commanders had any experience in handling this new
kind of organization, and all persisted in the Frederickian
convention of issuing detailed orders to every regiment.
In addition to this outdated method of tactical
organization, there was no question that the higher
generalship of the Prussian Army had fallen below the
acceptable standard of the past. Brunswick refused to
make a major decision without referring the problem to
councils of war, in which the King's many advisors played
an argumentative and disruptive role. Hohenlohe offered
non-compliance, if not outright disobedience to
Brunswick's orders. Furthermore, Frederick William
determined to stay at Brunswick's headquarters, thus
superimposing his sizeable military and diplomatic suite
on an already overburdened operational agency. The result
was confusion and indecision.
[2]
Each of the Prussian commanders also had his own
idea on how the campaign should be conducted.
Brunswick urged a general advance on what was
considered to be the French line of communications
centered on Wurzburg; while Hohenlohe argued for an
offensive on the east side of the River Saale. Both
commanders had positioned their forces to support their
particular scheme of maneuver, resulting in a dangerous
dispersion of the two main Prussian elements.
By the time the days-consuming Prussian Councils of
War had decided on a plan, the initiative had been
snatched away by Napoleon's clebouchment in the vicinity
of Saalburg. Scharnhorst wrote of his disgust with the
constant haggling at Prussian Headquarters, "What
ought to be done, I know quite well, what will be done,
only the gods know." [3]
Napoleon, too, had had problems in initiating his
campaign as rapidly as desired. Having reached Wurzburg
on 2 October, he found his army beset with logistic
problems and confusion. Through super-human effort, and
thanks to Prussian indecision, he was able to quickly put
things right and begin his advance. Passing through the
Thuringian defiles with three Corps abreast in their classic
V-formation behind a cavalry screen of light horse,
Napoleon found the eastern exits from the forest guarded
by dispersed detachments of General Tauenzien's
division. Tauenzien, finding himself beset by a flood of
Frenchmen, withdrew, leaving the door open for
Napoleon's consolidation on the east side of the forest.
The Prussian dispositions (see Map 2) were
dangerously dispersed. The threat was obvious;
nonetheless, another wrangling Council of War was called
to decide what would be the response to it. A
concentration around the town of Blankenhain was
eventually ordered, but in perfect 18th century form,
Brunswick also decided to send a force of some 11,000
troops under the Duke of Saxe-Weimar to maneuver
behind the French to harass their lines of
communications.
Along with this force went a disproportionate amount
of light infantry. As was discussed in the previous article,
the Prussians were sadly lacking in light forces, and the 6
battalions which accompanied Saxe-Weimar were to be
sorely missed on the plains of Jena.
Meanwhile Hohenlohe continued to advance, contrary
to the orders received from his superior. A short, but
decisive engagement on 10 October was to shatter his
offensive spirit. Prince Louis Ferdinand, the hotblooded
nephew of Frederick William, commanded the advanced
units of Hohenlohe's army. Although ordered to defend
behind the Saale River, the impetuous Prince advanced
across the river to confront the advanced guard of Lannes' Corps.
Advancing with his 8300 Prussians and Saxons in
perfect Frederickian order-two ranks deep and the left
flank refused forward, Louis' force was fixed by energetic
skirmishing by the French advanced guard while Marshall
Lannes maneuvered with his lead division to flank the
Prussian left. The battle lasted a mere four hours, and
only 5500 Frenchmen were ever engaged, yet the
Prussians lost roughly one third of their strength, 27 guns
and the life of their commander. French losses were
approximately 200. [4]The foundation of the Prussian military machine
was beginning to crumble.
The importance of this sharp skirmish at Saalfeld lay
less in the tactical or strategic sense than in the
psychological effect it had on the defeated soldiers and on
the Prussian high command. After confused marches and
counter-marches which seemed to have no other purpose
than exhausting the soldier's energy, the poorly supplied
Saxon troops began to wonder whether they had joined
the wrong cause. Stories spread that the Prussian
generals planned to sacrifice the Saxons to cover their
own retreat.
