MAIDA -- BEWARE YOUR SOURCES
ED NOTE: This is excerpted from an article submitted to EMPIRE, EAGLES & LIONS by Jim Arnold, author of MAIDA in Vol I, No. 6 and
of which there has been some controversy in those pages. Reprinted with kind permission of
the author and EE&L.
On the 28th of November, 1907, Sir Charles
Oman delivered a lecture to the Royal Artillery
Institution entitled "Historical Sketch of the Battle
for Maida".
In this talk he attributed Reynier's defeat to the
inherent difficulty of a column formation assaulting
a linear formation.
Simultaneously, Oman's great contemporary,
J. W. Fortescue, gave his account of Maida in the
first edition of A History of tbe Brithh Army,
Printed in 1910, Volume V accounts how the 1st
Leger advanced: "they came on, in columns of
companies three ranks deep . . . with a front of
not more than fifty men apiece, and with no great
interval between tbem; for Compere, faithful to the
Revolutionary traditions which had never been
abandoned by Napoleon, relied upon shock tactics".
So by 1910, the two most prominent English
language historians of the Napoleonic period
have given their versions of the Battle of Maida,
complete with details about the width of the
French attacking columns, and they both had it
completely wrong.
Oman recognized his error bY 1912. In a
footnote to his Wellington's Army, page 78, he
wrote: "Til lately I had supposed that Reynier had
at least his left wing . . . in columns of battalions,
but evidence put before me seems to prove that
despite of the fact the French narratives do not
show it, the majority at least of Reynier's men
were deployed' Fortescue concurred with this
revised view in the second edition of A History
of the British Army Volume V, released in 1921.
What this demonstrates of course is the
unreliability of secondary sources. (My article in
THI COURIER was based on seemingly reliable,
sources. Oman and Fortescues' first versions).
The great casualty differential between the
French and British seemed to support the idea
that it was a column versus line encounter. When
a letter quoting Fortescue as placing the French
in line I was surprised. Renewed investigation led
to the discrepancies between sources, and I
found a primary source, Sir Henry Bunbury's
Narrative of Some Passages in tbe Great War,
Bunbury was quartermaster to the Army of tbe
Mediterranean and was present at the battle.
Here is an eyewitness account of the assault of
the 1st Legere: "The French infantry formed for
attack and marched rapidly upon us . . . Their 1st
legere advanced in line upon the brigade of
British Light Infantry. . . A crashing fire of
musketry soon opened the battle on both sides,
but it was too hot to last at so short, distance . . .
Kempt gave the word, and his Light Infantry
pressed eagerly forward to close with their
antagonists. But the two lines were no paralled;
the light companies of tbe 20th and 35th
encountered the extreme left of the French, but
the rest of enemy's brigade broke before their
bayonets crossed. They had, however, come too
close to escape, it was headlong rout.
The incorrect version of Maida continues to b
perpetuated. The noted contemporary historian
David Chandler, in his Dicthnary of the
Napoleonic Wars, writes: "Reynier insisted on
advancing over a river onto the plain in column . .
Maida is important tactically as demonstrating the
inherent superiority of British tactics over the
French column of attack." In the confusion over
the French formation at Maida an important tactic.
lesson should not be overlooked. A French and
British line stood at short range and exchanged
several volleys. The French suffered much
heavier casualties than the British, even
discounting the French casualties suffered during
the pursuit phase, and this differential suggests
the superiority of two rank versus three rank fire.
-- JIM ARNOLD
TWO POINTS OF VIEW
ED NOTE: The article "The Hobby" Two
Points of View" generated more mail than anything else to date. Mr. Gill ("Square Bullets")
takes most of the heat. There is a definite antipathy among the readers for any type of
elitism in the hobby. It makes it more difficult to recruit to the hobby. But judge for yourself.
I personally don't see much to refighting
historical battles with EXACT FORCES. History
tells us what happened so why bother. The
historicos (sic) will say "but that is the whole
point of playing." I am interested in weapons,
tactics. technological. and personal history (Pop
or Kitchen history if you prefer); not in antique
political propaganda, which most court history is.
