The first examples of wooden ships protected by iron can be found in the late 1500s - early 1600s. To defend Antwerp against Duke of Parma, in 1585 the Dutch built on the Scheldt River a large flat bottom ship with heavy iron plates on its sides. [1] The Korean admiral Yi Sung Sin had a “tortoise ship” constructed in 1592. [2] While exploring Japan in 1613, William Adam noticed a huge Noah’s ark-like monstrosity a on his way to Osaka. The homely 800-1000 ton armored vessel was used to quash any would be insurrections on the outlying Japanese islands. [3] These iron-protected vessels, however, were anomalies and failed to establish any intellectual precedent. In 1810, Captain Jacques Montgery proposed French men-of-war covered with 4-inch iron plates, but disillusioned with his navy after the catastrophe at Trafalgar, Napoleon vetoed the plan. [4] Thus, Col. Henri Paixhans and the Stevens family of Hoboken, New Jersey, were the first to systematically experiment with the iron protected wooden ships. Col. John Stevens, who had built the first ocean going steamship in 1808, in 1812 proposed a saucer-shaped, propeller-driven “harbor-defense” vessel. The propellers allowed the ship to quickly change direction and its relatively low profile meant it would be hard to hit. On March 17, 1814, Thomas Gregg was issued a patent for an iron-protected ship that Scientific American later described as an “almost exact model of the Merrimac.” Its sides angled at 18 degrees were covered with iron plate and its sharp, iron prow was to serve as a ram. [5] The 1820s saw more limited experimentation with proto-ironclads. The Stevens continued their experiments, but the United States government saw little need for such vessels and rejected all of John Stevens’ proposals. [6] In France, Colonel Paixhans’, the inventor of the shell gun, turned his attention to iron-protected warships, which he described in his Nouvelle Force Maritime (1821). The French Comité Consultatif de la Marine carefully considered the famed artillery engineer’s proposal but concluded that although it was possible to cover a large man–of–war with iron plate, because of the weight it could carry only a few guns, a completely unacceptable condition. [7] Although in 1827 the British naval commander Charles Napier urged the Duke of Clarence to protect the boilers and engines of the steamship Dee with iron plates and in the US a decade later Captain Matthew Perry advanced the same argument for the Fulton II [8], interest in iron armor appears to have subsided for a few years. The Navy’s reluctance to consider the Stevens’ innovations (by this point, the family’s design initiatives had been taken over John Stevens’ two sons, Robert and Edwin) softened in the early 1840s as a perceived European threat intensified. A French fleet captured San Juan d’Ulloa castle in 1838 and the construction of a British naval base in Bermuda seemed to presage war in 1841-42. The Department of the Navy looked for means to prevent a foreign fleet from attacking American coastal cities. It was generally accepted that fixed defenses could not resist a large enemy fleet indefinitely. Wide harbors in particular had to be bolstered by moveable batteries. In theory, these could be small, mobile gunboats, with one or two guns apiece. These, like fleas on a dog, could pester the enemy men-at-war while shore batteries inflicted more serious damage. Unfortunately, these small gunboats could not operate in stormy weather since they were easily scattered. “Floating batteries” protected by massive wooden bulwarks could be placed at critical points in the harbor, but those strong enough to withstand heavy shot were necessarily clumsy and easily outmaneuvered. Even worse, the explosive shells hurled by the new Paixhans shell guns would soon ignite the wood. [9] The Stevens had continued their long string of experiments and finally managed to impress President Tyler’s administration and on January 13, 1842 Congress authorized a $600,000 contract to complete the project. [10] By 1842, the Committee of Naval Affairs concluded that a steam powered, iron protected floating battery was the best solution and awarded Stevens a contract in February the next year. The 900-horsepower vessel was to be 250-foot long with a 40-beam (the width at the widest point) and all surfaces above the water were to be protected by 4.5-inch iron plates sloped at a 45-degree angle to deflect shot as much as possible. [11] It was to be equipped with several heavy large wrought-iron guns. [12] The Stevens design exceeded the technological capabilities of the day and quickly ran into difficulties and delays. However, another event would doom the project. About a year into the project, John Ericsson introduced a heavy wrought iron 12-inch gun. The Stevens realized that the 4 1/2-inch plates they intended to use were not proof against Ericsson’s new gun and in violation of the official contract and they decided to substitute 6 3/4-inch armor. Of course, this forced a complete redesign and threw the project hopelessly behind schedule and eventually forced it to be abandoned. Most Civil War historians have overlooked the significance of the Stevens Floating Battery and the important role it played in the development of ironclads. Apparently, this has occurred because simply because of its designation as a “floating battery,” a term which by the second year of the Civil War had come to stand for floating gun platforms that did not have their own motive force. However, the term as used in the 1830s and 1840s did not yet imply this limitation. The Stevens’ never intended their “floating battery” to be a ponderous stationary gun platform. They purposely designed it to be faster than other ships than afloat, and especially suited for ship-to-ship fighting. But, after years of frustration, they had learned to be pragmatic, at least as far as terminology was concerned. The government could call their vessel a “floating battery,” as long as they were awarded a contract. Little Interest There was little official interest in iron–protected ships on either side of the Atlantic for the next nine years. The outbreak of war between Russian and Turkey quickly changed all