"The advantages of military science and art cannot be exerted unless a proper number of soldiers are united into one body and activated by one soul." -- Gibbon D.H. Mahan saw the art of handling troops upon the field divided into two categories, minor tactics and grand tactics. Minor tactics dealt principally with the "drawing up and moving of troops systematically." This included the drilling of troops and the maintenance of a particular body of troops in a formation. Grand tactics was different in that it was "the art of combining, disposing, and handling the troops in the field." The choosing of lines, positioning of troops and, especially, combining the arms of battle into one cohesive unit were the primary considerations. Unlike minor tactics, grand tactics had no prescribed maneuvers or formations. At best only the most general rules were made to apply to the planning and directing of battles. Often there was a general plan with many unique variations that fitted the terrain and disposition of each battle. With the coming of the rifle-musket, the face of battle was changed drastically to fit the new situations brought about bv the increase in firepower. With the introduction of the new arms, battles were being fought more with "fire" and less with the "bayonet." The steel-tipped masses of Napoleon's time simply could not maintain the morale necessary for a charge through the long deadly range of the rifle-musket. This meant that the defender could discard his masses and thin his manpower out along longer lines. Flanking attacks became harder as the lengthening lines made it more difficult to march around the increasing firepower. The attacker seemingly found only one option remaining -- the liberal use of his fire to weaken the enemy's strength and morale. It appeared as though war was entering a phenomenal growth in the use of fire. This emerging crisis was to increase every decade until by 1915, a war of mobility was nearly eliminated for a war of firepower. In order to understand the effect this was to have we should compare a "typical" Napoleonic and Civil War army in an approach and attack upon a hostile position. Scouts When approaching the enemy during the Civil War, armies employed a series of outposts and scouts based upon the system used in the Napoleonic wars. Large bodies of cavalry were thrown out to locate and scout the enemy's position. Often the defender would seek to deny the offensive cavalry such information by employing sharp counter attacks upon the reconnaissance force. In addition, the defender would also attempt to locate the attacker's approach and intentions by counter scouting. In addition to denying the enemy accurate information of an army's location, a thin line of individual observers, called Vedettes, were thrown out around the main body. It was the Vedettes' duty to watch for sudden enemy advances and then to report the information to his support unit, the Grand Guard. UsuaUy the Grand Guard was stationed around a key road or bridge with approximately thirty men to delay any sudden attack. With the delay in progress, the main body was frequently allowed enough time to ready for battle. When marching, the security problem became a more difScult one. As with the troops in bivouac, a system of progressively larger bodies of troops were deployed. Grand Guards were thrown out in advance, rear and both flanks of the marching army for maximum security. I. Typical posting of outposts while troops were encamped: (A) Vedettes warn of approach of the enemy. The Grand Guard (B) attempts to cover the approach via the bridge (C) to the Main Body (D) while it organizes. II. Posting of outguards while on the march: (A) Advanced Guard; (B) Rear Guard; (C) Main Body; (D) Flankers. Concentrations As information of the location of the approaching forces filtered in, both commanders would begin to concentrate their troops for battle at a specific location. As the troops converged in and along nearby roads, the general found himself now dealing with a new set of problems -- the delicate planning of grsnd tactics and the coordination of his forces into a simple yet effective plan. This became one of the most complicated problems of both wars. The three major arms of battle all required different terrain and locations for optimum use of their mobility and fire. The arms moved at different speeds and, if artillery, infantry and cavalry were not separated, extreme difficulty in movement and coordination could result. General Lepinasse criticized the French tendency early in the Napoleonic period of attaching batteries of artillery to shell infantry units. He wrote, "If you want to prevent your infantry from maneuvering, embarrass them with guns." Secret to Victory The secret to victory in both wars lay in separating the movements of the three arms while still uniting the effects of their action upon the enemy. As both the Civil War and Napoleonic wars continued, the generals discovered that by combining large units of infantry, cavalry and artillery, a powerful combination of fire, mass and mobility was delivered to the enemy. The old maxim, "Artillery prepares the victory, infantry achieves it and cavalry completes it," was the basic rule for coordination of the three arms. Yet when the attack was ordered, all similarity between a Civil War army and a Napoleonic army ended abruptly. In order to obtain the maximum benefits of fire, mass, morale and mobility, a Napoleonic attack relied heavily on shock applied to a limited area. Napoleonic Attack The Napoleonic attack would often begin with a series of local jarring attacks by dense swarms of skirmishers. These attacks were designed to pin the allied troops in position and force an exhaustion of the opposing army's reserve. As the stinging attacks continued, Napoleon massed his reserves opposite a key point in the enemy's line. Finally with the allied reserves exhausted and the troops disorganized, Napoleon ordered the main attack to begin. The artillery opened the action by galloping almost into the enemy's flintlock range. Then the pieces would be unlimbered and massed into a great battery of usually about 100 guns. When all was ready, the great battery would unleash a storm of canister and grape right into the massed ranks of the allies' infantry. When the canister tore gaps in the line, Napoleon's infantry and heavy cavalry were joined into solid masses and launched at the enemy. As the main assault advanced, the artillery was recalled and the masses of bayonets and sabers crashed into the enemy's demoralized line. As the gaps widened, the morale of the allies dropped and the demoralized infantry began to break leaving a large hole in the line. Into this gap rushed hordes of light cavalry who mercilessly pursued the routed infantry to prevent them from re-forming. The last strike of