By Jean Lochet
What was the Reserve Cavalry? To avoid misinterpretation, let us define “Reserve” which under the Empire had somewhat of a different meaning. It was not a specific force kept for the final push or the last part of the battle (with the exception of the Carabiniers and Cuirassiers) but a Cavalry pool in which some regiments were kept readily available for any new mission. In addition, it was a fast moving force always ready to be used where the military situation required it. So, the initial Cavalry distribution, in both the Cavalry Reserve and the Army Corps was not a rigid system of Cavalry distribution and changed anytime the circumstances or a specific mission required it. Consequently, the Emperor dipped into the Cavalry Reserve to increase the available Cavalry of a Corps that needed it ot accomplish its mission. Inversely, the Cavalry of any Corps could be withdrawn and transferred to another Corps or to the Cavalry Reserve.Only the Heavy Cavalry or battle cavalry - Cuirassiers and Carabiniers - werealways kept in the Cavalry Reserve. Both the location and the strength of the Cavalry Reserve might even change during the course of a battle. In theory, that enormous Cavalry mass was under Murat’s command. In reality, that command was fictional and very temporary, and usually only limited to the time necessary (as at Eylau) to make a charge with 80 squadrons, an irresistible torrent of horses and men, breaking everything before it. On the eve of Austerlitz, the Light Cavalry Division was detached from the 1st Corps (Bernadotte) and transferred to Murat’s Cavalry Reserve. At the same time the Cavalry Reserve transferred to the 3rd Corps (Davout), Boursier’s Dragoon Division; and to the 5th Corps (Lannes), Milhaud Light Cavalry Division. At Wagram, on July 5, 1809, the Light Cavalry Divisions of Lasalle and Montbrun were removed from the Cavalry Reserve and placed one under the control of Masséna on the left flank and the other given to Davout on the right wing. That Light Cavalry Division was ordered to detach Colbert’s brigade to Oudinot’s Corps in the center. NAPOLEON’S AND THE CAVALRY MISSIONS If we ignore the few exceptions found in Spain, the above clearly show a systematic principle of concentration. Only necessary Cavalry detachments were given to the Army Corps and sent on specific missions with precise assignments. We always find the same principles: precision and adaptation to circumstances and a disdain for stereotype doctrines and speculative formulas. Never did Napoleon send Murat or Lasalle on a vague mission of exploration or of screening. He sent them to precise locations, and they went there; he told them what they were to do and they did it. We always find the same principle: variable forces directed to specific objectives and with precise missions. All these maneuvers required from great audacity, great competence and decisiveness by the cavalry commanders. A competent Light Cavalry leader also required some degree of initiative to push - when the occasion presented itself - quick probes at the enemy and/or to pursue actively a defeated enemy. Napoleon advocated that the Heavy Cavalry to be really a reserve of cavalry to be kept for the final efforts at the decisive moments. That reserve of cavalry was the ultimate weapon that at a given time was to break the enemy’s attack or its final defenses. Hence, it was a force to manage closely. He did not want it to be wasted by unnecessary and tiring movements. In all his battles, the Emperor kept the heavy part of his Cavalry Reserve concentrated, morally and materially strong, always ready for a massive and coherent decisive blow. It was relatively rare in the large Napoleonic battles not to find the so-called “Cuirassiers’ hour”. That hour rang at Eylau, Essling, Wagram, Borodino, at Waterloo and many others. Each time it was the decisive charge that led to victory or death. It was when leading the Cuirassiers that many of its gallant commanders were killed, d’Hautpoul at Eylau, d’Espagne at Essling, Montbrun and Caulincourt at Borodino. When, in a battle, the Light Cavalry and the Dragoons were charging first, they may have been repulsed- - on occasion - however the Heavy Cavalry was the Cavalry that was never repulsed. One should not conclude that the system was rigid. In fact it was extremely flexible and could be adapted to answer any tactical or strategic imperatives by shifting the cavalry during the course of a campaign. In PART II, we’ll see how that cavalry was used on the battlefield. BibliographyAubier, Lt.Colonel A. La Cavalerie Napoléonienne, Peut-elle Encore Servir de Modèle? (Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1902)
French Cavalry Reforms 1803
Cavalry Segregation and Distribution Reserve Cavalry, Cavalry Missions, and Bibliography Related
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