Guadacanal: Part 1 Japanese Navy

The reader may be wondering why this particular piece of hell was selected to do battle. The choice was in fact made by the Japanese. Designed as part of the abortive attempt to mount a seaborne invasion of Port Moresby, New Guinea, a force consisting of two destroyers, a transport, two minelayers and four minesweepers landed elements of the Sasebo 6th Special Naval Landing Force and the 11th Naval Construction Battalion at Tulagi Island on 4 May, 1942.

The original intention of this force was to establish a seaplane base for elements of the Yokahama Air Group to operate from as long range search, augmenting units stationed in the Shorlands and at Rabaul. The invasion of Port Moresby was precluded by Japanes losses suffered during the Coral Sea battle. These losses plus the subsequent disaster at Midway were to have decided effects on Japanese plans for southern expansion, but let us first regress to April of 1942.

Japanese prewar plans outlined a six month program to conquer the needed resources of South-East Asia, but within three months all of their objectives had been attained. Flushed with victory, the Naval High Command began making plans for the next series of offensives, which were to include the capture of New Guinea, Midway, New Caledonia and the New Hebridies, and the Fiji Islands.

All four operations required the support of carrier-based aircraft which, after the first two operations, had suffered serious setbacks. Devoid of carrier air support, the task of fulfilling the operational requirements fell on the land-based Naval Air Arm, the 11th Air Fleet, This responsibility required the construction of airfields somewhere in the southern Solomon Islands, so in late June, survey teams from Tulagi began searching for a suitable spot to construct an airfield, and this was soon found on the northeast point of Guadalcanal.

Construction of the field began soon thereafter by elements of the 11th NCB with help of the 81st garrison battalion which had replaced the Special Naval Landing Force, The scheduled date of completion of the 60-plane-capacity airdrome at Lunga Point was 7 August, 1942.

US Counterplans

All of this activity did not go unnoticed by the Allied High Command In fact, as early as 18 February, 1942, Admiral King, C-inC, United States Fleet, had presented to General Marshall an outline of his intended plans for the conduct of the Pacific Campaign. This included the securing of the lifelines to Australia and the possible utilization of the Solomons as the springboard of the Allied offensive against Japan.

The first portion of King's plan was in fact already being implemented, by the establishment of a series of island bases stretching some 10,000 miles, connecting Hawaii to Australia. The second portion of the plan was held in abeyance for seven months, due primarily to the 'beat Germany first' policy agreed to by Roosevelt and Churchill during their Newfoundland Conference.

Following the carrier battles of Coral Sea and Midway, the balance of power had shifted sufficiently to persuade JCS to consider some sort of limited offensive action in the Pacific, although not all of the members were so convinced. General George C. Marshall and A.A.F. chief General H.H. Arnold continued to adhere to the original concept that the Far East military strategy should be defensive. Admiral King and General MacArthur disagreed violently with this, although each for different reasons.

King desired a limited offensive in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area, supported by long-range air units from the airbase being built at St. James Bay on the island of Espiritu Santo. This, along with an alternate plan for a Makin style raid on Tulagi were rejected by JCS on 28 May. The Midway victory inspired MacArthur to suggest an even more ambitious plan. His proposed operation required two carrier task forces, twelve transports, and a division of troops trained in amphibious operations. With these he was to make a direct assault on Rabaul!

The obvious implications of relinquishing command of half the Pacific Fleet carriers plus the only trained Marine Corps forces to Army control for such a hazardous operation certainly did not sit well with Admiral King. As an alternative, King reproposed the assault on Guadalcanal along with operations on Santa Cruz Island, and a feint by General MacArthur into the Dutch East Indies.

By 30 June King had passed on to Nimitz the responsibility of accomplishing the initial task of Operation Watchtower, the task of seizing Guadalcanal. Tasks II and III of Watchtower, the occupation of the Northern Solomons and the reduction of Rabaul, were assigned to MacArthur.

The Japanese construction of the airfield on Guadalcanal was discovered on 5 July. This news giving the needed impetus to have the plan approved, with the exception of the East Indies operation which was deemed too ambitious.

Nimitz in turn passed on the monumental task to Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, who had been appointed commander of the South Pacific Area. Ghormley was none too pleased with either the task nor the scant forces available to accomplish it, but King had made it imperitive that the operation, the Navy's first real offensive one, be put underway immediately. Ghormley was given five weeks to make ready for a target D-Day of 1 August 1942.

Preparations

The logistical and central problems associated with the task were horrendous. The 1st Marine Division, commanded by General A.A. Vandergrift, was to lead the assault, but of the three regiments, the 7th was garrisoning Samoa while the 1st was enroute to New Zealand to join the 5th which had arrived at Wellington on 14 June.

