All the details in the planning of Weserubung had been completed by March, 1940; there remained only the setting of the precise date and hour. Concern about British intervention in Norway, which had subsided when the Finns had capitulated, was renewed when German Naval Intelligence reported that enemy submarines were concentrated west of the Skagerrak. At the March 26 Fuhrer Conference Raeder stated that he no longer felt that British intervention in Norway was imminent. Nevertheless he insisted that German forces would have to occupy Norway sooner or later.

Raeder emphasized that existing conditions made it propitious for Weserubung to be executed as soon as possible. He pointed out that naval preparedness was complete; weather conditions, whatever they might be, would pose no problem. The invasion should take place soon, because U-boats on station in Norwegian waters (Operation Hartmut) would have to return in another three weeks for reprovisioning and refueling. Raeder further suggested April 7 as W Day, for there would be a new moon on that night. Since surprise was of the essence, Raeder cautioned that the progressive shortness of the northern nights would preclude an invasion after April 15.

At the Fuhrer Conference of March 29, Raeder again expressed concern that Weserubung be accelerated; he then stated rather cryptically that the Norwegian attitude was becoming more determined. Although Raeder did not elaborate, he made it clear to all present that conditions in the north were growing more unfavorable to the Reich each day.

The Norwegian government was not completely unaware of the course of events in both British and German camps. Determined to preserve neutrality, Norway attempted to give neither side the provocation to intervene in Norwegian affairs.

Norway's Intentions

Contrary to Raeder's evaluation, Norway was trying to keep her powerful neighbors in check by following a middle course. Actually all three nations were pursuing independent policies; unfortunately for the Norwegians, they were the object of a power struggle beyond their capacity to control or influence. Trade agreements had little meaning without guns to back them.

On April 1, Hitler signed the operational order for Weserubung; W Day was set for April 9, and zero hour for 0515. At 0200 on April 3, the first three ships of the lead-off groups (Ausfuhrstaffel) departed from Hamburg bound for Narvik. Their departure time, which was shrouded in secrecy, took place at an hour when the usually busy port was practically devoid of activity.

Despite all efforts to conceal invasion activity, Weseriibung was of such magnitude that it proved impossible to maintain complete secrecy.

The British Admiralty began to receive intelligence regarding German movements soon after the first ships of the Ausfuhrstaffel had sailed. The most significant report was from Copenhagen; the Admiralty was informed that ten German ships carrying a division of troops were proceeding on a northerly course out of the Baltic, their reported destination Narvik. While passing this information to Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, the Commander of the Home Fleet, the Admiralty described its validity as doubtful.

A misconception was responsible for the disbelief in German intentions. British naval doctrine eschewed landing a military force on a hostile shore without assurance of firm control of the sea contiguous to the area to be invaded; it was assumed the Germans pursued a similar policy.

More Reports

Reports signifying unusual shipping activity continued to be received by the Admiralty. By April 8, nineteen British and Allied submarines were on station off the Norwegian coast; they reported an unusual number of ships moving north under neutral flags, but were unable positively to identify any of the shipping as German troopships. Between April 3 and 7, twenty-two vessels, all the ships comprising the Ausfuhrstaffel and Seetransportstaffel (supply ships for the first wave), had departed from Hamburg and Stettin. On April 3 and 4, two large tankers departed from Wilhelmshaven, and on April 6, a small tanker left Hamburg. Another large tanker, Jan Wellem, departed from the Murmansk area for Narvik on April 6.

On April 8 the second wave of eleven ships of the Seetransportstaffel departed from Gotenhaven and Konigsberg. Between midnight April 7 and 0530 April 8 the Kriegsschiffstaffeln (the striking force) left Wesermunde, Cuxhaven, Wilhelmshaven and Swinemunde. This force consisted of a pocket battleship, two battle cruisers, two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, fourteen destroyers, eight torpedo boats, four minesweepers, and seven auxiliary vessels. Forty- two ships in all, the warships constituted almost the entire German Navy. By 0600 on April 8, the number of German ships poised off different points of the Norwegian coast totaled 107. In manpower and tonnage the German armada represented the largest seaborne operation in history.

