Infantry Squares
in the Napoleonic Wars

With Musket Cannon and Sword

Section 3

by Brent Nosworthy


SQUARES STANDING/BREAKING

As the eighteenth century unfolded, a debate between cavalry and infantry officers emerged. Which arm was mostly like to succeed when a strong body of cavalry charged well-prepared infantry? Obviously, opinions were largely drawn along the lines of the arm with which each officer served. Infantrymen thought they had the better chances oooof success while those serving with the mounted arm believed that the cavalry enjoyed this advantage. Not surprisingly, this debate carried over to the probable success of an infantry square when defending itself against a cavalry assault. The pro-infantry school, of course, felt that the employment of a square only made a successful infantry defence all the more certain.

Nevertheless, despite the confidence of those holding this view, and its frequent vindication by successful infantry defenses on the battlefield, most of those officers in the cavalry arm continued to feel that if the attacking cavalry was properly conducted the best formed square could often be penetrated and then annihilated.

This debate raged throughout the Napoleonic Wars with both sides citing many examples of the successes of the arm of their choice and the failures of the other. It certainly is not difficult to find many situations where a head long cavalry rush against an infantry assault did, indeed, end in failure. Among English-speaking readers, the most famous case is the success of the British 4-ranked squares at Waterloo.

Many other examples can be found. As we have already seen, the French on a number of occasions used large squares to hold off repeated assaults by the Mameluke horsemen. Austrian squares successfully resisted the French cavalry throughout the battle of Aspern while the Russian infantry squares were equally successful during the battles of Borodino and Smolensk. And, of course, many other examples of squares successfully holding off large, determined cavalry charges can be found among lesser known engagements.

Looking through various primary sources of the period, such as memoirs and after battle reports one occasionally finds detailed first hand accounts of what it was like to be a part of a square which successfully defended itself.

Then first lieutenant Bugeaud provides an example. At the first battle of Pultusk (April 6th, 1806), his brigade was on the French right. Although at the time it only consisted of three battalions, it was ordered to charge a superior Russian infantry force supported by several artillery batteries and a large body of cavalry some distance behind it. Despite the heavy odds against them, the small French brigade threw itself upon the Russians with such impetuosity that the Russian infantry was disordered and moments later fled. The French infantry made straight for the now unsupported Russian cannon. The mud was so deep, however, that the infantrymen found it difficult just to put one foot in front of the other. Before they could reach the artillery, they found themselves charged by the Russian cavalry coming in fast on their left.

The first two battalions, hampered by the mud were unable to form square and were run over despite unleashing a deadly fire at the close range. Bugeaud's battalion, positioned on the right, managed to form square. But a new problem presented itself. The fugitives from the other two battalions were seen running directly towards them, and there was a real danger of their companions breaking into and disrupting the square's defensive capabilities.

The men in the square withheld their fire until the mass of Russian horsemen and French fugitives were but twenty paces away. A single terrible volley was unleashed. The projectiles, unfortunately, were unable to distinguish friend from foe: many riders fell from their saddles, horses spun over and French infantrymen were knocked over dead or dying.

The surviving Russian cavalrymen panicked and fled off of the field. Their problems still weren't over. By this point the Russian artillerymen had returned to their pieces and raked the French square with round shot. The men in the spunky square were undaunted and returned fire until out of ammunition. Even then they did not break, the officers collected ammunition from the dead and wound infantrymen lying in and around the square, the fight continued unabated. [21]

Before moving on to the cavalrymen's side of the debate, we should take a quick look at what was probably at the most spectacular use of squares during the entire period. This was the defense of Gaudin's division against a large body of Prussian cavalry during the battle of Auerstädt. During the decades following the Wars of the Empire (as the Napoleonic Wars were called) most continental military writers felt that Gaudin's employment of oblique squares were even a more compelling argument of the intrinsic superiority of squares over cavalry than even the British squares at Waterloo. As they looked back, professional soldiers usually considered the quality of French cavalry at Waterloo to be relatively poor.

The Prussian cavalry in 1806, on the other hand, was conceivably among the best to be fielded throughout all the Napoleonic wars. As a dense fog suddenly lifted that morning at Auerstädt the French infantry were surprised to find a large body of enemy cavalry slightly to their rear. Consequently, they even had less time to meet the onrushing cavalry threat than did their English counterparts at Waterloo. A large number of squares were quickly formed. The right battalion of the 25th regimen de ligne in the first line, immediately formed square, while the 21st regiment in the second line followed suite. At the same time, the 12th regiment in the rearguard formed a single square of its two battalions. [22]

Moments after this, the squares were attacked by an impressive body of cavalry, at least 25 squadrons in strength.