the attack was delivered when the remaining heavy cavalry and infantry wheeled right and left and swept the remaining fragments of the allies from the field. Napoleon's attack allowed for the proper concentration of mass, fire, mobility and morale effect upon the enemy. Heavy massed artillery fire shook morale and pinned the enemy under a heavy fire. Along with being pinned, mobility decreased with the exhaustion of the resewes. Then the main attack soon developed into a huge battering ram that gouged a large hole inthe enemy's line. In short, the strengths of all the units were combined for maximum results on the allies' army. But with the appearance of the rifle-musket, the effectiveness of this type of attack decreased markedly. Civil War Attack Much like the Napoleonic battles, in the Civil War the sporadic clashes of outposts and scouts usually preceded a battle. As advanced elements of the army began to trickle into the battlefield, the small engagements would grow in fury as reinforcements fed the picket line. The cavalry would often interject themselves into the burgeoning battle by quickly seizing key terrain features for the battlelines. The attackers and defenders continued to feed the firefight as skirmishers fought to secure a line on which the main army could form. Then, as the firing intensified, the main elements of both armies began to draw up in battle lines with skirmishers fanning out in advance. At the right moment, the covering cavalry would withdraw and the skirmish lines of the opposing armies advanced and made fire contact. The artillery now began to add its weight to the struggle with increasing support and long-range counter battery fire up and down the line. The tempo of fire continued to grow in fury as the attackers' artillery made every effort to pin down the defenders under a storm of shot and shrapnel. As the artillery fire reached a crescendo, long irregular lines of infantry preceded by a thin screen of skirmishers advanced to the attack. Soon the defender's skirmishers gave way as the attack entered rifle-musket range. Then the thin screen of soldiers preceding the advance were ordered back as the attacker prepared to charge. Suddenly, some 300 yards from the defender, the attackers confronted a wall of bullets, canister and grape that shattered the attacker's momentum and forced them to seek cover or dig in for protection. Command control began to break down as the orderly lines spread out and sought protection from the crushing fire. The attacker sent forth reinforcements in an attempt to renew the assault by an attack with fire designed to break the defender's will. Often the defender would counter with his reserves as the small-arms and canister fire filled the air in intensifying fire. Casualties soared as units were worn down and replaced with reserves. Finally, one side ran out of replacements as morale dipped from the grinding fire. The only alternative was to withdraw and hope the victor's pursuing cavalry was delayed by the rear guards. Frequently the follow-up of a breakthrough was unsuccessful. It appears as though such Sre battles as Gettysburg, Antietam and Shiloh so demoralized, disorganized and bloodied even the victor that effective rapid pursuit was out of the question. Another factor was that even small rear guards often were capable of dealing with cavalry because their rifle-muskets forced them to dismount more often under fire, and lose the momentum of the pursuit. Limit of Punishment The rifle-musket was forcing a change into a battle fought more with the "bullet" and less with the "bayonet." One observer noted, "There was a limit of punishment beyond which endurance would not go, and the Springfield was capable of inflicting it." General Gordon echoed these words when he remarked, ". . . One line or the other gave way under the galling fire of small arms, grape and canister before the bayonet could be brought into requisition." Yet the attacks of massed infantry were still utilized more out of ignorance than intelligence. It was simply becoming impossible to use the steel-tipped masses of Napoleon effectively. Fredericksburg, Vicksburg and many other battles show the folly of the old tactics when they were used against the new firepower. The commanders simply had to change the tactics to adjust to the rifle-musket. Along with the increasing firepower and the thinning of lines, ne w problems of command were developing. It was becoming harder to see the progress of battle. With the lengthening distances between soldiers and the enemy, it became quite difficult to control and advance or even react to an enemy's movements. Many participants in a Civil War battle reported never even seeing the enemy's line. After three days of fighting in the Wildemess in 1864, Private Wilkeson later wrote that he saw but a glimpse of a thin line of Confederate skirmishers. Colonel Lyman had a similar point of view when he was quoted on page 105 of Fuller's Conduct of War 1789-1961 assaying: "I have taken part. . . in two great battles, and heard the bullets whistle both days, and yet I had scarcely seen a Rebel save killed, wounded or prisoners! I remember even line officers, who were at the battle of Chancellorsville, who said: 'Why we never saw any Rebels where we were, only smoke and bushes, and lots of our men tumbling about,' end now I appreciate this most fully. The great art is to conceal men; for the moment they show, bang, bang, bang go a dozen cannon, the artillerists only too pleased to get a fair mark. Your typical 'great white plain' with long lines advancing and maneuvering, led on by generals in cocked hats and by bands of music exist not for us. Here it is as I said: 'Left face -- prime -- forward!' -- and then wrang, wr-rang, for three or four hours, or for all day, and the poor bleeding wounded streaming to the rear. That is a great battle in America." Colonel Lyman's observation of two years were not an exception to the rule. The "great white plain" with its masses of infantry and cavalry were disappearing under pressure from the new deadly fire. Battlelines were becoming more modern, irregular and dispersed in an effort to avoid the fire. Yet with all of the tactical innovations of the three arms of battle, the fire was to increase until the only apparent alternative left in the face of such galling fire was to dig for refuge from the rain of death. More ACW Rifle-Musket ACW: Introduction ACW: Infantry ACW: Infantry Tactics (Examples) ACW: Cavalry ACW: Artillery ACW: Engineers ACW: Entrenchments ACW: Grand Tactics ACW: Tactics: Auerstadt 1806 vs. New Market 1864 ACW: Conclusion and Bibliography Back to Conflict Number 7 Table of Contents Back to Conflict List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1974 by Dana Lombardy This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com