The work on combat tactics and grand tactics if mainly based, after careful corroboration with many other highly reliable sources, on the work of two French officers. The first book was authored by Lt.Colonel A. Aubier, La cavalerie napoléonienne peut-elle encore servir de modèle? (Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1902) i.e. Can Napoleonic Cavalry still serve as a model? and the second by General T. Bonie, La cavalerie au combat, (Baudoin & Cie, Paris 1887) i.e. Cavalry in Combat.
These two French cavalry officers were writing after the disastrous Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71. They investigated the French cavalry tactics and grand tactics of the Napoleonic period in great depth and made a synthesis of the principles difficult to find in the writings of the Napoleonic period.
Of course many other reliable sources were used among which is von Bismark Tactique de la Cavalerie, (i.e Cavalry Tactics), Commant L. Picard, La cavalerie dans les guerres de la Révolution et de l’Empire, i.e. The Cavalry during the Wars of the Revolution and of the Empire.
The fact is that during the Wars of the Empire, after the reforms introduced in 1803, the French cavalry was, in the historical sense, victorious over everyone it encountered on a tactical level above the regiment prior to 1813.
Of course there were individual instances of the French cavalry being beaten by other cavalry but in most major engagements, the French tactical and grand tactical concepts appear to have been the decisive factor giving their cavalry the victory.
During the Campaign of 1805, the French cavalry besides performing the screening of the Grande Armée; the capture of strategic crossings and objectives; decisively defeated the Austrian and Russian cavalries at Austerlitz.
The highly regarded Prussian cavalry, although it was not engaged on a large scale, did not fare any better during the fulgurant Campaign of 1806 as it was completely incapable of holding back the French Cavalry pursuit after the twin battles of Jena-Auerstädt.
The Russian cavalry was again defeated during the Campaign of 1807 in Poland at Friedland and Eylau.
According to George Nafziger, “Only the British seemed to have been able to beat the French cavalry in individual regimental engagements, but they regularly threw away their victories by charging off like a band of fox hunters. Once they broke their pursuit the more organized French regularly used their reserves to slaughter them. This occurred most notably at Waterloo when the French cavalry practically destroyed the blown Union Brigade..”
Even during the Campaigns of 1813 and 1814, after the practical destruction of the original French cavalry arm during the retreat from Russia, the quickly resurrected French Cavalry was capable of decent performances - when numerous enough - apparently much above what logically could be expected from an ill trained rabble of recruits, in many cases, barely able to ride a horse.
There is a famous quotation from Duke of Wellington supporting that statement:
“…I consider one of our squadrons a match for two French, yet I did not care to see four British opposed to four French, and still more so as the number increased….”
“They (the British) could gallop, but could not preserve their order….”
So, what were the reasons for the French cavalry superiority above the regimental level?
Brigade or Division Charges
One of most important factors, if the not the key factor, is that the French cavalry of the Empire, especially the heavy cavalry, was trained to operate in formations larger than a regiment. This was a decisive advantage over the cavalry of most other nations that were not. (And that is a fact many wargamers refuse to accept: all cavalries were not equal!) In addition very simple, precise and uniform tactical and grand tactical principles were applied.
The key elements of the decisive cavalry charges optimized by Seidlitz during the Seven Years had been forgotten since only exceptionally do we find these types of charges during the Wars of the French Revolution.
Very precisely, a pro-Austrian author, L.A. Unger, in Histoire critique des exploits et vicissitude de la cavalerie pendant les guerres de la Révolution et de l’Empire jusqu’à l’armistice du 4 juin 1813, Paris, 1848 (which translates as Critical History of the Achievements and Vicissitudes of Cavalry During the Wars of the Revolution and of the Empire Until the Armistice of 4 June 1813) points out that the Allies (especially the Austrians) had, during the Wars of the French Revolution, a numerous cavalry which outnumbered the French cavalry. However, that Allied cavalry was seldom concentrated in large formations but more or less scattered among various infantry formations and hence was more or less relegated to a support role for the infantry.
Before we go any further we should define tactics and grand tactics as we use the terminology in what follows. Tactics are applied to the movements and actions performed at the squadron, regimental or brigade level, while grand tactics refer to maneuver and coordination of larger formation like that of Divisions and Corps.
