Conflict Special Study 1

Observations and Conclusions

by TP Schweider

Despite the differences between types of tanks employed by both sides in the Yom Kippur War, the fact remains that any tank could, within 1,000 meters range, destroy any other tank.

Most combat took place between 500 to 1,200 meters. This was especially true on the Golan Front, where the terrain is broken by low hills and ridge lines. After the Arab tank waves had crossed the cease-fire lines (exposing themselves to long-range gun fire from the Israeli tanks), they rapidly closed the distance to turn the battle into a slugging match close-up between platoons of tanks. The Jews then had to forfeit their superior range in order to close with and push back the Arabs once the Israelis began to counter-attack.

Tank-vs.-tank combat then resembled more of an Old West shoot-out, with the most accurate first shot often deciding the issue. Soviet doctrine dictates salvoes by platoons of tanks against a single target. While the Arabs were using 3 to 9 tanks to attempt destroying one Israeli tank, the Jews were often achieving a 13:1 kill ratio by individual tank gunnery action. Some crews even obtained a 40:1 kill ratio during the War.

Losses on either side were not as great as first supposed, although they were heavy. Only about 250 Israeli tanks were unsalvageable, the remainder were retrieved for immediate salvage and repair. Almost all the seriously damaged/destroyed Arab tanks fell into Israeli hands, as the Jews commanded nearly all the battlefields at the end of the conflict.

Both sides have had all their losses in armor made good by their respective sponsors, and are prepared for another go-round.

In general, Western-designed tanks proved superior in combat to their less sophisticated Soviet counterparts. The most important aspects of the tank-vs.-tank combat were accuracy, rate of fire, and crew training, more than the qualities of the individual tank.

Combat experience has shown the need for the following technological improvements:

    1) Modified types of frontal armor to reduce penetration of HEAT warheads;

    2) A capacity to shoot and fight on the move to suppress relatively simple, infantry-manned anti-tank weapons such as the RPG-7;

    3) A secondary weapon to defeat wire-guided anti-tank missiles such as the SAGGER;

    4) Compartmentalization and protection of ammunition stowage to prevent the ammunition from exploding in case of a penetrating hit;

    5) A lower profile.

However, more important than the quality of the tanks was the quality of the crews. Although the Arabs have improved considerably since 1967, in 1973 they were good, but not good enough. The Arabs have yet to match the Jews in intelligence, cohesion, experience, and the willingness to die intelligently. When their tanks were hit, the Arabs tended to immediately abandon them. The Jews would keep fighting their tank until they were all dead or the tank was untenable, thus making kills even though immobile. It was a matter of superior teamwork (one Israeli tank crew had been together as a crew for 12 years), training, morale, and leadership.

Israeli tankers shoot better with their main guns than the Arabs do. The Jews have more practice, better training, and a more competitive environment. They think, move, react, and make decisions better at all levels than any other army and do it on the move. They are willing to die, when necessary, but still maintain their combat efficiency. While not supermen (the Israelis made some very rash assaults in the opening days of the War), they are still superior to the Arabs.

Indeed, had the Israelis been equipped with the same Soviet tanks as their Arab opponents were, the outcome of the War may have been much the same. Western tanks gave Jewish crews just that much more of an edge over the Arabs.

People fight wars, not weapons.

A burned-out T-55 in the Golan heights. The tendency of Soviet tanks to burn easily earned them the nickname "flaming coffins" by Warsaw Pact observers. Also note the 12.7mm DShK anti-aircraft machinegun mounted on the turret. Obsessive Arab fear of Israeli air power led them to mount this weapon on all models of their tanks (including T-55's and T-62's), whereas only T-54's in Warsaw Pact and Soviet armies usually include the heavy MG.

TANKDESTRUCTIVENESSSURVIVABILITYAVAILABILITY
CenturionEXCELLENTGOODGOOD
T-54/55FAIRPOORFAIR
T-62FAIRPOORFAIR
M-48EXCELLENTFAIRGOOD
M-60EXCELLENTFAIRGOOD

Main BattleTank Losses
Country Tanks EngagedNo. of BattalionsLosses% of Force
Syria1,300411,15088
Iraq250*714056
Jordan200**65025
Egypt1,4004775054
Total Arab3,1501012,09066
Israel1,50040550***37
*One armored division.
**Two armored brigades (with Centurions).
*** 250 lost were totally unsalvageable. This figure includes tanks that were knocked-out/repaired several times. In addition, nearly every Israeli tank suffered from mechanical break-downs, small arms fire, or other battlefield damage.

Jewish tank losses on the Golan front were attobuted to: 1) Arab tanks; 2) RPG-7; 3) Artillery and mines; 4) SaggerAT missiles and aircraft.

On the Sinai front, losses occurred to: 1) Sagger and missiles, RPG-7, and recoilless rifles; 2) Arab tanks; 3) Artillery, mines, and aircraft.

Overall, the Jews lost 25% of their AFV's to Sagger AT missiles, 25% to RPG bazookas and recoilless rifles, 30% to Arab tanks, and 20% to artillery, mines, and aircraft.

Arab tank losses were due 63% to Jewish tanks, 20% to the Israeli Air Force, and 17% to artillery, AT obstacles, and Jewish infantry. Most Israeli tanks scored a 13:1 kill ratio in tank-vs.-tank combat.

Israel's most numerous tank type at the start of the October War was the Centurion. Well over a third of the armored command was M-48/60 types. Only a few units of vintage Shermans were identified. The Arabs had primarily T-54/55 tanks, but at least one-fifth of the Egyptian and Svrian armored force was made up of T-62's.

More Arab-Israeli Armor 1973

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© Copyright 1975 by Dana Lombardy.
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