DEFICIENCY OF SQUARES
Although a square once formed probably was the most formidable formation that cavalry could run up against, it nevertheless suffered from a number of potential drawbacks. Firstly, it could be difficult to form, requiring not only time for the men to methodically manoeuvre in place, but also clear terrain. [6]
Once formed, squares also lacked mobility, even in relation to cumbersome line formations. Although in theory squares could move once they were formed, this movement was accompanied by the greatest danger if this was performed in the presence of the enemy. Given its necessarily large dimensions, the hollow square inherited many of the problems of the line. The lengthy front and back sides would be subject to disorder if the formation attempted to move.
Moreover, it was difficult to have all four sides march at exactly the same rate: one side or another would invariably march faster than the other, causing a distortion of the formation. This would be most noticeable in the square's four angles where openings tended to appear, despite the usual precaution of placing grenadiers in each of these four corners.
These problems are poignantly illustrated by the fate of the Russian Trescow Regiment at the combat of Hallé on October 17th during the 1806 campaign. This regiment had been cautioned against French attack at Magdebourg and had marched along the Saale River to rejoin Prince Eugene of Würtemberg's corps. However, they arrived under the town's walls at the same moment that the French had captured the bridges crossing the Saale. Cut off, the regiment's commander decided to retire in an orderly fashion as possible and formed the regiment into two hollow squares. Unfortunately for the Russians, the French brought some artillery to bear and soon artillery shells fell among the infantry in one of the squares. Seeking to move out of the artillery's trajectory, the square attempted a sight lateral movement.
The square quickly disorganized into a formless mass, and the men panicking ran off of the field drawing the men in the other square along with it. As a result, about half of the regiment fell victim to the Saale River, the other half was made prisoner. [7]
By French Revolutionary and Napoleonic times, an alternative to the large "hollow squares" began to be resorted to increasingly. The defensive capabilities of the small "closed square" had been first noticed by the Prussian infantry during the Seven Years' War. By the late 1780's, the utility of this formation against cavalry had become common knowledge among well-learned military men in other western European armies, and it was often resorted to during the later part of the Napoleonic Wars when almost all armies adopted closed order columns to move up to their positions on the battlefield.
The traditional hollow squares also continued to be used, however, and by 1800 there appears to have been a split in opinion as to which formation was the best formation to withstand a cavalry assault. Many believed it was far preferable to simply take a closed column and form a "closed" square. Here, basically the intervals separating each platoon or compannnny in the column were closed up and the several files on each side of the column were made to face towards the flank.
Some authorities took greater precautions. Simply having the men on the side of the column turning and facing outward was seen less desirable than when a front was formed by a complete company in its usual formation. Colonel Bugeaud, for example, would place two battalions in closed square side by side. However, the first company of each battalion would first quarter-wheel (the one from the first battalion to the right, the other to the left) to one side and form the side of the square. These precautions guaranteed that each side of the square had a regular unit in its prescribed formation facing the enemy, and not some ad hoc cluster formed from the extremities of the moment. [8]
Preference for either the closed square or the traditional hollow square, did not neatly divide along national lines. In contemporary military literature, for example, one finds advocates of the closed square in the British, French and Russian armies. [9]
Those preferring the use of the closed square cited a number of advantages. The closed square was more manoeuverable, while the hollow square was difficult and time consuming to form, and as we have seen difficult to move. In contrast, a closed square formed from a close order column was compact and thus allowed the men to more readily act in concert. It was easier to perform the manoeuvers needed to break out of the formation, once the threat of cavalry disappeared. [10]
Some authorities also felt that the closed square was better at fending off cavalry, the purpose of these formations in the first place. The main vulnerability of a hollow square was that should the opposing cavalry ever manage to effect a breech along one of the sides the square would almost always be overthrown. The cavalryman managing to enter an opening would gallop into the open space in the center of the square and then quickly attack the infantrymen still facing outward from the their rear. Obviously, the square then would be immediately destroyed.
Breech
Though a breech effected by cavalry acting alone was improbable if the infantry was steady and well lead, a square could be easily overcome if the cavalry was assisted by artillery. As few as ten round shots could produce enough casualties along a line for the cavalry to work their way through the square's face.