The French cavalry tactics were really very simple, ignoring all complicated and subtle maneuvers. They operated according to a simple general principle that overrode everything else. The charge was to be carried out as all an out attack, and carried on quickly and carried home.
To obtain the necessary speed to efficiently carry an attack, to constantly achieve tactical surprise and hence to dominate the enemy, the French cavalry grand masters based their actions on two principles:
2. All the changes of formation and movements were carried out by simple procedures to be easily understood, without possible errors and without hesitation in the execution. Timing and speed of execution were an essential ingredient to success. Seconds were important for the stunning impact of the cavalry, since, if it became necessary to repeat an order, the decisive action may have been delayed and the opportunity to strike may have disappeared as well as the supreme advantage of attacking first.
The French cavalry commanders during the Empire always applied the first principle in its entirety. They were always at the forefront of the action hence controlling as much as possible the evolution of the combat. They were the ones to decide the numbers to be engaged, the maneuver to follow to quickly take advantage of the enemy weak spot or to face its threat. That authority was shared with no one else, and the subordinate commanders had only to execute their orders with dexterity. These simple actions could be carried out by even the less capable officers and very average troopers. The means used to put into practice the combat mechanism were also simple:
2. Combat Formation: The standard combat formation for a brigade or a Division was the deployment on 2 lines. The first line was to deliver the attack and the second was acting as the reserve. The two lines were located either one behind the other or in over-lapping echelons. When the Division included 3 brigades, 2 brigades were placed on the first line and the 3rd on the second line. By the same token, with a brigade with 3 regiments, 2 were placed on the first line and the 3rd on the second line.
3. The Charge: The mission of the first line was the simplest; it was to charge - and usually straight ahead. The charge was always carried out deployed in line (or in echelon) but not necessarily with the full line. Most of the time, the enemy was probed with a regiment or a brigade, and the commander who had all his forces ready at hand would evaluate - before launching a new echelon—the result obtained by the first one. That was done in order to engage only the necessary units to defeat the enemy. Hence, the order given to the attacking force was very clear: “Here is the objective to strike, charge home without worrying about your flanks and run over everything.” Only one objective was assigned: strike the enemy like lightning and break it!
4. If the first fraction was repulsed it fell back and reformed behind the other lines.
5. Then, a second one was launched, and if that one was also repulsed, (it also reformed behind the other lines) then the commander himself would strike. Such an instance took place at the combat of Hoff. It was confirmed by Murat’s report:
“The cuirassier regiment launched first was repulsed as well as Colbert’s brigade, but I was there; I vigorously charged forward with the Division and everything was run over. The reason for the charge boiled down to: “Fall on the enemy like lightning and break him!”
6. The Second Line: The second line was the reserve and, as seen above, was to assist the first line, and, on occasions, prevents flank attacks and be ready to pursue the defeated enemy. That reserve followed the first line to a certain distance to assist it without risking to be thrown back if the first line was repulsed. The distance between the first and second line was 200 to 250 paces.
7. Rallying and Reforming: After the charge—victorious or defeated—the cavalry fell back to the rear as quickly as possible to reform on 2 lines so to be in a position to quickly renew an attack. There are three extremely important points to keep in mind:
When one accept these 3 fundamental points everything becomes clear and easy to understand.
So were the tactical and grand tactical methods of fighting for an isolated cavalry brigade or Division. Such a cavalry force had most of the time infantry as a support, and could rally if necessary behind it
At Austerlitz, Kellermann’s cavalry reformed behind Lannes’ infantry in the initial stage of the cavalry battle on the north part of the battlefield.
If no infantry was present the rallying and reforming was done under the protection of cavalry support. In a large battle, it was relatively rare to engage on a decisive point such relatively small forces. Preferably larger forces were used in such cases.