this, however. Coming into the war, Britain and France realized that they would have to deal with Russian fortifications in the Baltic and Black Seas. During the Battle of the Sinope on Nov. 30, 1853, a Russian naval force completely destroyed a Turkish flotilla. The fate of a wooden-clad warship encountering a Paixhans-type shell gun became apparent to all. Napoleon III realized that Russian fortresses and vessels equipped with shell guns could destroy French ships with little effective response from the French fleet. In July 1854, the French hurriedly conducted experiments with 10-14 cm. iron plates supported by the wooden backing. These were found to withstand solid shot and explosive shell, even at close range. Encouraged, the French Minister of the Marine finally ordered 10 shallow draught, steam driven, armored “floating batteries” in July 1854. However, because of difficulty of construction, only five “floating batteries” were actually constructed: the Congreve, Devastation, Foudroyante, Lave and the Tonnante. [13] Armed with sixteen 60 pounders, these floating batteries had upper decks protected by 110-mm iron plate. Their submerged screw drives propelled them about six miles per hour. The next month, French authorities pressured its ally Great Britain into building five of its own “floating batteries.” These were but variations upon the French pattern. [14] On October 17, 1855 the French and British ironclad “floating batteries” along with the rest of the Anglo-French fleet, attacked Kinburn, a Russian fort on mouth of the Dnieper. The Devastation, Lave and Tonnant, proof against Russian artillery shells, slowly advanced to within 800 yards and opened fire. The Russian gunners responded vigorously. After fifteen minutes, the Allied mortar boats that had been advancing behind the ironclads joined in and the two sides exchanged fire. However, after about hour, a fire broke out in the Russian fort. The gunners abandoned their guns and the defenders had to surrender. The Allies’ confidence in their floating batteries was justified. One of the ironclads was struck 63 times, but all of these “broke against them [the iron plates] like glass.” [15] Soon after, Rear Admiral Lyons, Commander-in-Chief of the British Black Sea Fleet, prophesied to the First Sea Lord, “Floating batteries have become elements in amphibious warfare, so the sooner you set about having as many good ones as the French, the better it will be for you.” The admiralty responded by ordering four more floating batteries. [16] One other Crimean War proto-ironclad is worthy of mention. Captain Cowper Coles of the Royal Navy had also been impressed with the Russian shell guns at the Battle of Sinope. His solution was to create a raft-like floating battery armed with a 32-pounder he dubbed the “Lady Nancy.” Next, he proposed to construct vessels that from the outside looked like standard ships but the inside of which would be a number of empty mortar casks. A single 62-pounder would be housed in an iron turret protected by thick plates of iron sloped at 40 degrees that could rotate in a circle. A third of these rafts were to be steam powered and would tow the remainder. Projectiles, even 13-inch shells, which hit the hull between “wind and water,” could destroy a cask or two, but the remainder would keep the raft afloat. Although with the end of the Crimean War, Coles’ ideas were abandoned, the idea of covering wooden ships with a protective iron coating certainly was not. When the Italian War erupted in 1859, the floating batteries were mobilized and sent to northern Italy. They were to bombard Venice and Trieste but peace returned before this could be carried out. [17] The French also decided to construct La Gloire, a 250-foot “ironclad frigate” that was protected by 4.3-4.7-inch iron plates and carried 38 rifled 50-pounders. Its 900 horsepower engines allowed a maximum speed of 12 1/2 knots. [18] Of course, Britain immediately responded with its own program and quickly built thus the Warrior and Black Prince. The specter of a French invasion of the British coast once again raised its head and authorities looked to beef up coastal fortifications against the imaginary French threat. Cowper Coles advocated that the British Navy respond with its own shallow draft “iron-cased” vessels. Coles rejected the traditional ship design where the guns were placed “broadside.” Instead, one or two guns should be placed on a rotating platform to fire in a wide arc. This reduced the number of guns that vessel had to carry, but still insured that significant firepower could be brought to bear against the intended target. Building upon his raft designs he envisioned a much larger vessel with nine independent turrets each with two guns. Two turrets were staggered towards the bow and the stern, so that four guns at any given time could be fired, if need be, directly towards the bow or stern of the ship. The remaining five turrets were placed directly in a single line so that they could deliver a 10-gun broadside in either direction. [19] Given the unorthodoxy of Coles’ designs, the innovative designer was frequently censured in the press. Regardless of this criticism, historians should look seriously at Coles’ contribution to the development of the ironclad since there were a number of similarities with the Stevens’ earlier designs. Both used sloped armor and water to protect most of the vessel. Both also pumped water into tanks to reduce a ship’s profile on the water during combat. [20] The next contribution was made by a certain Doctor Eddy who in September 1861 lectured at the British Association in the London Athenæum. Eddy accepted most of the ideas embodied in the earlier Stevens and Coles’ designs. Again, most of the hull lay below the waterline. Above water, the topsides sloped to a central ridge providing a non-perpendicular target, so shot would ricochet harmlessly over their intended target. There were two important differences with earlier designs. The proposed armored gunboats were to sport a single rotating copula equipped with two Armstrong rifled artillery pieces spaced 4 1/2 feet apart. Eddy described the turret as a “conical fort” with sloped slides at a 45 degree-angle to deflect