Fort Henry The duel between ironclads at Hampton Roads did not mark the debut of the heavily armored vessel. The first action, albeit ironclad versus a traditional fortification, had taken place several weeks earlier on the Tennessee River on February 6 when Flag-Officer A.H. Foote led four armored gunboats, (Essex, Carondelet, Cincinnati, and the St. Louis) plus three “timberclads” (Lexington, Tyler, and Conestoga) against the unwisely situated Fort Henry. A reconnaissance by the Essex the previous day revealed the unexpected long reach (2 1/2 miles) of the Confederate artillery. [54] General Grant and Flag-Officer Foote decided to send their force up the narrow channel between Panther Island and the eastern shore to avoid being fired upon as long as possible. Setting off at 10:50 am, the flotilla was organized into two divisions. Two sets of four armored gunboats abreast followed by the timberclads. The “island chute” was so narrow that the Carondelet and the St. Louis were lashed together. Only the guns in the bow could be brought into action, so eleven Union artillery pieces were pitted against the same number in the fort. Foot ordered his men to avoid long-ranged fire and the Union gun crews only began to fire shell as they passed Panther Island around 11:35. Here, the gunboats along each tier closed together to offer a single front. Still 1700 yards from the fort, they initially lobbed shells at a 7-degree elevation. This was progressively lowered to 6, 5, 4, and finally to 3 degrees elevation. The gunboats began firing more rapidly as they advanced and the fuses were shortened from 15, to 10 and then 5 seconds. [55] The Confederate fort had only two long-ranged guns, a 128-pounder Columbiad and a 6-inch rifled cannon. The eight 32-pounders, two 42-pounders and five 18-pounder siege guns were much shorter ranged. [56] After twenty minutes, the Commander gave the orders to fire. As the Union ironclads approached to within 600 yards, a Confederate shell hit the Essex’s casemate just above a porthole, a shot penetrated its middle boiler. Carnage and pandemonium ensued. Some were killed instantly, others jumped through the portholes to escape. The tide soon turned against the defenders, however. First, the 6-inch rifled cannon burst killing its crew and some of those at other stations. Then the Columbiad’s touchhole was jammed by a priming wire. Soon after, the Union gunboats fire hit two of the 32-pounders, inflicting numerous casualties. The defensive fire almost eliminated, the ironclads could now fire with impunity. Shells now burst through the fort like a bullets ball through a board. Now defenseless, General Lloyd Tilghman, the fort’s commander, surrendered at about 1:55 pm. The engagement lasted little more than two hours. [57] Fort Donelson Grant next turned his attention to Fort Donelson. On Feb. 13 the Carondelet was sent to demonstrate to demonstrate in front of the fort to prevent the arrival of enemy reinforcements. The ironclad simply dropped anchor three miles from the fort and fired about a dozen rounds. [58] Grant ordered the Carondelet to return the next day and bombard the fort more vigorously with its bow guns, partly to unmask the batteries and partly to cover Union infantry activity on land. Unlike the day before, this time the Carondelet’s fire was too accurate to ignore and the opposing artillerymen began to trade fire. The fort’s Columbiad was the first to draw blood and hit the corner of the broadside casemate on the port side, ricocheted inside the ironclad and destroyed a steam-heater. A Union gun replied and killed the officer commanding the Columbiad’s gun crew and temporarily put the Confederate gun out of service. Though fire continued on both sides, nothing else memorable happened that day. The main assault was delivered at 3:00 pm on the Feb. 14 by the ironclads, the St. Louis, Louisville, Carondelet and the Pittsburgh, supported