Closing the Coast

At the same time the German fleet was approaching W Day jump-off positions, the British battle cruiser Renown and a force of fourteen destroyers, the Operation Wilfred Force, were closing the Norwegian coast. While the Wilfred destroyers laid minefields off the approaches to Bodo and Stadlandet, a contingency force lay in readiness at Rosyth and the mouth of the Clyde. Although the Admiralty did not anticipate German initiative in Norway, they did expect enemy intervention once it became obvious to the German High Command that Operation Wilfred posed a threat to the Reich's source of iron ore. Should the contingency force be used, its operational order was designated Plan R4; its purpose was to counteract German landings in Norway by landing British troops at key locations.

Operation Wilfred had been modified considerably since its inception. Originally it had called for troop landings subsequent to the mine laying operations. However, by the time Wilfred was implemented the War Cabinet had decided that no troop landings would take place unless the Germans landed first or demonstrated an intent of violating Norwegian neutrality. The units designated to carry out R4 would be the 146th and 148th Infantry Brigades. Of the six battalions comprising the two brigades, two battalions were assigned to seize Stavanger, two were set for Bergen, and one each would take Trondheim and Narvik.

The R4 expedition would be transported in troopships with an accompanying light cruiser force. Planning for the operation had been conducted haphazardly, and troops, equipment and shipping were assembled hastily. While the force to be landed numbered 18,000 men, troop and equipment organization was poor; it will be seen later how the poor organization contributed to British failure at Narvik, Namsos, and Aandalsnes.

According to Norwegian Admiralty records two reports were received prior to W Day that should have been construed as definite warnings of impending German aggression. On the night of April 7, the pilot station at Kopervik reported that the steamer Skagerrak bound for Trondheim was carrying cargo cases marked "Wehrmacht." The second warning occurred next aftemoon. The Polish submarine Orzel torpedoed and sank the German steamer Rio de Janeiro off Lillesand. Many of the survivors rescued by Norwegian fishemmen were wearing German army uniforms; some stated that they were bound for Bergen for the purpose of aiding the Norwegians against the British.

Apprised of the incident, shortly after 1700 on April 8, London warned the Norwegian government that an attack was imminent. The warning was discussed by the Norwegian Parliament and Cabinet that evening in Oslo. As a result, coastal fortifications were alerted, a precaution which was to cause the Germans heavy losses. At right, Norwegian coastal gun.

Despite the alert, however, coastal forts were not authorized to mine the fjords and harbor entrances, and the decision to mobilize was postponed; nor were steps taken to protect the airfields against capture by airborne troops. It is true that neither the British nor the Norwegians took decisive steps in the face of the two ominous warnings, but Churchill is wrong to assert that no action was taken by either nation as a result of the incidents which occurred approximately fourteen hours before zero hour on W Day.

Trojan Horse Myth

One of the myths surrounding the Norwegian campaign concerns German "Trojan horses." Although dramatic in its concept, the only phase of the operation that resembled an attack from within was the role assigned to the Ausfuhrstaffel and four ships of the Tankerstaffel.

The eleven ships in this group were scheduled to arrive off their destination ports at 0500 on W Day; the attack was to begin half an hour later. These ships carried heavy equipment, ordnance, provisions, and fuel, not troops to seize radio stations and key harbor installations. The supply ships and tankers were part of the main attack and not a planned thrust from within the Norwegian harbors.

Churchill contributed to the myth by writing that supplies and ammunition were carried to Narvik in empty ore ships; no ore ships participated in Weserubung In his memoirs Harold Macmillan compounds this error by reiterating Churchill's twenty-year old statement. Because of the notoriety surrounding Quisling's treachery, it was believed in 1940 that peaceful German freighters, which had allegedly been lying in Norwegian ports days before the attack began, suddenly disgorged hordes of fully armed soldiers who had been hiding below decks.

Again, the idea is imaginative but not realistic. In the realm of shipping and trade, where every vessel is known and registered, the arrival of cargo ships in a port is known and expected; ships do not lie in port unnoticed by the authorities. Discovery of one such "Trojan horse" would have betrayed the entire Weserubung operation. The German High Command would not have risked the success of the attack with such a harebrained scheme.

