Pat Condray' article "Three Roads to Paris" (The Courier , #64) presented a comparison of three sets of Franco-Prussian War period rules through playing the same sceanrio with all three sets. We received a lot of comment from The rule authors, or gamers who enjoyed one set of the rules or the other. I started to present them as "Letters To The Editor", but felt that they ere to lengthy and promised to present a rebuttal to Pat's comments by the authors of the rules as an article. I did not have rebuttals from All the authors, and endeavored to get them with mixed results.
Thus the following includes an out-and-out rebuttal, a "political" statement, and a set of modifications that address Pats comments by a player of the rule set, not its author. In retrospect, I feel that this is a fair representation of the letters I received and present here
As the co-author of They Died For Glory, I would like to comment on Pat Condray's review of my game in the article Three roads To Paris. I must confess that I was a little dismayed by the negative tone of all three reviews. If I were a newcomer to the hobby, or to late 19th century wargaming, I don't think I would want to play any of the three sets of rules after reading Pat's review. We need to encourage new players to join the hobby, not discourage them. There were also a couple of important pieces of information that were missing from the review.
First of all, how much does each set of rules cost? Secondly, how many miniature figures are required for each side in order to play a game (the review mentioned the number of battalions, but not the number of figures needed for a battalion as per each rule set). A newcomer to the period would need to know this information before deciding if he wanted to start gaming in this period.
I also want to point out that the number of troops Pat used for his playtest were out of proportion. He used 4.5 French battalions, which represented approximately one-third of a French Division (which contained 13 battalions), yet he used an entire Division's worth of artillery (two 4pdr guns and a mitrailleuse battery). His playtesting might have gone better if he had reduced the mount of artillery in proportion to the amount of infantry available. In terms of the Prussians, the ratios were better with approximately half a Prussian Infantry Division and half a division's worth of artillery.
Lack of Breakthrough Rules: Pat is right that TDFG does not allow Breakthrough by a victorious unit following a successful melee. I have seen Breakthrough handled differently in various sets of rules. Some allow it, and the opposing units are "frozen" in place, unable to fire if they have used up their limited number of operations during their regular move. other rulesets allow breakthrough, but give the opposing units additional operations in order to fire at, or move towards, the unit on Breakthrough.
In an era of breechloading rifles, it seemed unrealistic to prohibit units from firing at a unit in Breakthrough. Another problem with a Breakthrough round is that while one or two players are busy moving their units, the rest of the players stand around with nothing to do. I have seen Breakthrough rounds last over an hour, leaving the majority of players with nothing to do. Therefore, in order to speed up the game, units can take their "Breakthrough" on the next turn, and risk being fired at by the enemy.
Firing into the woods: as long as a unit can see an enemy unit in the woods(i.e. the unit is within 4" of the woods, or the enemy has fired out of the woods), the unit can fire into the woods. The unit can be at wextreme range when it fires, but the bullets won't penetrate more than 4" into the woods. This rule may be less than clear and will be clarified in a forthcoming errata sheet.
Open Column: Pat refers to the use of the Open Column as being the new version of themythical Flying Column. While the first edition of TDFG( published in The Courier, Vol VII, No. 1) referred to Flying Columns, the current edition uses the term "Deep Column" (not Open Column). We could have just as easily used the term "Battalion Column". In his book on the Franco-Prussian War (published in 1872), A. Boguslawski referred to the Prussian Company Column formation, and stated that the French tried to do something similar by dividing the battalion and sending companies to the front seperately. the Deep Column formation is our attempt to simulate the practice of sending out battalion skirmishers to screen an advancing column. One can argue over the best means of simulating this tactic, but the important thing is the results on the gaming table.
Sequence of Artillery Fire: One of Pat's playtesters complained that the French got the first artillery shot in the game. However, a player looking at the Sequence of Play Table (TDFG pp11) will see that artillery fire is simultaneous. Therefore, the French should not have been able to get off the first artillery shot.
Die Rolling for Artillery: THEY DIED FOR GLORY uses two sets of die rolling for artillery fire. the first roll is to determine the number of hits and the second is to determine the damage caused by artillery fire (when firing cannister, artillery skips the first roll and immediately rolls for damage). Pat is correct that we might jhave been able to figure out a way to reduce this to one set of die rolls. However, when using D6s there is a limited number of gradations available. Changing to a single die roll would have meant "bunching up" the hits on the artillery chart. Dave Waxtel and I discussed switching to a D10 system to increase the gradations available, but decided against this, primarily because we did not wish to alienate our players with a major change in the rule system, as had been done with other rule sets (eg. WRG and Empire).
