Throughout the history of warfare there has been perhaps no single battle as decisive as Napoleon's victory over the renowned Prussian army at JenaAuerstadt. This debacle ended with a whimper, the Prussian claim of military ascendency on the continent and would unleash the forces of reform in Prussia, which had been held in check so long by the conservative bureaucracy.
Much has been written (in the pages of THE
COURIER [1]) about
the Prussian army of this era. Having read these articles,
one might well wonder how Napoleon ever triumphed over
such a formidable foe. Yet triumph he did! What, then,
were the reasons for such a disastrous defeat at the
hands of the "Corsican Usurper".
To help the reader understand the underlying causes
of this Prussian catastrophe in October of 1806, it is this
author's intention to cover the major weaknesses of the
army inherited from Frederick the Great.
Relic
The Prussian Army of 1806 was in fact a relic of the
past in many respects. Historians describe this army as
"Frederician" in nature, and, although sometimes objected
to, it is nonetheless a valid characterization. While it is
true that numerous reforms were attempted from 1787 to
1806, the nature of the army and of Prussian tactics
remained, for the most part, unchanged. One might even
argue that some of these reforms prior to 1806 were
actually harmful to the army. More wiII be said about
these reforms later.
Let us now describe the Prussian army of 1806 and
thereby examine its inherent weaknesses. First it is
necessary to discuss the system of recruiting and training
extant in Prussia. This system is best categorized by the
term "canton system." Under the canton system, the
Prussian army was composed of reservists and
professional soldiers. The professionals were,
theoretically, volunteers.
In fact they were almost exclusively recruited
mercenaries, the majority of whom were foreigners. Only
these "professional soldiers" remained under arms the
entire year. They acted as a cadre for the regiment when
the reservists were called up each spring.
[2]
Service as a reservist was limited to natives. These
soldiers were conscripted by each canton to fill out the
ranks of the regiments and were required to report
annually for a six-week drill period with their regiments.
These reservists were conscripted on the contemporary
equivalent of "universal service." Such a term must be
used loosely, however, for in Prussia this service was
anything but universal. Although an attempt was made to
reform the conscription law in 1792, so many exemptions
existed that conscription was essentially limited to the
peasant class. [3]
Such an army had many of the inherent weaknesses
of the standing armies of the 18th century. In 1802 nearly
40% of the army, precisely 80,446 soldiers were
foreigners. [4]
Naturally, these foreigners did not share whatever
nationalistic "espirit de corps" that one might expect of
the natives. They were, however, well trained and did
comprise the nucleus of the peace-time army.
Reservists were available for training for a mere six-week period in the spring. Although this was considered
sufficient to properly train the reservists in the precise
close-order Potsdam drill which they were required to
master, little other training could be accomplished.
Reservists, although natives of the various cantons, were
for the most part members of the lowest classes in
Prussian society.
Consider also that the regiments were officered by
predominantly aristocratic officers, and another inherent
weakness is apparent. In German, this problem is termed
"die Kluft zwischen Mann und Officer" -- quite literally this
means that the division between the men and their officers
was so great, that little or no empathy existed between
them. Add to this that there was little upper mobility (e.g.
promotion possibilities -- especially into the officer corps)
available to the reservist, and one can plainly see; there
was little positive motivation for the soldier to excel in the
Prussian Army.
[5]
What, then, motivated such soldiers? Quite literally,
one of the most repressive systems of discipline extant
anywhere on the continent. It was an established principle,
"that the soldier had to fear his officer more than the
enemy".
[6]
NCO's were allowed to use a cudgel or the flat end of
a blade on soldiers for minor infractions or merely
clumsiness in drill. The most brutal punishment, known as
the "Cassenlaufen", was reserved for slightly more serious
offenses. It is little wonder, therefore, that the Prussian
army had to place pickets of elite troops (such as the
Feldjaeger and Husaren) around their cantonments, not so
much to keep the enemy from surprising the army, but
more so to keep their own troops from deserting.
The Officer Corps was also seriously deficient in the
Prussian army of 1806. Most were aristocrats from
Brandenburg, East Prussia and Pomerania. Of 7,166 officers
in 1806, a mere 700 were non-aristocrats, and these were
only allowed to serve in the branches of the army which were
less prestigious (such as the hussars, fusiliers, artillery or
technical troops). [7]
Even worse, most of the officers were seriously past their
prime as far as age was concerned. Over half of the senior
officers were over 65 years old, while only 13 (6%) were
under 50 years ot age. It was just as bad among the field-
grade ranks. Of 54 infantry colonels, 42 were over 60 and 12
had passed their 70th birthday. This aged-officer corps also
tended to stifle reform. Most of the senior officers were "old
campaigners of the Frederician era who revered all the
antiquated tactics and drill of that period.