Germans Sighted At 0800 on April 7, several German ships traveling in convoy were sighted off the western entrance of the Skagerrak by a British reconnaissance aircraft; the ships were part of the Kriegsschiffstaffeln. In the early afternoon a force of twelve Blenheim aircraft attacked the warships, but failed to do any damage. With the knowledge that the German Navy was at sea in force, Admiral Forbes and the Home Fleet sailed from Scapa Flow that same evening.

As continuing reports of German ship movements were received, other units were ordered to sea by the Admiralty to augment Forbes' force. Additional vessels included the four Rosyth cruisers aboard which the R4 troops had been embarked; these soldiers were hastily put ashore before the ships sailed. The sudden abandonment of Plan R4 came as a surprise to Forbes, who was convinced the many sightings of German shipping was evidence that an assault upon Norway was in progress, and that the very conditions for which R4 had been devised now existed.

The Admiralty, in spite of accumulating evidence, judged that it was the Germans trying to work the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst into the Atlantic trade routes. When an invasion is in progress the primary objective of the defending fleet is diverted from enemy warships to transports. After the war Admiral Forbes stated that he recognized the German intentions during the early stages of Weserubung; he felt that pursuit of the German battle cruisers had lost its purpose and was, in fact, aiding the enemy plan.

On the morning of April 7, the southern minelaying force executing Wilfred was recalled because of the German warships reported in the south. The force laying the field off Bodo, however, was allowed to continue operations; it consisted of four minelaying destroyers accompanied by HMS Renown and eight other destroyers under the command of Admiral Whitworth. By early morning of April 8, the minefield was in place, and Whitworth's force remained in the area to guard the entrance to Vestfjord.

During the night of April 7-8, Groups 1 and 2 of the Kriegsschiffstaffeln traveling together approached their destinations, Trondheim and Narvik. Heavy seas, while helping to screen German ships from observation, made it difficult for the fourteen destroyers to maintain the twenty-six knot speed of Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and Hipper. By morning of April 8, the force was scattered, and contact with several of the destroyers had been lost. Under these conditions the destroyer Bernd von Arnim encountered the British destroyer Glowworm off Trondheim at 0820. A running battle lasted until 1024, when the Glowworm was sunk by the Hipper which had come to the aid of the Bernd von Arnim. Admiral Whitworth had first tried to join battle with the rest of his force but, assuming that Glowworm's adversaries were bound for Narvik, he changed course.

Thus, Whitworth sailed to a position off the entrance to Vestfjord, where he hoped to intercept the German force. While the battle was raging, Forbes and the Home Fleet continued to sail in a northerly direction. By this time Groups 1 and 2 had separated, and Group 1, reduced to ten destroyers, was sailing directly toward Whitworth's force covering the approaches to Narvik; Forbes and the Home Fleet were closing Group 1 from the south. Although neither the Admiralty nor the fleet commanders were certain a German force was in the pocket, Group 1 was not only trapped between two British forces, but Renown, standing off the Lofoten Islands, was also ordered to close the German force from the west.

Saved from Destruction

On the afternoon of April 8 an incident occurred which was to save Group 1 from destruction. At 1430 a British flying boat sighted Hipper and four destroyers sailing westward; this was Group 2, and the westerly course was merely a maneuver to coordinate the attack on Trondheim with W Day Zero Hour. Knowledge of Group 2's location, however, caused Admiral Forbes to change the Home Fleet's course from northeast to northwest in an effort to intercept. Intelligence that a German flotilla was steering on a westward course confused Forbes, who to this time had had a fairly clear estimate of the situation.

Forbes changed course again, after determining that he had no chance to intercept the German force northwest of the Home Fleet. Before turning south Forbes ordered Renown and Admiral Whitworth's destroyers to intercept Group 2, which was still on a westerly course; it was not apparent to the Admiralty or the fleet commandes that Groups 1 and 2 had separated. Admiral Whitworth was ordered to leave his position guarding the entrance to Vestfjord and move his destroyers westward to set up a picket line across the North Sea; it was assumed that the German force might be trying to break out of the North Sea into the Arctic Ocean with the goal of reaching the Atlantic trade routes.