What was the origin of such tactics? They were the result of years of warfare. Commandant L. Picard in his La cavalerie dans les guerres de la Revolution et de l’Empire (i.e. The Cavalry during the Wars of the Revolution and of the Empire) gives us the answer in Volume 1 of his work, p. 104:
“On August 9, 1796, Gouvion-Saint-Cyr desiring to clear the battlefield of an Austrian Chevau-légers (that of Löwenher), recently arrived from Poland was posted near our outposts and menaced to surprise them, used for that purpose the 2nd Chasseurs à Cheval and the 2nd Cavalry. The 2nd Chasseurs debouched in the plain and surprised the grand guard of the Chevau-légers, which, pushed, decided to face their enemy and charged vigorously. At that point, we were waiting for them; the 2nd Chasseurs turned around and rallied behind the 2nd Cavalry which, charging en muraille (i.e. boot to boot) routed the Chevau-légers which had been disorganized by their charge. They were dispersed and the reformed 2nd Chasseurs pursued them and captured a great number of them, while the 2nd Cavalry reformed completely undisturbed.”
This example is one instance among hundreds of others of a cavalry formation, which after repulsing a first line, is defeated due to the disorder resulting of a successful charge by a second formed enemy line.
Picard was right. There are numerous similar combats reports from several source reporting similar instances. One of them is in Parquin, pp. 91-92:
“When I recall 6 May 1809, a day for ever glorious in the annals of the 20th Chasseurs, I should not forget to mention the part played by the 7th Chasseurs. These two regiments from the same brigade were in the most friendly of terms with each other and supported each other wholeheartedly on the battlefield. When the uhlans were joined by the Barko Hussars they turned about and returned to the attack. This was a critical moment for the 20th who were engaged on all sides and whose only line of retreat was across a small bridge. Colonel Castex and the officers, taking no heed for their own safety, charged headlong against the enemy, thus giving the brave 7th the time to arrive and the 20th time to rally.”
In the mist of this mêlée Colonel Castex exhorted his men with words which still rings in my ears:‘Rally around me men, or you will lose the fruits of the finest charge ever made.’
None too soon, Hulot, a young and fearless major of the 7th Chasseurs, arrived with his men. The troops commanded by Salmon and Paravay, followed him across the bridge, and charged headlong against the enemy, battering the ground, cutting down and running through anyone on the path of their terrible charge. Then the 20th returned to the attack and the rout of the enemy was complete.” Picard’s remark is to the point. So is that of Castex.
Once more the key points were: A charge and a mêlée always disorganized a cavalry units, and if it did not reform, it is always defeated by an ordered enemy. In larger formations the principles remained the same.
When in a larger battle a decisive blow was planned against the enemy, several Cavalry Divisions were concentrated as per the above principles, and basically still deployed as par the 2 or more lines principle. All that mass of cavalry was under a single command (usually Murat), each echelon flanking the other.
1. The Deployment: The cavalry was deployed in several groups of lines. The first group included a Division deployed on 2 lines. Behind it, or on one of the flanks, we find a second group also including a Division also deployed in two lines. Then a third group with a third Division, behind the first (or second) group also on two lines.
That third group could also be deployed on the other flank. Finally, a fourth Division, if it was available, was deployed behind that large formation also on 2 lines. So in such an instance, the cavalry cold often be deployed in 4, 6 or 8 successive groups of lines depending on the number of units concentrated.
2. The Charge: Except in exceptional cases like a Eylau, Ratisbonne, Waterloo, etc. where the charges were made in columns for lack of space, the usual combat took place as it follows:
The first group carried on the attack, and, if successful, started to pursue the enemy supported by the other group at proper distances. If the first group was repulsed, the second group moved forward to reestablish contact with the enemy and allow the first group to fall back to the rear to reform on two lines. If the second group was not sufficient, the third group intervened, and finally the fourth one, so each defeated echelon could in turn, fall back to the rear and reform on two lines to renew the attack if necessary. So the combat took place as a series of efforts, each line still under the control of a single commander. When the mass of cavalry reached 3 or 4 Divisions, the Emperor gave the command of that de facto corps to a commander of his own choosing, but the combat still took place by the principles outlined above.
We have outlined the principles by which the cavalry charges were carried out at the brigade, Divisions, Corps and groups of Corps. Now, let us see how some simple formations allowed breaks through, deployments, flank attacks, the means to counter that of the enemy and finally the rallying.
