"God fights on the side with the best artillery. --Napoleon Although the infantry was to play the key part in the armies of the Civil War, it was the proper use of artillery that often decided a battle. As with the other arms of battle, the rifle-musket was having a profound effect upon the tactics of artillery as well. Though the role of artillery was to remain basically unchanged from the time of the early nineteenth century, tactics were to differ profoundly. As outlined in the standard U. S. artillery text of 1861, Instruction for Field Artillery, the role of artillery was defined as: "Field artillery is used to attack and defend the works of temporary fortification; to destroy or demolish material obstacles, and thus prepare the way for success of the other arms; to act upon the field of battle; to break an enemy's line or prevent him from forming; to crush his masses; to dismount his batteries; to follow and support in a pursuit; and to cover and protect his retreat." The basic maxim of artillery tactics was further outlined in Instruction for Field Artillery as: "The effect of field artillery is generally in proportion to the concentration of its fire. It is therefore the object, not to strike down a few isolated men, and here and there to dismount a gun, but by a combined and concentrated fire to destroy an enemy's cover; to arrest his attack, and to support those which may be directed against him." First Shot for the Devil In order to accomplish its basic role using the maxim of artillery tactics on the early nineteenth century battlefields, it was necessary to get quite close to the enemy. The limited range of the older, smoothbore field pieces meant artillery had to be brought to within 500 yeards of the target. The accuracy of the old smoothbore guns beyond 1000 yards was such that artillerymen frequently remarked, "The first shot is for the Devil, the second for God and the third is for the King." For a good position the artillerymen preferred to stay out of flintlock range while still operating within canister range. Once positioned, the artillery commanders frequently massed 100 or more field pieces to achieve a concentration of fire. When massed and within canister range, the artillery would unleash vast quantities of canister and grapeshot into the opposing infantry ranks. The resulting c oncentration of fire opened gaps and the supporting infantry and cavalry could then attack through these gaps. Examples of this effective use of artillery could be seen at battles such as Eylau, Wagram, Borodino and Waterloo. Artillery, if massed in this manner, could often influence the course of battle to a great degree both offensively and defensively. With the coming of the rifle-musket, such offensive tactics at close range became quite hazardous. The effective range of the new rifle-musket was greater than that of grape or canister. If the gunners were bold enough to close to within rifle-musket range, the results could be disastrous. At Spottsylvania in 1864, two sections of artillery were rashly pushed right up into the skirmish line much like the Napoleonic artillerymen. After only fourteen rounds of canister were discharged, ALL of the gunners were either killed or wounded by the intensive musketry fire. The offensive tactics of artillery had to be changed to deal with the power of the new rifle-musket. Artillery was being forced back from front-line duty into a less direct supportive role in the attack. Defensively the artillery was not to change its tactics greatly but the artillery in the offensive underwent a profound change. Fortunately for the artillerymen of the Civil War, the recent innovations in weaponry had also increased the power of artillery. A great number of smoothbore artillery pieces were employed but they were a vast improvement over their Napoleonic ancestors in both weight and firepower. The most common and successful of the newer smoothbore pieces was the twelve-pounder, "Napoleon" gun/howitzer. Unlike the older fieldpieces of the early nineteenth century, the Napoleon could fire shot, shell, canister and grape with considerable effect. In addition, the Napoleon made good use of the highly effective spherical case or shrapnel shell and it weighed less than the older fieldpieces -- no small advantage in the wooded terrain of the Civil War. However excellent the Napoleon was, the rifled fieldpiece was the wave of the future. Inventors such as Rodman and Parrott developed a new generation of guns better suited for long-range support. Starting with the three inchers, rifled guns were to be constructed in many shapes and sizes by the war's end. Combining rifling and an elongated, conical projectile, the rifled fieldpieces were to develop good range, superior penetrating power and increased accuracy. General D. H. Hill stated that he once saw one of his men seek safety from a rifled gun behind an immense tree. A few minutes later a rifled gun's shot sliced clear through the tree and severed the man's head. Such was the awesome penetrating power of the new rifled artillery against wood and massed ranks of men. Artillery Battery Deployment Rifled Artillery The superior range and accuracy of the new rifled artillery gave them some key advantages. The rifled guns were able to reach out greater distances for wide fields of fire. The longer range allowed the rifled guns to be deployed further back in the lines, relatively safe from capture and harassing fire. Since the guns were not under fire, it became much easier and quicker to remove and re-deploy the guns in relative safety. The longer range enabled a rifled battery to be kept back out of range of smoothbore fire and with their superior accuracy pick off the enemy's guns. Of greater importance than all of these was that now a number of batteries from many distant locations could concentrate their fire on the target. Unfortunately, the rifled field pieces had some draw backs in regard to their projectiles. The percussion fuses were often defective or the impact force of the shell was insufficient to detonate the fuse. Very often the shells buried themselves in soft or sloping ground before exploding which muffled the blast effects. The advantage of the smoothbore was that its spherical case was designed to explode in mid-air over the target. If