These troops, elements of the Kure 5th Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF), the 16th Naval Pioneer Unit (NPU) and a company of the Sasebo 5th SNLF at Kavieng, plus an additional company of the Kure 5th SNLF at Buna, set sail on the morning of August 24.
The troops from Buna, traveling in seven landing craft, were detected by allied recon aircraft and coast watchers on the 25th and attacked by 12 Kittyhawk LAs (P-40s, using US nomenclature) from Gili-Gili airfield. All seven landing craft were sunk on the beaches of Good enough Island, where the Japanese had put in for a short rest. Already, Milne Bay was proving an effective asset in the war on Japan.
DAY 1 (25 AUGUST 1942)
The troops sailing from Kavieng fared much better. Though also detected on the 25th by a recon plane, bad weather kept allied strike aircraft grounded and then concealed the ships from the aircraft once they did take off. The Japanese began landing the night of the 25th at 2200 hours. A beachhead and supply dump was established on the north shore of Milne Bay near Waga Waga, five miles east of the intended landing point.
DAY 2 (26 AUGUST 1942)
The hours of the 26th were spent securing the beachhead and conducting probing attacks to the east and west along the narrow coastal plain. In the afternoon, P-40s from Gili-Gili and B-17s from Port Moresby strafed and bombed the beachhead, destroying substantial quantities of supplies and driving off the still unloading transports. During the night of the 26th, the Japanese attacked east toward K.B. Mission, dislodging two companies of Australian militia. At dawn on the 27th the Japanese broke off and retired back toward the beachhead.
DAY 3 (27 August 1942)
On the 27th General Clowes, the Allied Milne Bay force commander, ordered the 2/10 Australian infantry, 18th brigade, to occupy the Kristian Broders (K.B.) Mission. General Clowes needed better information as to the Japanese dispositions and plans. The 2/10th was to maintain contact with the Japanese, draw them Out, and in general find out what they were up to. As this was primarily a recon in force, few heavy weapons were brought, although the force's battery of 25 pounders would be available for general support.
The General positioned most of his force, two battalions of militia plus the US engineers and antiaircraft artillery, in a defensive line paralleling the west edge of Airfield No. 3's runway. The 2/10th reached K.B. Mission in the late afternoon of the 27th, encountering no organized opposition from the Japanese troops in the area. Had they withdrawn? Were they using their landing craft to outflank the defenses and capture the airfields? With orders to continue east the next day, the battalion settled into night quarters.
Shortly after sunset the Japanese attacked with all they had, including a handful of light tanks. The 2/10th, armed only with light weapons, and whose only anti-tank protection were stickytype hand grenades, were unable to stop the Japanese. After two hours of fighting the Japanese split the Australian battalion, forcing the battalion headquarters and two companies into the jungle, while the remainder retreated down the road, toward the airfields.
The Japanese pursued the retreating Australians, slogging through -the mud and woods. Shortly before dawn the Japanese force reached the outskirts of Airfield No. 3. The airstrip provided the Allies with an ideal defensive position. The runway was Cleared, but not graded, the eastern edge being covered with heavy mud.. It provided a cleared area 2,000 yards long and 100 yards wide. Here the 25th and 61st battalions Citizen Military Forces (Australian Militia), along with the US 709th airborne anti-aircraft artillery battery and two companies of US engineers had dug in on the west side of the airstrip and waited.
The Japanese attempted a frontal assault across the airstrip about the only option present at the time. The Japanese force was repulsed with light losses.
DAY 4 (28 AUGUST 1942)
Considering the situation desperate, General Clowes ordered the aircraft based at Gili-Gili to Port Moresby, and dug in deeper awaiting the next Japanese move. The Japanese regrouped in the woods east of the airfield.
The Japanese attempted to break through the defensive line at airfield No. 3. Again, a large scale frontal assault was thrown against the Allied defenses. This attack was beaten back with heavy losses to the Japanese.
DAY 5 (29 AUGUST 1942)
On the 29th, the Japanese landed additional reinforcements at Waga Waga from a convoy of one light cruiser and nine destroyers 568 men of the 5th Kure SNLF and 200 of the Yokasuka 5th SNLF. The convoy also brought Captain Yano (IJN), who as senior officer, assumed command of the attack on Airfield No. 3.
On the Australian side, General Clowes, sensing the decisive battle was near began concentrating the remaining battalions of the 18th Brigade, West and South of Gili-Gili airfield. The survivors of the 2/10th battalion, from the attack on the 27th August, regrouped at Gili- Gili.
DAY 6 (30 AUGUST 1942)
During the day the Australians conducted patrols toward Kilabo. These patrols encountered stiff resistance from the Japanese troops. Interpreting the continued presence of large number of Japanese as signs of another attack, General Clowes alerted the defenders of Airfield No. 3 to guard against attack. The same troops occupied much the same defenses that they used on the night of the 27th. and 28th.
That night the Japanese launched another all-out attack against airfield No.3. Near dawn, the attack intensified. Raked by the concentration of defensive firepower, the Japanese suffered heavy casualties and the attack failed. Not a single Japanese soldier crossed the muddy clearing or airfield No. 3.