An Example of Large Scale Cavalry Combat
Eckmühl is known as the Moonlit combat. It was one of the 1809 Campaign largest cavalry confrontations. It included the Cuirassiers brigade of the Austrian Second Reserve Corps. While the Austrian Cuirassiers had been lightly engaged during the day, the Light Cavalry had been badly diminished by heavy fighting.
The Austrians deployed on the top of a gentle rise some 6 squadrons of Gottescheim Cuirassiers in the first line with 8 squadrons of Stipcisz Hussars and 2 weak squadrons of Ferdinand Hussars on their left. The Austrian 2nd line of 6 squadrons of Kaiser Cuirassiers with on their left 8 squadrons of Vincent’s Chevau-Légers.
At 7PM, the French began to debouch from the direction of Eckmühl. They were under the command of Nansouty. The French commander was the man who said to Napoleon:
“It is not your Majesty at any rate who can teach me to lead cavalry!”
A regiment of Carabiniers flanked by 2 regiments of Cuirassiers formed the first line. The remainder of Nansouty Division formed the second supporting line. Saint-Sulpice’s Cuirassiers stood in a mass of columns on the 3rd line. Some 26 German allied Light Cavalry squadrons supported the right.
A single Austrian regiment advanced: the Gottescheim Cuirassiers advanced. The French first line advanced at a walk, the second line following at regulation distance. At, 40 paces, the Carabiniers fired a volley, drew sabers and charged while on both flanks the Cuirassiers received the order: “Squadron! Trot! March!”
The more numerous French overlapped the Austrians. The galloping Austrians met the trotting Frenchmen. After a furious mêlée, the outflanked Austrian Cuirassiers broke to the rear. The Kaiser Cuirassiers and the Stipsicz Hussars charged into the confused fighting. The Kaiser Cuirassiers stabilized the situation along the front while the Hussars had some success against the disordered first French rank.
Before the Austrians could penetrate further the disorganized first French line, Nansouty’s second line surged forward and a second round of a furious mêlée took place.
During the struggle, Vincent’s Chevau-Légers maneuvered to take Nansouty’s entire Division in flank. However, Nansouty’s initial deployment had prepared for such a threat by a wise initial deployment and the Bavarian and Würtemberg Light Cavalry were in a position to counter charge the Austrian Chevau-Légers.
No less than 70 squadrons were now engaged in the struggle. The French Cuirassiers were able to push through the outnumbered Austrians.
The last Austrian reserve: 2 squadrons of Ferdinand Hussars charge into the fray. Protected by that last charge, the majority of the Austrians broke and fled. According to an Austrian eyewitness, the French Cuirassiers followed the Austrians who lost all cohesion dribbling casualties and prisoners.
Soon the all action - which had not lasted more than 10 minutes - ended before St. Sulpice Cuirassiers could be engaged in pursuit.
It was a very unusual and untypical cavalry combat in which the second lines engaged before the first lines could withdraw. The result was a confused struggle degenerating in individual combats in which the French Cuirassiers with their double cuirass had a clear advantage over the Austrians which only had a front cuirass. (The French claimed 300 prisoners and Pelet who saw the action said that the Austrians suffered 138 more killed and wounded than the French).
However, the combat shows us that disorganized Cuirassiers can be defeated by formed Hussars! Furthermore it also shows how important the initial deployment was. Nansouty had placed his Light Cavalry on its right flank to prevent possible flank attacks which did not fail to materialize.
It is difficult to estimated how much of a pursuit (if any) took place with the first and second line of Cuirassiers. The pursuit was certainly carried by St. Sulpice Cuirassiers and the reformed Light Cavalry. It lasted until 11PM and stopped near Ober-Traubling when the fresh Austrian Cuirassiers of the Albert regiment countercharged.
Battle Formations and Evolutions
In the majority of the cases, the cavalry commander, once the target had been selected had the time to decide what formation would be appropriate to attack the target.
Basically, the commander had the choice between 3 formations. The main and preferred attack formation was the line or a modified version of it, the attack in echelon. The Third attack formation was the column which was only used under special conditions. As we’ll see later keep in mind that a charge could be initiated as an open column and then changed to line.