While Brunswick concentrated the main army near
Weimar, Prussians and Saxons at Jena fought over
supplies, firewood, and bivouac areas. Suspicion quickly
turned to outright lack of confidence. During a march
through Jena on 12 October, one column panicked at the
totally groundless report that French troops were between
Jena and Weimar. By night fall, Hohenlohe managed to
settle his troops in unreconnoitered assembly areas, and
prepared to defend against Lannes' driving advance from
the south. No one knew for sure where the French Army
was; rumor ruled the Prussian camp. In the confusion,
both Hohenlohe and Brunswick failed to act on the one
most important piece of news the Prussians received that
day: French cavalry was in Naumburg, fifteen miles north
of Jena. [5]
Prussian forces consolidate around J Weimar (12 October).
The Prussian High command had been shocked by
the defeat and the death of Louis Ferdinand. Both Ruchel
and Saxe-Weimar were ordered to join Brunswick as
quickly as possible. Hohenlohe withdrew his scattered
forces to Jena, where, with his Saxons almost mutinous
and his Prussians in disorder, he finally managed to rally
his forces. Ruche[ and Brunswick achieved a confused
concentration around Weimar, but SaxeWeimar was still a
great distance away (see Map 3).
Throughout these two days of hard marching, the
sluggish Prussians had managed to average just over half
the distance covered by the French. As previously
mentioned, major French elements under Davout and
Murat were already converging on Naumberg, far north of
the Prussian positions. Staff work had been poor, and the
Prussian Headquarters was absolutely ignorant of the
location of most of the Grande Armee.
Fortunately for the hapless Prussians, the French
troops were to receive a rest on the 13th, with the
exception of the corps now consolidating. Napoleon
issued orders to speed up the movements of Soult's Corps
and the Guard infantry, which were now converging on
Jena. At the same time, he sent orders to Davout and
Bernadotte covering two contingencies. If they heard firing
at Jena, they were to march via Naumburg on the west
bank of the Saale to envelop the enemy's flank. If no
enemy attack developed, they would receive further orders
on the morn.[6] He
then was to conduct a personal recon of the Prussian
forces in the vicinityof Jena.
He was to see a great deal, thanks to the Prussian
surrender of the heights on the west bank of the Saale.
Hohenlohe's covering force had given up this difficult
terrain feature and withdrawn in search of more level
ground for fighting. This was again indicative of the
Fredrickian mentality which was so pervasive in the minds
of the senior Prussian commanders, Lannes' arriving at
daybreak with his advance guard, promptly took
possession of the Landgrafenberg, a high plateau
overlooking Jena to the south and dominated by a round
hill, the Dornberg, to the north.
At 1600 on the 13th, the Emperor arrived,
dismounted, and walked forward over this ground with
Lannes until they came under fire from the enemy
outposts. Napoleon had a clear view to the west where
nearly 30,000 Prussian troops were visible. He estimated
that Hohenlohe's troops comprised the whole Prussian
army. Without checking this presumption, he immediately
ordered all of Lannes' corps and the Guard Infantry to
occupy the Landgrafenberg that night.
And what were the Prussians doing during this nearly
two-day respite they had been granted since their arrival
at Jena. Naturally, another Prussian Council of War was
called to decide upon a course of action. With Davout's
threatening position at Naumberg having finally become
too obvious to overlook, it was decided late on 13 October
to withdraw. Orders went out for the retreat of the main
Prussian army to Merseburg along the road on the west
bank of the Saale, while Hohenlohe's smaller force
covered the withdrawal from positions near Jena. In
contrast to the vigorous French advance, the Prussians
failed to send out security forces to clear the intended
escape route and were accordingly ill-informed of Davout's dispositions.
This was partly due to the lack of light troops
available for this mission. Thus, on the evening of 13
October, Napoleon was maneuvering to bring the bulk of
the Grande Armee to bear on the Prussian rear guard at
Jena while Brunswick and 63,000 men struggled along a
single road toward Auerstadt and Davout's thoroughly
aroused III Corps. The stage was now set for one of the
most decisive battles in the annals of military history.
[7]
At 0630hrs on the morning of the 14th, Napoleon gave
the signal to advance. The dense fog caused Lannes'
attack to swerve too far to the left, thus blocking
Augereau's deployment. When Augereau was finally able
to bring his forces to bear, he found the terrain on the left
extremely compartmentalized by deep ravines and wooded areas.
Had the Prussians had sufficient light forces in this
area, the going could have been made extremely
unpleasant for Augereau's VII Corps. Meanwhile, on the
right Soult had managed to advance as far as Rodigen,
where he halted for his artillery to catch up. As Ney's VI
Corps marched onto the battlefield, a hole had developed
in the French line on Augereau's left. Without waiting for
orders, the impetuous Marshal plunged into the melee in
time to ward off a counterattack by the Prussians and to
retake what little ground had been lost.
