The first phase of the Nomonhan Incident broke out in May 1939, when Outer Mongolian cavalrymen, perhaps 700 strong, crossed the unimpressive but very rare and therefore coveted river Halha (or Khalkhin-gol) into an area claimed by the Japanese and the Manchurians; that is, the right side of the river.
Large Map: Opening Positions (slow: 107K)
Jumbo Map: Opening Positions (very slow: 241K)
In this region, the width of the Halha was 120 to 130 meters, the depth over two meters, the current flow rate 0.8 meters per second. Later the Japanese learned that the Soviet Union was insisting that Outer Mongolia's national frontier extended east of the river, but in the spring of 1939 the military authorities in Manchukuo seem honestly to have believed that the Halha itself constituted the natural boundary line, sanctioned by historical practice, in this remote area.
Responsible for defense of the Nomonhan sector, from the Japanese side, was the newly created, weak 23rd Infantry Division commanded by Lt.-Gen. M. Komatsubara from his headquarters at Hailar, about 125 miles to the north. Komatsubara decided promptly to punish the Mongolian horsemen for their alleged trespass, by committing motorized elements of an infantry regiment from Hailar, as well as the main body of the division's reconnaissance regiment. Kwantung Army headquarters was asked to provide transportation and air force reinforcements. The Japanese task force swept the right bank of the Halha, with modest air support, and then returned to Hailar. Supposedly the mission of chastisement had been accomplished. Instead, the Outer Mongolians were soon reported to have reappeared on the right bank.
General Komatsubara, greatly irritated, now formed a new strike force, the Yamagata Detachment, built around an infantry battalion of Colonel Yamagata's 64th Infantry Regiment and Lt.-Col. Azuma's Reconnaissance Regiment. According to the Japanese plan, which looked excellent on paper, the Azuma Unit was to press toward the Mongolians' bridge across the Halha and cut off the main Red force, which would meanwhile be engaged by the Japanese infantry battalion attacking from the east.
| OPPOSING FORCES 1st PHASE (May, 1939) | ||
|---|---|---|
| Type | Soviet-Outer Mongolian | Japanese |
| Infantry | 668 | 1,676 |
| Cavalry | 260 | 900 |
| Machine Guns | 58 | 75 |
| Guns, 75mm and heavier | 14 | 8 |
| AT Guns | 6 | 10 |
| Tanks | - | 1 |
| Armored Cars | 39 | 6-8 |
On May 28 the Japanese infantry forced back the enemy but were checked shortly by hostile artillery firing from the left bank. Striking toward the enemy's rear, the Azuma Regiment was caught between the foe falling back from the east and those enemy reinforcements which came across the river onto the right side. Red forces trapped and annihilated Azuma and his 200 men.
To the consternation of the Japanese, it had not been Mongols who has shattered Azuma's unit, but regular troops of the Soviet Army's 11th Tank Brigade, elements of which crossed the Halha on May 26. Deployed against the Japanese horsemen and thin-skinned tankettes were Russian 76-mm. self-propelled guns, 122-mm. howitzers, 45-mm. antitank guns, armored cars, and Soviet motorized infantry. The one reinforced Russian infantry battalion which entered action against the Japanese was strenghtened, before the end of May 28, by Remizov's 149th Regiment from the 36th Rille Division, which joined the battle piecemeal from the headquarters at Tamsag, about 75 miles away in Outer Mongolia.
The Japanese concluded that the destruction of the Azuma Regiment was attributable mainly to poor tactical coordination and teamwork, coupled with lack of artillery and antitank capabilities or training. Higher headquarters was displeased with the infantry regiment commander's conduct of operations, particularly his inability to maintain contact with or to save Azuma's maneuver force. Apart from the objective problems of terrain, equipment, and training, the Japanese commanders were undoubtedly overconfident, expecting to deal only with lightly armed, unsophisticated Mongolian horsemen.
At right: Japanese soldiers display the wing of a Soviet SB medium bomber shot down by Japanese AA. Very few of the aircraft employed by either side were of newer types--most still had fixed landing gear.
In the air, dogfights raged until the end of May, on terms consistently favorable to the Japanese Air Force. Then, on June 18-19, the second phase of the Nomonhan Incident commenced in earnest when Soviet warplanes conducted two unexpected raids against Japanese dumps and installations inside Manchuria. Fearing that the main base at Hailar, farther to the rear, might be the next target, General Komatsubara recommended that effective retaliation be unleashed. The Kwantung Army headquarters willingly devised plans for a counteroffensive, based upon the prerequisite of acquiring aerial supremacy beforehand.
Escalation
Escalation was rapid. Aggressive orders were issued by the Kwantung Army to the Japanese Air Force in Manchuria, while the 23rd Division was directed to commit all of its elements. Supporting Komatsubara would be Lt.-Gen. Yasuoka's mechanized detachment comprising most of the Japanese tanks in Manchuria (two tank regiments), plus another infantry regiment from a seasoned division, the 7th Infantry Division. Since the 23rd Division was a triangular division of the latest type, dispatch of a regiment from the 7th Division meant that, in practice, Komatsubara would possess a square division in terms of infantry strength.
By employing its reserves in West Manchuria, the Kwantung Army was making available to Komatsubara a total of 13 infantry battalions, 400 trucks, 70 tanks, and 180 planes. The scale is all the more impressive within the context of Japanese intelligence estimates that only 1,000 enemy soldiers, a dozen field pieces, and several dozen tanks were deployed in the entire Nomanhan sector. Although it was common knowledge in the Japanese Army that the 23rd Division was still very far from being a first-class combat division, the Kwantung Army was confident that the supposedly overwhelming material strength of the Japanese side would crush enemy units east of the Halha.
Meanwhile the air war was accelerating. Although the Japanese Air Force won some resounding successes throughout June, the Japanese strategists were convinced that victory in the impending ground offensive depended upon the prior elimination of Soviet air bases inside Outer Mongolia. This was the view in Kwantung Army headquarters, not at IGHQ in Tokyo, where the war in China was of prime concern.
Therefore the Kwantung Army deliberately defied the High Command by sending its air group (some 150 planes in all) against the enemy base at Tamsag. According to the Japanese pilots, 100 to 150 Soviet planes had been knocked out, and the air base had been neutralized. IGHQ's response was thankless and angry, but the Kwantung Army, unashamed, argued that wheu the 23rd Division launched its impending ground offensive, the skies would be controlled by the Japanese, thanks to the great raid of June 27.
More Nomonhan (Khalkhin-Gol)
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Introduction
1st Phase (May 1939)
2nd Phase (July 1939)
3rd Phase (August 1939)
Japanese TO&Es: 23rd Div. and Yamagata Detachment
Four Vehicle Specs and Illustrations (72K)
Five Large Combat Maps (extremely slow: 708K)
Four Jumbo Combat Maps (monstrously slow: 1.2MB)
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© Copyright 1998 by Dana Lombardy
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