For the breakthroughs and deployments, the squadrons moving forward had, most of the time, to go through the gaps between the friendly troops formations ahead of them. Thus, the cavalry had to reduce frontage by forming columns of platoons, then quickly re-deploying ahead into line to charge.
When it was necessary to move on the right or left of the line, the squadrons, also formed in columns of platoons. Then they had to reface and re-deploy forward by either successively moving left or right by platoon, or changing direction by the column heads and by a forward move to re-deploy into line.
During the Empire, (after Austerlitz) the change of front was seldom used as too slow and too complicated. Consequently, only a quarter or a half change of front were commonly used.
The deployment on 2 lines was pretty much the standard procedure used by all nations to deploy their cavalry. As mentioned above, the first line was the main battle line and the second line was the support and the reserve.
Flank Attacks
To counter a flank attack, the maneuver was very simple and consisted in moving the second line (or part of it) in good order, forward straight ahead. Consequently, that was now the turn of the enemy to be taken in flank, which was often disorganized and at a disadvantage because in order to make its flank attack, it had to make some successive quarter-wheels.
Flank attacks were made against the enemy to either relieve a threatened or defeated friendly line or to carry an attack on several points at the same time. In the first case, i.e. to relieve a threatened or defeated friendly line, a flank attack was almost always successful since it was carried on an enemy disorganized unit with horses tired by the prior combat and taken in flank or in the back by fresh cavalry. In the second case, it was a different story. Success was doubtful as it was practically impossible to take the enemy in flank by breaking through its center line.
Such a maneuver could not be carried out successfully 99% of the time. That last type of flank attack had for main objective to confuse and disturb the enemy by attacking it on several points.
Rallying
After a charge, the rallying was carried on as per the following principles:
2. If the enemy had been defeated, rallying was carried on the most forward group and the pursuit actively carried on by the formed second line (reserve) supported in turn, if necessary, by the reformed, victorious echelon.
Quick rallying was considered quite rightly as a very important maneuver since a cavalry formation victorious or defeated, regained only its striking power after reforming its lines broken after the impact, and brought back under the control of its commander. The battle reports (by reliable sources) of the period prove that the cavalry squadrons were well versed in quick rallying.
In short, the combats, evolutions and tactics used by the French Imperial cavalry were so easy and simple that they could be carried out with horses relatively average training and of lesser blood and with horsemen of mediocre abilities.
The irrefutable proof is given by the great cavalry battles carried on by the poorly trained French cavalry in 1813, and 1814.
At that time the French cavalry was facing the well mounted European cavalries with many veteran horsemen in their ranks. On the other side, the French cavalry, after it had been practically annihilated as a fighting force by the huge losses of the retreat from Russia, was in the process of reforming. Hence, practically, with the exception of that of the Guard and few units called back from Spain, the “new cavalry” had only conscripts in its ranks, but in spite of that consistently defeated the enemy squadrons in most combats.
The secret of these successes is easily explained. The speed and the audacity on the attack were the two main factors. To obtain the speed the illustrious cavalry commanders had understood that only the simplest movements had to be used to be understood without errors and lost of time.
At COLDWARS 2001, when we presented a somewhat different version of the present paper, some attendees had difficulty accepting these facts. Furthermore some attendees had a hard time in believing that the Allies did not practice with units larger than the regiment, i.e. large brigade or Division formations as the French did. And that alone gave the French a huge advantage in large combats. See the famous Wellington statement on the first page of this article.
The most difficult point in our lecture was to convince wargamers not to pursue the defeated enemy with disorganized victorious cavalry, it was simply not done by the French cavalry.
After a charge and a combat, the victorious cavalry was disorganized and more or less in open order. If disorganized cavalry - in open ranks - was engaged by formed cavalry, it was practically always defeated. That was the reason for yhe victorious French cavalry not pursuing a defeated enemy but letting the formed second line to do so.
Training Of The Chevau-Legere With The Cuirassiers
The decree fixing the training of the Chevau-Légers-Lancers with the Cuirassiers is dated February 15, 1812 and was initiated on Napoleon’s orders. We are going to cover only the critical points of the decree:
Article 2: The musketoon shall have a bayonet….