I would have to agree with Otto Schmidt. I feel
youneer fantasy gamers are shy of regular
wargamers do to the fear of game bigotry. As for
Mr. Gill's letter, what ever people have in their
collections whether it is wood blocks or the
greatest of miniatures doesn't bother me. When I
go to a convention and they use unpainted
figures or the judges don't know the period or the
rules, that I don't like. Have you ever seen horse
archers that can't shoot in retreat or a cavalry
charge over wagons. Go to a convention and see
it.
--WARREN BURRUS
Mr. Gill's type of thinking reflects an elitist, I-
was-here-first-so-listen, type attitude that can
only #rye to our hobby's detriment. that such
pennyanny snobbery exists in the field is
unfortunate for it causes potential parties that
may show a peripheral intent to judge or
generalise all gamers in a similar genre.
I remember very sourly, a character who I
gamed wrth a few times. Out of personal
aesthetic preference, I chose to paint my bases a
royal purple shade (don't faint now, Mr. Gill). Now
the figures were based according to the rules in
use and were painted as accurately as my
research permitted, but that individual chose to
ridicule my efforts by judging them by the base
colour, alone. Hence, on the few occasions that I
have the misfortune to game with him, his first
question is a sneering, sarcastic "You got the
bases painted right?" If I don't does this mean I
can't play? Mr. Gill's letter smacks of the same
stiltedness, narrow-minded attitude that Mr.
Schmidt rightfully decries.
To any waryamers or peripherally interested
ones don't lose hope. Our hobby is indeed
prospering but it can only progress with the
infusion of your ideas -- and your thoughts are
valid, no matter how small you yourself may
assume them to be. Not all of us are ensconced in
conservatism. If you can't find a group that
satisfies you don't close up the store. Shop
around until you do (and keep looking beyond
that). Only by your participation and new ideas
can we relegate the Mr. Gills of our world to the
backrooms where they belong and insure the
continued prosperity of the art.
--
BEN JAMIN PESCON
All this portrayal of more realism is done at the
expense of playability and fun. It seems that many
games are now played out to include the actual
conclusion of whatever battle somebody is
recreating. While I do not believe that the games
are to be competitive, I also do not believe that the
games need to be played with completely painted
(I realize that most of you are shuddering at this)
armies or played on tables that are completely
furnished with terrain models to accurately
represent the various types ground found on the
battlefield. Many players now playing have
probably been into the hobby for some time now
and more than likely have had their figures for
many years and have had the time to gradually
paint up an entire army. However how about the
person just getting into the hobby. He has two
ways to go about amassing his (or hers) army.
1. They can buy one or two units to start
with, paint them up and to to a game and get
runover time and time again until he or she can
eventually build up a reasonably strong
indepedent body of troops such as a Corps or
Division.
2. They can go out and buy an entire Corps or
Division of troops and play with these at the same
time gradually working on getting them painted up.
And I find that this is the course most generally
taken by someone starting in the hobby.
Whatever course a person takes in beginning a
hobby such as this I do not believe that an entirely
painted force of figures is a necessary
prerequisite.
(ED NOTE: Doesn't anyone join clubs and
pool their troops anymore?)
Neither do I think that the surface being played
on need be painstakenly detailed to represent
terrain. A few pieces of irregularly cut out green
paper will work well enough to represent
wooded areas. and built up areas can be
simulated by the same means if the players
desire. Or any other type of terrain can be
represented just as easily. It is all up to the
player's taste.
I guess that by biggest pet peeve are the rule
books that are coming out now. Many of the
latest rules now include historical ratings for
actual generals, but isn't this supposed to be
where the player inserts himself into the game?
And many of the rules books are veritable
volumes in themselves. Whatever happened to
the rules booklet that in 20 or so pages quickly
set down the basic sequences to be followed
and let the players get down to playing and not
spending evenin~s readiny the rules.
Remember the name is WARGAMING and I believe
that we are losing sight of the emphasis which
should be on gaming. If you choose to play with
an 80 page booklet attempting to cover every
possible occurence, 2,000 painted figures on a
playing surface detailed to represent the
battlefield or whatever, fine. But don't start
gripeing about the player who chooses not to get
that involved with his gaming. Remember the
hobby belongs to all of us, the fanatic and the not
so fanatic. The first wargames devised and
played bY H. G. Wells, Jack Scruby, and Charles
Grant all the rest stressed fun and comradeship.