DAY 7 (31 AUGUST 1942)
The Japanese spent the 31st regrouping their losses from the previous nights attack. General Clowes decided to shift to the offensive and began to plan an attack . Minimal conflict occurred as patrols from both sides maintained contact. The Japanese began to suffer from their lack of supplies.
DAY 8 (1 SEPTEMBER 1942)
The 18th Infantry Brigade, under Brig. General Wootens, began the offensive designed to clear the Japanese from Milne Bay's north shore. Though the progress was slow, the Australians pushed the Japanese back toward their beachhead over the next three days.
Admiral Mikawa at the IJN's 8th Fleet HQ offered 200 SNLF troops immediately and 1,000 additional troops, if the SNLF could hold on until the September 12th. Captain Yano informed Mikawa that, given the status of his troops (a combination of lack of supply, fatigue, and reduced morale), further offensive operations were impossible and successful resistance against an Allied attack was unlikely.
DAY 9 (2 SEPTEMBER 1942)
Admiral Mikawa cancelled the reinforcement operation, and ordered Captain Yano to begin planning to withdraw the Milne Bay force by sea.
DAY 12 (4 SEPTEMBER 1942)
The Japanese, having resigned any hope of success, began evacuating the wounded men by sea. The continued lack of supply reduced the effectiveness of the SNLF troops. Units of the Australian 18th Infantry brigade continued to attack the Japanese troops, making impressive gains, up to the K.B. Mission.
DAY 13 (5 SEPTEMBER 1942)
The remainder of the Japanese troops at Milne Bay, except for a small rearguard. detachment, embarked on their transports. The Australians, hot on their heels, were within earshot of the withdrawing Japanese. 1600 of the 1900 troops were successfully withdrawn, but none of them not even the troops landed on the 29th were in any condition to fight.
GAMING THE MILNE BAY CAMPAIGN WITH COMMAND DECISION
Milne Bay, as organized for Command Decision (CD), is a small campaign, suitable for four to six players and a referee. To instill a measure of surprise and uncertainty, it is highly recommended that the players use the services of a referee.
Campaign length
The campaign begins with the 1200 hours/25 August 1942 turn. The campaign continues until the Japanese capture Gili-Gili airfield, are withdrawn by the Japanese, or are eliminated by the Allied players. Failing that, the campaign ends on the 5 September turn in a draw.
Turn structure
The Milne Bay campaign consists of two types of turns-operational turns of eight hours duration, and tactical turns of 15/30 minutes correlating to a single day/night turn of CD. For further information on the turn structure and movement rates, see CD's Campaign rules in Appendix II-Campaign.
The major change to the campaign rules is that the Japanese player(s) may elect to conduct offensive operations during a night turn. Either the previous or following operational turns must be spent resting the troops due to the spent night turn.
The Allies may not conduct night attacks, though they may continue afternoon combat operations until 2200 hours. Allied troops that are attacked at night may conduct counter-attacks and pursue a withdrawing Japanese force.
Maps
Two maps are used in this campaign the strategic map and the operational map. The strategic map, scaled at fifteen miles per hex, is used to regulate the movement of task groups of ships and formations of aircraft between the far-flung bases of the Southwest Pacific area. It is also useful for resolving air attacks on naval vessels at sea. You can use either CD or a set of naval miniature rules to resolve the spotting and combat attempts.
The operational map, scaled at one kilometer per hex, is used in setting up battlefield terrain. It is also used to move troops and ships into and during tactical combat.
Terrain
Milne Bay has truly horrific terrain for the conduct of a modern battle. The only clear (non-obstructed LOS) area on the map are the airfields, the beach and the bay itself.
Campaign set up
The Allied troops are deployed around Milne Bay as listed in the order of battle. Aircraft start at the indicated airfield. Only aircraft at Gili-Gili may be reassigned or may land at other airfields. The Allied theater command will not risk more planes in the battlefield, but will allow the Gili-Gili aircraft to re-deploy to avoid capture or destruction.
The Japanese are deployed in two groups, the Kavieng group (CruDiv 18) and the Buna group (Buna), as listed on the order of battle. Troops listed as deploying with these forces are embarked upon the transports, destroyers, and landing craft, as the Japanese players see fit. The starting points of the Japanese task groups is within six hexes of the point marked on the strategic map.
Additional Japanese troops become available as indicated on the reinforcement schedule. These troops must be transported to Milne Bay from their entry port by ship, landing craft, or, if a suitable airstrip is secured, aircraft. There are no replacement points available to either side. Regroup orders may not be issued to units which conduct night movement, or are engaged in combat.
Supply Sources
Supply is determined as given in CD's campaign appendix. The Japanese supply dump unloaded from the ships functions as a supply source for the Japanese. They may trace supply along the dirt road as stated in the campaign rules, or from general supply provided by amphibious transport.
Victory Conditions
The Japanese must capture Airfield No. 3, Gili-Gili airfield, and the Milne Bay jetty to achieve total victory. capturing the jetty and Gili-Gili results in a major victory. Capturing Airfield No. 3 alone, is a minor victory. Any other result is an Allied victory.
Battle of Milne Bay, New Guinea: August 27-28, 1942 An Introductory Campaign for Command Decision, 2nd Edition
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