the ground was not suitable, the rifled guns could be at a disadvantage against smoothbores. Because of this fuse problem, Imboden's battery of six-pounder, smoothbore guns defeated twice their number in rifled guns. Imboden later said about this engagement: "I venture the opinion that in open ground a six-pounder battery at 1000 yards or at 1500 to 1800 yards a similar battery of Napoleons, well handled, will in one hour dismount double their number of the best rifled guns. A smoothbore gun never buries its projectiles as a rifled gun does invaribly when fired against sloping ground." In the Confederate ranks the problem was compounded by the fact that shells manufactured in the South were often defective. General Alexander noted at Gettysburg how often the rifle shells tumbled end-over-end or failed to explode upon impact. Alexander later remarked, "How our rifled batteries always envied our friends in the opposition their abundant supply of splendid ammunition!" Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of the rifled fieldpiece was that in the wooded terrain of the Civil War their added range was of little value. The Napoleon smoothbore was considered a superior fieldpiece for battles in terrain such as the Wilderness. What mattered at close range was the Napoleon threw larger projectiles and more canister with deadlier effect. At greater ranges, the Napoleon's accuracy dropped off in the same way as the older smoothbores until, as with the older guns, much over 1000 yards was outside of effective range. Offensive Tactics With the limitations of the Napoleon and the rifled gun considered together, it is obvious that artillery was entering a dilemma with regard to offensive tactics. Once forced back out of canister range, the defective projectiles of the rifle guns limited their effect. When the Napoleons fell back, their accuracy dropped off as well. Add to this the problems of wooded terrain on fields of fire and the dilemma for the artillery offensive becomes apparent. In situations where the defenders were to be pinned down, offensive artillery was still effective. Also, when it came to counter battery fire, the offensive artillery was usually on an equal footing with the defensive artillery. However, when it was necessary to destroy defending infantry and open a gap for an attack, offensive artillery was generally a failure. The twelve-pounder Napoleon M1857 Gun-Howitzer. Although the Napoleon was a bit heavy when compared to the rifle-Run (1227 pounds for the gun tube alone), it nonetheless was a very sucessful weapon, being lighter and easier to handle than its predecessors. There are many such examp1es of feeble offensive barrages in the Civil War. Lee massed 120 guns at Gettysburg for a furious bombardment on the Union center. The barrage was, in general, ineffective it was too inaccurate, scattered and mostly fell behind the enemy's main line. The Union offensive at Kenesaw Mountain in 1864 was even less effective, their bombardment merely warned the Confederates of the impending attack. At Fort McAllister in December, General Hazen went as far as to dispense with the preliminary bombardment because it would only warn the enemy of attack. When artillery operated as the defense, the disadvantages of the field pieces markedly diminished. Attacking infantry often did not have the opportunity to volley their rifle-muskets at the artillery. The artillery could then wait until the infantry closed to within deadly canister range. When the artillery did fire the infantry many times found themselves confronted with an impassable wall of fire. At Chancelloreville in May of 1863, General Pleasonton massed 22 guns in a well directed fusillade of shot, shell and canister against Stonewall Jackson's onrushing flank attack. This scratch battery under Pleasonton halted the Confederate advance and saved a portion of the Union Army from capture. Earlier in 1862 the brilliant Henry M. Hunt massed some 60 pieces into a battery upon Malvern Hill. When D. H. Hill's Confederates assaulted the hill, they were handed a bloody repulse. D. H. Hill stated later that, "Hence more than half the casualties were from fieldpieces. An unprecedented thing in warfare." Perhaps the finest example of the power of defensive artillery was at Stone's River in 1862. A superior infantry force under Breckenridge had sliced through Van Cleve's division and was striking for the Union rear. Major Mendenhall quickly gathered a great battery of 58 guns. When Breckenridge's men approached, Mendenhall broke loose with a storm of shot, shell and, finally, canister. After a brief resistance, the Confederates were driven back in great confusion. A cross-section of an M1841 twelve-pounder gun behind the 1857 Napoleon The weight difference between the two was about 530 pounds in favor of the Napoleon. The three-inch Brooke rifled field piece. It was a Confederate copy of the ten-pounder Parrot gun. The gun tube weighed only 899 pounds. The offensive power of the artillery was being severely hampered. This was mainly due to the rifle-musket's firepower. Regardless of the improvements in artillery ordnance, the rifle-musket was forcing the attacker's artillery to drop back into a more modern, long-range, support role. Once deployed more to the rear, its effective power was limited by either defective shell construction in the rifle guns or limited accuracy as in the smoothbores. Offensively, artillery seemed to be entering an eclipse on the Civil War battlefield that was to continue with the exception of the Franco-German War. Defensively, the general situation was different. Massed defensive artillery that was well handled frequently decided situations. Like the infantry and cavalry, offensive power was declining, and defensive power was growing with the use of the improved firepower. Ammunition of the Artillery More ACW Rifle-Musket ACW: Introduction ACW: Infantry ACW: Infantry Tactics (Examples) ACW: Cavalry ACW: Artillery ACW: Engineers ACW: Entrenchments ACW: Grand Tactics ACW: Tactics: Auerstadt 1806 vs. New Market 1864 ACW: Conclusion and Bibliography Back to Conflict Number 7 Table of Contents Back to Conflict List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1974 by Dana Lombardy This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com