[8]
It is little wonder that reformers prior to 1806, such as
Berenhorst and Bulow, met with little success.
The supply services in the Prussian army were also
extremely antiquated. Non-military personnel, called Knechte,
served as laborers in the baggage trains and artillery. These
were conscripted from among subjects in the canton during
wartime, and received no previous training. Some 34,000 of
these Knechte served in the field during 1806.
[9]
The trains were also extremely large and cumbersome
when compared to the French. This was due primarily to the
fact that the Prussians relied almost exclusively on
magazines and forts for their supplies. Requisition was
frowned upon and foraging was especially out of the question
for an army where unsupervised troops were prone to
desertion.
This problem of supply was further complicated by the
Prussian method of training. Individual cantons trained their
own regiments. Rarely did the army come together on a larger
scale, and therefore the logistical support required for such a
mass mobilization as occured in 1806 was poorly anticipated,
to say the least.
The artillery and technical troops were also backward,
especially in organization. Guns were scattered among the
infantry, where they were less effective, and many of the
heavier guns were "old and ineffectual and could hardly be
relied upon to fire a shot." [10]
The artillery "zu Pferd" was by far the most modern of the
bunch, having been newly reorganized in 1805 and issued
with lighter versions of the 6-pounder for mobility. Once again,
however, the Prussians failed to appreciate the value of
massed artillery support, and the 10 companies of mounted
artillery proved to be insufficient when dispersed on the
battlefield. The artillery was also the least trained arm of the
Prussian forces. Emphasis was placed on "speed of
unlimbering and smartness of appearance" rather than rate
of fire and accuracy. [11]
Most Glaring Deficiency
By far, however, the most glaring deficiency extant in the
Prussian army was its reliance on tactical doctrine as
practiced, for the most part, during the Seven Years War. This
placed great reliance on the infantry as the arm of decision;
where the superior rate of fire of the Prussian automatons
would eventually prove superior to their foe in the extended
fire-fights of the 18th century. Naturally, the heavy cavalry
played a significant role under this doctrine also, but all other
branches of the service were considered as secondary. This explains
why the positions in line regiments of both infantry and
cavalry were reserved exclusively for the aristocratic
officer, while non-aristocrats were only deemed fit for
service in the auxiliary branches.
Nor were the infantry, cavalry or light troops trained to
cooperate with one another under this doctrine. Infantry
comprised the main battle line, cavalry was placed on the
flanks to secure the infantry (or for preemptive charges
against the enemy) and the light troops were used to deal
with difficult terrain or "to draw the fire" of the enemy. This
would seem to attribute to Frederick II a prophetic
appreciation for light infantry capabilities, and maintain
that this mission for light infantry was the forerunner to
later skirmish techniques developed by the French.
However, we instead find that Frederick then goes on
to write that light infantry was given this mission because
they were considered "expendable", and because he did
not wish his precious line infantry to be subjected to the
devastating "first volley" of the enemy. [12]
This lack of appreciation for the "Taktik der
verbundenen Waffen" was perhaps the greatest cause of
the Prussian defeat at Jena-Auerstadt. It required
inflexible battle plans to be adhered to once the battle had
started, and did not allow for much initiative on the part of
subordinates.
Thus once the initial Prussian onslaught had been
thwarted by the French at Jena, all semblence of an over-
all battle plan ceased to exist. And one must only witness
the ignominious slaughter of Prussian infantry in front of
Vierzehnheiligen to realize how little initiative was shown
by the subordinate commanders.
Now as promised, a few words on the reform in the
Prussian army prior to 1806. With the death of Friedrich
dem Grossen in 1786, the opportunity for reform in the
army was apparent. Both of his successors, Friedrich
Wilhelm II. and Friedrich Wilhelm III. began their reigns
with investigations into possible reforms of the army.
Several notable reforms were forthcoming from such
renewed attention.
Light infantry troops were organized as fusilier
battalions, and in light of the experiences in the Poland
and Rhein campaigns of 1792-95, these troops were
gradually to attain a strength of 24 battalions, further
reinforced by an additional 3 sharpshooter (Schutzen)
battalions. Against the hordes of French skirmishers,
these light troops were to prove insufficient in 1806.
[13]
An attempt was also made to improve upon the
abysmally poor Prussian musket.
Reputed to be the "worst musket in Europe", it was to
be replaced by the Northardt musket by royal decree in
1801. Although 45,000 of these muskets had been
produced, unfortunately only 7 battalions had been issued
the Northardt by 1806. Other improvements such as
improved training of staff officers were recommended by
Colonel von Massenbach, and were approved prior to
1806.