by two timberclads, the Tyler and Conestoga. As during the attack against Fort Henry, the armored gunboats were in the first line with the timberclads following a thousand yards to the rear, the whole moving at a “moderate speed.” [59] The defenders quickly became aware of the impending attack. As the ironclads’ slowly approached large billows of smoke could be seen from miles away and the Confederate Columbiad started to shell the still invisible Union naval transports that initially accompanied the attacking naval force. The armored gunboats appeared around a bend and when they had approached to within a mile and half the fort’s rifled gun began to fire solid shot, ricocheting off the water to improve the chances of hitting the target and causing damage near the waterline. The rifled gun quickly jammed and only Columbiad could fire until the gunboats entered the range of the Confederate 32-pounders. [60] The Union flagship, the St. Louis, was the first to return fire by lobbing conical shells on the fort. It was soon joined by the other three ironclads and then the timberclads. Once again, the Union ironclads were forced to crowd together and were only able to use their bow guns. Thus, it was a duel between the 12 guns on the gunboats versus the ten in Fort Donelson. [61] The pace of firing quickened. The Union vessels were only able to close within 300-400 yards. If they approached any closer they would not be able to elevate their guns enough to reach the top most battery in the fort. Unlike Fort Henry, which was unwisely situated almost at river level, Fort Donelson was positioned atop bluffs that loomed 120 feet above river level. Its artillery was organized into three batteries. The first was positioned about 20 feet above the river, the second at the fifty-foot level, while the third was in the fort itself at the top of the bluffs. The Fort with its advantage of height had the advantage, however, and the guns along the two upper batteries were able to deliver a deadly plunging fire able to easily pierce the ironclads’ thin top armor. During the vicious fighting the St. Louis, for example, was hit 59 times, while the Louisville suffered similar damage. To make matters worse, some of the shells fired from the timberclads fell short and exploded very near and occasionally on the gunboats in front of them. [62] Much of the Confederate’s fire was directed towards the Carondelet, which had so annoyed the Confederate gunners during its previous two forays. The fort’s Columbiad severed the vessel’s anchor and destroyed part of its smoke stack. Other shots gradually weakened its armor. A pilot was mortally wounded when the pilothouse was hit and a little latter number sailors and gunners were wounded when a shell from a rifled gun exploded on the port side. The brave Carondelet continued to fire, but the odds against it only worsened as the other gunboats dropped out of the fight and all three defending batteries concentrated on the sole Union gunboat left in the fight. Out of desperation, the Carondelet continued to fire, not out of any hope of inflicting any damage on the fort, but to enshroud itself in large, thick pall of smoke. Soon, even this determined vessel had to give up the fight and Grant was left to take Fort Donelson either by bloody escalade or a formal siege. Examining the Carondelet after the fight, it was observed that the vessel had taken hits hit “between wind and water.” The rather inglorious outcome of the federal ironclad attack on Fort Donelson was no anomaly. It seems that the original prediction that ironclads could not successfully overpower land based fortifications, provided these were competently constructed and adequately manned, proved true enough. True, Flag-officer Foote’s assault against Fort Henry did succeed, but this had more to do the idiocy of the southern engineers who disregarded all military scientific principles when they