-- MIKE WALKNER, MAREK
WALKNER and DALE STARR.
If Sam wants to join together with other elitists
and (by a majority vote) form an exclusive club. . .
fine. If Sam wants to join MY company, then I will
respect his quaint notions, but he will have to
accept the fact that I occasionally play (oops,
excuse me . . . wargame) with unpainted models
and frequently use a ship model of the wrong
class if the scenario calls for a ship which I don't
have. I also enjoy an occasional shout, oath,
thump the table and, from time to time, deride the
intelligence and ability of my opponents . . .
because that happens to be part of the ritual of
MY style of play. If other gamers wish to view the
table soberly and thoughtfullYy quietly stroking
their chins or tugg ing at their beards . . . that may
be the ritual of THEIR style of play, which is OK
with me. I happen to enjoy wargaming win or
lose, for the activity involved and for the
fellowship wrth my friends.
In summary, I make the plea that civilization
general and our hobby, in particular, will
probably be more enjoyable and simpatico in
response tolerance and forebearance raher
than clanishn and elitism.
-- CLIFF
SAYRE JR.
If, as Mr. Gill suggests, the hobby is heading for a "crisis in the foreseeable future" it is the fault all of us who have anything to do with Doubtless, we need to develop a bit of tolerance. We also need to stop trying to sate our egos with what amounts to plaigarism a pedantic put downs and begin to do some real clear thinking. Where is the imagination which created the hobby? Let's see some really innovative rule systems instead of "new" rules that change a few of the mechanics of existing sets. Let's see some clear thinking about what affect various levels of command. Fantasy could use really cohesive and coherent set of rules or at very least, scenarios. The manufacturers at least seem to be coming around to a more even
balance at last, thankfully.
It's a big hobby in more ways than just the number of participants. If it dies or goes through a major decline it will be because those same people cause it to happen. R.I.P.
-- CHARLES ECKART
A few opted for Mr. Gill's point of view.
GOD BLESS SAM GILL
-- Anonymous
BRAVO . . . that's all I can say about the
Samuel T Gill article entitled "Square Bullets"
published ir your latest issue. Gill is right, we
need a higher standard of gaming in the hobby and
this can only be achieved by striving towards
more presentable figures and tables to play with
(on). More importantly, though, is the dire need to
upgrade our literary standards and the strong
advocation of research before gaming.
Mr. Gill also brings up the important point of
competition in wargaming . . . must we compete?
The most disturbing thing about WRG Ancient
tournaments is the incredible amount of arguing
that goes on over the tritest of matters. This
would neva happen at a truly social wargame.
I feel that we must also cradle Mr. Schmidt's
suggestion of opening our expertise to the Young
novice. We must encourage them to strive toward
attainment of their potential. In order to better our
hobby, we must educate newcomers. Let us nolt
become a group of cold hearted snobs . . . it's a
turnoff. At the next convention you attend (if you
ever playing a game), ask the novice wishfully
standing by the table if he'd like to . . . I bet he
would! Remember, we were all novices at one
time.
-- DAVID SMITH
And then there wete those with a more general outlook.
Who says that we, as a group, must define
the goals and objectives of the hobby. I suggest
that we do as we like as individuals. If you fight
wargames as a competitive challenge, great! Find
opponents who feel the same way and have at it.
Toilet-paper roads and milk carton houses on a
game table suit you? Fine-- Fight your heart out. If
you use spray-painted Civil War armies because
you don't like to paint that's no one's business except you and your opponent.
Let's not allow the erudite "Spokesmen" of the
hobby to tell us what the hobby will be. It can,
anc should be, "all things to all people". I believe
there is a vast underground of Fun Wargamers
who rather than "stand up and be counted", are
sitting down and paintiny more figures for their
massed armies and are, as Douglas Southall Freeman
said of the Confederate infantry, "Inarticulate
save when their volleys speak!"
-- LARRY BROM
I am afraid sir, that I must beg to differ with
you. I found nothing in (the article) which made
me angry; after several readings, during which I
was unable to discern anything particularly new
or controversial or even outstandingly stupid, I
was left with a vague sense of annoyance and
the question: "Did we really need all of this
again?"