The advantage of the closed square in this case is not that obvious. Being a very compact formation, it would tend to take even higher number of casualties than a hollow square. However, despite this it was still less vulnerable to artillery in the short run than the hollow square. The reason was that it was more resilient. Having a depth of 18 or more ranks, as fast as men were lost there were others close enough to run in and fill the breaches. The important psychological consideration here was not the rate of attrition, which was high, but rather that the formation would likely survive until helped arrived from neighboring friendly forces. [11]
An example of both the potential effectiveness of the closed square and the type of situation where it was employed is provided by the Battle of Schleiz (October 9th, 1806). Five companies commanded by General Maison were assaulted by Prussian cavalry before they were able to form hollow square. General Maison halted the companies already in a closed order column. The infantry was made to withhold its fire until the enemy cavalry was at "point blank" range, causing over 200 casualties. [12]
The Austrians at Aspern demonstrated that these same small closed squares could be even against large waves of cavalry. The Austrians used their "massed order", battalions deployed in closed columns, for the first time, and they succeeded in repelling a number of assaults of French cavalry, though the latter charged determinedly and were commanded by Napoleon himself. [13]
These closed squares were not invincible and examples of their defeat can be found. Probably the most notable defeat of these small squares occurred at Salamanca during the third charge that day. We owe a vivid description of this achievement to a British officer known to posterity only as "A.Z." who wrote shortly after this event.
The French on the other hand, partly screened by the oaks managed to form closed columns and were able to take the defensive measures against cavalry one applied in this formation, i.e., the closed columns were transformed into closed squares.
The remainder of the action is best described by the original account:
Innovation
The various circumstances encountered on the battlefield often forced the competent commander to be innovative. History provides many examples of infantry adopting varieties of squares neither officially sanctioned by the regulations nor practiced on the parade ground. One interesting example occurred during the combat of Kaiserlautern on November 17th, 1793. A Prusso-Saxon corps under General von Kalkreuth (later Marshal) had been retiring from Saarbrüch towards Kaiserslautern decided to attack the French which had been following them without respite.
The French having been repulsed on all points decided to atttttempt one last cavalry charge just prior to the end of the engagement to try to regain the day. Major Strantz who commanded the Crusatz Regiment saw the French cavalry advancing towards him and quickly formed several small squares by "doubling" the platoons. The first part of this manoeuvre was similar to a technique frequently used at the end of the seventeenth century when infantry would meet cavalry simply by doubling the 3, 4, or 5 rank line to 6, 8, or 10 ranks, respectively.
Returning to the action at Kaiserlautern, Major Strantz ordered every second platoon to march behind its neighbor to the right. However, unlike the doubling of an earlier day, no effort was made to bring these resulting double platoons back together to form a single line. Instead, three or four small columns were formed, each six men deep and separated from their neighbor by exactly one "interval". The men in the rear three ranks were ordered to about face, and those on either end to face the flanks.
The columns thus formed were virtually identical the divisional mass later prescribed by the Archduke Charles in the Austrian regulations of 1806. The French cavalry swirled around each of these small squares or columns, yet without achieving any success even after repeated attempts. Finally, the French cavalry was forced to retire off of the battlefield leaving numerous dead and wounded behind. [15]
Practical experience had demonstrated that it wasn't always possible to formays possible to form
square. This was especially true for skirmishers deployed in open order. When suddenly threatened by cavalry, they would form what was known in the British army as a rallying square. Two infantrymen were to run up to each other and place themselves back to back. The next three to run up were to post themselves immediately in front of the two men, looking forward. The next three placed themselves immediately in the rear, looking back. Each group of four men were now placed on one of the ad hoc formation's angles. This allowed a square to be quickly built up, regardless of the number of men that ran to it, and it could effectively hold up to eighty men. [16]
Sergeant James Anton of the 42nd Highlanders in Sir Denis Pack's Brigade tells us that his regiment employed just such a formation to successfully repel a charge made by French lancers at Waterloo. [17]
Infantry squares were intended as a defensive formation against enemy cavalry. Lacking the mobility of columns and the firepower of a line, these bulky formations were of very little use when facing enemy artillery or infantry. Any sizeable body of infantry encountering squares during their advance would simply stand off at one or two hundred paces and deliver volleys until the troops in the square were forced to deploy into line or retire. Artillery facing an enemy square would do likewise; only it would more quickly achieve decisive results.