[14]
By far the most serious reform prior to Jena-Auerstadt
was the attempt to expand the army after the accession of
new lands on the Polish frontier. Established in 1795, with
Marschall von Moellendorf as its chairman, the
"Commission for Military Organization" undertook to
expand the army by conscription of troops from the
occupied territories; by the creation in 1805 of the so
called "third battalions" (essentially depot battalions for
the training of reserves for the regiments); and by the
establishment of a militia called the "Land Reserve
Troops" for the defense of the provinces.
These additions to the regular army brought the
strength of the Prussian military, on paper at least, to
314,380 effectives. Certainly this should have been
sufficient numbers to deal with the 160,000+ Frenchmen
advancing through the Thuringen Forest in October of
1806. Why, then, were the Prussians in reality only able
to mobilize 145,000+ men to meet the French onslaught?
[15]
In fact, the majority of the reserve strength existed
only on paper-the formation of the "Land Reserve", for
example, remained tied up in red tape by the conservative
Prussian bureaucracy. It was not until 14 days before the
actual battle of Jena-Auerstadt that the order for the
assembly of the militia reached the appropriate
authorities.
Other Reforms
Other reforms were also attempted prior to 1806. In
order to increase the mobility of the army, token efforts to
reduce the excessively heavy train and artillery were
undertaken. In an army which had traditionally depended
on supplies stocked in magazines and fortresses, and in
an army where foraging and requisition were officially
discouraged, even the myriad of changes in this area did
little to improve the mobility of the Prussian army in
comparison with the French.
One must also mention among the reforms prior to
1806, the use of light troops by the Prussians. As
previously mentioned, 24 fusilier and 3 Schuetzen
battalions comprised the majority of Prussian light
infantry. In addition, however, each line company was
directed in 1787 to train 10 men in light infantry tactics,
and by 1806 these marksmen had been issued rifles and
were being used in a skirmisher role. Farsighted officers
(in the extreme minority, unfortunately) had also adopted
the practice of abolishing the third rank to reinforce the
light troops.
This practice was eventually sanctioned by royal
order on October 5, 1805, which recommended that the
men of the third rank be formed into separate battalions
and be utilized for skirmish duties. This change came,
alas, too late to be effectively implemented, and was
hindered especially by the General Mobilization of 1805.
[16]
Many progressive officers went even so far as to issue
unofficial instructions for their own commands on the use
of light troops.
These training manuals "did not influence the tactical
doctrines of the army as much as the accounts of
sympathetic German historians would lead us to believe,
and . . . could not offset the great emphasis of the revised
infantry regulations of 1787 on line tactics." Even the
"Regulations for . . . light Infantry" of 1788 devoted most of
its instructions to linear tactics. A mere 4 paragraphs are
devoted to what might be called "skirmish tactics." [17]
This meant that most Prussian officers found "the old
method of forming a firing line three ranks deep and
advancing in close order on the enemy" perfectly
adequate.
Tactical utilization of light troops in the field by the
Prussian was also seriously flawed when compared with
the French "tirailleur" tactics. Light troops continued to be
primarily detached from their parent units and assigned
separate missions. Of the 27 light battalions, only 17 were
even available at Jena-Auerstadt, and of these, nearly half
were detached for other purposes during the actual battle.
[18]
Some officers did attempt to offset this deficiency by
using their third ranks as skirmishers, but here again they
were forced to improvise with line troops who were ill-
equipped (both in terms of armament and training) for
such a role.
Finally in the eleventh hour of 1806, one last reform
was attempted. Having paid lip service to the "combined
arms concept (die Taktik der verbundenen Waffen)",
Friedrich Wilhelm did an about-face and approved a
reorganization for the army in divisional units along the
lines of French organization. This reorganization was not
put into effect, unfortunately, until the troops had actually
departed for the theater of war. The armies of Brunswick
and Hohenlohe, which were to oppose Napoleon, were
organized into 10 such "divisions"; each consisting of 2
brigades of line infantry, a cavalry brigade, 2 batteries of
artillery (1 horse, 1 foot), and a fusilier battalion plus
hussar squadrons for Iight troops. [19]
This change proved disastrous for the army. First of
all, there were few Prussian officers of flag rank who truly
understood how to manage such a unit. Secondly, the
divisions were sadly weak in artillery, and the cavalry had
been so dispersed, that it could no longer rely on the
"shock tactics" for which it had been trained. Such a
drastic change as this might well be compared with taking
a Macedonian phalanx, and on the eve of battle, reorganizing it as a Roman legion. The
results of such a change are easy to imagine!
In recapitulation, one must respond to the question,
"Why did the Prussians lose", as follows: Barring any
disastrous blunder on the part of Napoleon, such an
outcome was almost inevitable. Although one cannot
impugn the individual tenacity and bravery of the Prussian
soldier, the army as a whole was inferior to the French
both organizationally and doctrinely. The reasons for this
inferiority include the following:
2. Native Prussians "reservists" were, at best,
parttime soldiers recruited from the lowest classes in
Prussian society.
