By Barry J. Fox
On June 18, 1812, the day that the United States declared war on Great Britain, the U.S. Navy, excluding coastal gunboats and light craft on the Great Lakes, consisted of just 17 vessels of 442 cannon and 5,000 men. The Royal Navy, on the other hand, possessed some 900 vessels of 27,800 cannon and over 151,000 men. It’s not my intention to get into the reasons for the declaration of war, but it’s important to note that those U.S. officials responsible were assuming that native privateers would help make up for the disparity. When one considers that 515 commissions, or letters of marque, were issued by the federal government to owners of private vessels during the three years of the war, it justifies the official assumptions.
The figure of 515 commissions includes two classes of vessels. A letter of marque was a merchant vessel which was expected to carry on trade as normal, but could attack an enemy merchant vessel if the opportunity occurred. Letter of marque vessels could be bulky merchantmen or be exactly the type of vessels used for privateering.
The main difference was that letter of marque vessels carried the typically small crews carried by ordinary merchantmen. They also paid the crews since they were mainly acting as normal traders. If they did happen upon an enemy merchant ship, then the crew would get a share of any profit from capturing and selling the enemy vessel and cargo. A privateer was a privately owned ship of war. Its mission was to prey on enemy merchantmen and to flee from enemy warships. Privateering was a business, and one doesn’t stay in business long if he risks his assets needlessly.
Privateers were built for speed, and carried a large crew to both work the guns needed to goad a merchant ship into surrendering and to provide prize crews to take the captured vessels to a safe port. The crews did not receive pay. They were given shares in any captured material sold. The way it worked was for an owner, or group of investors agreed to put up the money for a privateering venture. They would also pay the U.S. government a bond of $5,000 to ensure the correct behavior of their crews. This bond increased to $10,000 if the crew was to be over 150 men. The owners would forfeit their bond, and the crews were subject to prosecution by the federal government, if any illegal acts were committed.
In fact, the U.S. Navy had jurisdiction over privateersmen who committed certain offenses. A court martial would be convened and any guilty parties would be dealt with exactly as if they were in the U.S. Navy. The owners would receive 50% of any sale of enemy vessels or goods captured. The other 50% would be divided into a number of shares, the amount of individual shares depending on the position of the crew member.
According to the articles signed in advance by crewmen, a privateer with a crew of 95 might have a total of 151 and one half shares. A captain might get 10, a lieutenant, master or surgeon 6 each. Mates and specialists might get from 3 and one half to 1 and one quarter each, the common seamen 1, and a ship’s boy as little as one half a share. If no captures were made, or worse the privateer was captured, there was simply no remuneration for anyone. Even when a capture was made the federal government might take up to 40% for customs duties, although early in the war Congress agreed to rescind this practice. It must be remembered that in the days before federal income tax the U.S. Government relied largely on customs duties. In the 1790s Salem, Massachusetts was the sixth largest city in the U.S. (San Diego, CA now holds that distinction) and actually provided 10% of the money needed to run all federal activities! That money came from collecting customs from U.S. and foreign merchant ships coming into Salem.
Of the 515 vessels issued with commissions, around 250 were pure privateers, while the remainder could remain as letters of marque or switch back and forth. Once the federal government quit demanding customs duties from captures, privateering was as good as legal piracy. A successful privateer could earn its owners a fortune, while a privateer scooped up by the Royal Navy before it could make a capture was a total write-off.
American privateers generally sought their prey in well known shipping lanes, or off of enemy or neutral ports. Not only were British ships eligible for capture, but in the early months of the war many American ship owners accepted British licenses to trade openly with the enemy. Wellington was very keen to see American supply vessels continue to deliver goods to further his war effort in the Spanish Peninsular campaign. Anyone who remembers the divisions caused in this country by the Vietnam war can’t cease to be amazed by the thought of anyone putting greed above patriotism in such a fashion.
When these British-licensed vessels were encountered by American privateers they were officially looked upon as legitimate prizes. Naturally, neutral shipping was off limits to American privateers, but there were more than a few cases in which American privateers were forced to fire on Spanish and Portuguese warships escorting British merchant vessels, as well as a few French privateers who didn’t know the difference between British and American vessels. If prize crews could not risk taking their prizes back to American ports for adjudication, they sometimes were forced into neutral ports. It was not unknown for them to have their prizes seized by neutrals, especially the Spanish, and their prize crews imprisoned.
