The Sudan
1881-1885

First British Involvement
1884-85

by Lynn Bodin

The political overtones of both Hicks' and Baker's defeats were now being heard in Britain. Queen Victoria vigorously supported an expedition to Suakin. The Cabinet was divided but Gladstone (the Prime Minister) and Granville (the Foreign Secretary) both opposed such an expedition. In the end, the Queen's pressure won out and Major-Ceneral Graham was dispatched to Suakin with two brigades of British infantry, some cavalry, eight cannon and six Gatling gunsabout 4,000 men total.

By the time Graham arrived, both Tokar and Sinkat had fallen, so his mission changed from one of relief to one of offense. Public opinion demanded a victory and Graham was in the best position to satisfy the public.

On 29 February 1884, Graham's force marched out of Trinkitat towards Uthman's forces, who were dug in near the wells of El Teb. The huge British square moved slowly across the desert. They were soon under fire from two Krupp guns which had been captured by Uthman and were being served quite well by ex-Egyptian artillerymen. At about 900 yards range, Graham's artillery and Gatlings (which were positioned at the corners of the square) opened fire on the native entrenchments.

Despite fanatical sword and spear charges, the square continued to advance and soon had captured the entrenchments. By 2:00 PM the tribesmen were in flight and the Anglo-Egyptian forces had a victory! Uthman's losses were over 2000 killed, the British had lost 34 killed and 155 wounded. Graham and his troops returned to Suakin to regroup.

Two weeks later, on 13 March, Graham marched out to meet Uthman Diqna's forces at the wells of Tamai. The British advanced in two squares. Under the cover of great clouds of black powder smoke, the Hadendowa tribesmen charged one square in a great mass. The natives impacted the square along one flank where the men had become extended. Within an instant, the square was reduced to a large number of small groups of men fighting for their lives with bayonets against swords and spears.

A battery of guns from one corner of the broken square and some steadfast Highlanders checked the surge of natives. Gradually, the men rallied and the square was reformed. The advance now continued with both squares throwing back the fanatical charges of the natives. By late afternoon, Uthman's camp had been destroyed and his troops were in flight. The British suffered 211 casualties, of whom 109 were killed. The natives left over 2,000 dead on the battlefield. Graham had won yet another victory for the British and Egyptians.

With Uthman's forces in flight, Graham felt that he might be able to force a passage to the Nile and then up to relieve Khartoum. He wired Cairo for permission to march with his force to Berber. The government refused his request. On 3 April, after leaving two British battalions to garrison Suakin, Graham and the remainder of his force boarded ships and sailed for Egypt.

Shortly after the demise of the Hicks expedition, the series of events which led up to the decision to send Gordon to Khartoum had begun. Sir Evelyn Baring, British agent in Cairo, asked the Foreign Secretary to clarify Britain's position should the Khedive ask for British, Indian or Turkish troops to help hold the Sudan. Granville replied that Baring should counter with a proposal for the abandonment of the Sudan. About this time the suggestion to send Gordon to Khartoum surfaced and Baring flatly rejected the idea. Baring felt that Gordon was not the right man for the job and stressed that the idea of appointing a Christian to deal with what was primarily an Islamic religious revolt was quite undesirable.

On 4 January 1884, the Egyptian government was informed of Britain's position regarding the Sudan. The government resigned and a new ministry was formed which was more receptive to Baring's ideas. At this time, the British press picked up the scent of the Gordon story and public opinion was soon centered on sending Gordon to Khartoum. On 10 January Granville again offered Gordon's services to Baring. Baring refused again. On 15 January, Gordon met with Lord Wolseley and agreed to go to Suakin to assess the military situation in the Sudan. Before Gordon could leave, Baring finally requested a "qualified British officer to go to Khartoum . . . to conduct the retreat." The British government again offered Gordon, and this time Baring accepted, reluctantly.

Gordon's Plan

Gordon's plan was sound and received the approval of Baring. The idea was to evacuate all Egyptian troops and any civilians who wanted to leave from the Sudan. The petty chieftains who had been deposed by the Egyptians when the Sudan was conquered would be restored and all arms and munitions still under Egyptian control in the Sudan would be turned over to them.

Gordon left Cairo on January 26, accompanied by Colonel Stewart (who Baring felt could have handled the job better). On February 10, Gordon wrote to the Mahdi and offered him the Sultanate of Kordofan. Accompanying the letter was a red robe of honor and a tarboosh (fez). The Mahdi refused the offer in a letter which Gordon received at Khartoum on 22 March, returned the clothing and sent Gordon a Mahdist fibba, offering Gordon the chance to become a follower of the Mahdiyya. Gordon immediately realized he had made a mistake in seriously underestimating the convictions of the Mahdi.