Range of French Mitrailleuse: I have to disagree with Pat's assertion that the Mitrailleuse had a longer range than the Chassepot. In his book "Mitrailleuses and Machine-Guns" (1874), Captain J. F. Owen, R.A., stated that the mitrailleuse was intended to produce fire "like that of case...or a hail of bullets, for ranges up to 1000 or 1200 yds.". Other sources that I read placed the mitrailleuse's range at approximately 1000 yards. Since TDFG has a ground scale of 1" equals 50 yards, that would give the mitrailleuse a range of 20". We reduced the range to 15" since the mitrailleuse was ineffective at long range. While machine guns in WWI may have been crewed by specialists and used effectively as infantry support, such was not the case during the Franco-Prussian War.
The mitrailleuse had never been used in battle before and no one knew how to use it effectively; witness the fact the mitrailleuses were assigned to the artillery and were often used at long range, thereby reducing their effectiveness.
Alternatively, the Chassepot had a range of 1200 to 1600 meters. This would normally have translated to a range of 24" to 32" on the gaming table. However, we reduced the range to 18" to take into account the Chassepot's accuracy problems. Among them was the fact that the sights on a Chassepot rifle would often get bent out of alignment after a few bayonet charges.
It is not my intention to get into an argument over the respective ranges of the Mitrailleuse and the Chassepot. I merely wishto point out that we had a rational basis for assigning the various weapons' ranges that we did.
Range of Prussian Needlegun: Pat incorrectly stated that TDFG gives the Dreyse Needlegun a range of 800 yards. We used 600 yards as the range for the Needlegun and reduced the range of the Chassepot for the reasons stated above.
French vs. Prussian Melee dice: Most French infantry melee with 1 die for every 2 figures, while the Prussians receive 2 dice for every 3 figures. This has nothing to do with the amount of room that French and Prussian wounded took up. Rather, this is our attempt to reflect various factors that differentiated the French and Prussian infantry. These factors include: unit cohesion, leadership, equipment (the French were often without basic supplies and were, therefore, tired and hungry), and fighting experience. The Prussians had more recent combat experience than the majority of the French (i.e., Denmark in 1864 and Austria in
1866). The French had not fought a major war in over a decade (Austria 1859). It should be noted that in TDFG the French units with more recent combat experience (eg. the Turcos and Zouaves) also melee with 2 dice for every 3 figures, like the Prussians.
French Artillery: Major James E. Hicks, in his book, "French Military Weapons", stated that the French 12pdr gun was originally a smoothbore gun, but was modified in 1858 by rifling. That is why the 12pdr has a longer range than a 4pdr gun in TDFG. Michael Howard, in his book "The Franco-Prussian War", states on page 5 that the French Army, by 1866, was the first army to be totally equipped with rifled cannon. All artillerymen melee as per French line infantry (i.e., 1 die for every 2 figures). I'm not sure I would describe that as a "hefty" melee value. However, players are free to reduce that ratio if they think it is appropriate (eg., 1 die for every 3 figures). Guns do such little damage in melee that I'm not sure I found the article well done and thought provoking. I enjoyed it very much. I hope that it will be further elaborated upon in future issues.
As per Dick Bryant's request concerning any comments on the article Three Roads to Paris I have these observations. When Grande Bataille, Grande Victoire was released in July, 1991 it was then the only rules set (for miniatures), designed specifically to meet the basic needs of an entire period (namely the 2nd Empire). I do emphasize the word basic. GB,GV was not designed to answer every question, tactical or otherwise, relating to the period, but rather it has been designed to offer an introduction to a fascinating period in military history - a period in which ABSINTHE PRESS will continue to dedicate itself to.
It's apparent that my interpretation of a mid-nineteenth century battlefield conflicts with those who approach wargaming through drill-manuals and other quasi-scientific methods. My main emphasis (if there is one to be found) centers around more human factors - morale, leadership and that which fascinates me most, the fog of war. That being said, I will opt to forego arguing any points made in the article relating to GB,GV directly. It's enough for myself, at this juncture, to simply appreciate and respect the opinions presented while not judging any of the comments made. I would suggest that, for those interested, go out and purchase all three of the rules presented in the article and game them for yourselves. They all have something to offer.