In one case, an American prize crew who fell into Spanish hands was severely flogged to coerce them into joining the Spanish Navy. As already stated, privateers were not expected to fight with regular men of war, but it could not always be helped. Even some merchantmen proved to be less than lambs to the slaughter. British Post Office Packet ships proved to be very obstinate foes. If an enemy vessel would not surrender meekly, then she needed to be boarded. This put the American boarders at more risk than just trading shots. Thus, one can see what a gamble privateering could be. If you were not maimed by enemy shot and bullets, or suffered from the normal diseases common to sailors, you could be wounded by boarding pikes or swords trying to capture an enemy vessel. You could also find yourself captured and imprisoned for years in intolerable conditions. All this just for the hope of capturing fat prizes.
The Bistol Brig Yankee
One of the most successful American privateers was the Bristol brig Yankee. In six cruises, from 1812-1815, she took 40 prizes. She managed to capture or destroy property worth $5,000,000, and sent prizes and goods worth $1,000,000 into Bristol alone. If you failed, as many did, you could also go home broke. Never the less, many signed on to privateers for the chance of quick riches, adventure, and the short duration of cruises. Regardless of their motives, those 515 American privateers and letters of marque managed to capture 1,345 enemy vessels, which certainly caused the enemy financial harm.
How many privateers were taken by the enemy is unclear, but the case of Baltimore probably gives a good indication. Baltimore sent 126 letters of marque and privateers out on cruises during the war. Those vessels took, destroyed, or ransomed 556 enemy vessels. 27 of the 126 were pure privateers while another 21 were both. 32 letters of marque were captured, 5 were chased ashore, and 3 were lost at sea. 9 privateers were taken, 3 chased ashore, and 3 lost at sea.
From my list of sample American privateers you can see that just about every rig was used, but schooners were the main types used. Schooners were small, usually under 300 tons, and generally faster than other vessels unless the wind and weather acted against them, and required less men to sail. That would leave more men available to work the guns, board, and act as prize crews. They were also small and light enough to use sweeps to move if the wind dropped, and they were in shallow enough waters.
There are currently two different American privateer schooners available in 1/1200 scale. Skytrex Ltd. (see web site using the name) makes a lovely 12-gun schooner, they choose to call a Charleston privateer, for 3.25 pounds sterling. See details on the net for ordering. The model would represent the larger type schooners of up to 300 tons. The other schooner is from GHQ (web site ghq models). It goes without saying that quality is GHQ’s middle name, so their products recommend themselves. This one is listed as a Baltimore privateer and goes for $6.75. It is much smaller than the Skytrex privateer, but is closer to the normal tonnage of most privateers. Langton Miniatures also makes a generic schooner which can be used as a privateer. Brookhurst Hobbies, see the net again, carries Rod’s excellent line of 1/1200 ships. If you need merchant vessels for your privateers to attack, Skytrex and Langton have them as well.
Numbers vary according to sources, but breakdown for privateers: Baltimore- 58. New York- 55. Salem- 40. Boston- 31. Philadelphia- 14. Portsmouth- 11. Charleston- 10. Bristol- 4. Marblehead- 4. Unknown- 3. Newbern- 3. Newburyport- 2. New London- 2. New Orleans- 2. Norfolk- 2. Portland- 2. Barnstable- 1. Fair Haven- 1. Newport- 1. Providence- 1. Washington, NC- 1. Wilmington- 1. France- 1.
A good indicator of how a vessel should be rated for a wargame is by the amount of prizes it took. If about half of the 515 commissioned vessels were privateers, I would give the top 10% USN gunnery and boarding capabilities. The rest I would probably rate with Royal Navy gunnery and boarding capabilities. The rationale for this is that America had a very large merchant marine, from whence most privateersmen came, and the average merchant seaman was very experienced in gunnery and boarding drill, and in some cases, actual combat experience.
The Royal Navy was very spread out, so they could not always count on having the most superior crews and officers on every vessel. Most American letters of marque would be rated a cut below Royal Navy vessels, due to their small crews and generally different mission.
Cranwell, John Phillips and William Bowers Crane. Men of Marque: A History of Private Armed Vessels out of Baltimore During the War of 1812. W.W. Norton & Co. New York, 1940.
Guide to The War of 1812 By Barry J. Fox
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