By the time Gordon reached Khartoum, on 18 February 1884, his concept of his mission had changed radically. No longer was his primary goal the safe evacuation of the Egyptian troops and civilians, but rather, the establishment of a sound successor government. Gordon felt that al-Zubayr was the best man to head the new government in the Sudan. Britain continually refused Gordon's request on the grounds that the public would not tolerate having an ex-slave-trader heading the government. Gordon then proposed a delay in the evacuation and the sending of British and/or Indian troops to Wadi Haifa and Berber. He felt that the Mahdi could be smashed easily with a British expedition of reasonable size.

The Desert Column in Square - Mountain Guns at the Corner (Photo courtesy of The University of Washington Library)

Further, he felt that unless the Mahdists were defeated, even an evacuation to Egypt would only delay the inevitable involvement of the British Army in stopping the spread of the revolt. On 13 March (the day after the telegraph line to Khartoum was cut) Baring was informed by London that all of Cordon's suggestions had been rejected.

When Gordon rejected the Mahdi's offer to join the Mahdist cause, Muhammad Ahmad sent a force to begin the siege of Khartoum. By mid-May, all the territory surrounding Khartoum was in the hands of the Mahdi. Gordon was cut off. Nothing short of a major military operation expedition could now execute the evacuation. Gordon realized this and decided that his duty was now to hold Khartoum at all costs for as long as possible in hope that the British government would change its attitude and organize a relief expedition.

Slowly, public opinion began to have its effect on the Gladstone government. Finally, on 5 August, Parliament authorized funds for a relief expedition. On 9 September, General Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived in Cairo and began organizing the expedition. Gordon received news of the expedition on September 20. Wolseley chose to move his 7,000-man expedition up the Nile in a fleet of 800 small boats manned by Canadian Voyageurs. The boats were towed as far as the second cataract by steamers, but after that, the 10 soldiers in each boat had to row the boats against the Nile's strong current. By mid-December, 1884, the bulk of the expedition had arrived at Korti where a base camp was established.

From here, the relief force would be divided into two columns. One column, under the command of Major- General Earle, with 2,200 men, would continue up the Nile. The second column, under the command of Brigadier-General Sir Herbert Stewart, with 2,000 men mounted on camels, would cut straight across the Bayucla desert to Metemmah, where they hoped to meet Gordon's steamers from Khartoum.

On 30 December, 1884, Stewart and the Desert Column marched out towards the wells at Gakdul, which were reached without incident on 12 January, 1885. After a brief rest, the column continued its march.

On 17 January, the British entered the Abu Klea valley and formed a huge square to meet an estimated 15,000 Mahdists who blocked their path. The natives launched a fanatical charge against the square when it approached to within about 500 yards. Initially, the Mahdists headed for the left front corner of the square. When they got closer, however, they noticed a bulge and gap in the side of the square caused by the Naval Brigade's Gardner gun.

Before the British could reinforce the gap, the Mahdi's troops were crashing into the square and pushing in the face of it. The Gardner gun jammed and at least half of the Naval Brigade was killed while trying to defend it. Martini-Henrys jammed and bayonets bent in the heat of the fighting. The whole column was only saved by the steadiness of the Guards, who, holding their ground on the opposite side of the square, cooly did an about face with their rear rank and shot down or bayoneted all the Mahdists who had penetrated the square.

As quickly as the attack began, it ended, with the natives withdrawing in reasonably good order. In only about five minutes of fighting, the Mahdi's forces lost 1,100 dead and the British had 74 killed and almost 100 wounded.

Two days later, while the column was marching towards Metemmah (only 23 miles away) they reached Abu Kru and were able to once again see the Nile which they had not seen for the last 20 days. While the British were having breakfast they came under long range rifle fire from the Mahdists. General Stewart was hit and mortally wounded during this erratic firing. Command now transferred to Sir Charles Wilson and he formed the majority of the column into a large square, leaving the Heavy Camel Corps, the 19th Hussars, the Naval Brigade and the guns on a small hill inside a redoubt made from baggage, boxes and rocks.

Wilson and the square marched off towards the enemy and soon had lured them to attack. Stricter fire discipline and flanking fire from the redoubt held the Mahdists at bay. No native got within 50 yards of the square and within minutes the attack had withered away. British losses were 23 killed and 98 wounded, the Mahdists lost several hundred. On 20 January, the village of Abu Kru, on the banks of the Nile, was occupied and the buildings loopholed for defense of the wounded and the supplies.

At dawn on the 21st, Wilson and 1000 men marched on Metemmah. The natives were strongly entrenched and, after some fighting, the British withdrew. On the 22nd, four steamers sent by Gordon from Khartoum met the column at Abu Kru. Two days were spent on making two of the ships ready for a quick dash to Khartoum. On the morning of 24 January, Wilson, 20 men of the Royal Sussex Regiment (wearing scarlet tuncis borrowed from the Guards), some men of the Naval Brigade and 200 Sudanese soldiers set out for Khartoum.