During the Revolutionary Wars, Blücher employing classical Prussian cavalry tactics against infantry successfully had used a combination of mounted skirmishers and a series of indirect charges to overthrow squares and other strong defensive infantry positions. In his biography of the Field Marshal, Gneisenau tells us these proved to be of "no avail" against the French squares at Auerstädt and he went on to provide a hint why:

    "His [Blücher's] old manoeuvres, of indirect charges following each other in succession, and skirmishing on all sides, first throwing the files into disorder, and then, by a heavy unexpected charge, to break through, were here found of no avail. The new tactics of Napoleon, of drawing up his infantry in alternate squares, flanked by light artillery, and connected by troops in line, frustrated all Blucker's desperate attempts to make an impression. [23]

What surprised the Prussians was the new arrangement of the squares and the dramatically heightened level of combined arms support thus derived. Between the time French forces returned from the unsuccessful "oriental" campaigns in Egypt and the outbreak of major hostilities in western Europe in 1805 and again in 1806, French tacticians experimented with a new variety of square, the carré oblique à la ligne de bataille. Although this new variety of square seemed to be only subtly different from the carrés à cremaillière occasionally encountered during the Revolutionary Wars, it nevertheless represented a significant tactical development in the infantry's arsenal against their equestrian foes.

Effectiveness Considered

As we have seen, to be effective carrés à cremaillière had to consist of two rows of battalion squares. The same end now could be achieved with half the number of squares. Each square, was rotated 45 degrees. This offered two advantages. In this new arrangement, there was no front edge of the square directly facing the enemy. Each of the two forward sides sloped inward 45 degrees. This meant that the enemy cavalry would have to manoeuvre and turn 45 degrees if it wanted to charge one of these faces head on, something that might not prove that practicable under fire. Like the carré à cremaillière the infantrymen could fire straight ahead without worrying about hitting friendly troops in the adjoining square.

However, in this new formation, a line of infantry also could be extended from the inside angle of one square to the facing angle of its neighbor. This allowed a deadly cross-fire to be delivered against any cavalry attempting to charge one of the front sides of an adjoining square.

The 33rd regimen de ligne, a regiment known for its mastery of all manoeuvres, both those officially prescribed and experimental, practiced adopting the carré oblique during its exercises in Paris. There is evidence that this was by no means an isolated experiment, but rather reflected certain wide spread tactical trends with advocates near the very highest levels of the French military.

While stationed with his corps at the camp de Montreuil-sur-mer in 1804, Marshal Ney penned his Military Studies. These were a series of tactical analyses meant to compliment the official 1791 regulations. Part of the work dealt with various ways infantry could defend itself against cavalry and the formation of squares in particular. Ney noted if eight battalions along two lines, i.e., four battalions per line, were attacked suddenly by cavalry, they could form two diamond shape formations.

To do this, the men in front line would face the rear. Then the first and second battalions along line would wheel 45 degrees inward to form a "v". The third and fourth battalions would do likewise. Once in position the men would about face again. Meanwhile, the first and second battalions along the second line would simply wheel 45 degrees inward to form another "v" thus forming the first diamond. The third and fourth battalions along the second line would also wheel to form another "v" and complete the second diamond. The two formations thus created were nothing more than carrés oblique. [24]

When the French went to war against the Austrians and Russians in late 1805, they do not appear to have been overly intimidated by the enemy cavalry they expected to face. In a directive to his Marshals Napoleon mentions that precautions had to be taken against the irregular Russian horsemen, i.e., the Uhlans and Cossacks, and this appears to be part of the reason why the large, divisional-sized mixed order formations were prescribed during the first weeks of December.

The next year when hostilities against the Prussians were expected, the same equanimity was noticeably absent. The fame of Seydlitz and his cavalry had been passed down over the years, and it was generally believed that the Prussian cavalry in 1806 possessed the same awesome capabilities as its famous predecessors during the Seven Years' War. A writer in the Spectateur Militaire after the wars suggests that it was for this reason that the precautions of previous year were considered inadequate and the carré oblique experimented with during the 1801 - 1804 period was substituted instead. And, of course this was the exact the type of formation(s) adopted by Gaudin's division that day at Auerstädt. The carré oblique proved to be completely successful.

