Frontage to Range: As noted, the ratio of the closest formed battalion formation to weapon range varies somewhat. Assuming a Prussian battalion occupying 250 - 300 yds+ in a triple line (which was regulation until the magazine rifle was introduced circa 1887), the respective ranges in GBGV are indicated as 430 yds for the Dreyse, 688 yds for the Chassepot. TDFG rates out at 800 yds for the Dreyse, and 1200 yds for the Chassepot. BNIII makes it 600 yds for the Dreyse, 1200 yds for the Chassepot. Both the latter are arguable. The former is incorrect. I would suggest that the problem can be overcome if GBGV allowed firing lines 2 deep.

Artillery: The artillery ranges are all more or less arguable. TDFG claims that the Prussian 6 pdr, with a 15 lb shell, had less range than the 4pdr with a 9 lb shell. I can't vouch for that. I have read that the French 12pdr had less range than the French 4 pdr. The reason was that the 4pdr M1859 was designed (although badly) as a rifle. BNIII says of the French rifles that they were "Napoleon Artillery."

Actually the 12pdr, which first saw action in the Crimea, was Napoleon III's definitive smooth bore field gun, a progressive development of a prior artillery series, the "Systeme Anglais Modifie" based on the British M1809 series single trail cannons. It was, of course, adopted as the U.S. Army's M1857 Napoleon Gun Howitzer. The M1859 "piece de 4" was the basis of the La Hitte bronze rifle series. Many left over Napoleons were subsequently rifled as were several 8pdrs of the M1828 series. Bronze rifles were a problem anyway because the shells were harder than the tube. According to some accounts some Austrian batteries holding an entrenched advanced position before Koennigraetz dueled with a much larger number of Prussian guns until they shot out their rifling, then withdrew.

All of these rules give a pretty hefty melee value to artillery. I don't know of any historical reason for this.

Formations: The two major areas of concern for me are the "Open Column" and, more importantly, skirmishers.

Open Column: BNIII is not cursed with this. Both the others have a formation which moves like a skirmisher, more or less melees like a column, and is a less vulnerable fire target than either a real column or cavalry. It appears to represent a column in which the ranks are straggling. TDFG permits this formation to close to the front. Most authorities before and during the Second Empire period noted that columns do not so much close to the front but recoil to the rear on entering melee. This could be overcome to some extent if the columns were well closed up and determined. Road columns were open in that sense, and tended to be hopeless close combat formations. At Custozza Captain Bechtoldshiem led about 100 troopers of the Sicily Uhlans into a road column of the Forli Brigade, roughly 3,000 infantry, and put it out of the battle, although a battalion reformed and ambushed them on the way out.

It is not clear how an increase of 20% or less in the depth of a column (or width of intervals between ranks) is expected to reduce casualties to frontal fire from rifle and canon when the files remain shoulder to shoulder.

Forget the "Open Column." The Prussians used battalion columns, half battalion columns, and company columns preceded by skirmishers for manuever, and formed into triple lines when necessary for a serious fire fight. Following the 1867 regulations, the French used double lines and skirmish lines for manuever and fire. I can't actually remember reference to French manuevering in column under fire before Sedan. At that battle there was a disasterous attack in what amounted to division column to break out. After Sedan the Republican levies sometimes attacked in column because they lacked the training to manuever in line.

Skirmishers: In all cases the frontage accorded to skirmishers is totally inaccurate.Skirmishers as represented in BNIII represent an increase in frontage of about 100% over a triple firing line (which in the mixed formation also serves as company columns.) It halves casualties. That is balanced, except that a formation half as dense as a triple line is still shoulder to shoulder. GBGV is actually the best in this regard, since it's skirmishers use up to 3 times the frontage of a triple line. At best, TDFG skirmishers take about 10% more space than a double (or triple) line. GBGV allows mounted skirmishers to extend to 4 times the normal frontage, but cavalry spread out like that still takes losses as heavy as a shoulder to shoulder triple line.

The real trick is that skirmishers didn't advance more rapidly than lines or columns. In fact, Prussian officers, even long after the war, when experience with the Prussian Guard in attacks near Paris showed that well disciplined troops could be counted on to advance in open order, remained paranoid about even attempting to use unsupported skirmishers. It was an article of faith that skirmishers would not advance more rapidly than their supports, and, left to their own devices, would stop and shoot all day. This is at least captured in TDFG, but only with respect to prone troops. (recall in THE COURIER 61 that the scenario for 1870-1914 penalized the Prussian player for having his battalion go to ground in open order before rushing a small force of dismounted dragoons.)

Prone Position: As noted, BNIII infantry don't resort to such unfair tactics. Pity. In real life that was the norm for infantry under heavy fire, especially from artillery in 1870-71. GBGV reckons prone infantry to be .75 as vulnerable as standing infantry, even though they would be only about 15% as exposed. TDFG reduces effect by 1/3rd to 1/2 depending on range, but standing up costs one function. The latter penalty is correct. However, prone soldiers should be very hard (but not impossible) to hit with rifles and resistent to artillery.