Infantry in a square were also vulnerable to enemy skirmishers. This was especially true if the square was surrounded by swarms of skirmishers and some outside factor prevented the defenders from deploying out of the square to chase away the pests firing at them. Defenders caught in this situation would eventually be overpowered, if the skirmishers were left unchallenged. Drawn up three, and sometimes even six, deep, the square became an easy target for skirmishers who in extended order were spread out and presented less of a target.
The potential effects of this type of situation are dramatically illustrated by the destruction of a portion of the British 78th Regiment of Foot at Rosetta in Egypt. As they struggled to make their way back to Alexandria, three companies of the 78th were unlucky enough to become surrounded by a number of Albanian infantry in Turkish service. The Albanians, though in no particular formal formation, were able fire at the British infantry at long range. The Albanians' fire was anything but accurate, and the Albanian infantry, in general, were known to be "even worse shots than the trained soldiers of Europe." Their muskets were notoriously crooked, their black powder was substandard, and their musket balls apparently came in all shapes except round.
Notwithstanding these facts, over a period of time these rag tag group of
irregulars were able to force the defenders into surrendering. This, even though the Albanians made no effort to close and settle the affair at close quarters. [18]
The susceptibility of squares to small arms fire had long been recognized. Continental and British tacticians writing in the 1780's & 90's devised a number of methods to use against squares. An anonymous article in the British Military Library, a military science periodical published during the late 1790's, recommended that when a large body of cavalry encountered isolated infantry in a square a portion of the cavalry dismount and deliver fire against the squares. The dismounted troopers would approacccch the enemy square until 250 paces, while those remaining on horseback acted as a screening force at a 300 pace distance from the enemy. They would be grouped into "platoons" of about 20 files.
However, there was to be a 12-pace gap between each of these platoons. Every second platoon would advance while the other delivered fire. If there were enough dismounted troopers, they could be deployed concentrically so that their fire could be concentrated against one face of the square. On the other hand, the intervals between the platoons stretched out their line so that the side of the square firing at them was not able to inflict many casualties on the dismounted troopers, when considered as a whole.
After a while, it was expected that the infantry square opposed by superior numbers on one face would begin to fall into confusion. As soon as this happened, the cavalry still on horseback would begin its assault and exploit the intervals between the platoons to pass through the friendly dismounted cavalry. The confusion in the defenders' ranks meant that the charging cavalry more than likely would destroy the square. [19]
Often, however, the cavalry couldn't wait until the square had been disrupvalry couldn't wait until the square had been disrupted by small arms fire and had to attempt to break the square immediately. Then, it was recommended that the attacking cavalry charge in waves, the second 150 paces behind the first. Should the first line of cavalry be repulsed, the second probably would still reach the defending infantry before it had time to reload and a good chance of breaking the square. The squadrons in the second line had to be separated by 30-pace intervals in order to allow the troopers from the first line to pass through should their attack fail.
If the defending square was a large 3 or 4-battalion affair, two of the squadrons in the first line were to charge one of the square's faces, while each of the two remaining squadrons fell upon an adjoining angle. Frederick the Great and his Prussian cavalry, incidentally, had used similar tactics when they encountered the occasional square during the Seven Years' War. The only difference that the Prussian cavalry frequently attacked en echiquier, that is, with a full interval between squadrons. The British tacticians felt, however, that its cavalry should eschew the attack in echelon and charge in lines four squadrons wide instead. They reasoned this allowed twice as much cavalry to be brought to bear. The attack in column was to avoided almost in any circumstances, the deep formation would suffer too many casualties and brought too few troopers to bear.
Different Tactics
The anonymous article in the British Military Library, recommended a different set of tactics when the cavalry attacking the square were accompanied by artillery. While still beyond small arms range, the cavalry was to deploy into line with large intervals between the individual squadrons. The regiment then would advance so that it surrounded the beleaguered sssssquare, still hanging back at a distance, however. The cavalry's cannon was then brought forward against one side of the square. It was not to advance against an angle. When attacking a side, the artillery would be subjected to the cannons on each endddd of that side. If it attacked an angle, it would have been subjected to defensive fire from three angles, instead.