Ironically, it would never see significant use on the battlefield again. This had nothing to do with the formation in and of itself. The blood letting of the 1807 and 1809 campaigns would take their toll, especially among the NCOs nd subaltern officers. This marks the beginning of a gradual decline in the French army and its tactical capabilities. Henceforth the French army would increasing rely on brute force instead of a sophisticated orchestration of techniques.

Repel Cavalry

These, of course, only a few examples of infantry squares standing up to and successfully repelling enemy cavalry. There were probably more than a hundred of such instances when all engagements during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars are considered, both large and small. It is not that surprising that many military historians and enthusiasts have concluded that the infantry arm, if experienced and well-lead, held an insurmountable advantage and that the infantry square, especially the traditional "hollow" variety, was essentially "proof" against cavalry assaults.

Unfortunately, this is an oversimplification, one which doesn't stand up to a close examination of even some of the larger, well-known battles, such as Jena, Auerstädt, Wagram. And, when the full spectrum of conflict is considered it is possible to identify many cases where cavalry did manage to break infantry squares. Many readers might believe this only happened before the infantry was able to complete the maneuver into square or when a large amount of artillery was brought to bear against the completed formation. And, of course one can easily find examples of these situations.

During the Battle of Hielsberg (June 10, 1806) two French battalions were ridden down while trying to form square, while the 8th Cuirassiers (French) at Quatre Bras (June 16, 1815, Date) rolled up the 69th Foot which was just started to manoeuvre into this formation. We have already seen how artillery was used to destroy the Russian Trescow Regiment at Halle (Oct. 17, 1806), and skirmishers gradually broke the British 78th Regiment of Foot at Rosetta in Egypt (1807).

However, if one digs deeply, looking especially at various instructional works used to teach military science during the 1815-1854 period, one is able to find a number of cases where cavalry crushed completely prepared infantry squares.

In 1793, during the Revolutionary Wars, Austrian cavalry destroyed a French square near Quesnoy, despite the fact that this square reportedly "waited the attack with the greatest intrepidity [Bulow, A; The Spirit of the Modern System of War by a General Prussian Officer; London, 1806, p. 145]." An even more dramatic example was provided the next year at Villiers-en-Couche (April 24, 1794) when ten British and four Austrian squadrons defeated a French force of 15,000 men. During the action two British and two Austrian squadrons succeeded in crushing a French square, taking 400 prisoners and five cannon, and killing 900 of the enemy. [25]

Though during this period the Mameluke cavalry overall was a dismal failure against European infantry, they nevertheless were responsible for the destruction of at least one infantry square. At the battle of Sedyman (Oct. 7, 1798) these eastern horsemen were able to crush a small square positioned to the extreme right of the large central army square and commanded by a Captain Vallette. Ferocious warriors, the Mameluke horsemen butchered the hapless men of the 21st demi-brigade. Here, it appears that these infantrymen began their defensive fire at too long a range. [26]

Infantry squares were also broken at several of Napoleon's great victories during his middle years; at Austerlitz, Jena, Auerstädt, and Wagram. At Austerlitz (Dec. 2, 1805) the Russian cavalry ran over several squares formed by General Schinner's brigade, part of Vandamme's division in Soult's corps. The Russian lancer regiment also crushed the 4th de ligne regiment in square and captured its eagle. [27]

It was the French cavalry's turn to destroy squares at Jena (Oct. 14, 1806). During this battle, the Saxon Burgsdorf and Nehroff brigades attempted to retire off the field in two squares. Three sides of each were formed from infantrymen, the fourth consisted of artillery. Murat ordered some dragoons and cuirassiers to attack these squares. After a first futile charge, the dragoons broke one of the squares. The cuirassiers led by gen. d'Hautpoul crushed the second. [28]

At Auerstadt the same day, thePrussian Irving cavalry regiment ran over a French square, this despite the fact that the infantrymen withheld their fire until the enemy cavalrymen were only 15 paces away, killing nine officers and men cavalrymen. Nevertheless, the face of the square gave way and the French soldiers were sabered. [29]

At Wagram (July 6th 1809) the French 9th Hussars regiment ran down a square in Prince of Hohenzollern's command. [30]