I very much like Phillips' (BNIII) reactive formation which seeks to duplicate the Prussian company column/skirmisher combination. However, it is out of balance in terms of frontage and the relative number of rifles that would be in a skirmish line for a battalion in company columns. One would in fact expect that only one company would be so engaged and part of it would be in small groups immediately behind the skirmish line. Also, some provision might be made to permit reactive adaptations in other circumstances. Much as I enjoyed riding down a skirmish line and terrifying a couple of Bavarian battalions with my cavalry, I wouldn't necessarily expect an oncoming brigade to be unable to adapt while 480 daredevils crossed 1700 yards in plain sight.

Cavalry and Movement: Apparently terrified that their rules might misrepresent the period by allowing successful saber and lance charges, all these rules have built in extraordinary penalties which rule designers for other periods usually find unnecessary.

TDFG takes the added precaution of forbidding cavalry to fight on foot or attack in open order. Dave says of this that they so rarely did it that it should be forbidden. In point of fact, attack by light cavalry en forragere was not uncommon in Uncle Napoleon's Army, and the Chasseurs d'Afrique charged in that manner at Balaclava. At Vionville Mars La Tour none other than Von Bredow. before launching his Todesritte (Death Ride) with his 7th(Madgeburg) Cuirassiers and 16th (Altmark) Uhlans told off the 16th (Schlesswig-Holstein) Dragoons to clear a wood on his flank as dismounted skirmishers so that enemy skirmishers would not creep up and fire on his heavy cavalry while they were forming for the charge. I have read that he also, in 1866 near Tobischau put his squadrons of the 5th (West Prussian) Cuirassiers which rushed the Austrian artillery rearguard in somewhat open order while leading the first squadron knee to knee against the cavalry supports. (Ten cuirassiers down, 18 guns captured-no double casualties here!) Dave acknowledges that a couple of squadrons of dismounted French Dragoons played a key role in defending a railroad station. He may not have been aware that in some of the sorties from Metz French dragoon brigades were sent to seize and hold villages on the flanks of infantry attacks.

Forget it. If Bredow can do it, and Bazaine can do it, so can the historical gamer.

It should be noted that MG Hughes classic FIREPOWER, based on the Royal Artillery and Madras Artillery manuals circa 1848 estimated relative casualties to notional attacks by lines of infantry or cavalry as being proportionate to time under fire. Under any of the rules considered, the cavalry would suffer twice the casualties per turn-although it must be admitted that under BNIII the cavalry moves almost fast enough to make up for it.

As to movement, the best manuever speed on the battlefield (except in the closing stages of a charge) for line infantry should be reckoned at no more than quickstep of 3mph. If we assume that to be the rate of a mythical "deep column," or the highly motivated skirmisher of BNIII, we find that in TDFG a heavy cavalry unit will charge at 3mph, light cavalry at 5mph. GBGV seems to make a heavy cavalry charge nearly 4mph, while light cavalry can move out at a smart 5mph. BNIII reckons that heavy cavalry in 1870 would manuever at 3.2mph and charge at 4.8mph

By contrast, MG Hughes (op.cit.) relates that cavalry attacking a position occuppied by artillery would cross the first half mile at a trot (per my 1936 manual, 6mph to 8mph) the next quarter mile at a canter (8mph to 10mph) and the last quarter mile at a gallop (12mph to 16mph.) The aggregate time under fire, based on the rounds reported, was less than a third of the time infantry would spend under fire. Hughes reports an anticipated 40 cavalry casualties per gun (rather more than at Tobischau) versus 120 infantry casualties per gun.

Cavalry as a target was mainly cursed with the lack of hiding places and an inability to go prone while mounted (except for cossacks.) Normally it would be about 2/3rds as dense and 50% taller than a single line of infantry. However, in a charge, per the German 1877 regulations (borrowed heavily from those of 1757) the distance between the first and second rank would be 2 lengths (of a horse) for troopers armed with sabers, 3 lengths (for obvious reasons) for troopers armed with lances (in uncle Napoleon's Army it was concluded that the lances of the second rank were chiefly dangerous to the troopers in the first rank.) A canon ball slanting down through a cavalry charge would be lucky to take a man from the first and a horse from the second. With the same effort it could crunch three Prussians or two Frenchmen in line, or cut a ghastly swath through a column. It is problematical whether cannister, minie balls, or the slug from a Dreyse could pass through more than one victim, but the slug from a Chassepot (44 caliber) probably could at many ranges-but certainly not through more than one horse.

The double effect of fire on cavalry seems to have no historical basis and is far from universal in smooth bore rules, although it is in the close range deviation of the smooth bore musket and its inability to go through more than one victim that the added height of the mounted trooper over the standing soldier would be greatest. It can only be that Second Empire authors are afraid that their rules would otherwise permit rash cavalry charges to succeed on a regular basis.

Stop hobbling and otherwise harassing your horsemen, I say! (I've been telling Don Featherstone that for 30 years.) If your overall fire, movement, range, and morale rules are well written, the cavalry will be able to do little enough to add tone to a dull brawl.

More Three Roads to Paris

Introduction
Review: They Died for Glory
Review: Grand Bataille Grand Victorie
Review: In the Age of Bismark and Napoleon III
General Issues

Letter: Clarification for They Died for Glory (#65)
Rebuttals to Three Roads to Paris (#66)