On the Prussian side, activity ranged from organized
panic among the Saxons to pure sloth on the part of
Hohenlohe. Prussian artillery fired aimlessly, exploding a
Saxon ammunition wagon near Lutzeroda, and
occasionally felling a clump of French soldiers.
Hohenlohe's forward defenses were alert and ready for the
attack, repulsing several of Lannes' assaults in hand-to-
hand fighting around the Closwitz Woods.
The Prussian division commander, Tauenzien, sent
back several calls for help, but Hohenlohe only responded
after an intrepid attack by Lannes and Ney had already
won the western slopes of the Dornberg and the burning
town of Vierzehnheiligen. Prussian infantry, attacking in
rigid waves, was badly mauled by a battery of twenty-five
guns personally assembled by Napoleon on the
Landgrafenberg. Throughout the morning, Brunswick's
slow march had snailed through Auerstadt; 13,000 men
under Ruchel were trudging through Weimar; Saxe
Weimar's 11,000 men were thirty miles away; and the
Duke of Wurttemberg with 15,000 men in Halle in reserve
would have been no farther removed from the battle if he
had stayed in Berlin. [8]
Towards 1100hrs, Hohenlohe finally mounted a
coordinated counterattack in the vicinity of
Vierzehnheiligen. With band playing and flags flying,
Hohenlohe was to make his major effort, advancing in
Potsdam parade ground order, in echelon from the left
with his artillery moving between his battalions. This
concerted effort might well have succeeded, for French
troops were now somewhat in disarray.
However, Hohenlohe's men were untrained for street
fighting, and upon reaching the outskirts of
Vierzehnheiligen were ordered to halt. Confronted with a
dilemma for which their doctrine and training had ill
prepared them, the Prussian commanders ordered their
men to do what they best knew how-battalion volley on
command in the open. For two hours, 20,000 infantrymen
remained exposed to French marksmen who were nearly
untouched behind the cover of garden walls and village
masonry. Hohenlohe could think of nothing better to do
than to wait for reinforcement from Hotzenclorf and
Ruchel. [9]
Between 1200 and 1230, Napoleon judged the time to
be right for a final push. With the cavalry divisions of Klein,
Nansonty and d'Hautpoul nearing the field, he ordered a
general advance. For the first hour, though going back
steadily and despite heavy casualties, the Prussians
maintained some semblance of a front. "Extreme
measures" were required to keep some of the regiments
from breaking. To the credit of the Prussian officer corps,
commanders at almost all levels exposed themselves
without regard to safety to try and inspire their men.
It was, however, too little and much too late. By 1430,
Hohenlohe's army had been reduced to fugitives, only one
or two units holding together in squares. The Prussian
Colonel von Hopfner described the scene, "Those
[Prussian] troops withdrawing on Weimar were in full
flight; only one unit remained steady-it was the Saxon
Grenadier Battalion Winkel with whom the Prince
[Hohenlohe] was and who commanded it personally for a
time. In this terrible moment, when defeat and confusion
was everywhere, only this battalion stood like a rock."
[10]
As a final encore to this disaster, one must not forget
the valiant but vain attack by General Ruchel. "Ruchel
came tramping onto the lost battlefield, plowing his way
through the rout with difficulty," wrote John Elting.
[11]
Ruchel's attack did manage to initially stagger the
French as he managed to gain the plateau in the vicinity of
Kapellendorf. Once again, however, the Prussians halted
to deliver their touted volley-fire, and soon they were
exposed to the withering fire of almost the entire French
army. By mid-afternoon, Ruchel's troops were in full
retreat and the Battle of Jena had become a total rout. Clausewitz probably best
critiqued the Prussian performance at Jena when he
wrote, it was "when the Prussian generals . . . all threw
themselves into the open jaws of destruction in the
oblique order of Frederick the Great, and managed to ruin
Hohenlohe's army in a way that no other army has ever
been ruined on the actual field of battle-all this was due
not merely to a manner which had outlived its day, but to
the most downright stupidity to which methodism has ever
led." [12]
Jena had seen approximately 50,000 Prussians and
Saxons matched against some 96,000 French (40,000 of
whom were not ever engaged). The French losses were
estimated at somewhat over 5,000; the Prussians lost over
11,000 killed, 15,000 taken prisoner, 200 cannon and over
30 flags. But even worse was the fact that what remained
to Hohenlohe had been reduced to nothing less than a
horde of fugitives, where no rally could be accomplished
nor any semblance of a rear guard action was possible.
