Campaign for Forts Henry and Donelson

Feb. 15 Confederate Counterattack

by B.F. Cooling, PhD.

The massive Confederate assault wave moved into position during the dark winter night as snow and wind muffled the sounds of marching men, horses, and artillery. Buckner's division withdrew from entrenchments on the right leaving a single regiment -- 450 men -- to bluff Smith's division. Grant's shivering Federals failed to detect the Confederate movement and even the army commander and his staff inexplicably failed to discern the nature of Confederate intentions.

About 6:00 a.m. Pillow sent the attacking columns forward east of the Forge road against McClernand's right flank, held mainly by cavalry pickets. But the Federals were not caught completely off guard and several of McClernand's brigades soon offered stout resistance. Nevertheless, by 8:00 a.m. all of his front was under pressure and Oglesby's and MacArthur's brigades had been swept back toward the Wynn's Ferry road. Heavy fighting enveloped the country lanes and ravines, and blood-stained snow marked points of contact between the two forces. McClernand requested reinforcements from Wallace (who sent a brigade), and army headquarters.

Grant's staff, however, was reluctant to act in the absence of their leader. That morning Grant had gone to confer with the wounded Foote aboard his flagship and anticipating no move by the heretofore docile Confederates, he failed to detect the sound of battle through the intervening woods. Grant may even have been a bit overconfident at the ultimate result of the siege.

By mid-morning McClernand had been pushed back from the Forge road and chree hours later the relentless Confederate drive by Pillow's and Johnson's infantry, Forrest's cavalry, supported by artillery from the main defense perimeter had shattered the Federal battleline. The 1st Division of Grant's army virtually ceased to exist as an organized fighting force; bits and pieces were strewn through the snowy woods; and at that hour the way out of Donelson lay open to the Confederates.

The men in the ranks were ready; their leaders were not. During the subsequent two hours Confederate leadership yielded the initiative and a combination of circumstances changed tactical victory into defeat. Pillow, believing that rations and equipment remained to be secured in the trenches, ordered the entire attacking force back to the defenses. At the same time he noted Federals massing for an attack upon the weakly defended Confederate right, in Buckner's old sector. But Buckner raised strong objections and even questioned Pillow's authority to change the assumed battle plan.

At first Floyd agreed with Buckner, but soon reversed himself and ordered all the troops -- Buckner's included -- back to the trenches in support of Pillow's orders.

Grant finally arrived on the field during this lull in the battle. He discovered McClemand,s division demoralized and splintered but some units desirous of returning to battle if someone would supply ammunition and positive leadership. Wallace had thrust additional units into a blocking position astride the Wynn's Ferry road and the Confederate drive appeared to be stalled temporarily. A quick consultation with McClemand and Wallace led Grant to conclude that the Confederates were just as demoralized and that the side which seized the initiative would carry the day.

His order was simple: "Gentlemen, the position on the right must be retaken." The crisis of the battle, of Grant's very career, had been reached, yet his orders hid any agitation. Calling upon every resource at hand, Grant even directed Foote to have his battered gunboats make a show of force. Meanwhile, the Union leader realized that the Confederates had thrown nearly their entire mobile force against McClernand. Thus, he directed Wallace and McClernand to counterattack on the right, while Smith's division was to assault the weakly held Confederate rifle pits along the Eddyville road. Both assault waves moved forward as the February aftemoon began to wane.

On the right, Wallace and McClemand slowly pushed Pillow's retiring troops back into the defenses. On the left, Smith's units swept over the objectives before being stopped by Buckner's resuming troops posted on a second ridge, adjacent to the main fort. But it was too late as the damage had been done, and Confederate counterattacks failed to recapture the lost rifle pits.

Another cold night descended upon the scene with Union and Confederate battlelines nearly in the same position as in the morning However, not all of the ground lost on the morning of February 15 was recovered by Wallace and McClernand -- an important fact which went undetected by the tired and dejected Confederates. Both the Forge road and a little known river road lay open as exhausted Rebels settled into their rifle pits to await further orders.

Many of the subordinate commanders and their men felt betrayed since victory had seemed so close and final withdrawal remained difficult to comprehend. That night another Confederate council of war at the Dover Hotel talked of ways to extricate the army from the trap. Talk wasted time although Floyd stressed reports of further reinforcement of Grant and ordered evacuation of the lines at 4:00 a.m. Conflicting scouting reports failed to clarify whether or not the Federals had completely reinvested Fort Donelson and its outworks; all the command had been engaged in fighting for an extended period and battle fatigue was clearly evident that night especially at army headquarters.

Confederate Command Weakness

Now the full weakness of a divided Confederate command came to the fore. When Forrest's scouts reported seeing campfires rekindled the brigadiers chose to interpret that reinvestment was complete. Buckner, of all people, preached the hopelessness of further resistance. His men were starving and fatigued, he claimed, and could not hold against a determined attack in the morning -- surprisingly, post-battle reports noted huge caches of food in Dover and good morale among the troops!

Pillow wondered about holding on a day longer since the fortunes of war often changed overnight and steamboats might yet descend from Nashville to insure evacuation. Floyd stated that dohnston wa6 already in the Tennessee capital -- the ostensible reason for holding Fort Donelson in the first place -- and so the conversation wandered on. Talk turned eventually to capitulation with Buckner leading the discussion, closely followed on that course by Floyd.