constructed the defenses very near river level, so that the full brunt of Union naval firepower could be brought against them. Fort Donelson with its three levels of batteries proved an entirely different matter. The Union gunboats were unable to sufficiently elevate their artillery against the top defensive battery at very close range, while it and the middle battery were able to fire deadly plunging fire against the roof of the Union ironclads, just where their defensive armor was the thinnest. This would be a problem that would reoccur during the war. Although Porter’s attack against Fort Hindman would later be cited as a successful attack of ironclads against river fortification, in his memoirs Daniel Webster paints a very different picture. Although Fort Hindman was only 25 feet above the water, its powerful two 8” guns in casemates and a 9” gun en barbette were able to embarrass Porter’s gunboat (ironclads) flotilla. It was only when Webster’s land based guns silenced first the 8” guns and then their 9” companion that the ironclads were able to pound the fort into submission. [63] Regardless of the difficulty often experienced with land-based fortifications, the ironclad represented a tremendous improvement over the wooden man-of-war. Praise for the U.S.S. Monitor and the C.S.S. Virginia immediately appeared in the American and European press. Though the role of the Stevens family and Cowper Coles was generally acknowledged at the time, unfortunately, cronyism ultimately prevailed and in the decades following the war gradually Ericsson was mistakenly viewed as the creator of this class of vessel. FOOTNOTES [1] Citing “A Man of War,” C. N. Robinson, The Graphic, Feb. 10, 1894, in Scientific American – New Series (henceforth abbreviated SA-NS), New York, Vol. LXX, no. 7, April 28, 1894, p. 260. [2] Dupuy, R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History, Second revised edition, New York, 1986, p. 464; Greene, Jack, Ironclads at War; The Origin and Development of the Armored Warship, 1854 – 1891, Conshohocken, Pa, 1998, p. 16. [3] Army and Navy Journal, New York, Vol. I, no. 20, Jan. 9 1864, p. 306. [4] Atlantic Monthly, New York, Vol., VIII, No. 46, p. 227. [5] SA-NS, Vol. VII, no. 21, May 24, 1862, p. 328. [6] Tucker, Spencer C., The Stevens Ironclad Battery, American Neptune, Salem, Mass., Vol. 51, #1 (Winter, 1991), p. 13. [7] United Service Magazine, London, p. 211, excerpting Sir Howard Douglas’ Treatise on Naval Gunnery. [8] Gardiner, Robert (editor), Steam, Steel & Shellfire: The Steam Warship 1815-1905, Annapolis, 1992, p. 51; citing Samuel Eliot Morison Old Bruin: Commodore Matthew C. Perry, Boston, 1967, p. 129. [9] Serial Set, House Report, #448, 2nd session, 27th congress, p. 10. [10] SA-NS , Vol. VIII, no. 6, Feb 7, 1863, p. 81; Tucker, pp. 13-14. [11] Tucker, pp. 14-16. [12] SA-NS, Vol. V, No 9, (Aug. 31, 1861) p. 129. [13] Osbon, George A., The Crimean Gunboats (Part I), The Mariner’s Mirror, Vol. 51, No. 3, London, 1965, p. 189. [14] Greenhill, Basil and Ann Gifford, The British Assault on Finland: 1854-1855, London, 1988, pp. 301-303. [15] Tyrrell, Henry, History of the War with Russia, London, circa 1858, p. 311; Greenhill, p. 305. [16] Greenhill, p. 305. [17] Greene, p. 31; Blackwood’s New York Mirror, Vol. 88, no, 541, p. 622. [18] Chesneau, Roger, & Kolesnik, Eugene M. (editors), Conway, Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, London, 1979, p. 286. [19] Coles, Cowper P (Capt. R.N.), Shot-Proof Gun Shields as adapted to Iron-Cased Ships, Journal of the United Service Institute, 1860, pp. 280-281. [20] Coles, pp. 280-281. [21] Journal of the Franklin Institution, Vol. XLII, Dec. 1861 3rd Series, #6, pp. 369-382, describing “A Proposal for a Class of Gunboats capable of engaging Armour-plated ships at sea, accompanied with Suggestions on Armour-Plates” in Proceedings from the British Association in the London Athenæum, Sept. 