Campaign for Forts Henry and Donelson

Feb. 13 1862 Union Attack

by B.F. Cooling, PhD.

When Floyd and Buckner arrived with their commands the garrison was complete, and on February 13, 15,000 expectant Federals, organized into twenty-three infantry regiments, seven batteries, and several mounted units, faced over 18,000 anxious but determined Confederates (organized into twenty-seven infantry regiments and additional supporting troops), cooped up behind field works with their backs to an unbridged river.

Thursday, February 13, dawned clear and serene, but before the sun had set that day, both sides had drawn blood. Constant skirmishing and two sharp infantry attacks complemented by a naval bombardment marked the first day's action as one for testing Confederate defense positions. In the morning, as Smith's division went forward to tighten investing lines in the Eddyville road sector, one of its brigades nearly succeeded in making a lodgement in Buckner's section of the defense perimeter. But the attack was unsupported by other elements of Smith's command and sporadic firefights continued to occupy both sides for the remainder of the day. Similarly unsuccessful, but more spectacular was the probing assault launched by McClernand from the Wynn's Ferry road.

Probe

McClernand had strict orders from Grant not to bring on any engagement as he extended his lines to the river. Still, a particularly galling fire from Maney's Tennessee battery located in the center salient of the Confederate defense line brought on a sharp battle. The impetuous Union commander sent one of his reinforced brigades, led by inexperienced officers, streaming up the hill to dislodge the troublesome battery. The repulse was bloody as thick abatis impeded the Union advance.

More important was the human interest story for, as the attack subsided, dry leaves on the hillside caught fire threatening Union wounded with the torture of a cruel death. Confederates, disregarding their own lives, rushed to aid their erstwhile enemies and saved many Federals from the flames. As dusk settled over the Cumberland, a savage north wind and blizzard descended upon the troops huddled around Dover. Orders prohibited fires, and rain, sleet, and three inches of snow covered the dead, the dying, and the cheerless living, contributing measurably to the eventual course of events at Fort Donelson.

Grant's plan was to keep the Confederate infantrymen pinned down within their lines by sharpshooter and artillery fire while the gunboats bombarded the river batteries at close range. Both he and Foote decided that the navy might reduce Fort Donelson as it had Fort Henry. Then, when the river batteries were destroyed and the fleet controlled the Cumberland, and Grant's soldiers blocked the escape exits, the Confederates would have to surrender.

The thermometer registered 12 degrees Fahrenheit on the morning of February 14 as Grant sought to implement his plans. Foote felt unready to battle the river batteries but Grant insisted that something be done that afternoon. Reinforcements had swelled his army to nearly 25,000 men; Wallace's troops had been organized into a third division and thrust into a dangerous gap between McClernand and Smith. Busy with preparations for an escape attempt on McClernand's far right, Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner missed a superb opportunity to split Grant's land forces and relieve t he siege. Now Grant's position was consolidated and the time seemed propitious for consummating the siege.

At 2:30 p.m. Foote moved his naval force upriver with the ironclads St. Louis, Louisville, P`ttsburg, and Carondelet in the lead and Tyler and Conestoga in the rear. Protective bags of coal, stacks of lumber, and chains covered the boilers and upper decks.

Opening fire one and one-half miles from the Confederate positions, the gunboats initially received the counterbattery fire from only the 6.5 inch rifle in the Upper Battery and the 10-inch Columbiad in the Lower Battery. Captain Jacob Culbertson who commanded the batteries withheld the fire of his 32-pounders until the gunboats were at point-blank range. Nine hundred yards from the batteries found the gunboats passing easily over a barricade of floating trees and Foote steamed his ships steadily closer in an attempt to repeat the tactics employed at Henry.

Using their bow guns only, the Union ships worked their way to within 400 yards of the Confederate batteries while the severe plunging fire of the latter raked each boat from bow to stern. The naval gunners consistently overshot their mark (and the Confederate rifle pits beyond Dover suffered more severely than did the water batteries). A severe fight of an hour and one half left Foote and fifty-four of his men disabled and the gunboats in a shambles.

The commanding officer of the Carondelet recorded: "Before the decks were well sanded, there was so much blood on them that our men could not work the guns without slipping." All but the Carondelet drifted helplessly downstream out of the battle to the delight of Confederate onlookers on the bank. Another harsh winter night enveloped the dispirited Federal soldiers and humiliated sailors besieging Fort Donelson.

Even before the naval action developed, the mismatched Confederate generals decided that some effort should be made to escape the ever-tightening investment. Johnston's final message of the thirteenth simply counseled preservation of the field force even at the expense of losing the fort. A council of war determined upon immediate evacuation, plans were laid, Pillow -- who was to lead the assault -- vacillated and Foote's attack completely disrupted the move. Yet another golden opportunity slipped from the Confederates' grasp. That night another council of war met at the Dover Hotel, Confederate GHQ. Floyd discussed the hopelessness of the defense in the face of Grant's growing strength. Once more the Confederate command determined to cut an escape route through the investing lines.

Pillow and Johnson were to lead the assault waves while Buckner provided support, but Pillow and Buckner emerged from the council with divergent ideas about key provisions of the attack plan. Pillow understood that after the Federals had been hurled back his troops would then return to the rifle pits to secure rations and equipment before evacuating the Donelson area. Buckner, on the other hand, thought that the soldiers would not retrace their steps once the enemy had been cleared from the escape route.

Therefore, his troops were ordered to carry full haversacks, knapsacks, blanket rolls, and rations when they left the jump-off point for the attack. This contradiction of views between the two generals was to have fatal consequences for the Confederate fortunes on February 15.

More ACW Campaign for Forts Henry and Donelson

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© Copyright 1974 by Dana Lombardy
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