Now that I Painted
All these Swiss
What Do I Do with Them?

Battle of Morat: June 22 1476

by Tom McMillen
Maps by A. Karasa

THE BATTLE OF MORAT (Kirk)

For forces engaged, Kirk gives 19,000 Swiss (15,000 cantonal, 2,500 allied) with 7,000 Bernese, 1,200 Schwytz, 1,900 Lucerne, 1,700 Zurich infantry and 300 Strasburg, 60 Basel, and 120 Austrian cavalry. For Burgundians he gives 20,000 plus, probably at least one-half cavalry (other estimates--Harbottle gives 18,000 Swiss and 36,000 Burgundians, Eggenberger chooses 30,000 Swiss, and Dupuy gives 15,000 Burgundians and 18,000 Swiss).

MORAT, JUNE 22,1476

As his army was not seriously damaged (except in morale), Charles was able to renew the fight without much delay. He proceeded to besiege the town of Morat, which, as can be seen from the map, has severely restricted access from the east due to the lake and marshland to the north and the gorge and river to the south. In addition, most of the area in between is occupied by the wooded hill of the Bois de Domigne. The logical approach for the Swiss would have been along the Clamitz road, where there were no natural obstacles and the vulnerable flanks of the pike squares would be protected. However the Swiss were in no mood simply to drive off the Burgundians once again; they intended to sweep over the hill, encircle the enemy right flank and annihilate the entire army. Interestingly, that was exactly what the Burgundian duke was counting on.

Charles set up a solid palisade on the high ground near Chapelle and placed his artillery, arquebusiers, and English longbowmen securely behind it. He then formed his numerous, powerful heavy cavalry at right angles to the palisade just south of Munchenwyler, facing south. The trap seemed deadly - as the Swiss emerged from the wood they would be decimated by missile fire at point blank range while charged in the flank. If they tried to advance against the cavalry, or even stand to face it, the artillery would plough into them at will; if they tried to neutralize the palisade they would be swept away by 6,000 horse!

The Swiss proceeded over the hill but, half way through their passage, halted. In that arbitrary, almost perverse way in which the Swiss always do the unexpected (to the constant dismay of their French employers in the future), they stopped to say some prayers, award some military honors, and basically stand around in the rain for three hours. The Burgundian knights, meanwhile, grew tired of sitting around in their armor getting rained on, decided that there was not going to be a battle, and persuaded Charles to retire to the camp for lunch. He had even very uncharacteristically removed his personal armor, just about the time the Swiss arrived.

The rest of the battle is easily imagined. The detachment left at the palisade fought well and delayed the Swiss considerably, but the Burgundian gendarmarie arrived piecemeal, could not effect a reasonable charge, and were unable to halt the pike columns. The rest of the Burgundians attempted to repeat their performance of Grandson, but the retreat was already blocked. The Swiss attack went exactly according to plan with the left flank swinging around and enveloping the enemy camp, after which Charles' army was mercilessly slaughtered.

Kirk gives 36-40,000 Burgundians for the campaign, with 24,000 regulars available for the battle. Since Grandson the army had been reorganized into eight battalions, each with 500 pike (they had used spears at Grandson), 600 archers and 1600 cavalry (in 200 "lances"). The first battalion had double infantry, the second had a preponderance of cavalry. He gives 35-40,000 Swiss with 1600 cavalry. There were apparently an unusually large number of "light" Swiss troops, i.e. not in pike columns, perhaps 40%. Other estimates: Eggenburger 35,000 Swiss, 20,000 Burgundians; Harbottle 24,000 Swiss and 35,000 Burgundians, Dupuy 20,000 Swiss and 25,000 Burgundians.

There are a couple of points from these two battles which deserve to be emphasized. One is that Charles the Bold was not one of the history's more fortunate captains, and was considerably more capable than his reputation indicates. Looking at Marignano, where Francis I was forced by circumstances to fall into the same situation which Charles had so carefully prepared at Morat, one can see that the Duke had correctly evaluated the weakness of the Swiss formation against the proper use of combined arms, and probably should have smashed them. Also Charles had been born just a little bit too early, since if he had had the quality of artillery present at Ravenna or Marignano (and though a chivalrous sort Charles was a great believer in artillery), Grandson would probably have been a Swiss disaster.

The second significant point is that the notion that Swiss troops were bereft of tactical sense, and would commit suicidal charges at the first available opportunity, is nonsense. Most sets of rules have clauses to reflect this supposed Swiss stupidity. One British set has a "Disobedience Test", to see if troops will overstep their orders, in which being a mounted noble or facing an enemy rear give a "plus 2", while simply being Swiss gives a "plus 10"!

This sort of thing certanly did occur at one battle, Bicocca. It was definitely not the case at Grandson, Morat, Nancy, Cerignola (true, the Swiss charged into a trench, but they were under French orders and the French gendarmes were in the van!), the Garigliano, Novara, Marignaro (honest), the Sesi, or Pavia.

The Swiss did practice a "fast-break" style of warfare in which they attempted to catch the enemy unprepared. When both sides were formed for battle, however, the Swiss advance was generally planned, orderly, and in conjunction with an overall tactical plan. Those who still do not accept this should study the battle of Nancy. In that engagement the Confederates and their allies had a massive numerical superiority over the same Burgundians they had so decisively drubbed three times previously. Yet both wings were sent on lengthly and difficult flank marches, the right wing not even arriving until the issue was decided, rather than chance a frontal assault.

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