To the north around the small village of Auerstadt, the
results were even more remarkable. In accordance with
his orders, Davout had discovered that, after crossing the
Saale River, there was no way to march on the enemy
other than by the long, steep slope which led to the
Hassenhausen Plateau. This road, which crossed the
Pass of Kosen, ran directly into the road to Freiburg,
which was the escape route as prescribed by Brunswick
for the Prussian army. [13]
After colliding with the Prussian advanced guard, the
imperturbable Davout seized the heights and then began
to race his troops forward across the Kosen bridge to
support his position.
The Prussians, however, were not as quick to seize
the initiative. General Schmettau, commander of the lead
division, halted his troops to form up and then stood in the
open volleying at Hassenhausen. Had he advanced to try
and push the French from their tenuous positions, he
might very well have saved the day. As it was, all he
accomplished was to give Davout sufficient time to deploy
his forces to block further deployment of the Prussian
elements to his rear. By now the road behind could only
be described a massed traffic jam as the Prussian
divisions jockeyed to deploy forward.
The problem was further exacerbated as the flinty
sixty-year-old hussar General, by the name of Blucher,
pushed his unit to the front. Unsupported, he conducted
furious charges against the French flank, but was beaten
off with heavy losses. As successive Prussian units came
into action, Davout fed his trailing divisions into the battle,
always keeping just one step ahead of the desperate
Prussians.
As the Prussian divisions of Orange and
Wartensleben, supported by the cavalry and Guard
infantry, made one final determined effort on the French
left, Davout was forced to commit his last unit, the division
of General Morand, into the fray. Why did the "Iron
Marshal" have no further reserves to call on? Simply
stated, the 20,000 men of Bernadotte's I Corps, who could
have come to his support, were now busily counter-
marching to the south. Bernadotte was later to receive the
ire of his Emperor for this inexplicable action (a case of
following orders with no flexibility).
As the final Prussian effort was ground to a halt by the
advance of Morand's division, Prussian determination at
last began to falter, partially because it had now become known that both Brunswick and
Schmettau had fallen. Frederick William, himself, now
took command of the Hohenzollern army. At around noon,
he ordered one last assault on the shaken French left.
Having no more reserves to bolster this flank, Davout rode
to the site personally to rally his men. It proved to be just
enough! By 1230 hrs., the spirit of the Prussian army had
died.
Realizing that his army was crumbling, Frederick
William lost heart and ordered the retreat from Auerstadt.
The order was superfluous but the King hoped to fall back
on Hohenlohe for support. From that quarter, however,
there was to be no support, only the wreck of a dispirited
army pouring west across turnip patches and potato fields
through Weimar, every man for himself. On the other side
of the Ilm River, the two streams of fugitives intermingled,
rendering impossible any positive control by their
commanders. Once the elaborate apparatus of discipline
was demolished, the primordial instinct for survival
reasserted itself and each man bent his remaining energy
to ensuring that he remained a survivor rather than
becoming a casualty. A proud army had lost its title to
greatness; an era was conclusively ended.
[14]
At Auerstadt, Davout had faced and defeated the main
Prussian army of over 60,000 men. His losses had been
heavy, over 8,000 men. But the Prussians had lost over
12,000 killed and wounded, 3,000 prisoners, and 115
guns. The pursuit that was to follow remains one of the
classics of such operations in the annals of warfare. in
three weeks of unrelenting maneuver, battle, and forced-
marches, the French gathered 140,000 prisoners, 250
flags, and 800 field guns. Except for the units in East
Prussia and Silesia, the long-feared Prussian Army
ceased to exist, and the heir of Frederick the Great had
been totally humiliated.
Now for a brief recapitulation, not of the course of the
battle itself, but relating how some of the events in the
battle point out succinctly the various weaknesses of the
Prussian army as mentioned in our first article.
Of prime importance was the ineffectual leadership
provided by an over-aged and tradition-riddled officer
corps. Overall leadership was nothing less than abysmal.