1861. [22] SA-NS, Vol. IV, no. 3, Jan. 19, 1861, p. 37; These are canonnières nos. 1-5 & 11 cited in Conway’s p. 285. [23] SA, Vol. 4, no 15, XV, April 13, 1861. p. 235. [24] Reed, Rowena, Combined Operations in the Civil War, Annapolis, 1978, pp. 5- 6, 389. [25] SA-NS, Vol. IV, no. 3, Jan. 19, 1861, p. 41. [26] Blackwood’s New York Mirror, New York, Nov. & Dec. 1860, pp. 616- 632 & 633-49; March 1861, pp. 304-317. [27] Military Gazette, Albany, N.Y., Vol. II, No. 5, March 1, 1859, p. 69. [28] The World: Morning Courier and New York Enquirer, Friday, July 16, p. 4. [29] SA-NS, Vol. V, no. 9, Aug. 31, 1861, p. 132. [30] The Congressional Globe, Washington City, 1861, 37th Congress, 1st Session, p. 210. [31] Soley, James, Battles and Leaders (henceforth abbrev. B&L), Secaucus, N.J., c. 1992, Vol. I, pp. 616. [32] The Congressional Globe, 1861, 37th Congress, 1st Session, p. 256. [33] Ericsson himself used the term “floating battery” to refer to this vessel as late as 20 1862 when writing to the Secretary of the Navy, Ericsson, John, B&L, Vol. I, p. 731. [34] Soley, B&L, Vol. I, pp. 616-618. [35] Wheeler, B. Francis, The First Monitor and its Builders, Poughkeepsie, NY, 1884; pp. 4-6. [36] A hand written note in the margin seemingly written by an expert reader per sonally associated with the project says Novelty Iron Works. [37] Dorr, Eben P., A Brief Sketch of the First Monitor and its Inventor, Second Edition, Buffalo, NY, 1874, pp. 7-10. [38] Manufacturer and Farmer’s Journal, Pawtucket, RI, Feb. 18, 1861 Vol. XI, #14, p. 1. [39] Manufacturer and Farmer’s Journal: June 6, 1861 Vol. XL, #45 p. 1. [40] Manufacturer and Farmer’s Journal: July 15, 1861 Vol. XI, #56 p. 1, p. 2; Sept 26/61, Vol. XL, #77; p. 1; Aug 12/61 Vol. XL, #63; p. 1. [41] Porter, John L.; B&L, Vol. I, p. 717. [42] Frank Leslie’s, New York, Feb. 9, 1861, p. 189. [43] Brooke, John; B&L, Vol. I, pp. 715-716. [44] Porter B&L, Vol. I, p. 717. [45] Martin, Charles, Personal Reminiscences of the Monitor and Merrimac Engagement, New York, 1886, pp. 4-5. [46] Reaney, Henry; B&L, Vol. I, p. 714. [47] Butts, Francis B., Monitor versus the Merrimac, Personal Narratives of the Events in the War, ser. 4, no. 6, Providence, RI, 1890, p. 26. [48] Cannon Le G. B., Recollections of the Iron Clads, Monitor and Merrimack, Burlington, Va., 1875, pp. 8-9. [49] Wood; John, B&L I, pp. 702. [50] Monitor versus the Merrimac, p. 26. [51] Wood; B&L, Vol. I, pp. 700-702. [52] Greene, Dana; B&L I, pp. 723-725. [53] Wood; B&L, I, pp. 703 & 710. [54] Gosnell, H. Allen, Guns on the Western Waters, Baton Rouge, La., 1949, p. 49, citing James Laning excerpted in Walke’s Naval Scenes and Reminiscences [55] Gosnell, p. 51, citing Walke’s Naval Scenes and Reminiscences. [56] Taylor, Jesse; B&L, Vol. I, p. 369. [57] The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and the Confederate Armies (Henceforth, abbreviated “OR”), 128 volumes, Washington, 1880-1891, Series I, Vol. I 7, pp. 125, 136. [58] Gosnell, p. 59, quoting Lt. H.L. Bedford, Vol. XIII, Southern Historical Society Papers. [59] Walke, Henry, B&L, Vol. I, p. 433. [60] Gosnell, p. 65 citing Lt. H.L. Bedford, Vol. XIII, Southern Historical Society Papers. [61] Gosnell, p. 66 citing Lt. Bedford. [62] OR I 7, p. 166; Coombe, Jack D., Thunder Along the Mississippi, New York, 1996, p. 67. [63] Webster, Dan and Don C. Cameron, History of the First Wisconsin Battery of Light Artillery, Washington D.C., 1907, pp. 111-120. Ironclads Their Development and Use During the Civil War Introduction and Background The Monitor The C.S.S. Virginia The C.S.S. Virginia versus the U.S.S. Monitor The Attack of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson Gaming ACW Naval Actions Back to Table of Contents -- Courier # 89 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2003 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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