It took three days to fight the currents, sand bars and Mahdists to reach Khartoum. When they were greeted by a hail of hostile gunfire, Wilson realized that he was too late . . . Khartoum had fallen on the 25th and Gordon had been killed. The steamers turned around and headed back downstream to rejoin the Desert Column. The return journey was more perilous than the ascent. Both ships struck rocks and were lost. The relief force barely being saved by Sir Charles Beresford in one of the steamers which had been left at Abu Kru. The column was finally reassembled on 6 February and proceeded back across the desert to Korti.

The advance of the River Column had been much slower than that of the Desert Column. It took four days for the column to proceed up only seven miles of cataracts. On February 9, after temporarily abandoning his boats, General Earle found his way blocked by hostile forces at Kirbekan. Feinting a frontal attack, the Mahdists were caught in the flank by the Staffords, Black Watch and the 19th Hussars. Broken, the natives fled, but not before General Earle was shot and killed. British casualties were 12 killed and 48 wounded, Mahdist casualties were estimated in the hundreds. The advance continued to Abu Hamed, which the British would have probably taken by storm, but on 24 February Wolseley ordered a withdrawal. The column turned around and reached Korti on 8 March.

Part of Wolseley's plan included the building of a military railway from Suakin to Berber. In order to protect the construction, a large force of British and Indian troops were dispatched to Suakin. Nearly 13,000 men under Lt.- General Graham had assembled at Suakin by 12 March, 1885. Graham's initial task was to clestory the forces of Uthman Diqna, estimated to be at least 10,000 men split between Tamai and Hasin. On 20 March, Graham marched out and occupied the wells at Hasin, forcing the natives to attack. Graham sent out cavalry to harass Uthman's men and soon, the lancers were retiring to the infantry square pursued by at least 3,000 sword and spear- wielding Hadenclowa, tribesmen. None of the natives got within 20 yards of the square.

As they turned and fled, the Lancers were hot on their heels. British losses were 48 (9 killed and 39 wounded), Uthman lost at least 1,000.

Graham now sent Major-General McNeill with a strong force to build and garrison two zaribas (thorn-bush squares) as intermediate supply stops between Hasin and Tamai. Though the camps were to be 8 miles apart, McNeill realized that he would not make the full distance on the first day, 22 March. He requested permission to build the first zariba atTofrik, only six miles from Hasin. McNeill consented and work began on three zaribas, a large central one to hold the animals and supplies and two smaller squares at opposite corners of the large one to hold the troops and provide covering fire for the central square.

At 2:00 PM the men stopped for their mid-day meal with only the two small squares completed. At 2:30 pickets galloped into the camp to report the enemy closing fast. Over 5,000 of Uthman's screaming Hadendowa. warriors burst into the camp before the British could react. The first casualties were the baggage camels, who, left out beyond the British positions, were quickly slaughtered. The 17th Bengal Native Infantry, who faced the main Mahdist attack, fired one volley and broke and fled.

The incomplete central square was swept away by a rush of retreating Indian troops, panic-stricken animals and swarming native warriors. About 60 of Uthman's men penetrated the square held by the Royal Marines, but they were quickly dispatched with the bayonets. The British troops found themselves having to pour volley after volley into the swarming mass of animals and men in the area once occupied by the incomplete central zariba. Camels, mules and Hadendowa warriors fell with every volley. The other two Indian units, the 15th Sikhs and 28th Bombay Native Infantry held their ground on the far side of the central square and repulsed several surges by the native warriors.

Finally, their fire plus that of the two squares held by the Marines and the Berkshires finally forced Uthman's men to flee. In less than half an hour the British lost 100 killed, 140 wounded and 900 camels destroyed. Over 1,000 native bodies were counted in and around the zaribas.

On the next day Graham came to Tofrik with the Guards Brigade. The next eight days were spent in cleaning up the battlefield and rebuilding the thorn bush squares. On April 3, Graham advanced unmolested to Uthman Diqna's headquarters at Tamai. All he found was a deserted village and wells nearly drained of all their water. On 2 May, Wolseley arrived in Suakin to announce that the railway project was to be abandoned and that all British troops, except for a garrison at Suakin, were withdrawing from the Sudan.

By the middle of May, Korti had been abandoned and the withdrawal was in full swing. In June, Wolseley returned to England. Also in June, the Mahdi died, probably of typhus, and was succeeded by the Khalifa Abdallahi. For all intents and purposes the Nile Expedition was now at an end. Mention must be made, however, of one minor battle fought in december of 1885. The Khalifa had been raiding the British outposts of Kosha and Mograka, on the Egypt-Sudan border.

On 30 December, General Stephenson with two mixed Egyptian and British Brigades, marched to the town of Ginnis. The Anglo-Egyptian force, supported by cavalry and gunboats on the Nile, defeated the Mahdists and captured the town in about five hours of fighting. Casualties were light, less than 50 for Stephenson's force and only a few hundred for the Mahdists. The prime significance of the battle of Ginnis is that it was the last time that British troops wore their scarlet tunics into battle. Thus, with the defeat of the Mahdists at Ginnis, the first phase of the Sudan campaigns comes to an end.

Watch for the second part of this historical overview in a future issue of THE COURIER.

More Sudan

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