We have already seen how Le Marchant's Heavy Brigade broke several French closed squares at Salamanca (July 22, 1812). During the same year at the action of Garcia Hernandez (July 23, 1812), the King's German Legion broke three French squares. [31]

At the combat of Georde (Sept. 16, 1813) a corps of 9000 French with fifteen pieces of artillery, threatened by Allied cavalry formed squares. Some of these were on broken ground others were in the open. The French squares resisted charges from the Cossacks and the Russian German legion. When the 3rd Hanoverian Hussars charged, however, they were able to ride down those squares in the open terrain, dispersing its men and capturing the guns. [32]

The Mecklenberg-Strelitzer Hussars at the battle of Möckern (Oct. 16, 1813), broke the 1st regimen d'Artillerie de Marine which had formed square; the French infantry had been forming square until the final moments but were able to get off an effective volley when hussars were 20 paces away. The square still was nevertheless intact. [33]

A torrential rain fell as the French counterattacked the Allies during the second day during the battle torrential rain fell as the French counterattacked the Allies during the second day during the battle of Dresden (August 26-27, 1813.) The defending infantry were able only to fire a few shots with their muskets, when they were able to fire at all.

The French cavalry was able to close with impunity and sabre the defenders here and there. Many of the Austrian squares were soon broken, their men captured or forced to flee. The lancers in particular had an easy time of it, since the superior reach of their weapon made it easy to stab the hapless infantrymen who were unable to defend themselves with their usual musket fire. [34]

During the combat of Fére-Champenoise (1814) Amé and de Pactod's divisions utilized a rather unique form of large hollow square. Each side of the large formation consisted of a series of battalion closed squarges. The Prussian and Russian cavalry pursuing the French at first were unable to make any impact on the formation. A battery of horse artillery was brought into play, a gap in the large formation was created and all of the infantrymen in the two divisions were taken prisoners soon after. [35]

Probably the last square to be broken during the Napoleonic period occurred during the advance on Fleurus (June 15, 1815) prior to Quatre-Bras. One of Napoleon's Aide-de-Camp's, General Letort, with four squadrons from the Imperial escort, succeeded in breaking a battalion of Prussian infantry that formed square. The latter lost about 50% of its men. [36]

Not Formed

Probably most squares ridden down by cavalry were because the enemy horsemen managed to reach them before the square had been completely formed. At the Battle of Heilsberg in 1807, for example, two battalions of French infantry were surprised by two squadrons of Prussian Black Hussars and completely formed and overthrown before the squares could be completely formed. [37]

Another frequently successful tactic was to bring artillery to bear against a square. The fact that the cannon balls would often cut through two sides meant increased casualties, and if the squares were formed by first doubling the ranks, even greater casualties could be expected.

However, even when artillery was brought to bear against the enemy infantry in square there was no guarantee of success. At El Bodon (Septembbbber 25, 1811) the 2nd battalion of the 5th, the 77th regiment, and 2nd battalion 83rd that made up Colville's brigade were significantly weakened by a prolonged artillery fire. Nevertheless, these weak battalions were still able to warded off repeated assaults of a larger force of French cavalry. [38]

Experienced cavalry officers would also use "indirect charges" to surprise the defenders, and capitalize on the confusion arising from an assault delivered by some other cavalry formation only moments earlier. In this method two or more bodies of cavalry advanced simultaneously, each threatening a square or line directly in front of them. When one of the formations charged, a neighboring cavalry formation could then change its direction and follow the cavalry that had just delivered its charge, either as individual squadrons or whole regiments.

The French trooper Parquin in his colorful memoirs provides an account of how just this method was used to destroy an Austrian square at Wagram (July 6, 1809). His brigade lay deployed in front of three enemy squares, six ranks deep, commanded by Prince of Hohenzollern. Around two o'clock the Marshall in command rode over and ordered the brigade to charge the enemy.

The 7th Chasseurs and the 9th Hussars began their advance, each advancing towards a different square. Unfortunately, before the 7th Chasseurs managed to advance even 100 paces, a murderous volley killed or wounded 50 to 60 riders -- including Gen. Colbert who led the regiment -- and "wroght havoc" among those who remained in their saddles, thus preventing any further advance on the part of the regiment.

    Seeing this, Col. Castex, instead of charging the square in front of him, as he had been ordered to do, decided to throw his regiment, which was still at the trot, against the square that had so thoroughly repulsed the chasseurs. He commanded in his stentorian voice: "Squadron! To the right! Charge!"