3. Discipline was overly harsh and counter-productive.
Little positive motivation existed in the army of 1806.
4. The Prussian officer corps was over-aged and
adhered, for the most part, to antiquated tactics.
5. Supply services were cumbersome, adversely
affecting the mobility of the army.
6. Artillery was old, tactics and training were inferior
to the French, and an appreciation for "massed artillery
support" was lacking.
7. Although the number and quality of light troops had
been increased since 1786, these proved insufficient in
numbers and in light-infantry training to deal with the
French "tirailleur" tactics. This was, in part, caused by
misutilization of these troops by senior commanders.
8. Most importantly, the Prussian hierarchy lacked an
appreciation for the flexible "combined arms concept" of
the French system -especially at subordinate levels of
command. Senior commanders continued to rely on
Frederick's "moving battalions" of line infantry as the
decisive stroke.
9. Lastly, although many reforms were attempted
prior to 1806 to improve the quality of the army, many
were accomplished only half-heartedly; some, such as
the eleventh-hour divisional reorganization of the army on
the eve of battle, were even to prove detrimental to the
Prussians. In the next article, we will take a look at the
jenaAuerstadt campaign itself, in order to discover some
of the effects that the above deficiencies would have on
the Prussian performance in "die Katastrophe von 1806. "
[1] The Courier, Volumes IV-1, 111-5,6.
Clausewitz, Carl von. Nachrichten uber Preussen in seiner grossen Katastrophe,
Berlin, 1888.
Die Katastrophe Von 1806 Part II: Jena-Auerstadt
1. The Prussian army was demographically a relic of
the 18th century, with nearly 40% of its soldiery
consisting of recruited mercenaries, many of whom were
foreigners.
ABBREVIATED ENDNOTES
[2] Frauenholz, Das Heerwesen in derZeit
des Absolutismus, XII, 156-72.
[3] Shanahan, Prussian Military Reforms,
1786-1813, 46-48.
[4] Jany, Geschichte der... Preussischen
Armee, 1, 542-564, 676-692.
[5] Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian
Reform, 16-21.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Shanahan, op.cit., p. 29.
[8] Ibid., p. 30.
[9] Jany. op.cit., 111, 349-394.
[10] Jany, Gefechtsausbildung der
Preussischen Infanterie von 1806, pp. 4-36.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Scherbening and Willisen, Die
Reorganisation der Preussischen Armee . . . 662-680. and Paret, op.cit., 36-61.
[13] Jany, Gefechtsausbildung. . ., pp. 12-24.
[14] Scherbening and Willisen, op.cit., 257-8.
[15] Clausewitz, Nachrichten uber Pressen
in seiner grossen Katastrophe, 46248-.
[16] Jahns, Geschichte der
Kriegswissenschaften. . ., 2172-2189.
[17] Reglementfur ... leichtelnfanterie,
118-131.
[18] Lettow-Vorbeck, Der Krieg von 1806
und 1807, 303.
[19] Lehman, Das L eben ... von
Scharnhorst, 1, 407-417.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Das Preussische Heer vom Tilsiter Frieden his zur Befreiung, 1807-1814.
(Publikationen aus den Preussischen Archiven), Leipzig, XCIV, 1938.
Die Preussischen Kriegsvorbereitungen and Operationasplane von 1805. Berlin, 1883.
Frauenholz, Eugen von. Das Heerwesen in der Zeit des Absolutismus. Munchen, 1940.
Fuchs, Theador. Geschichte des europaischen Kreigswesen. Bd. 11, Munchen, 1972.
Jahns, Max. Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften vornehmlich in Deutschland. Munchen, 1889.
Jany, Curt. Die Gefechtsausbildung der Preussischen Infanterie von 1806. Berlin, 1903.
Jany, Curt. Der Preussischen Kavalleriedienst vor 1806. Berlin, 1904.
Jany, Curt. Geschichte der Koniglichen Preussischen Armee. Bdr. III and IV, Berlin, 1929-1933.
Lehman, Max. Das Leben des Generals von Scharnhorst. Leipzig, 1871.
Lettow-Vorbeck, Oscar von. Der Krieg von 1806 und 1807. Berlin, 1899.
Martens, Georg F. von. Recued des principaux traites. Gottingen, 1835.
Paret, Peter. Yorck and the Era ofPrussian Reform. Princeton, 1966.
Reglementfur die Konigliche Preussische leichte Infanterie. Berlin, 1788.
Scherbening and Willisen, eds. Die Reorganisation der Preussischen Armee
nach dem TilsiterFrieden. Berlin, 1866.
Shanahan, William. Prussian Military Reforms, 1786-1813. New York, 1945.
Rebuttal: Die Katastrophe Von 1806: Was That Really Why the Prussians Lost
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