Pat Condray raised several specific objections to The Age of Bismark (ABN) in his article. I listed them below along with my comments and/or solution:
The "figures per unit" do not match the OBs and figure scale: This comment is quite true. One of the strengths of They Died for Glory is the extensive Order of Battle section; this and other sources available on the wars in question allow players to adjust the "figures per unit" numbers given in ABN without too much difficulty.
Troops cannot go prone: Allow troops to go prone at no cost at the end of movement. Troops are then allowed to stand during their next formation segment (this would count as a formation change), and would automatically do so when an attacker closes on them in the melee phase. Fire at prone infantry is halved for small arms and treated as two fire classes worse for artillery.
Cavalry are twice as vulnerable to casualties (vs speed is armor"): Assuming his figures are correct(formations 2/3 as dense, 150% taller target) and leaving aside the question of distance between ranks, count cavalry the same as infantry for vulnerability to fire (1 x0.6 x 1.5 equals .9, call it 1 to satisfy the "cavalry are a good target" proponents). radical cavalry exponents could take Mr. Condray and M. G. Hughes at their word (i.e. that cavalry attacking spend one-third the time under fire that infantry do) and decrease the effect of fire on CHARGING cavalry by, say, two or three range classes.
Skirmish fronts are not broad enough; they do not depict complete dispersal of the unit: I am inclined to wonder whether even a unit "completely" in skirmish order is not holding some formed local reserves for the firing line (Condray suggests as much on Pg. 19, Para. 7 #64). This might explain the "body spread" that concerns him.
The mixed formation is a little too powerful, and more reactive formations are needed: One correction would be to form the supporting columns as one stand in front of two (to show broad front but small forward firepower) and allow only one stand forward as skirmishers. Looks ugly, though
Artillery has a "pretty hefty melee value": This was a general comment about all three sets of rules. But in ABN, close combat is not resolved by comparing melee values, it is resolved by comparing morale values after both parties have inflicted casualties through fire (or, if cavalry, through direct action); artillery suffers a heavy penalty in this final comparison. I would advocate leaving this as is.
Cavalry are not allowed to move at the proper speed: Allow cavalry charge speeds of 25" and 30" for heavy and light; this reflects the average speed Pat calculates.
Cavalry are not allowed to dismount: Allow cavalry to dismount up to 3/4 of all figures, presumably into skirmish line (I am not aware of dismounted cavalry employing other formations), taking one entire move to do so. Remounting would be the same process in reverse.
In addition, I have one complaint of my own:
The command system is designed only to limit players, not unit commanders: Being employed in the realm of command and control, I always examine this part of a game's design first. The order capacity rules are the only reflection of C2 in ABN; they are not innovative, but are nonetheless sufficient to the task. Their two drawbacks are: They only apply between player commanders, and they do not really deal with command at the divisional level in 1870 or 1877-78.
The first drawback, I would address by requiring players to write orders for subordinate commanders as well as player commanders. each commander may start the game with one order; any changes fall within the limitations of the order capacity system. An order must contain either offensive of defensive (i.e., attack, maneuver, or defend) instructions, and either a relative or specific position (i.e., "to the west of the 1st Corps" or "within the town of Spicheren"). Attack or maneuver orders must specify a route, otherwise they should be interpreted as "by the fastest possible route".
New orders could not be acted upon if a commander has become a casualty; a new commander would have to be appointed by the senior officer in the chain of command (at the cost of 1 order capacity point). The receipt time of orders should also vary by distance between commanders; a good rule of thumb would be the distance between sender and receiver divided by light cavalry charge distance, rounded up.
The second drawback can be simply addressed by requiring orders not only for all corps commanders (and army commanders, if more than one present), but also for all divisional commanders. in some battles (those between armies), this suggestion would too greatly increase the number of orders being written.
In such cases, I would suggest that instead of full written orders for division commanders, a system of chits, like those used in Johnny Reb or Command Decision be used to issue summarized orders (e.g., "maneuver in this direction", "take terrain objective", "attack enemy formation", "defend this position", "stand in reserve"). These would be placed at the beginning of the day and could be changed by the appropriate corps commander, given the same amount of time lag as with written orders. This system would not be necessary in smaller battles, like those in the Crimea, where most of the generals of even divisional rank are player characters; written orders would do here.
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