The Battle of Leipzig Recreated

Random Thoughts

by Bruce Weeks

I must begin by saying that Leipzig attempted not only the recreation of a table top battle, but also the planning, intelligent placement and use of units, and the timely commitment of reserves that were all problems that characterized most Napoleonic battles.

Due to the fact that these aspects have not often been focused on in previous games, there was no established body of experience or tradition to fall back upon for the respective commanders. It was obvious that each commander brought several preconceived ideas to the game. It was equally as obvious from the play of the game that many of these rules of thumb" could not be translated directly to a system like GRAND TACTICS from other game systems.

I can only state that the lessons learned noted later are substantial refinements to the overall game system and that I and the other game designers feel that what has evolved is a very accurate yet playable representation of Corps level actions that took place during the Napoleonic period.

Game Planning

As far as game planning went, the French commander chose a well-balanced force and organized into two Corps which were deployed in line across the best defensive terrain on the map. These Corps were broken down into two divisions each which in turn deployed one or two brigades forward and one or two in reserveÄthus showing a very flexible approach to his basic defensive mission.

The lack of significant outposts (one regiment out of seven available) meant, however, that he would not receive adequate forewarning of the enemy's forces. In addition, when all map movement prior to combat was resolved no attempt was made until after the battle had commenced to call the Division deployed off board onto the battle area.

The Allied forces were initially handicapped by late submission of force compositions and then trying to decide on frontages and the "best" deployment formations. They opted to advance along a broad front with all three Corps in line each being lead by a sizeable Advance Guard Brigade. The lack of French outposts helped speed these units to combat. The employment of the Heavy Cavalry Division in the area south of the Galgenberg was questtionable, but they were fortunate not to suffer from it. The main Allied problem and what could have well been catastrophic was the fact that when they rolled to see when their units broke bivouac the Allied CinC rolled exceptionally high dice and delayed the start of each Corps by an hour to an hour and a half.

Had he not rolled consistently high dice, his Corps could well have started out in complete disarray and have been committed to the battle board piecemeal. With universally poor luck, however, the Allied columns muddled through and were even able on the flank boards to achieve considerable penetration onto the battle area prior to the commencement of action. The center Corps, being the most delayed, in contrast, had barely managed to get its lead elements onto the board.

French Gap

As has been observed in many battles, it often boils down to a question of how units are placed and how well you take advantage of the enemy's weaknesses that decide the issue. It appeared obvious to almost the whole Allied army and to some members of the French army as well, that the complete lack of deployed infantry between Markleeberg and Wachau was a serious fault in the French dispositions.

This gap was weakened still further when the commanders of the areas of each town drew their partly exposed units into the protection(?) of the towns, thereby voluntarily giving up the ground. True, a massing of French batteries initially seemed to slow down the Allied advance, but it also required the commitment of the entire French cavalry force into the gap to support the guns and give some semblance of a continuous line. This weakness was even further aggravated by the fact that the French artillery spent its initial fire shooting cannister ineffectively at the Russian infantry slowly deployed onto the board and advanced over two feet towards them.

On their side the Allied initial plan to push through with the Austrian Corps and use the other Corps as a flank guard had to be changed immediately as it became obvious that the Austrian commander would not or could not force Markleeberg at once. The intention to break the French center being made, all available forces (including the Reserve Division and the Heavy Cavalry Division), were promptly committed to the attack while the flank Corps was ordered to merely contain the enemy to their front.

Once made, this plan was adhered to for the rest of the battle and its simplicity and well founded appraisal of the forces involved was responsible for the Allied victory.

No Support

The French, on the other hand, made no move to support their center. In fact, they early on dissipated their Wachau force by an attack against the Prussian left wing. This attack was made and ran out of force before it could be coordinated with the later assault by the 16th and 17th Divisions from the heights of the Galgenberg.

Thus, by the time this second attack got under way, even though it was supported by the last French reserve, a Guard Division, it had to push the Prussians back too far for any real hope at a quick decision. It also expended the last reserves without drawing forces off from the attack on the center where the massed French squadrons were sacrificing themselves in vain by repeated and fruitless attacks upon the unshaken Russian infantry.

The destruction of the French center once again illustrates the maxim that cavalry can gain ground but can not hold it against a determined infantry attack, they are too brittle an instrument.

More Leipzig

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