All of his troops needed training and Vandergrift bluntly informed Ghormley that he felt they would not be ready until early 1943, but it was all in vain, for the operation had to go on. Two concessions were made to help ease the situation provided for the release of the 2nd Regiment of the 2nd Marine Division to replace the 7th Marines, and the delay of D-Day by one week to 7 August 1942.

The advanced base for the operation and Ghormley's headquarters were located at Neumea in New Caledonia. A quiet provincial capital prior to the war, the port and its facilities were ill prepared for the huge demands made upon them. Berthing facilities at the Grand Quay would allow only three ships to be unloaded at a time, which caused a huge bottle-neck.

This bottle-neck was never completely eliminated even after the facilities were expanded. During November alone, there were 37 ships waiting to be unloaded and 52 ships due in, but fewer than 45 ships were worked. In fact, it took better than 100 days for a merchant-man to make one round trip! In New Zeaiand, even further away, the situation was little better. The equipment and supplies being stockpiled and prepared for the invasion had unloaded and sorted in conditions so abysmal that the stevedores refused to work. Police cleared the dock workers from the wharves and marines worked shifts round the clock to load and unload their own supplies.

Amid all of these difficulties, Vandergrift and the amphibious force commander, Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, were preparing for the first wartime U.S. amphibious landing since 1898!

Postponement Denied

As time grew short, Ghormley and MacArthur pleaded for a further postponement, which King refused to grant. This was unfortunate and even the Admiral himself later admitted that the urgency of seizing and occupying the island had caused planning and preparations to be less than the desired standard. Quite an understatement of the situation when one considered the chaotic conditions existing. Maps were drawn using 19th century German surveys and the National Geographic as sources. Special aerial photographic maps were made, then promptly mislaid in a New Zealand warehouse.

Intelligence estimates of the Japanese forces occupying Guadalcanal were handled no better.

Martin Clemens, probably the best known coastwatcher, had reported from Guadalcanal a most accurate and detailed accounting of the forces and fortifications on the island, but these reports never made it to the people who really needed them.

After Midway, the Japanese had changed their naval codes causing this all important source of intelligence to dry up. The end result was a two-fold overestimation of Japanese strength as well as a collection of hopelessly inaccurate maps.

Theatre demands for the impending invasion of North Africa severly limited the availability of combat loaders (transports and cargo vessals capable of landing troops) and landing craft. There were only 14 transports and 5 cargo ships on hand with little likelyhood of any additional ships becoming free.

Throughout the month of July, plans were worked up at a frantic pace. The final product that emerged outlined a two-pronged thrust.

The 1st and 5th Marines were to land at Red Beach, some 200 meters east of the Tenaru River, and from there advance west to occupy the airstrip and Lunga Point. In the meantime, two battalions of the 2nd Marines plus a battalion of the 5th Marines, the raider battalion and the parachute battalion were given the task of occupying Tulagi, Florida, and the Gavutu-Tanambogo island pair.

The exact details of the landings were the brainchild of R. Admiral Turner. His capacity for minute details was equal to his ability to comprehend the broad view of a situation. He and his small staff worked day and night to plan every phase of the landings down to the specific employment of every launching craft and the exact amount and duration of naval gunfire support. Turner often said that he "hated above all things to see soldiers swimming".

The chain of command for the operation extended from Admiral Ghormley as ComSoPac to Admiral Fletcher on the Saratoga, who was the officer in tactical command. Turner's amphibious forces were autonomous from Fletcher although Vandergrift was subordinate to Turner, even after the landings had been completed. The amphibious covering force was commanded by RAdm V.A.C. Crutchley, R. N. who was second in command to Adm Turner.

Two separate air forces existed, South Pacific under RAdm John S. McCain who had responsibility from Guadalcanal east; and South West Pacific who answered to General MacArthur and covered the area west of Guadalcanal, including Rabaul.

Plans had included the neutralization of Rabaul by MacArthur's Australian based planes staging through Port Moresby. On 21 July the Japanese threw a monkey wrench into the works by landing at Buna on the north coast of Papua. MacArthur, who had a month before wanted to directly assault Rabaul, was faced with a hard and difficult defensive campaign which required virtually all of his resources to keep the Japanese from taking Port Moresby.

More Guadacanal

Guadacanal: Part 1: Japanese Navy

Guadacanal: US Preparation
Guadacanal: US Supply-Line Forces 1942
Guadacanal: US Pacific Fleet
Guadacanal: US Air Units Order of Appearance