Pillow was opposed and Forrest angrily stalked out of the meeting determined to cut his way out of the Federal trap. When the army's medical officers counseled against crossing the frozen backwaters which lay astride the evacuation route, the Confederate leaders at Donelson literally talked themselves into surrender while resisting responsibility for the act. Floyd feared personal reprisals and wondered what the Federals might do to officers and men; Pillow was equally wary of falling into enemy hands; and only Buckner appeared willing to accept the onerous task of asking his old friend Grant for terms. But, when the final parley took place several hours later, Grant shot back the unchivalrous "No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works."

Some elements of the garrison escaped with relative ease. Pillow and his staff merely rowed across the river in a small skiff and rode off to Clarksville. The opportune arrival of two steamboats from Nashville not only deposited 400 raw Mississippi troops on the wharf in time for surrender but permitted Floyd to evacuate his Virginia brigade by water. The question arose as to why these same boats were not used as a bridge to enable the whole army to escape to the other side of the Cumberland, but fear of the Union gunboats thwarted that scheme.

Forrest demonstrated his leadership by taking 800 cavalry and infantry over the river road through the frozen backwater. As he passed beyond the outposts of the beleaguered garrison, Forrest noted only a line of fence posts silhouetted against the early morning sky. Undoubtedly mistaken by jumpy scouts as the Federal battleline, it was too late to inform Buckner and Forrest turned toward Nashville. His command reached the city two days later without incident. Other random groups of Confederates, including Bushrod Johnson, simply slipped through the Federal cordon after the formal surrender.

The meeting between Grant and Buckner proved to be brief. As Grant telegraphed Halleck later on February 16: "We have taken Fort Donelson and from 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners including Generals Buckner and Bushrod Johnson; also about 20,000 stand of arms, 48 pieces of artillery, 17 heavy guns, from 2,000 to 4,000 horses, and large quantities of commissary stores." Nonetheless, the meaning of Forts Henry and Donelson cannot be measured by statistics alone. More important was the elimination of a Confederate field force as divided command, inept leadership, indecision, and lack of ingenuity sacrificed an army to Northern prison camps. The fruits of the great Union victory became even more apparent when Johnston -- baffled perhaps by glorious reports of victory telegraphed by Pillow on the 15th which turned to news of surrender the next day -- evacuated Nashville within a week and one-half of the defeat.

Columbus was evacuated by Polk on March 2 thereby clearing Kentucky and virtually all of Middle and much of West Tennessee of Confederate troops. Hopes of early European recognition were dashed; Johnston pronounced the loss of the two forts as irretrievable; and Jefferson Davis reflected the sentiment of the Southern people when he exclaimed simply: "Events have cast on our arms and hopes the gloomiest of shadows."

The fall of Fort Donelson changed the war in the western theater almost overnight. Flagging spirits and letdown of the Union war effort after the initial patriotic race to the colors in the spring evaporated in a new spurt of dedication to preservation of the Union.

New Star

A new star rose on the Union horizon -- Ulysses S. Grant, whose sobriquet, "Unconditional Surrender" seemed to appropriately fit the modest, retiring, yet resolute man who had seized the initiative. Overlooked was the stumble which nearly cost the general a battle and perhaps his command and Grant repeated the mistake several months later by being caught off-guard at Shiloh. Still, the Union leader never really lost the initiative which he had seized at Henry-Donelson. The deep wedge driven into the South by events along the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers eventually split the Confederacy.

Three more years of bitter warfare would be required to complete the Union plan in the west. It was during those dark gray days of disaster in December 1864, perhaps, when John Bell Hood's Army of Tennessee was wrecked before Nashville, that the full impact of static defense, erratic and inept generalship, and wastage of resources as witnessed at Henry-Donelson were driven home to the Confederacy. Successive generations have examined the blunders and pronounced judgment, and it remains difficult to avoid the conclusion that from Johnston to the four brigadiers, the Confederate defeat resulted more from errors of command at tactical level than strategic problems of manpower, munitions, or the will to win. Johnston certainly erred in selecting lesser men to fight the major battle especially when Beauregard, William J. Hardee, or even Johnston himself might have better served the Confederacy by taking command at Henry-Donelson. Aside from the high command breakdown, however, certain conclusions are inescapable when viewing the tactical level of operations:

    1) Floyd, as senior general, should never have bottled up his army, or allowed Pillow to do so;

    2) The Confederates should have retreated before the investment was complete;

    3) The Confederates should have attacked Grant's army during its passage from Henry to Donelson or they should have attacked while the disparity of numbers was slight;

    4) The Confederate command should have massed its forces and attacked immediately after the repulse of Foote's gunboats while morale and the will to win were high;

    5) The Confederates should have retreated after opening the escape routes on February 15, or they should have continued to attack after crushing McClernand's division;

    6) Fear of the gunboats, as a result of Fort Henry, conditioned too many Confederate reactions at Fort Donelson;

    7) Floyd and Pillow should not have deserted their army.

Additional specifications of incompetence, dereliction of duty, and cowardice can probably be leveled at all echelons in relation to Henry-Donelson. Unfortunately, as in all battles and all was, the subordinate officers and men paid the price for the sins of the top leades. Perhaps Charles P. Roland, Albert Sidney Johnston's foremost biographer aptly summarizes the Twin Rivers campaign as "a series of events that defy comparison in the annals of warfare, a melange of courage and timidity, of resourcefulness and indecision, of brilliance and stupidity -- a tactical comedy of erros turned into high tragedy for the South."

B. Franklin Cooling, who possesses a Ph.D. in history from the University of Pennsyluania, is the author of numerous articles in historical journals relating to the Forts Henry and Donelson campaign. A former park historian at Fort Donelson National Military Park, Dr. Cooling now serves as Chief of Research Studies, U.S. Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

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