Once it became apparent that the Germans had established themselves in Norway, the Royal Navy acted decisively, if belatedly. Admiral Raeder's principal concern during the planning of We serubung was how German shipping, particularly the warships, could be protected after the British discemed that an invasion was in progress. To protect his ships when they would be most vulnerable to attack inside the Norwegian fjords, Raeder had recommended that the Luftwaffe mine the exits from Scapa Flow. Although mining would not have eliminated the mobility of Royal Navy units, the German Navy would have gained valuable time during the initial stages of Weserubung: time to disembark troops, equipment and supplies and, theoretically, time to leave the fjords before the British counterattacked.

Goring, however, had refused to allocate aircraft for mining operations; he would only permit Luftwaffe units to bomb the naval base at Scapa Flow. Raeder had warned Hitler not to allow the German warships to remain in Norwegian ports after the landings; he felt that the narrow fjords would become death traps, because the ships would have little area to maneuver against inevitable sea and air attack. Raeder had particularly cautioned Hitler not to leave the destroyers at Narvik and Trondheim.

Goring, who exercised considerable influence over the Fuhrer, argued that the warships should remain in the ports to provide gunfire support for the ground troops. Hitler supported his Air Marshal, stating that the ships should remain at least until more supplies and equipment arrived and the ground troops became self-sustaining.

Failure of Supply

To the Navy's disadvantage the failure of the supply arrangements had left the German detachments at Narvik and Trondheim critically short of ammunition, artillery, and transport. Of the leading ships in the Ausfuhrstaffel only Jan Wellem had reached Narvik, and one supply ship, Levante, had arrived safely at Trondheim. The troops' predicament ashore, the shortage of fuel, damage suffered en route, and the tactics of the German High Command all contributed to the warships' remaining in the fjords. There was also the factor of chance which was to play an important role in the worsening German position.

In addition to the diversion offered by Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, Operation Hartmut was designed to screen the invasion fleet from attack by British warships. The effectiveness of this screen was almost completely broken when on April 15, the submarine U49 was sunk by the British destroyer Brazen at the approaches to Andfjord; the wreckage yielded a chart giving the dispositions of all U-boats in the North Sea supporting the Norwegian invasion.

Therefore, with the German battle cruiser force temporarily out of the way far to the north and the U-boat net deciphered, Royal Navy units were able to close the Norwegian coast with only minimum interference.

During the late morning of April 9, Admiral Forbes, still on a southerly bearing with the Home Fleet, detached four cruisers and seven destroyers to attack the German ships at Bergen. At 1130 the Admiralty, overruling Forbes, canceled the attack, fearing the coastal guns would now be in German hands. At noon Forbes redeployed the remainder of his force and sailed northward to rendezvous with the aircraft carrier Furious, intending to mount an air attack against Trondheim. During the afternoon, while on this course, the Home Fleet came under heavy air attack.

For over three hours Forbes' ships were attacked continuously by waves of He 111 and Ju 88 bombers; the battleship Rodney, the cruisers Devonshire, Southhampton, and Glasgow were damaged, and the destroyer Gurkha was sunk west of Stavanger. This display of German air superiority led Forbes to conclude that ships could not be protected by anti-aircraft guns without fighter plane support.

Until the evening of April 9, the damage to the Kriegsmarine had been relatively slight, the loss of Blucher notwithstanding; this situation was about to change. At 1800 twenty-four RAF bombers attacked German shipping in Bergen harbor; there was little damage. Later that night the light cruiser Koln and two torpedo boats put to sea and eventually reached their home base, but the damaged Konigsberg was unable to leave.

On the morning of April 10, fifteen Royal Navy planes, operating from a base in the Orkneys, attacked Bergen harbor again. During the attack Konigsberg was hit three times and sank at her mooring. Stephen Roskill later wrote that this was the first occasion on which a major warship was sunk in wartime by air attack. On the night of April 9, Karlsruhe, attempting to duplicate Koln's successful flight from Bergen, left Kristiansand for Germany. Just as the light cruiser cleared the harbor, she was torpedoed by the British submarine Truant; damage was so severe that it later became necessary for her own escorts to sink her. On the night of the 10th Liitzow, having left Oslo to return to base, was torpedoed by the British submarine Spearfish. Lutzow was severely damaged and had to be towed to Kiel, where she remained out of action for a year.

Two Sea Battles

Two sea battles, fought inside the fjords leading to and around Narvik on April 10 and 13, were to prove disastrous to the Kriegsmarine. At 1600 on April 9, the British 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, under the command of Captain Warburton-Lee, entered Vestfjord. Warburton-Lee had been informed by the Norwegian pilot station at Tranoy that there was a German destroyer force at Narvik. The flotilla leader forwarded this information to Admirals Forbes and Whitworth, notifying them that he intended attacking at dawn at high tide.