    The square could not resist the fresh onslaught and was utterly broken. The 9th hussars had gallantly carried their square; thus the brigade had succeeded in crushing two of the three squares; under a galling fire from the artillery of the enemy, who were now raining grape shot into our ranks and even into those of their own captured infantry. [39]

After looking atthe square's performance during the Revolutionary and the Napoleonic Wars, one is forced to conclude that although the infantrymen in a square held the uppoer hand, the issue was by no means a foregone conclusion. In the 1730s, Marechal Puysegur had indeed correctly concluded that a well lead, well prepared cavalry that knew its own strength would invincible.

Of course, on the battlefield, these preconditions did not always exist. Moreover, the vagaries of the battlefield occasionally meant that a formation that had been well-prepared, suddenly ceased to remain so, offering an enemy both lucky and bold enough to seize the opportunity of the moment. This was applied as much when attempting to assault a squareas any other formation.

Notes

[1] Marmont, A. The Spirit of Military Institutions, Philadelphia, 1862. p. 57
[2] Bismarck, F.W.; On the Uses and Application of Cavalry in War; London, 1855. p. 18.
[3] Combe, I.; Mémoires du Colonel Combe dur les campagnes de Russie 1812, de Saxe 1812 de France 1814 et 1815, Paris, 1896, p. 69.
[4] Bismarck, p. 25 Beamish footnote.
[5] Renard, J.; Considérations sur la tactique de l'infanterie en europe; Paris, 1857, p. 46
[6] Marmont, p. 56
[7] Okounef, N. A.; Examen raisonne des propriétés des trois armes de leur emploi dans les batilles et de leur rapport entre elles; Paris; 1832, pp. 83-84.
[8] Bugeaud, The Practise of War; Richmond, Va., 1863.p. ??.
[9] Cooper, T.H.; A Practical Guide for the Light Infantry Officer; London, 1806, pp. 90-92, Marmont, pp. 56, Okoneuf, pp. 86-88
[10] Cooper, pp. 90-99.
[11] Okounef pp. 86-88.
[12] Thiers, A.; History of the Consulate and Empire; 12 volumes, London, 1893, Vol. 4, p. 263.
[13] Decker, K.; De la tactique des trois armes; Paris; n.d. pp. 164-165.
[14] Maude, F.; Cavalry Versus Infantry; London, 1896.p. 136.
[15] Okounef, pp 89-90
[16] Glover, M.; Wellington's Army in the Peninsula 1808-1814; New York, 1977, p. 50.
[17] Brett, A.; The Hundred Days: Napoleon's Last Campaigns from Eye-witness Accounts, New York, 1964, p. 58].
[18] Mitchell, J.; Thoughts on Tactics and Military Organization; London, 1838, pp. 44-45.
[19] Brit Mil Lib, London, 2 volumes, 1798-1801, p. 147.
[20] British Military Library, p. 147.
[21] d'Ideville, Henri; Memoirs of Marshal Bugeaud, London, 2 volumes, 1884, p. 48.
[22] Thiers, Vol 4, p. 286].
[23] Gneisenau; The Life and Campaigns of Field-Marshal Blücher; London, 1815, pp. 37-38.
[24] Ney, Ney, Michel, Military Studies, London, 1833, pp. 50-53.
[25] Nolan, L.; Cavalry: its History and Tactics; Columbia, S.C., 1864, p. 304].
[26] Jonquiere, Vol 3, pp. 212-213 quoting letter from General Desaix to Bonaparte - 18 vendémiaire VII (10th Oct 1798).
[27] Nolan, p. 305.
[28] Thiers, Vol 4, p. 282.
[29] Nolan, p. 305
[30] Parquin, C.; Napoleon's Victories: From the Personnel Memoires of Capt C Parquin of the Imperial Guard 1803 - 1814; Chicago, 1893, p. 130
[31] Nolan, p. 306
[32] Nolan, pp. 306-307
[33] Translation from Die Mecklenburger 1813-1815 trans by John Koontz p. 6 in EEL Issue 73, July 15, 1983.
[34] Combe, pp. 216-217.
[35] Decker, p. 164-165.
[36] Wood, Waterloo Campaign, p.43
[37] Decker, p.164
[38] Leach, J. Rough Sketches of Life of an Old Soldier; London, 1831, pg. 234-235
[39] Parquin. pp. 130-

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