Articles 3, 4, 5, 6,7: These cover the training of the Cuirassiers on foot according to the Provisional Ordinance (Ordonnance Provisoire) of the Year 13, applicable to the Light Cavalry.
Article 8: The Chevau-Légers-Lancers shall be trained to use their musketoon with the bayonet as per the Ordinance of the Year 13.
Article 9: Chevau-Légers-Lancers shall be trained to handling of the lance as per the Ordinance for Lancers dated September 24, 1811.
Article 10: The Chevau-Légers-Lancers shall have only on e pistol….
Articles 11, 12: These deal with other training details.
Article 13: Specifically deals with combat on foot. The other articles deal with the service of both Chevau-Légers-Lanciers and Cuirassiers when brigaded together. The main points are:
Article 15, 16: These specify that they can not be used in detachments, vanguard, escort and the like.
Article 17: When on the move they shall not be sent as scouts, flankers or skirmishers.
Article 18: During the charges by Divisions, brigades or regiments, they shall never disperse themselves or pursue the defeated enemy, unless it is routed infantry far away from the support from its cavalry.
Article 19: As soon as the enemy is broken and the success of the charge assured, the Cuirassiers shall stop and leave the pursuit to the Chevau-Légers-Lanciers. … the Cuirassiers are to reform … to assure another orderly charge if necessary…
Article 20: Grand Guards, scouting, detachments, escorts shall only be made by the Chevau-Légers-Lanciers. Other recommendations are stipulated in the remaining 11 articles of the Ordnance and too numerous to be considered here.
Aubier, Lt. Colonel A. La cavalerie napoléonienne peut-elle encore servir de modèle?, Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1902.
French Cavalry Reforms: 1803 [Courier 87]
Our assessment of the Napoleonic cavalry tactics and grand tactics is the result of years of research to be included in a massive work on the French Cavalry during the Wars of the French Revolution and of the Empire that we have been working on for many years and is now - finally - near completion.
COMBAT TACTICS AND GRAND TACTICS
1. All available forces were concentrated and placed under a single direct command so the cavalry commander could instantly draw and strike very quickly the assigned objective with the maximum possible strength.
1. In Awaiting Position: The cavalry adopted a formation per regiment en masse (in mass) i.e. in close column by deploying squadrons one behind the other.
1. Cavalry after a charge or mêlée was disorganized.
2. Disorganized cavalry was always defeated by formed cavalry
3. After a charge and/or a mêlée the victorious cavalry did not pursue the defeated enemy but fell back to reform! Cavalry Forces Larger Than The Brigade or Division
ECKMÜHL
CAVALRY MANEUVERS AND EVOLUTIONS
1. If defeated the squadrons fall back quickly to the rear behind the support or reserve (infantry or cavalry) to quickly reform on two lines with minimum delay, ready to move forward to resume the attack if necessary.
CONCLUSION
Article 1: The Cuirassiers shall carry the musketoon….
Article 14: The Divisions, brigades or regiments of Cuirassiers shall be kept in mass (i.e. concentrated for mass action and not dispersed in small detachments, JAL)
Sources
Bonie, General T. La cavalerie au combat, Baudoin & Cie, Paris 1887.
Bismark, Comte von Bismark, Tactique de la cavalerie, Levrault, Paris 1821.
De Brack, Avant postes de cavalerie légère, Paris, date unknown.
Chandler, David The Campaigns of Napoleon, Macmillan, N.Y. 1966.
Nafziger, George, A Guide to Napoleonic Warfare, Privately published, 1995, newly published by Greenhill as Imperial Bayonets, 1997.
Oman, Sir Charles, Wellington’s Army, 1968 reprint by Francis Edwards LTD. London.
Parquin, Charles Napoleon’s Army, London 1969.
Picard, Commandant L. La cavalerie dans les guerres de la Revolution et de l’Empire, reprint by Teissedre, Paris, 2000.
de Lee, Nigel French Lancers, Almark Publishing Co. London 1967.
Several past issues of EE&L.
Misc. notes and documents from French archives (Archives Guerre, SHAT)
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