Admiral Whitworth considered reinforcing Warburton-Lee, but decided a good opportunity would be lost if an attack were delayed. The Admiralty was communicating with Warburton-Lee directly and approved the flotilla leader's decision. Warburton-Lee's decision was to attack at dawn on April 10. The Germans were caught by surprise and, in the resulting battle, they lost two destroyes while five others were damaged. The British also sunk six merchant ships in the crowded harbor; British losses numbered only two destroyes.

As of April 13, the eight remaining German destroyes were still at Narvik. There is some controvesy as to why the Germans had remained in such an obvious trap; the most valid reason was fuel limitations -- they had no choice.

By morning of April 13, Forbes and the Home Fleet had arrived off the Lofoten Islands. An air attack was mounted against shipping in Narvik harbor by planes from Furious. After observing that the air attack had inflicted no damage, the Admiralty ordered the battleship Waspite, supported by nine destroyes, to enter Vestfjord and attack the shipping in Narvik harbor. Between 1300 and 1500 the eight remaining German destroyes were destroyed. Although the crews were saved, the ten waships lost during the two battles of Narvik represented half the total destroyer strength of the German Navy.

The Germans had suffered their first major defeat of World War II. While the Germans held the town of Narvik the Royal Navy was in complete control of the fjords and harbor. The second battle of Narvik marked the end of the first phase of Weserubung. While the German Army was established ashore, the Royal Navy was in command of the sea along Norway's westem coastline. The Luftwaffe, operating from its newly gained bases, enjoyed complete command of the air. Although German air attacks inflicted considerable damage, they could not prevent the Royal Navy and its allies from exerting continual pressure against German forces in and around Narvik.

British control of the sea was exemplified by the failure of the Germans to supply the Wehrmacht by sea during the opening phase of the campaign. None of the seven ships comprising the Ausfuhrstaffel had reached their scheduled destinations, and, as described previously, only one tanker of the four dispatched to Narvik and Trondheim had reached its goal.

The ensuing supply flotillas fared better. Of the fifteen ships in the first Seetransportstaffel (Sea Transport Echelon), three were lost; the second STS made up of eleven vessels lost two ships; the third STS, composed of ships from earlier waves, lost one. While the following five echelons made the journey to Norway without losses, the Allied submarine menace continued. German antisubmarine measures, particularly during the first weeks of the campaign, proved ineffective.

Menace

After the initial phase of Weserubung the Germans responded to the menace they faced at sea by transporting to the south Norwegian ports all troops in small, fast warships and transports routed from Frederikshaven located on the Jutland Peninsula. Between the middle of April and June, 1940, 42,000 troops were ferried to Norway without loss. From the beginning of the campaign to June 15, 1940, a total of 370 ships and trawlers carried 107,581 officers and men, 16,102 horses, 20,339 vehicles, and 109,400 tons of supplies to Norway at a cost of twenty-one ships.

Since the failure of the Ausfuhrstaffel particularly affected German garrisons in the north, it proved necessary to utilize aircraft and submarines for purposes of transporting supplies. Submarines carried out a total of eight transport missions; while the tonnage carried was insignificant to the need, what supplies were delivered alleviated the Wehrmacht's critical situation in the northern latitudes. The Luftwaffe performed yeoman service: 582 transport aircraft delivered 29,280 men and 2,376 tons of supplies during the course of the campaign.

After the first day of Weserubung the British, if they were to dispute German possession of Norway, were placed in the position of having to dislodge a well- trained, determined enemy. Rather than encounter either the half-hearted resistance or the cooperation from the Norwegians envisaged in Plan R4, the British would now be invaders. After the debacle in Poland, Allied prestige was at a low ebb; something would have to be done for Norway.

The key to control of Norway was bases where a large army could be landed and supported. The Germans had accomplished this in one day. While German control was still tenuous in the north, troops were pouring into Oslo and quickly fanning out over all southem Norway. The German Army had also begun to move north to connect with their enclaves at Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik. Since the Norwegian Army was small and ill-equipped, their ability to resist could not last unless the Allies were able to get help to them quickly. The British War Cabinet hastily decided that the best bases from which to mount an expeditionary force would be Narvik and Trondheim; the plan to accomplish this feat was similar to the original Plan R4.

Trondheim, with its excellent port facilities, was thought to be the best base to support a major campaign; Sola, near Trondheim, offered an airfield which could accommodate several RAF squadrons, which were essential in view of the increasing Luftwaffe superiority. The War Cabinet devised a plan to seize Trondheim: Operation Hammer.

As hastily as it was drawn up, however, it was as quickly canceled. According to Churchill, the plan would have been adopted had it not been for the Chiefs of Staff, who felt that Trondheim's defenses had been improved since the Germans had captured the city.