The order for Whitworth to leave position did not originate with Admiral Forbes The order came directly from Whitehall and was passed on through the Admiralty; it was a case of governmental interference in a purely naval matter. The departure of Whitworth's destroyers left the approaches to Vestfjord unguarded. On the night of April 8, the ten destroyers of Group 1 carrying two thousand troops slipped into Vestfjord unnoticed.

W Day Zero Hour began with a coordinated naval and air assault on Norway's principal port, population, and industrial centers. For purposes of clarity each attack will be examined separately from north to south.

Narvik Captured

The ten destroyers constituting Group 1 proceeded through Vestfjord and into Ofotfjord without being observed. At 0530 on April 9 this force appeared off Narvik, where the Germans were finally challenged by the Eidsvold and Norge, two coastal defense ships, which were torpedoed and sunk. After this brief engagement the destroyers disembarked their troops along the quays of Narvik harbor. General Eduard Dietl, commanding the Third Mountain Division, went ashore with the first troops, met the local Norwegian commander, and demanded immediate surrender.

Caught by surprise, the Norwegians were in no position to resist; they capitulated without resistance. At 1810 Dietl reported that Narvik was in German hands.

Despite successful occupation of the city, the German position was precarious. Much of the occupying force's equipment, transported by the destroyers, had been lost or jettisoned during the stormy passage north. Accentuating the scarcity of supplies and fuel, of al1 the vessals destined for Narvik to support the invasion, only the Jan Wellem arrived safely.

One of the four ships of the Ausfuhrstaffel was forced to put into Bergen, and the other three were sunk or had to be scuttled to avoid capture. Because of these sinkings Dietl suffered from an almost total lack of equipment and. supplies. The most serious loss was the tanker which was to have assisted the Jan Wellem in refueling the destroyes, whose bunkers were almost empty after the long journey north; now they would be compelled to remain at Narvik until refueled.

While Narvik was being occupied, Renown and Admiral Whitworth's force of nine destroyes encountered Gneisenau and Scharnhost en route to their patrolling position in the upper North Sea. The sighting took place at 0337, and the battle that resulted, fought in heavy seas, caused the two German ships to flee northward after the Gneisenau's main armament control system had been put out of action. Because of the slowness of her escorting destroyes, Renown was unable to keep up with the German battle cruises and by 0630 contact had been lost.

Group 2, which had been crusing off Trondheim on April 8, closed the entrance to Trondheim Fjord at 0300 the next moming. The shore batteries were not caught by surprise, although their fire was only desultory. Despite the alarm, Group 2 was able to pass through the entrance to Trondheim Fjord without sustaining damage. The situation within the harbor at Trondheim was similar to that at Narvik; the troops were disembarked without incident, and there was no resistance w,ithin the city. By nightfall the city was reported secured.

Fog proved beneficial to Group 3, whose task was the seizure of Bergen. Here the shore batteries were most effective. Despite the covering fog, the coastal guns inflicted damage upon the light cruiser Konigsberg and the gunnery training ship Bremse as these ships approached the harbor entrance. Had there been greater visibility, the accuracy of the shore batteries might have been aufficient to turn away the attacking German force. The ships of Group 3 were able to close the coastline, however, and after a brief duel with the Norwegian guns, were able to pass into Bergen harbor, where the troops were disembarked. By 0620 Bergen was in German hands; there had been minimal resistance ashore. German losses were slight, although Konigaberg, which had taken three hits, was rendered unseaworthy.

Group 6 secured Egersund without incident. Group 4 was assigned the double task of taking Kristiansand and Arendal; the latter was captured by a single torpedo boat. Fog proved to be a serious hazard in the assault on Kristiansand. Because of poor visibility the Germans were delayed in entering the fjord. Surprise was lost when at 0600 a Norwegian aircraft sighted the German ships off the entrance to the fjord. The commander of the German ships had to request air support to neutralize the shore batteries. By 1100 the coastal guns had been silenced by several Luftwaffe strikes, and by early afternoon Kristiansand was in German hands.