-- Thomas Tuohy
LINEAR TACTICS -- I
I was impressed with the quality of Richard K. Riehn's
article Linear Tactics and the Wargame Part 1
(N. B. Riehn is spelled Reihn in the Table of
Contents, and the first paragraph of p. 5 seems to
have been garbled, reading from "Far more
importantly, . . .") Mr. Riehn's breadth of
knowledge is clearly very great, and I was
impressed with his insights. The matter of the
evolution of the line formation, for example, is
something that I feel is critical for an
understanding of early tactics.
Aside from the changing fire disciplines,
though, the influence of such factors as the
introduction of the cadenced pace and the
deployment by conversion from column of
platoons must be considered. Thus the
Regulations for the Prussion Infantry,
conveniently cited by Bunger in his excellent
bibliography in this same issue, calls files of three
men "half files," showing that the line still consists
conceptually (in this regulation) of files of 6 men
with open intervals between the files. The
bringing up of the rear half files into the interval
between files not only permits the substitution of
platoon firing for rank firing, but permits wheeling
all three ranks simultaneously, during the
conversion by platoons in developing, and is
permitted in this and other movement by the
development of cadencing (and other
techniques). (It also presents a closed fence of
bayonets against attacking cavalry.)
In spite of my esteem for Mr. Rihen's article,
there are a few points I'd like to quibble with.
Though not a statistician, I work with a group of
them, and I'd like to point out that Riahn's
conception of what they do is poor. However
brilliant or stupid the individual who calculated that
it took 15 minutes to load a matchlock musket, he
was not "doing statistics." A statistician's job
would have been to determine how much
confidence could be placed on this estimate, by
consulting on the method of collecting the data
(was is biased? was if efficient?) and by
computing assumptions involved would not have
fallen within the province of a statistician's
concern.
On this same subject, given Riehn's estimate
of about 1 round per minute for a matchlock (not
counting overhead time due to the firing by
ranks), it is interesting to note that the usual
estimate for firing rate for a flintlock is still only 2
or 3 times a minute. I suppose that the increase
must have been mostly due not to the lock
mechanism's change, but to the use of fixed
ammunition (cartridges) and, possibly, lighter
pieces.
Considering Riehn's general freedom from
devotion to myths, it is surprising to find him taking
seriously the Fontenoi legend of the officers of
the opposing sides offering each other first fire.
At most it was a matter of disciplined units holding
fire to close range, whereupon someone called
out something, someone bowed (or ducked?),
and the slaughter began. Whatever else
happened, and whatever they offered the
English, the French are supposed to have fired
first, anyway!
Riehn, aside from a reference otherwise
unexplained to the "falsetto voices of the officer
and noncoms," speaks of the fear of the men
without cor sidering that the officers must have
felt the same fear, too, even given class
differences.
Riehn speaks of the vigorous (Napoleonic)
cavalry pursuits after Jena and Waterloo (in
contrast to the lack of these under Frederick)
without apparently realizing that these were
virtually the only ones even in this later period,
and that these two were possible because of
fresh reserves and the absolute collapse of the
pursued armies, which they merely took
advantage of.
The remarks on the pointlessness of the grim
systems practiced at the instigation of "parade
ground mentalities" seem to miss the point. First
these parade ground exercises (as Riehn
indicated later) were intended to reduce to habit
the discipline practiced, so that its use would
extend a bit further into the confusion and panic
of the actual fire fight. Second, all techniques
practiced were designed to start the battalion's
frontage firing in a continuous rather than a
periodic fashion. Thus, even if the men slipped
discipline and began firing at will, the pattern of
continuous fire would persist, and there would be
no intevals in which cavalry could approach
relatively unscathed, or in which, for what
seemed like an eternity to the nervous mass of
men, the battalion was not defending itself. (The
first of these is frequently mentioned. The latter is
my supposition, inspired by Riehn's morale-
centered approach in his article.).
I look forward to the next installment of Riehn's
article, which if as interesting as this one, will
provide us all with considerable food for thought.
Before I close, let me also say how much I
enjoyed Jim Arnold's article on the research
underpinnings of his Generalship rules.
-- JOHN E. KOONTZ