The impromptu attack on Singling, 6 December 1944, by Company B of the 37th Tank Battalion and Company B of the 51st Armored Infantry Battalion represented the farthest advance
northeast of the 4th Armored Division in its slow, difficult drive
toward the German border which began 10 November from assembly areas just east of Nancy.
Jumbo Map 2 (extremely slow: 353K)
From the military standpoint, Singling is important not as a town but as a terrain feature. An agricultural village of some 50 squat stone houses, it is strung along about half a mile of the highway from Achen (near the Sarre River) east to Bitche and the German border. Around the simple square church, the brown stone schoolhouse the market square, cluster the houses whose concreted walls are painted white, red, yellow, blue, pink, and roofed with red tile. As in most Lorraine villages, the stables are on the main street and the manure piled in the front yards.
But the picturesque insignificance of Singling conceals a military reality. Some of these farm houses have 3-foot reinforced concrete walls; the garden walls are high and thick; concrete pillboxes stand guard at the entrances to town east and west, on the hills and in the valley north, and on the ridge south. For Singling is in the Maginot Line, and its position along a southwest-northeast ridge is tactically important. In the Maginot fortification scheme, oriented north and east, Singling was a focal point in the secondary system of forts. For the Germans defending south and west, it was admirably placed as a fortified outpost for the defense against attack from the southwest toward the cities of Rohrbach, an important rail and road center and military barracks area, and Bining, which controls the approaches to Rohrbach from the south.
Rohrbach and Bining, both located in the valleys dominated on three sides by high ground, are themselves tactical liabilities. But control of the cities through occupation of the ridge to the north was especially important at this time both to XIII Corps, which ordered the attack, and to Seventh Army (XV Corps), which was on the 4th Armored Division right flank The principal objective of the XII Corps was Sarreguemines, an important city on the Sarre River and the German border. Through Rohrbach pass a railroad and one of the main highways east out of Sarreguernines to Germany. The 4th Armored Division was to seize this escape route while the 35th Infantry Division attacked Sarreguernines. Rohrbach had an additional importance as an objective at the time, because it was a focus for roads north out of the large forest area (including the Forfit-de-Lemberg and Forfit-de-Montbronn) then under attack by XV Corps units.
But Rohrbach as an objective could not be separated from Singling (Map No. 2, and Map No. 3). The main road into Rohrbach from the south follows high ground, but passes by a series of small knobs which makes it unusable for attack. The alternative is the ridge west of the Vall6e d'Altkirch. The east slopes of this ridge are, of course, enfiladed by the same hills that control the Rohrbach road.
The west side, on the other hand, comes under direct frontal fire from Singling, which, by reason of a few feet additional elevation, and its position on the curving nose of the ridge, commands this approach route for three or four kilometers to the south. Neither route, therefore, was satisfactory, since tanks on both would come under enemy observation before they were within range to attack, but the west side of the ridge with comparative freedom from flanking fire seemed to offer the best hope for success. To use it for attacking Bining, however, it was first necessary either to take or to neutralize Singling. The ridge configuration and the impassability of flooded terrain in the Vallee d'Altkirch compelled the attacking force to come up east of Singling and then make a ninety-degree turn southeast on the high ground into Bining. Assault of Singling was rendered difficult not only by the canalized approach but also by the fact that the heights it occupies are themselves dominated by a ridge 1,200 yards to the north which is in the main defenses of the Maginot Line.
Just how difficult the task was had been discovered on 5 December by the 37th Tank Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Creighton W. Abrams, when it attacked from Schmittviller under orders to advance as far as possible, with Rimling as a limiting objective. In fact, the attack carried only to within 1,000 yards of Singling and was there stopped by difficult terrain and by heavy artillery and direct fire from Singling and beyond. Fourteen medium tanks were lost to mud and enemy guns. Five were hit almost simultaneously on topping a ridge south of town; others bogged in the sticky ground and were destroyed by artillery or temporally disabled. The battalion, reduced in effective strength to two medium companies and unable to advance, reassembled northwest of Hill 349.
That night (5/6 December), Combat Command A Headquarters received from Division the plan of attack for the next day. Combat Command B was to advance from Schmittviller to take Singling and the high ground to the east. Task Force Abrams (of Combat Command A), whose principal combat elements were the 37th Tank Battalion, 51st Armored Infantry Battalion, 94th Field Artillery Battalion (105 mm. howitzers), and Company B of the 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion (less one platoon), was to attack Bining and Rohrbach and reconnoiter the high ground to the north. Task Force Oden (of Combat Command A) meanwhile would push on from the Eichl River bridgehead at Domfessel to take Dehlingen and Rahling, and be in a position to support Abrams (Map No. 2).
Colonel Abrams recommended to Combat Command A that he be allowed to attack Singling first. Combat Command B was still in the vicinity of Voellerdingen and Schmittviller, and, though they could march as far as Abrams' assembly area without opposition, he knew that they would be unable to come up in time to jump off abreast with Combat Command A in the attack. This would mean that Abrams would have to turn his flank to Singling in attacking east. If that turning had to be made, he asked Combat Command A for the support of at least six battalions of artillery. (In fact, when he attacked the next morning, all artillery battalions except the 94th were, unknown to him, on the road.) Abrams sent his recommendations as to objectives and artillery support to Combat Command A by liaison officer, along with a plan for attack on Bining if his preferred plan was not accepted.
But Colonel Abrams heard nothing further from Combat Command A, and assumed that they desired the original scheme of attack carried out, as ordered.
This called for advance north to the high ground south of Singling, then cast to the trail fork and along the axis of the main road into Bining (shown on Map No. 3). Like-lettered infantry and tank companies were to be paired off, the two platoons of tank destroyers to be used for direct fire support. The turning movement south of Singling, compelled by the terrain, was to be covered not only by the artillery fire but by the assault guns and mortars of the 37th Tank Battalion, firing smoke and HE into the town and adjacent high ground from positions near Hill 356 (southwest of Singling). In the detailed plan, the assault team composed of the B Companies of the 37th Tank Battalion and of the 51st Armored Infantry Battalion was selected to make the sweep into the town of Bining.
Capt. James H. Leach and 1st Lt. Daniel M. Belden, the respective company commanders, therefore met with their platoon leaders to study a town plan of Bining and map out detailed routes and dispositions for their troops. No one paid any attention to Singling, which they were to bypass under cover of the supporting fires.
Both tank and infantry battalions were far below strength; the 37th had only the equivalent of two medium tank companies; the 51st had about 180 combat effectives. Team B had 14 tanks, of which one was a Headquarters 105 assault gun attached', and 57 infantrymen.
More France: 4th Armored Division at Singling Part I
France: 4th Armored Division at Singling Part II
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