The key to success of Weserubung lay in the early capture of Oslo. While control of Narvik was important, the German High Command was aware that after the initial landings the northern port could not be supplied by sea, in view of the superiority of the Royal Navy. During the initial phase it had been possible to bring troops and supplies to all of Norway's major ports. Most of the troops and supplies committed to Norway, however, were still in the German Baltic ports.

The first stage of the operation was designed to gain footholds; additional troops and supplies would be required if the Germans hoped to hold what they had taken so easily. Because the German Navy could not possibly protect merchantmen from the Royal Navy, supplying of the new bases along Norway's west coast by sea was out of the question. There was only one altemative -- the protected route between the Baltic ports and Oslo.

From bases in northern Jutland the Luftwaffe maintained complete air superiority over the narrow waters of the Kattagat and Skagerrak; except for submarine penetration, the Royal Navy would not dare enter these waters. The prime reason for Oslo's importance to the High Command was that Norway's capital was the only port on the southem coast which was capable of handling the logistics of an invading army.

Oslo was not to be a bloodless conquest for the Wehrmacht. During the initial stages everything went well for the Germans.

Group 5 encountered little resistance and passed the entrance to Oslo Fjord just after midnight on the night of April 8-9. Group 5 was the strongest of the attacking formations and, possibly because of this, the flotilla proceeded boldly up the fiord toward its destination. The only resistance encountered at the mouth was offered by a Norwegian patrol boat, Pol III, which was torpedoed and sunk. At 0440 Group 5 proceeding in column reached the Drobak Narrows, ten miles south of Oslo.

Fortress

The narrows were protected by a system of defenses dominated by the Oscarsborg Fortress. In addition to the fortress the Narrows were defended by 280 mm. guns located at Drobak and Kaholm, two small towns on the banks above the Narrows; Kaholm also maintained a land torpedo battery. Ignoring several signals from shore, the German column proceeded into the Narrows, whereupon the Norwegian guns opened fire at point blank range. The Blucher, leading the column, was hit several times by gunfire before the heavy cruiser was struck by two torpedoes fired from the Kaholm battery.

Within half an hour the Blucher had capsized (see photo at right) and sunk with heavy loss of life, and the remainder of the German column was forced to withdraw. The Weserubung timetable had been upset: Before the naval column could proceed north, the fortress system had to be taken by ground assault. This delay enabled the Norwegian government to escape north, taking Norway's gold reserves with them; the battle fought at the Narrows had gained the Allies valuable time.

Ultimately Oslo was to fall as the result of a daring airborne assault. Paratroopers, closely followed by Ju 52 transport planes carrying more troops, captured Fornebu Airfield just outside 0810. After meeting only slight resistance at the airfield, the Germans marched into Oslo led by a military band. Whereas a bluff had not worked at the Narrows, this one did; Oslo was in German hands by noon April 9.

The warships, however, held up by the determined resistance of the batteries located at the Narrows, did not arrive in Oslo harbor until 1145 on April 10. Group 5 had been severely mauled, and for one of the warships the ordeal was not over. On April 11, on her return journey to Kiel, the Lutzow was torpedoed and severely damaged by a British submarine. The damage was so extensive it was necessary to tow the pocket battleship back to Germany for repairs, where the Lutzow remained out of commission for the remainder of 1940. The Kriegsmarine had paid dearly for the capture of Oslo.

By early afternoon of April 9, the Wehrmacht had succeeded in establishing control at every point of attack. Despite the several warnings surprise had been almost complete.

It was not only the British and Norwegians who were taken by surprise. The Italians, allied to Germany by the Pact of Steel, had not been privy to Weserubung planning, and were informed of events only after the invasion was in progress. Despite Mussolini's seeming enthusiasm, it was apparent that this was the first he had heard of Weserubung. While Ciano privately expressed sympathy and admiration for the Norwegians, the Duce stated that the disorder in Europe offered Italy opportunities for expansion.

By April 10, the situation in Norway had not been clarified to those active in the British government. Harold Nicolson recorded that the Foreign Office was languishing in the depths of gloom. While the situation was clouded to those in the government, the fleet commanders were fully aware of what had transpired in Norway.

More Weserubung

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