the incoming shots. Eddy argued these agile gunboats would be able easily to outmaneuver their much larger and more cumbersome adversaries and neutralize the latter’s otherwise overwhelming preponderance of armament. [21] Of course, this is exactly the idea Ericsson would embody in his own designs the following year. There is some evidence around the same time that French authorities also became interested in smaller armored vessels that would carry far fewer, but heavier, ordnance. French naval experiments demonstrated rather conclusively that the large multi-gunned traditional fighting ships could be overpowered by much smaller vessels armed with rifled guns firing shells. In 1860, the London Times reported that the French navy had ordered the construction of a number of tortoise-shaped armored gun-boats, one of which was observed traveling from Bordeaux to Toulon in January the next year. The vessel which carried a single gun was made of steel plates and propelled by two screws driven by a 14-Horse Power engine: The mouth of the canon will just pass over the back of the fish, which will present an inclined plane to the enemy, over which the balls will slide. The crew will be completely sheltered under this roof, of which the force of resistance is so well calculated that the heaviest shot or shell cannot ignore it. [22] This French experiment was short-lived, however. The April 13, 1861 edition of Scientific American reported that the Emperor had canceled the further construction of this type of armored ship. [23] Ironclads at the Start of the War. Ironclads at the Start of the War On March 3, 1861, a few weeks before the start of the war, Winifred Scott, the veteran commander-in-chief, recommended implementation of the “Anaconda Plan,” a military operation designed to separate the eastern states of the confederacy from western food-growing states and possible European supplies. The Federal navy would blockade the Southern Atlantic coast and the Gulf of Mexico, while a series of fortified positions along the Ohio and the Mississippi Rivers from Louisville past Memphis, Vicksburg, and New Orleans were constructed. [24] The success of Scott’s plan was initially jeopardized by bureaucratic inertia. The government underestimated the scope of the upcoming struggle. The Navy failed to take even the most basic step of ordering the return of widely dispersed ships in the Foreign Fleet. To compound this complacency, the higher echelons of the Department of the Navy were also very conservative, unwilling to look at the latest naval innovations. This attitude appears to be very much at odds with popular sentiment. Articles in magazines had touted the virtues of the new iron-protected ships. Scientific American applauded the recent British trials with the Warrior, an iron-protected frigate and concluded that “It appears…that such a frigate could walk through a entire fleet of wooden ships as easily as a life guardsman could cut his way through a regiment of pasteboard soldiers.” [25] Blackburne’s New York Mirror ran a 3-part series on the new more resilient ships and coined a new term: the “iron-clad vessel.” [26] [Up to then iron-protected vessels were called “mailed ships,” “iron plate ships,” “armored ships,” and sometimes just as “floating batteries.”] Not surprisingly, some remembered that there was a partially completed ironclad sitting in a Hoboken drydock. In February 1861, the New York Mirror appealed to authorities to complete of the Stevens’ floating battery. [27] On July 16, the New York Enquirer argued that had this vessel been available Sumter may not have fallen and asked its readers to urge Congress to take action. [28] Interest in this uncompleted vessel only intensified that summer when Scientific American in a feature article claimed that this floating battery from a technological point of view was still the most innovative design. Among the innovations cited was the use of water as armor, inclined or angled armor above the waterline, an iron hull, high steam, tubular-bridge framing, two screws for rapid turning, and link-motion and steam reverse gear. [29] The public uproar in early 1861 wasn’t simply posed by the rebellious southern states, once again the northern population felt threatened by the specter of a European invasion. The proliferation of European ironclads caused alarm and some like the American shipbuilder Donald Mackay claimed that Britain and France would have about twenty iron-cased naval vessels and could interrupt the intended naval blockade of the southern coast or even attack northern cities. One of his friends, E.H. Derby, began to implore Federal naval authorities and Congress to allocate funds to build iron-cased ships. [3] Welles, was very familiar with advances that had been made in Europe with ironclads and in his July 4 1861 report to Congress admitted: Much attention has been given within the last few years to the subject of floating batteries or iron-clad steamers. Other governments, and particularly France and England, have made it a special object in connection with naval improvements. Though recognizing their potential utility the Department of the Navy was concerned about expense and so the issue was brought before Congress in July. [31] Unfortunately, after successfully passing through the Senate, some of the representatives in the House remembered the money that had been squandered on the Stevens Floating Battery and the debate grew hot and acrimonious. Some members of Congress, in fact, wanted to amend the wording of the bill to allow funding to resurrect and complete the Stevens Battery, then in dry-dock in Hoboken, N.J. The resulting ballyhoo quashed this effort, and the matter was transferred to a committee to study the issue. [32] Ironclads Their Development and Use During the Civil War Introduction and Background The Monitor The C.S.S. Virginia The C.S.S. Virginia versus the U.S.S. Monitor The Attack of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson Gaming ACW Naval Actions Back to Table of Contents -- Courier # 89 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2003 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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