But even worse, the Prussian tendency to rely on
methodism developed under Frederick the Great proved a
major deficiency. The fire-fight on the outskirts of
Vierzehnheiligen provides a case in point. With absolutely
no skirmishers deployed, 20,000 Prussians stood in the
open for two hours conducting volley fire while the French
sniped at them from behind cover.
The fact that the Prussian army consisted of nearly
40% foreign mercenaries, and that the remainder were
"reservist" cantonists contributed greatly to the rapid
disintegration of the army once the battle was lost.
Contributing to this also was the overly harsh system of
discipline that was extant in the Prussian army. Jornini
writes in this regard, "Commanders cannot depend on
discipline alone, but must instill in their soldiers a
cohesion based upon mutual respect, an "espirit de
corps", upon which both officer and soldier alike can
depend in the darkest hour of battle." [15] Such sentiment was
missing in the Prussian army of 1806.
The mobility of the Prussian army, adversely effected
by the cumbersome supply services, also played a
significant role in the outcome of the battles. The
Prussians were slow to consolidate after the initial French
onslaught, and could not even hope to out
march the rapid moving French elements. The lack of
adequate supplies in the Jena area also contributed
greatly to the demoralization of the Prussian army long
before the battle began.
Prussian artillery proved to be inferior to the French,
both in employment and effectiveness. Nor did the
Prussians have an appreciation for massed artillery
support such as Napoleon utilized with his 25-gun battery
situated on the Landgrafenberg. This might well be
considered the forerunner of one of Napoleon's favorite
tools of war-the Grand Battery.
Also significant was the lack of light troops with the
Prussian army. Many of the fusilier battalions were
detached from the main army on special duties during the
battle. Of the 24 such battalions, only 10 were engaged in
the double battles. Light troops screening for the Prussian
forces in the defiles around Iserstadt or for the forces
advancing on Vierzehnheiligen might well have given the
French a nasty time of it. As it was, the Prussians were
incapable, for the most part, in dealing with the French
"tirailleur" tactics.
Lastly, the lack of appreciation among the Prussian
hierarchy for the "combined arms concept" detracted
greatly to the overall performance at Jena/Auerstadt '
Unsupported and piecemeal attacks, such as were
conducted by Ruchel, Blucher and Hohenlohe, no matter
how enthusiastically pressed by their commanders ' were
doomed to failure. Only with the proper coordination of
infantry, cavalry and artillery could the Prussians have
hoped for success against the flexible French tactics.
Jena/Auerstadt provides a great lesson for even
modern-day military professionals, this being that armies
can never afford to become entrenched in the traditions
and methodology of the past, but must be responsive to
progressive changes of the present and future. The
Prussian army, reincarnated after Tilsit, would reflect
many of these reforms.
[1] Lloyd, Henry, History of
the Late War In Germany, P. XXXVII.
** Maps included in this article are derived from A Military History
and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars.
(includes books which were not listed in the previous article)
Bonnal, H. La Maneovre d'Iena, Paris, 1904.
Die Katastrophe Von 1806 Part I: Why the Prussians Lost
Auerstadt
Recapitulation
END NOTES
[2] Britt, Albert Sidney III,
The Wars of Napoleon, p. 106.
[3] Lettow-
Vorbeck, Der Krieg von 1806 und 1807, 1, p. 170.
[2] Britt, p. 111.
[2] Ibid., p. 112.
[2] Bonnal, La
Manoeuvre d'Iena, p. 388.
[2] Britt, p. 114.
[2] Ibid.
[9] Ibid., p. 115.
[10] Pivka, Otto
von, Napoleon's German Allies (3): Saxony, p. 3.
[11] Esposito, Vincent J., A
Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, p. 65.
[12] Clauswitz, Carl von, On
War, p. 91.
[13] Esposito, p. 66.
[14] Britt, p. 118.
[15] ?
EXPANDED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Britt, Albert Sidney III. The Wars of Napoleon, West Point, NY, 1973.
Clauswitz, Carl von. On War, New York, 1943.
Esposito, Vincent J. and John R. Elting. A Military History and
Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, New York, 1964.
Lloyd, Henry. History of the Late War in Germany, London, 1781.
Pivka, Otto von. Napoleon's German Allies (3): Saxony, London, 1979.
Die Katastrophe Von 1806 Maps (extremely slow: 625K)
Rebuttal: Die Katastrophe Von 1806: Was That Really Why the Prussians Lost
Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. V #2
To Courier List of Issues
To MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1984 by The Courier Publishing Company.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com