The attacking artillery was to began firing when it had come within 600 paces. It would continue to advance, by alternate guns or sections: half the guns fired while the other half prolonged forward. The cavalry meanwhile remained stationary until a gap or some other weakness appeared in the square. In no case, was any cavalry to be placed behind the friendly artillery, since the defensive fire could cause double casualties. [20]
These were some of the anti-square tactics that had been developed prior to the outbreak of the French Revolutionary wars. Certain tactical advances in the use of squares forced the French to revise these tactics, however. As far back as the 1740's a large sophisticated type of square known as the quincunx had been experimented with and in a few cases actually used in the field. Unlike the ordinary square which was either a square or a rectangle, the quincunx was shaped like two rectangles placed so that they overlapped to form a cross. The idea was that cavalry that attacked any one of its internal sides would be subjected to a deadly feu croisés, i.e., a cross-fire. It was an extremely clumsy affair, however, and its formation was beyond that of most the troops of the time who were just being introduced to cadenced manoeuvres. Besides, the cavalry would rather be so obliging and would attack the top or bottom of either rectangle and thus avoid any cross fire.
During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars a much simpler way of achieving the same deadly cross fire was discovered. The method of placing squares à cremaillière. These squares were formed as follows.
Two rows of battalion squares were formed. The odd numbered battalions along the line were positioned formed the first row of squares. The even numbered squares formed the second row, approximately 100 to 150 paces behind the first. The squares in a row did not form a straight line, but were placed en echelon, instead. This meant when the cavalry attempted to circle any square it was subjected to the fire of battalion under attack as well as the next square in the echelon. At the same time, since the battalions were placed in a slanted series of formations, it was unlikely that the fire would inadvertently hit men in an adjoining square.
The French cavalry developed tactics to counter this formation. The cavalry was not to enter
the spaces between the squares. The troopers were to attack one of the front corners of the leading square. They were to concentrate their efforts on this square. Once it broke they would then proceed to the next square in echelon and use the same tactic. This procedure was to be repeated until all the enemy squares had been overthrown, one by one.
Each assault was only to be delivered by only two squadrons, positioned in close column 45 degrees from its side and outside of musket range. In order to mask the actions of the squadron, twelve or so troopers would ride out in skirmish order until they were within medium range of small arms' fire. The squadron had been position so that it was looking straight at the square corner angle. As the squadron advanced at the trot one half wheeled slightly to the right and attacked the square's side in that direction, while the other half of the squadron wheeled slightly and attacked the other side of the square.
This was actually only a feint intended to draw the infantry's fire. The second squadron initially was also to advance at a trot. However, if either of the two sides of the square that were attacked opened fire, it was then to immediately charge at a gallop. In this case, it quickly sprung pass the first squadron, which, along with the twelve skirmishers, was to follow and serve as a reserve. This tactic had been designed so that the cavalry approached each of the two sides of the square at a very acute angle. This meant that the infantrymen along that face would only be able to direct an extremely oblique fire, which would prove as a result to be quite ineffective.
More Infantry Squares Excerpt
CLOSED SQUARES
Le Marchant lead his (British) Heavy Brigade against a French infantry brigade positioned in an "open wood" of evergreen oaks. As the British cavalry advanced they began to encounter an increasingly denser populations of oaks. Though the land was still sufficiently open to permit a charge, the occasional trees were enough to slightly disorganize the British ranks, which were even further confused when it became necessary to wheel the line towards the right to correct the direction of the charge. The effect was to intermix the various cavalry ranks and to concentrate the attackers into one continuous line without the typical intervals.
"These men reserved their fire with much coolness till the cavalry came within twenty yards, when they poured it in with a deadly and tremendous effect upon the concentrated mass of men and horses. The gallant Le Marchant and Captain White of his staff were killed, Colonel Elley was wounded, and it is thought that nearly one-third of the dragoons came to the ground; but as the remainder maintained sufficient command of their horses to dash forward, they succeeded in breaking them in utter confusion. [14]
RALLYING SQUARES
TACTICS USED AGAINST INFANTRY SQUARES
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