While certain high-ranking naval personnel still favored a direct assault on Trondheim, the plan was changed drastically. The goal was still Trondheim, but it was decided that the city should be taken by the indirect method, a pincer movement (Operation Sickle). Two forces would be landed, north and south of Trondheim -- at Namsos and Aandalsnes, and they would converge on Norway's ancient capital from the landward side.

Allied landings took place unopposed at Namsos and Aandalsnes on April 14 and 17; they were made by seamen and marines. Later the naval personnel were relieved by regular troops, whose task was to implement the pincer movement. The operation went badly from the beginning. Since the Luftwaffe had complete command of the air, Allied troops were constantly harassed by bombing and strafing; their bases at Namsos and Aandalsnes also underwent constant attack from the air. By April 27, proposals to abandon Operation Sickle were advanced by the local commanders.

The proposals were approved by the Chiefs of Staff, and all Allied forces were evacuated from central Norway between May 2 and 3. While the British had been able to maintain complete command at sea, German air power had contributed mightily to the failure of Operation Sickle.

The key to Allied control of northern Norway was Narvik. After the second battle of Narvik, Admiral Whitworth had signaled the Admiralty on April 13 and 14 that direct occupation of Narvik would be a simple matter. By the time Whitworth's opinion had passed through channels, it was too late to divert the troops, who had been landed on April 14 at Sjovegan located on the north shore of Vaagsfjord, forty miles from Narvik.

While port facilities were completely lacking, a base was established at Harstad, which afforded transports and supply ships little more than an anchorage. The local fleet commander, Lord Cork, had wanted to act upon Whitworth's advice and land at Narvik, but the commander of the expedition, Major General Mackesy, exercising extreme caution, preferred the Harstad base; he proposed advancing on Narvik over land, which was mountainous, intersected by fiords, had few roads, and was covered with deep snow.

A detailed account of the campaign to capture Narvik falls outside the purview of this study. The operation bears a striking similarity to Operation Sickle, since both concepts adopted the indirect approach. Problems encountered, prior to and during these operations, illustrate hasty planning and preparation; this was in antipodal contrast to Weserubung planning. British naval and army personnel entertained diametrically opposed views throughout much of the campaign.

An illustration of a major impasse was that under naval direction, transports and supply ships necessary to support both operations were not tactically loaded; in General Mackesy's view this oversight necessitated establishment of the base at Harstad and precluded a more direct assault against Narvik. The General maintained that, since he did not have the equipment to support an immediate attack, the longer route would have to be taken.

Narvik Captured

After a long and arduous campaign the Allied Expeditionary Force succeeded in capturing Narvik on May 28. In addition to all the difficulties the Allies had encountered, a new and desperate problem had arisen: France, which had been invaded on May 10, was already near collapse. Since Allied troops were required in what was deemed a more important theater, Norway was relegated to the category of a secondary campaign by the Supreme Allied War Council.

Therefore, the British War Cabinet decided to evacuate all troops from Norway even before the final attack on Narvik. Before the Norwegian campaign was abandoned, however, it was decided to take Narvik, destroy the port facilities and disrupt as much of the rail line running to Sweden as time allowed; after this was accomplished all Allied troops would be evacuated. Once Narvik was taken and the vital ore carrying and handling facilities were destroyed, it was estimated that the Germans would be unable to use the port for a year.

This was small compensation for having lost Norway, but the recapture of Narvik was utilized for propaganda purposes by the Allies, who were in desperate need of a victory to bolster fading morale.

Narvik was evacuated in two stages. Between dune 4 and 6, 15,000 troops were embarked and brought back to England on a fleet of transports; on June 7 and 8 the remaining Allied forces, numbering 10,000 men, were evacuated. Except for scattered Norwegian resistance, the departure of the last transport from Harstad on June 8 left Norway completely in German hands. The one bright spot during the evacuation was that all Allied troops were brought back to England without loss.

Operation Juno

Prior to the Allies' quitting of Norway, the German High Command had suspected the British were readying to pull out. To counteract the British departure, OKM had devised Operation Juno. On June 4, a naval task force comprised of Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and Hipper left Kiel accompanied by four destroyers; their objective was to attack the shipping at Harstad.

On the morning of June 8, while proceeding north, the task force encountered and sunk three ships, one of them a transport. On the same aftemoon the German ships met and sunk the British aircraft carrier Glorious and her two escort destroyers, Ardent and Acasta. Before Acasta went down, however, she made a torpedo hit against Scharnhorst and inflicted serious damage; this caused Admiral Wilhelm Marschall, the Juno Fleet Commander, to cancel further operations, whereupon the fleet retired to the protection of Trondheim. Except for submarine action, this was the last naval battle of the campaign. The battle for Norway was over.

More Weserubung

German Attack
British Counterattack
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German Naval Losses