The Japanese offensive plans called for a limited invasion of Outer Mongolia. Yasuoka's mechanized task force would strike to the Halha, while the Komatsubara Division crossed the river and destroyed enemy forces on the left side. At right: Japanese infantry move out onto the Nomonhan plain. In July and August, the rivers dry up or become marshy, breeding millionsof mosquitos which plagued both sides. Ground and air reconnaissance of the Halha region was conducted by the Japanese at the end of June. Yasuoka's detachment pushed toward the river on July 2, and Japanese engineers began construction of a pontoon bridge on the night of July 2&3. The Japanese tanks broke through the Russians' first two lines on the 2nd but were checked by artillery at the third defenses. Next day, Soviet armor joined the fray on the right shore. After scoring some successes at the third line, the Japanese medium tanks were mauled. In two days the Japanese lost 40 of their 70 light and medium tanks. Officer losses were specially severe. To all intents, the Japanese had been stopped on the right bank. It was their first and last attempt at armored maneuver at Nomonhan, and it had proved to be an ignominious failure. Across the river, the Japanese operation was hardly more successful. Initial surprise was complete, as the Russians admit. The Japanese were able to move their infantry battalions to the left bank, unscathed, by dawn on July 3. Then the invaders encountered unanticipated swarms of Soviet armored cars and tanks -- 450 in all, according to Russian sources. Actually the Soviet command had dispatched the 11th Tank Brigade, 7th Mechanized Brigade, and 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment from Tamsag on the night of July 1/2, with the mission of counterattacking the Japanese units on the right, not the left, bank. OPPOSING FORCES 2 July, 1939 Type Soviet-Outer Mongolian Japanese Infantry 11,000 20,000 Cavalry 1000 4700 MGs 152 164 Guns, 75mm and heavier 86 170 Guns, AT and Bttn 23 98 Tanks 186 130 Armored Cars 266 6 General Komatsubara, riding one of the few vehicles to get accross the bridge, had a very close call and was only saved by a Japanese antitank battery firing at point blank range. Against the mechanized formations operating on a relatively huge scale, the 23rd Division possessed three-dozen guns and limited ammunition. The Japanese used these resources to maximum effect, in conjunction with daring demolition attacks by individual soldiers. By nightfall on July 3, perhaps 100 or 150 Soviet tanks and armored cars had been knocked out. The pyres reminded one Japanese officer of the great steel works at Yawata in the homeland. Long-range Soviet artillery supported the Russian armor and infantry which launched powerful counterattacks. Soviet records testify to the vigor of the Japanese fire. Japanese casualties, however, were mounting, ammunition was running low, and the weak, narrow bridge came under enemy air attack. Pull Back Daytime heat was exhausting, and Russian numbers seemed limitless. Meanwhile, the Japanese command reluctantly decided to order a withdrawal from the left shore. The main body of the 23rd Division pulled back to the right bank on July 3/4; the covering regiment, by dawn on July 5. These tired infantrymen joined the remnants of the Yasuoka detachment in a fruitless effort, lasting a week, to break through to the river on the right shore. At one time the Japanese units managed to get as close as 3,000 or 4,000 meters from the Halha, but they could advance no farther. Soviet annals reveal the ferocity of the struggle for the bridgehead. For example, the Russian infantry regiment commander was killed in action on July 8, and the 11th Tank Brigade commander was killed on the 11th. The scale of the Soviet effort is betokened by the fact that 186 tanks, 266 armored cars, and 86 guns were arrayed against the Japanese on July 2, according to Russian military records. Although Soviet losses were heavy, Yasuoka's mechanized units were crippled, and the remnants of his once-proud detachment were ordered on July 10 by the Kwantung Army to be disbanded and removed from the area. The Japanese attributed the failure to their own inadequate heavy firepower. Never again during the Nomonhan campaign did the Japanese attempt to commit armor to redress the imbalance, but they did strive to rectify the disparity in heavy artillery strength. With still another offensive effort in view, at the end of June, the Japanese mobilized a heavy, field artillery brigade from the homeland. This brigade consisted of a 10-cm. gun regiment (16 pieces) and a 15-cm. howitzer regiment (another 16 pieces). In addition, the Kwantung Army sent an independent Seld artillery regiment of eight 75-mm. guns and a provisional heavy artillery battalion made up of six 15-cm. guns. Supported by these four-dozen howitzers and cannon, the Japanese scheduled their second offensive after mid-July. The timing was hastened when Russian aircraft again hit inland targets, this time a railway bridge well inside Manchuria, west of Tsitsihar, on July 16. While ordering air defense and combat alert measures, the Kwantung Army simultaneously asked Tokyo for permission to smash Soviet air bases inside Mongolia ageun. IGHQ, however, continued to insist upon restraint, and the recommendations were rejected for the time being. Second Offensive On July 23 the new Japanese ground offensive commenced. Enemy batteries seemed to have been suppressed by the reinforced Japanese artillery. Japanese infantrymen and artillery officers were awed by the might of the friendly barrages. But the Soviet artillery reply dwarfed the Japanese effort. According to Russian records, the Soviet batteries had remained silent to prevent revealing their positions prematurely. When the main body of the 23rd Division jumped off against the Russian bridgehead on the right side of the Halha, it was stopped in its tracks. Thus the second and last major Japanese ground offensive effort at Nomonhan proved to be another costly failure; little more than a dent was made in enemy lines. For their part, the Russians assert that they were ready for the Japanese attacks, which they call poorly coordinated; and that the Soviet Air Force crippled Japanese attempts to reinforce the front. At right: Soviet equipment captured by the Japanese in the Nomonhan affair. In the center is a BT-5 tank, surrounded by a 12-cm howitzer (far left). A troop-carrying truck. and an English-made armored car (far right). The Japanese could now expect a Russian counteroffensive, probably in mid-August. Although hampered by transportation shortages, the Kwantung Army did what it could to strengthen the enfeebled 23rd Division, which was optimistically digging in for the autumn and the winter. There was some talk of a new Japanese offensive effort in the fall, but the plan was discarded. In any case, it was expected that major combat operations would resume in the spring of 1940. An army headquarters (Sixth Army) was established by the Japanese in early August 1939 to direct activities on the Nomonhan front. Japanese thinking presupposed that the Russians would remain quiescent and that the initiative would be vested in the Japanese. The Soviet Command was determined otherwise. As early as August 9-10, the Russians probed the Holsten river sector. Japanese firepower reportedly checked the Soviet infantry-artillery-armor effort and inflicted casualties of the order of 10:1. Significantly, the traditionally offensive-minded Japanese admitted that, for the first time during the Nomonhan Incident, they perceived the advantages of defensive firepower and of fixed positions. More Nomonhan (Khalkhin-Gol) Introduction 1st Phase (May 1939) 2nd Phase (July 1939) 3rd Phase (August 1939) Japanese TO&Es: 23rd Div. and Yamagata Detachment Four Vehicle Specs and Illustrations (72K) Five Large Combat Maps (extremely slow: 708K) Four Jumbo Combat Maps (monstrously slow: 1.2MB) Back to Conflict Number 5 Table of Contents Back to Conflict List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1998 by Dana Lombardy This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com